                                                 [gaines.txt 08/04/92]

Gaines Report
                  Director's PW/MIA Task Force Report

                  Director's PW/MIA Task Force Report

                                 INDEX

1. Introduction.
2. Findings.
3. Related Issues and Recommendations.
        a. Issue 1 -- The DIA Strategy
        b. Issue 2 -- Mindset to Debunk
        c. Issue 3 -- Lack of Management
        d. Issue 4 -- Condition of Case Files
        e. Issue 5 -- Direct Exposure of PW Division Analysts to Outside
           Agencies and Individuals.
        f. Issue 6 -- Blurring of Analysis. Collection and Investigation
        g. Issue 7 -- Collection Management.
        h. Issue 8 -- Internal Organization of PW Division
        i. Issue 9 -- Realignment of PW Division in DIA
        j. Issue 10 - Resolution of Case Files
        k. Issue 11 - Reorientation of JCRC
        l. Issue 12 - International Assistance
        m. Issue 13 - Garwood
        n. Issue 14 - Vietnamese Disinformation Campaign
        o. Issue 15 - Interagency Committee on Vietnam PW/MIA
        p. Issue 16 - Standardized Polygraph Procedures
        q. Issue 17 - ADP Deficiencies <-------MISSING

1. (U) INTRODUCTION:

a. (U) Pursuant to verbal instructions from the Director on 20 February
1986, the subject Task Force was formed and began active session as a
group on 24 February 1986. Members of the Task Force were as follows:
Kimball M. Gaines, Colonel, USAF, JSO; Franklin D. Mastro, Colonel, USA,
ATSA; Joseph A. Schlatter, LtCol, USA, DB-2; William T. Mayall, Major,
USAF, OCJCS; and Ms. Clara Harris, RS1-3A.

b. (U) Task Force Charter was to conduct a hardnosed objective
examination of PW/MIA substantive issues and procedures and to report
findings and recommendations to the Director within 30 working days. In
addition to discussions with supervisory and working level personnel
within the PW Division, the Task Force held discussions at CIA (Annex
D), the Intelligence Community Staff (Annex E), and with the National
Security Agency Representative to DoD. Additionally, all active
first-hand-live-sighting case files were reviewed by the Task Force as
well as a representative number of previously closed cases. The results
of prior IG reports, Congressional Investigations and in-house reviews
concerning the PW Division were also studied. Additional perspective on
how the PW Division conducted its business was gained by discussions
with RADM Thomas A. Brooks, USN, previous Assistant Deputy Director for
Collection Management, and for a short time responsible for the PW
Division until it moved to VO.

2. (S/NF) FINDINGS:

a. (U) The Task Force review revealed serious shortcomings in every
important area: attitudes, management procedure, organization, and
leadership. paragraph 3 of this report is devoted to a detailed
discussion of the 17 major issues which derived from these findings and
which contain the recommended solutions which will turn the PW Division
into an effective, disciplined and productive organization.

b. (U) Findings are as follows:
        (1) Unhealthy attitudes.
        (2) Almost total lack of management - hard working but not
        working smart.
        (3) Haphazard approach to problems and functions.
        (4) Too much direct exposure to working level analysts.
        (5) Inadequate planning, internal communication, and written
        guidance.
        (6) Data base is a wasteland.
        (7) Working files unprofessional, sloppy, incomplete, no
        standard procedures.
        (8) No disciplined, coherent, collection management effort.
        (9) Too much detective work, not enough analysis.
        (10) Not nearly enough admin and intelligence technician
        support.
        (11) Significant ADP deficiencies.

c. (S/NF) Amplification of the findings:

(1) (U) Unhealthy attitudes are evident in the deeply defensive mindset
which promotes a rigid inflexibility toward criticism and an adversarial
approach to those with strong dissenting views. There also tends to be a
strong moralistic bias at work which manifests as a preoccupation with
everybody's motives and unrealistic expectations with regard to source
accuracy. This could also be termed the "Minset to debunk."
Additionally, an attitude of resignation toward outside events seems
prevalent at all levels and contributes to a noticeable lack of
persistence in problem-solving and iniative generation. Management, by
and large, is preoccupied with minutia and preservation of the status
quo and forward thinking is a rarity.

(2) (U) The almost total lack of management has resulted in a condition
where all functions are carried out in a haphazard fashion. Generally,
most of the major ills of the PW Division can be traced to this source.
In fact, managers themselves freely acknowledge that they haven't
managed, but quickly rationalize it away by invoking uncontrollable
circumstance or other arguments of convenience. It is clear to the Task
Force, however, that the effects of this abdication of responsibility
have been devastating to the organization and special treatment is given
this subject in Paragraph 3.

