According to the article "New Report Links U.S. Trade Deficit To Exclusionary Practices of Japanese", a recent report issued by the Congressional Office for Technology Assessments states that " Japanese Multinational companies effectively control U.S.-Japan trade since as much as 66% of such trade is among Japanese concerns and their affiliates." It also goes on to state that "Japanese affiliates in the U.S. have consistently run far larger trade deficits than affiliates of European companies. In 1992 for instance, U.S.-based affiliates imported $37.4 billion more in goods than they exported. German and British affiliates had smaller deficits of $9.6 billion and $4.1 billion, respectively, that year." The report also goes on to state a very controversial recommendation called "conditional national treatment" which, effectively means that those multinational companies that come from nations that did not discriminate against U.S. companies, would be treated more favorably than those that come from nations that maintain "Formal or Informal market barriers" to U.S. exports. Based on the information supplied by the report, the author has misinterpreted the information as being proof of Japan's unfair trading policy. While it's true that Japan does have restrictive import laws, the report says nothing about that issue. Instead, it states the high level of imports of purchased by U.S. resident Japanese firms in comparison to U.S. resident European firms. This information more illustrates the difference in European and Japanese business strategy than a difference in trade attitudes. The major ingredient of Japan's past financial success was the use of developing nations as areas where parts were manufactured by affiliated subcontractors. While at the same time in nations such as the U.S., where there is a strong market for the finished product, the majority of production deals with assembly and transport. This isn't an example of unfair trade, but good business savvy. By using third world nations as a base for subcontracted low level manufacturing, Japan gets the added perks of prices being substantially lower than what they would have been if bought from within the nation where assembly takes place. Plus, in the third world subcontractors are more likely to have contracts that are more favorable towards the buyer, often meaning that if sales of the finished products are lower than expected, Japanese companies aren't obligated to buy the excess parts inventory. Thus the subcontractor eats the loss, reducing the amount of loss in revenue that most companies would be subject to. Another plus of this strategy is, usually in the nation where the final sale takes place, there is a preexistence of the technology that is needed to assemble. This makes investment costs lower than building the plant in a third world nation where the technology does not exist. Plus, there is a major reduction in shipping costs by shipping a large number of small parts that are tightly packed to be assembled in the nation where the final goods are to be sold. In comparison to the additional cost of the shipment of a bulky finished goods across seas. I believe that If more U.S. companies adopted this strategy instead of crying about its unfairness, there would be a definite upturn in aggregate productivity. Though luckily, it seems that there has been a recent trend towards U.S. investment in low level production within the developing world, especially in the pacific rim. Which goes to show that some U.S. companies have not been oblivious to the advantages of this style of business. I would think that even though pacific rim stocks have had high yield in the past and will have in the near future, they are one of the most vulnerable to any economic slow down due to their developing Japan style relationships with U.S. business, where they would be the first to feel the sting of reduced sales. While, I believe that those U.S. companies who use third world nations as subcontractors will be the most financially stable during an economic slow down, due to the low level of probability of an inventory glut.