(3) (U) Lack of written guidance in all functional areas has contributed
to individualistic work standards and procedures as well as general
confusion and unprofessionalism.  It should be noted that the IG report
of 26 February 1985 also recommended that SOPs be written, and that all
procedures in the Division be formalized; however, this obviously was
never done. Two good examples of how this laxity came home to roost are
(1) the present sloppy and incomplete condition of the so-called case
files, and the (2) the situation wherein for lack of written procedures,
the five Mail/Text profiles created in the SAFE system for PW Division
were not accessible to the PW Div SAFE operator. Incredibly, division
management hadn't even noticed and the problem would still exist were it
not for the ADP member of the Task Force.

(4) (C) No disciplined, coherent, collection management was being
performed and, in fact, the PW Division does not appear to function in
the mainstream of the DIA collection system. This ad hoc approach, so
characteristic of Division operations in general, is seriously
detrimental to analytical efforts upon which the entire PW/MIA edifice
rests.

(5) (C) The data base is a wasteland, neither structured nor maintained
to support analysts adequately in all areas. Automated file structure is
sorely out-of-date and no management action has been taken to obtain
assistance with this problem. One intelligence technician is responsible
for data base maintenance but she is encumbered with an outmoded file
system, overwhelmed by the volume of material, and has not been provided
assistance from readily-available DIA customer service elements. The
data base structure, maintenance, design, and upgrade have received
little management attention. The data base, of course, is the central
foundation for the entire DIA PW effort and why a recognized problem of
such importance (and management admits to the "recognition") had gone
unresolved simple boggles the mind. The Task Force solution to enforce
attention to the problem is reflected in the Paragraph 3 issue on
reorganization wherein data base is raised to the level of a Branch. The
overall condition of the data base is one of the main reasons the Task
Force does not have complete confidence in the conclusions resulting
from the PW Division analytic process.

(6) (U) The existence of shoddy case-files is not new and others have
pointed this out, the latest official mention being a flag-rank memo to
VO as late as September 1985. There has been a sporadic effort to throw
people at the problem, such as Reservists and as late as the first part
of March, two )-6s and two GS-15s, from elsewhere in VO; however the
solution does not lend itself to the ad hoc method of doing business
which is so characteristic of PD Division. Detailed treatment of the
case-file problem is contained in paragraph 3.

(7) (S/NF) Outside the mainstream is the only way to describe the
collection effort and one telling proof of the pudding is the fact that
it took outsiders, IC Staff members and Col Childress of the NSC staff,
to include PW/MIA EEI in the National HUMINT Collection Plan, Indo
China, and to raise the priority of collection from five to three in
the National Intelligence Topics (NITS). None of this initiative
originated from the PW/MIA Division.

(8) (U) By their own admission, there is not enough "analysis" being
done by the analysts. There is somehow never enough time for it because
of "other priorities" although they think it would be a really good
thing to do if they could. In fact, the Chief of the Analysis Branch
feels that there is probably enough information on hand already to allow
a definitive judgment on the live-POW issue in North Vietnam, but they
just can't get around to doing it. When a case is being worked, however,
it is plainly evident that the emphasis is on the investigative side of
the question in most cases, where the focus rests on debunking the
source more than it does on the analysis of the information itself. It
should be noted with trepidation that there are some 600 heresay reports
of live sightings backlogged in the Division which have not had any
evaluation. And there is no actual proof that this class of report has
any less potential for yielding some usable information than do first-
hand sighting reports. The implications of this are obvious to the
casual observer, but do not seem to be appreciated by the experts.

(9) (U) The Task Force also felt strongly about the personnel shortages,
organizational deficiencies and ADP deficiencies and has devoted
considerable attention in paragraph 3 to the solution of these problems.

(10) (U)  The ultimate bottom line to this entire review is the absence
of leadership. Every condition uncovered and detailed in this report
attests to that fact. The Division is not an organized effort and it is
certainly not a model that deserves emulation, the reports by the House
Task Force and the DB March 1985 Examination not withstanding. It is the
judgment of the Task Force that in its present condition, the PW/MIA
Division cannot provide the Director, DIA with the proper level and
quality of support. Furthermore, given the existing discrepancies in the
functional areas, the Task Force has no confidence that the current
analytical process has adequately addressed all relevant factors and has
dawn totally reliable conclusions.

3. (U) Related Issue and Recommendations:

a. (U) From the major handicaps identified in the previous section, the
Task Force distilled a family of related major issues and
recommendations. What follows represents both an aggregation of problems
into solvable entities and a formulation of new initiatives which will
improve the way DIA deals with the POW problem. These issues are indexed
below, followed by the respective detailed discussions on succeeding
pages:

               (1) The DIA Strategy.
               (2) Mindset to Debunk.
               (3) Lack of Management.
               (4) Condition of Case Files.
               (5) Direct Exposure of PW Division Analysts to Outside
                   Agencies and Individuals.
               (6) Blurring of Analysis, Collection and Investigation
               (7) Collection Management.
               (8) Internal Organization of PW Division.
               (9) Realignment of PW Division in DIA
               (10) Resolution of Case Files
               (11) Reorientation of JCRC
               (12) International Assistance
               (13) Garwood

                      ISSUE #1 -- The DIA STRATEGY

DISCUSSION:
(U) The present Administration has made the PW/MIA issue a top national
priority, has taken a strong public stand, and has developed a ten-point
strategy to  guide the U.S. approach to resolution of this question.
Since the Defense Intelligence Agency is a major, and now visible, actor
in this effort, it is only proper that DIA adopt a strategy of its won
with respect to the contribution it makes. With the overall objective
of taking DIA out of the reactive mode and putting it on the offensive,
the following three-point strategy is proposed:

A. Present Facts Fairly and Objectively to Public, Media, Congress.
        - White Paper
        - Regular Press Summaries
        - Cultivation of "friendly" journalists
        - Work with League of Families
        - Respond, on a selective basis, to information disseminated in
          the public fora.
B. Actively Involve the Entire National Intelligence Apparatus:
        - Make Interagency Intelligence Action Group work.
        - Increase DCID 1/2 priority from three to two.
        - Involve other U.S. agencies in the investigative effort.
C. Improve the DIA PW/MIA Effort by Implementing the Recommendations of
   this Task Force, the most critical of which are:
        - Revamp the PW/MIA Division: Leadership, MAnagement,
          Organization
        - Make the pW/MIA Division a Special Staff Section under the
          Director, DIA.

                     ISSUE #2 -- MINDSET TO DEBUNK

DISCUSSION:

There exists a mindset to debunk. The perception is one held by external
elements, and has worked against DIA's interests. Within the PW/MIA
Division, it has evolved over time as an investigative technique,
whereby intense effort is initially focused on the veracity of sources
with a view toward discrediting them. This penchant has overridden the
seeking of the corroborative data necessary to support the "sighting."
Reinforcing the mindset is the investigative audit trail which has
confirmed an inordinate number of originally promising sources to be
fabricators. Thus time and money have been saved in those investigations
skewed toward debunking. Unfortunately, the mindset now permeates the
Division in other than investigative matters, and it appeared during the
review period that just about any new idea on the PW/MIA issue is met
with a negative response. Even more unfortunate is the fact that the
analysts involved are not even consciously aware of their negative
approach. This is not a newly developed attitude, as review established
that ADM Tuttle, a former supervisor, had noted it during his tenure
through 1981, but was not able to reverse it before reassignment. It
appears to be a matter better handled by positive leadership within the
Division, rather than external sources. In the main, sources who
volunteer information have no ulterior motive, especially those already
relocated to the US. Sources were very young when they observed the
event; others were in dire straits as a result of the war; and, in many
cases, the "sighting" was a fleeting one. Therefore, sources should not
be badgered when they come forward to volunteer information they do not
recall well, in view of the long time interval involved; otherwise word
gets around the refugee community and information dries up. The Task
Force review was not able to confirm that the outcome of any
particular case has so far been effected by negative mindset. HOwever,
it should be noted that the existence of this sort of bias not only
detracts from the DIA image, it also can reduce the objectivity of
analysis.

RECOMMENDATION: Can best be controlled, neutralized and eliminated by
recognition and close attention of the Division Chief.

                      ISSUE#3 - LACK OF MANAGEMENT

DISCUSSION:

(C) The TAsk Force addressed this issue from the standpoint of the five
traditional pillars of management, -- namely plan, organize, direct,
control, and coordinate. Each element is flawed with one of the
contributing factors being that managers of the organization, by their
own admission and confirmed by the Task Force review, do not manage.
They function instead as ad hoc action officers. Not surprisingly,
planning is almost non-existent. Missing is the realization that
everything pertaining to PW/MIA's must originate within the Division.
Some Division personnel know that the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan:
Intelligence Priorities for Strategic Planning; National Intelligence
Collection Plans; Defense Wide Intelligence Plan, etc. exist but they do
not see them as tools to be employed in resolving the problem. There is
no appreciation for a two-year time frame of resolution, as specified by
the SRV.

(C) The POW Division is short of personnel and needs to be augmented as
described elsewhere in this report. All aspects of ADP are deficient, to
include training of technicians. Similarly, analysts have not been given
the requisite six week DIA Training Program; hence were handicapped.

(C) Direction is by exception. Everyone does his individual effort,
according to self-imposed priorities and procedures. (One GS-12, judged
to be ineffective by his fellow workers, simply kept his own schedule
and was available only intermittently.) There are no enumerated goals or
objectives (SOPs, mission statements) upon which any direction is based.
Functions are carried out on an ad hoc basis.

(C) Control emanates from VO to the staff section and then blurs. Within
the element there is little formal control -- from receipt of tasking
through the execution phase. Operations are totally decentralized to
include formal presentations to members of Congress. During this review,
one GS-14 was humiliated by a Congressman, who terminated the session by
throwing the former's papers on the floor and verbally admonishing him.
There was no one present to back up  the staff officer. Supervisors,
acting as analysts, are not controlling actions.

(C) Coordination is informal and ad hoc like the rest of the effort.
Memorandums for Record are not kept on significant actions being handled
via telephone. Even collection coordination is informal, with the
exception of messages to the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC).
Emphasis on humanitarian considerations, at the expense of intelligence
collection remains a deficiency as cited by the DIA (XX) in 1983. There
is insufficient coordination with OSD/ISA.

(C) As a general comment, most of the discrepancies in the POW Division
can be traced to this lack-of-management as well as a strongly
entrenched attitude that they can do no wrong, even in the face of
evidence to the contrary. This attitude has also been abetted by the
Congressional review of May 1983 through June 1984 and the DO review of
March 1985, both of which essentially whitewashed the whole operation.
Good initiatives originating   (NOTE: the sentence stops there)

                   ISSUE #4 CONDITION OF VO-PW FILES

DISCUSSION:

(U) Members of the TAsk Force reviewed 63 VO-PW case files. It is the
finding of the TAsk Force that the case files, in general, are not
complete and, in some cases, not well maintained. Specifically:

        - There is no log of incoming reports.
        - A report containing information on several different cases is
          not necessarily reproduced and placed in the various relevant
          case files.
        - Some cases have not been resolved based on analytical judgments
          of information not contained in the case file. When queried
          about resolution on some of these files, the analysts could
          provide sound reasoning for closing the file but there was no
          documentation in the file to support that reasoning.
        - Polygraph records are not in the case files. Whiles files on
          polygraphed sources do state whether or not deception was
          indicated, details of the polygraph exam are not filed.
        - There is not in every case file a resume of the case to date
          which states the present status of the case and supports this
          outcome with a clear and lucid exposition of the train of logic
          and evidence involved in reaching that conclusion.
        - There are numerous cases of loose papers, and undated
          scribbled analyst notes present.
        - Generally, the same case file discrepancies exists today as
          were pointed out in the Brooks memo to VO, dated 25 September
          1985 (Annex B).
        - There is no centralized suspense system to insure tracking of
          requests for reinterview, polygraph requests, attempts to locate
          refugees, and attempts to locate related information. (For
          example: there are numerous cases in which follow-up action
          was not completed for several months or a few years. Some of
          this delay is attributable to lack of a centralized system
          whereby managers and analysts can track follow-up actions.)

RECOMMENDATION:

(1) VO-PW should produce immediately a file SOP that establishes
explicit instructions for the content and maintenance of case files.

(2) Files must contain complete, detailed, and FORMALLY-RECORDED data on
EVERY aspect of the respective case. Data must include both substantive
and procedural information to establish a complete and unbroken audit
(NOTE: the sentence stops there)

ISSUE #6 -- BLURRING OF ANALYSIS, COLLECTION INVESTIGATION

(U) DISCUSSION:

The Task Force appreciates the need for overlap in various portions of
the intelligence cycle. However, review revealed a blurring of analysis
collection and investigation at the expense of the analysis.

Operating predominately on an ad hoc basis, the Division opens,
investigates, analyzes, and closes cases, thus validating its own
efforts. Organization structure cannot, nor was ever, intended to
support all these functions so each is denigrated. Analysis, the most
critically needed function, had the greatest shortfall. Despite
investigative effort, cases remain backlogged just as they were when the
DIA IG conducted his 1983 inspection of VO-PW. The push is on "first-
hand live sightings" but a backlog of approximately 600 hearsay live
sighting reports has accumulated which is not justifiable in view of the
high priority assigned to this effort. Over 784 manhours overtime in
1985 failed to reduce this backlog.

In his 12 March 1986 testimony to Congress, the Director stated: "No
budgetary constraints are imposed on research, interviews and
investigative follow-up associated with DIA's pursuit of PW/MIA
information." The intent of this statement was to emphasize DIA's
dedication to US Government efforts to resolve the PW/MIA issue.
However, the perception by the PW/MIA Division that there are no
limitations on travel and contact funds encourages investigative efforts
that could be carried out by investigative agencies more efficiently and
without taking DIA analysts away from their analytical tasks. VO-PW
analysts carry no credentials nor are they trained investigators. Case
files are not investigative files and are not complete analytic files.
Instead, they are working files.

The Division characterizes its investigative activities as collection,
but the Division operator, in general, is outside the mainstream of DIA
and Intelligence Community collection effort. While the Division
believes it is conducting a vigorous collection effort, that effort is
largely focused on investigating the whereabouts and the veracity of
sources. Thus, the Division's management believes that it is collecting
extensively when, in fact, the collection effort is not well-planned,
executed or managed and is not taking full advantage of all collection
assets.

The PW/MIA Division requires a well-defined mission statement as well as
numerous SOPs. Division personnel are operating under a myriad of
mission statements -- all outdated. The 1983 IG report had a statement
of mission enclosed, as did several outdated DIA functions and mission
publications. Unfortunately, the current DIA mission and functions
publication left the PW Division (VO-PW) out altogether. Similarly,
repeated inspections, including the IG, have cited the failure to have
an SOP. This deficiency still exists.

               ISSUE #7 -- COLLECTION MANAGEMENT BY VO-PW

(S/NF) DISCUSSION:

VO-PW collection management is uneven and, as a result, the ad hoc
nature of the collection management effort is detrimental to analytical
efforts. VO-PW does not appear to function in the mainstream of the DIA
collection system.

In the area of HUMINT collection, a comprehensive Continuing
Intelligence Requirement (CIR) was issued in October 1985. However,
there is no record of tailored tasking guidance, collection emphasis
messages, or other actions taken to follow-up the October 1985 CIR.

In the area of SIGINT collection, the current requirements in support of
PW/MIA collection are integrated into the NAtional SIGINT Requirements
List (NSRL) for Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotian political collection.

While VO-PW IMINT requirements are now current, the requirements have
not been reviewed as part of the recent COMIREX-directed Intelligence
Problem (IP) review. In fact, VO-PW personnel had never been tasked to
complete an IP review. Furthermore, VO-PW personnel had never developed
tasking for KH-9 missions.

Within the last few weeks, Mr. Robert Desatte, VO-PW, has received
assistance from DC-4 and DC-7 collection managers in putting together
and issuing coordinated collection requirements. Mr. Destatte has made
initial steps toward a fairly complete overhaul of the VO-PW collection
posture. However, as with many other projects in the office, higher
priority ad-hoc requirements have pushed his efforts in the collection
area at a lower priority.

The primary source of VO-PW's information are refugee interviews by
personnel from the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC). When reports
are received, there is frequently need for follow-up questions. There is
normally a time delay of several days or weeks before follow-up
questions are transmitted to JCRC. If JCRC interviewers had better
collection guidance, much follow-up would be done on the spot. (e.g., If
a refugee claims to have been in a certain relocation camp, the
interviewer should have analysts questions relative to that camp.)

Currently, DADs are required to report PW/MIA information by message,
not by IIR. As a result, DAOs do not get IIR credit for PW/MIA
reporting.

By being out of the mainstream of the DIA collection system, there are
several sources (primarily HUMINT) that are not being exploited fully by
the Division. Collection requirements are not normally levied on DOMEX
assets, 500th MI Group, and DIA Liaison Officers, thus another available
group of assets are going unutilized.

RECOMMENDATION:

(1) VO-PW must get into the mainstream of the collection system, and
should be augmented for 90 days by an individual experienced in
all-source collection. This  augmentee should be assigned the following
tasks:

        - Completely review and formalize the VO-PW collection posture.
        - Prepare an all-source collection plan.
        - Prepare, have validated, and maintain current specific
          collection requirement documents (CIR, ICR, KB, NSRL, IMINT
          IP/CPS/EPS).
        - Prepare and have validated a separate PW/MIA NSRL.
        - Review with all relevant VO-PW analysts, collectors, and
          supervisors the purpose and functioning of the collection plan
          and requirements to insure the VO-PW collection effort is
          managed dynamically and aggressively.

(2) As outlined in the issue on Internal Organization of VO-PW, the
Collection and Analysis functions should be divided between separate
branches of the Division, in order to give more visibility and a more
separate identity to this crucial function.

(3) Collection requirements should be leveled on USDAOs worldwide. DAOs
in Asia, Soviet Union, and Europe should be ACTION collectors with all
other DAOs being INFORMATION collectors. Reporting should be by
electrical IIR. The DR should issue a message to all DAOs emphasizing
this requirement.

              ISSUE # 8 -- INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF VO-PW

(CONF/WNINTEL) DISCUSSION:

The organization of VO-PW cripples mission accomplishment. SPecific
problem areas that are part of the overall issue of organization are
discussed below.

- INADEQUATE SUPERVISION AND MANAGEMENT. VO-PW has two subordinate
branches: VO-PW1, External Relations, and VO-PW2, Collection and
Analysis Branch. Each of these branches is headed by a GS-14 who has
considerable analytical and/or operational responsibilities in addition
to the supervisory and managerial responsibilities required of a branch
chief.

This situation is a major contributor to many of the  other problems
within VO-PW. Supervisors should have no analytical, collection of
operational responsibilities other than SUPERVISING AND MANAGING
activities of their branches in those areas. There is little, if any,
time available for managers/supervisors to detach themselves from the
operations of their branches and analyze HOW their branches are
operating; they are too involved in WHAT their branches are doing, or
are doing it themselves.

- NO CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN ANALYSIS, COLLECTION, AND INVESTIGATION.
Analysts within VO-PW2, Collection and Analysis Branch, perform both
collection and analysis. Some analysts, particularly those with language
capability, are more deeply involved in collection than others. In the
case of the branch chief and two of the analysts with excellent language
capabilities, much of their time is spent in telephone interviews with
sources. Investigative activities consume an inordinate amount of time
that should be spent on analysis and/or collection.

In this regard, VO-PW requires its own limited collection and interview
capability for selected sources of information (Vietnamese refugees) who
must be interviewed by Vietnamese linguists who are also familiar with
information in VO-PW files. Thus, the continued use of VO-PW personnel
as active collectors and interviewers is important to the operation of
the office.

- INSUFFICIENT ADMINISTRATIVE AND CLERICAL SUPPORT. The administrative
and clerical support to VO-PW is insufficient and this situation is a
major shortcoming. A newly-hired secretary is quickly becoming
proficient in supporting the Division but is  completely overloaded by
typing demands. At the time of the team's review of VO-PW, there were at
least 48 finished reports, 25 collection emphasis messages, and 11 case
evaluations along with a two-inch stack of other items awaiting typing.
For several days, nothing except material for the Director's upcoming
Congressional testimony was typed. A major backlog exists in two areas:
final evaluations of sighting reports and filing of data on the
Vietnamese prison/reeducation camp system. At present, there are 179
resolved first-hand sighting cases for which the analyst has written an
evaluation, but the evaluations are awaiting editing and typing. Some of
these date back to 1981. In the other area, refugees have been
reinterviewed for specific knowledge on the prison/reeducation camp
system and over one hundred reports have been received, some with
information on several camps. These reports have been read but have
never been files in the appropriate camp folder. On 17 March, an Army
Reserve NCO was assigned to VO-PW and given the task of filing these
reports.

The office has a minimal tracking system of keeping track of taskings.
There does not seem to be a clear system of logging incoming
requirements (suspensed or open-ended), assigning them to an individual
for action, and tracking their completion.

A single Air Force Master Sergeant serves as administrative NCO but her
many other duties and the lack of any other administrative personnel
serve to make administration within VO-PW an ad-hoc affair.

- INSUFFICIENT INTELLIGENCE TECHNICIAN SUPPORT. VO-PW currently is
authorized and has present two intelligence technicians (one newly-hired
and not trained) who support six analysts and, when all current
vacancies are filled, will support twelve analysts. Two intelligence
technicians cannot support the six analysts adequately and will fall far
short of being able to support a full contingent of analysts. As an
example of the impact of insufficient intelligence technician support,
one analyst has over 75 reports that need to be entered into the
automated data base. The shortage of intelligence technicians --
combined with insufficient ADP equipment and training -- has led to this
situation and will perpetuate it.

- INADEQUATE PLANNING. There is virtually no planning done in VO-PW.
The Division should anticipate Congressional testimony, media  features,
and other events requiring VO-PW action. The Division should also
develop initiative studies and products as part of a coherent production
plan.


RECOMMENDATION:

That the PW Division be reorganized along the three key functional areas
where management focus is most critical.  These are:  Data Base
Collection Management, Analysis, and Collation and Planning.  The
proposed ideal reorganization into three branches in shown below as TAB
A and requires an increase of 9 personnel from the currant 25 presently
authorized.  A reorganization with minimal personnel increases is TAB B
and represents an incremental fix to the malorganization that currently
exists, while additional and more extensive manpower authorizations for
the ideal organization are established.  Comparative manning breakouts
are at TAB C.

The proposed TAB A organization, in contrast to that presently in force,
will impose order on the numerous functions of the Division and result
in an orderly flow of information and products while allowing a
disciplined approach to problems that arise.

Even adoption of the minimal augmentation TAB B organization would be a
positive step, however, full benefit would not be realized until the
military managers, extra typists and intel techs as outlined in the TAB
A organization are on hand.


          ISSUE #9 - REALIGNMENT OF PW/MIA DIVISION WITHIN DIA

(U) DISCUSSION:
The PW/MIA Division, currently assigned to VO, has been located
previously in DC, DI, and DB.  The issue of where the PW/MIA Division is
within DIA is vital to the Agency because of three considerations:
First, the location of the Division is a visible indicator of the
importance DIA places on the PW/MIA issue.  Second, many requests
requiring PW/MIA Division action are high-priority requiring rapid
response and should not be slowed by layers of bureaucracy.  Finally,
the position of the Division determines the "clout" it will have within
and outside the Agency.

In previous years, the PW/MIA Division was reduced to five personnel and
Division personnel state that a previous Director "planned to close us
up."  If such a situation developed again, it would suggest strongly
that DIA does not place high priority on the PW/MIA issue.

The PW/MIA Division has little "clout" within DIA and this fact has had
certain specific detrimental impacts on the Division.  As an example,
the Division is woefully behind the rest of the Agency in analyst
training, ADP equipment, and word processors.

Currently, the PW/MIA issue is of high national visibility and priority.
However, we must anticipate that some future Administration, if not the
current one toward the end of its term, will lower either or both the
priority and the visibility of the issue.  At that point, the DIA
mission in the PW/MIA area should become less visible.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1)  The current VO-PW office should be removed from VO and made a
special staff section reporting directly to the Director and the Command
Group.

(2)  When a U.S. Administration makes a determination that the PW/MIA
issue is resolved or lowers the national priority of the issue, the
office should then be removed from its position on the special staff and
placed in an analytical element (JS or DB).


                  ISSUE #10 - RESOLUTION OF CASE FILES

(C) There are currently approximately 60 unresolved live sighting cases
of Americans in a POW-type environment.  At least 17 of those cases are
viable candidates for closure.

(C) DISCUSSION:

The PW/MIA Division should reduce the live sighting cases to a
legitimate bottom line number.  An inordinate number of unresolved cases
leaves the impression that many of the open cases contain credible
evidence when, in fact, they do not.  In cases where the source's
evidence is weak, credibility is doubtful, probability of reinterview is
small and/or requests for a followup collection effort have proved
fruitless, the case should be closed.  Case #1270 illustrates this
point.  All attempts to follow-up and verify the source's information
have proved fruitless.  Efforts to reinterview the source have proved
impossible.  This case should be closed.

(C) RECOMMENDATION:

The Interagency Intelligence Committee provides a logical vehicle for
conducting periodic inprocess reviews of case actions of the PW/MIA
Division.  This group permits a formalized external assessment of the
Division's analytical process and the review of decisions concerning the
status of individual cases.  Final adjudication of case files should not
be an internal PW/MIA Division decision.  That authority should rest
with an external agency.  No one organization should have the ability to
open, investigate, evaluate and close a case file.  The INteragency
Intelligence Committee is the logical oversight body to perform this
function and the Chairman should be enjoined to add this duty to the
Committee's charter and institute the necessary mechanism to make it
work.


ISSUE #11 - REORIENTATION OF JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER (JCRC)

(C) DISCUSSION:

Relations between JCRC and the PW/MIA are excellent and, in effect,
constitute a joint investigative effort.  Coordination with JCRC
involves staff visits, message traffic and telephone.  JCRC appreciates
the high priority on this matter and reacts accordingly.  The Task Force
did not talk to JCRC representatives directly, hence our comments are
predicated on input from PW/MIA Division.

As acknowledged by CIA during Task Force coordination, DoD has a wealth
of background and expertise on refugee screening and exploitation (e.g.,
Soviet emigres, Cuban emigres, etc.).  Coordination needs to be effected
with JCRC to ensure that this expertise is being brought to bear on the
problem of exploitation.  Other matters need to be covered with JCRC.
For example, the PW/MIA Division perceives JCRC's charter as limited to
background questions to refugees concerning "sightings".  Their concern
is that more detailed exploitation will be adversely regarded by the
host government, and JCRC could lose its charter.  This is naive.  Once
the host government allows access to the refugee assuredly it considers
that exploitation will be complete.  There have been detrimental effects
from this conservative policy, namely, indepth questions do not get
directed to sources; sources disappear before being reinterviewed as
they move on through the refugee stream; and essential information on
other than live sightings is not collected.  Case files reviewed
reflected invariably that reinterviews were the norm rather than the
exception.  This is wrong.  Sufficient data should be elicited in the
initial interview to make reinterview the exception.  Data is needed
concerning reeducation camps through SEA; biographics; PW enclosures
and other areas.  These areas should be exploited in the initial
interview rather than focus only on the live sighting question.
Significantly, there are other intelligence initiatives which may be
supported as an ancillary effort, provided JCRC is reorganized, or
augmented by other DoD personnel.  One commonly accepted tool in refugee
screening is the Knowledgeability Brief (KB).  A sample is attached at
Annex C.  Consideration should be given to making KB's a routing tool in
the screening process.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the POW Division meet with JCRC to review collection guidance and
planning, adequacy of resources, and policy matters.  Specific
recommendations will result subsequently.  (This kind of meeting was
also suggested earlier in the Commodore Brooks' memo of 25 Sep 1985
(Annex B).)


                  ISSUE #12 - INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

(C) DISCUSSION:

Since our 10 point national strategy is apparently working and impacting
internationally, demarches to other countries on PW/MIA's may be in
order.  It is a matter that merits discussion in the Interagency
Committee.  For example, the French (based on the past outstanding
record of French intelligence, the Surete National) pass information
which would clarify or resolve some of our "sightings" or lead to new
initiatives.  PW/MIA Division case files that are currently "open"
include numbers 1909, 1943, 1757, 0974, 1025, 3115, 3713, 0950 and 0953
which could probably be resolved with French help.  Other "open" cases
such as 1792 (Australia), 0712 (possibly Sweden), 1169 (China), and 2582
(Canada) might be resolved by assistance from countries indicated.
Analysts advised that both Canada and Australia are problem countries in
which to run down leads.  Since Canada is our largest economic trading
partner, pressure could be exerted accordingly.  Concerning France,
perhaps our recent assistance in Chad would warm the climate for
information on Indo China?  In an effort to leave "no stone unturned"
international assistance should be sought through Department of State.

RECOMMENDATION:

POW Division take the initiative in gaining State Department assistance.


                          ISSUE #13 - GARWOOD

Garwood has placement and access in SRV.  No other American source meets
this qualification.  Therefore, his past track record of character
defects must be shunted aside and exploitation should proceed on a
positive note.  Analysts speculate that approximately 130 of their
reported "live sightings" involve Garwood.  Now is a chance to check
this out and not only clear up some live sightings -- but also run an
audit trail on the Division analytical capability.  For example,
consider Yen Bai, a case that remains perplexing.  Garwood was at Yen
Bai from 1975-1979, working as a low level member of the staff.
(Assuredly he knows whether or not there were 1000 PW's held there as
previously reported.)  He traveled to various SRV camps repairing
generators, so he should be able to retrace his routes on maps and be
questioned on area knowledge.  He must know personalities, both SRV and
American PW's.  Garwood represents the best source available to date in
this imprecise initiative, and fortunately DIA appears to be embarked on
a positive dialogue with him.

RECOMMENDATION:

Supervisors must optimize plans for Garwood's cooperation and
availability.  Planning should include consideration of hiring him as a
consultant.


             ISSUE #14 - VIETNAMESE DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN

(CONF)  Determine if there is a concerted effort on the part of any
foreign government, or outside agency, to run a coordinated
disinformation campaign.

(C) DISCUSSION:

Several organizations involved in the PW/MIA issue believe there is a
disinformation campaign being conducted by the SRV and other outside
agencies to undermine the US Government's PW/MIA effort.  This belief
often influences the amount of credibility VO-PW places in reports
received pertaining to PW information.  DIA has been at the forefront in
alleging a disinformation campaign.  The Task Force, however, was not
able to confirm or refute its existence, but positive evidence appears
to be tenuous and linked primarily to dog tags.  Counterintelligence
(OS-1) advises that is has attempted to get the military departments
involved in the matter, with little success.  Perhaps DB analysis could
be brought to bear on this issue.  DB has the wherewithal and expertise
as evidenced by their past track record.

RECOMMENDATION:

(1)  That DB conduct a study on this issue.

(2)  That pending outcome of such a study, DIA refrain from making any
     more statements supporting the existence of such a campaign.


          ISSUE #15 - INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON VIETNAM PW/MIAs

(CONF) DISCUSSION:

DIA retains responsibility for the PW/MIA initiative, a fact totally
appreciated among the national intelligence agencies.  Implicit for DIA
is the need to drive the national system to resolution of this matter
within two years.  The Task Force review involved coordination with the
Intelligence Community Staff, CIA and NSA wherein the need surfaced to
formalize our relations on this matter to a greater extent.  The
Interagency Committee is a firm step in this direction.  DIA must not
let it languish; as it assuredly will do if not pushed.  A second step
is a radical overhaul of the PW/MIA Division to ensure it takes a
leadership role within the Community.  Due to Task Force suggestion, the
IC Staff has agreed to update the National Human INtelligence Collection
Plan on INdoChina promulgated in November 1982.  Update will start
within two months and a new plan can be forthcoming in the summer of
1986.  The IC Staff will consider a separate plan pertaining exclusively
to PW/MIA's if priority warrants; and it will be up to the PW/MIA
Division to provide the impetus.  CIA reiterated that is knows the high
priority assigned PW/MIA, but hedged when the review team asked that a
CIA analyst be assigned full time to the Division in DIA.  CIA
emphasized that DIA must make in-house fixes, after which the
feasibility of assigning a CIA analyst can be examined.  Continuing
coordination in the INteragency Committee would facilitate this.
Additionally, suitable topics for the Committee would include such
matters as the following:

a.  Reallocation or allocation of assets to appropriate field units,
    such as the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) or the military
    departments.

b.  Final authority on closing out or reopening cases pertaining to live
    sightings.

c. Pushing for international assistance.

RECOMMENDATION:

Energize the Interagency Committee.  Make it a player in the effort.
Ammend charter of Committee responsibilities as required, and especially
fix responsibility for adjudication of POW case files.


             ISSUE #16 - STANDARDIZED POLYGRAPH PROCEDURES

(U) DISCUSSION:

There are no procedures outlined for the administration of polygraphs
either to sources who claim to have first-hand live sighting information
or to those individuals who claim to possess hard evidence of Americans
still held in captivity.  The failure to have a standardized procedure
lends credence to the argument of those who claim that DIA administers
polygraphs only when it is their own interest to do so. The 17 Ly Nam De
Street case is an example. The source in question was polygraphed twice
because his veracity was in question. Yet the sources who refuted the
prime sighting testimony were not polygraphed, thus giving rise to
allegations that DIA only uses  the polygraph to support its own
contentions.

RECOMMENDATION:

Set up a standardized procedure where all individuals claiming to have
first-hand live sighting information and those individuals claiming to
possess hard evidence of Americans in captivity will be polygraphed as a
matter of course. Although the polygraph is not a panacea, its
consistent use in high priority cases is not only as an investigative
tool, but also from its standpoint of appearance.

[PROVIDED BY THE FORGET ME NOT'S POW/MIA BBS 908-787-8383]
                     [FIDONET 107/450] 

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