
                      DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
                        Washington, D.C.  20301


                                                        27 May 1986


To:  Lieutenant General Leonard H. Peroots, USAF
     Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
     The Pentagon
     Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT:  Review of DIA'S PW/MIA Analysis Center

1.  Enclosed is the report of the Task Force examination of DIA'S PW/MIA
Analysis Center.  The Foreword, Conclusions, Recommendations, and
Epilogue sections of the report are unclassified.  The rest of the
report is classified-- can be sanitized if you desire, as your security
experts deem proper.  My colleagues have asked that I note their
unanimous support for the entire report; conclusions and
recommendations.

2.  The undersigned have spent hundreds of hours reviewing the files of
the DIA PW/MIA Analysis Center over the past weeks; speaking with DIA
officials and analysts regarding DIA'S handling of the JCS directed
mission to account for those American Military personnel missing in
action.

3.  You told us to look for coverup.  We found none.  We departed from
the narrow charter given us only when, as you directed, we felt it
useful to this investigation.  Ours was certainly not as detailed a look
as it could have been.  We believe, however, our insights, similar to
those available to you from your independent DIA investigation before
our arrival, should be taken most seriously by you and the United States
Government and that our recommendations be quickly implemented.

4.  Yours are inherited problems.  We salute the vigor with which you
sought to correct them early in your tenure.  Your obligation, and ours,
however, to the comrades waiting to be brought home is light in
comparison with its importance.

(signed)                            (signed)
Eugene F. Tight, Jr.                John S. Murray
Leiut General, USAF (Ret.)          Major General, USA (Ret.)

(signed)                            (signed)
Lester E. McGee Jr.                 Roberta Carper Maynard
Colonel, USA (Ret.)

(signed)                            (signed)
John Francis McCreary               Arthur G. Klos


=========

                      DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
                        Washington, D.C.  20301


                                                        27 May 1986


To:  Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
     The Pentagon
     Washington, D.C.


SUBJECT:  Tight Task Force Report


Lt General Tighe asked that we serve as a Review Panel to go over the
findings of his Task Force review of DIA'S PW/MIA Analysis Center
performance.

We have completed our review of the report, support its conclusions and
urge that you implement those of its recommendations which you have not
already brought about, as quickly as possible.

The finds of this report must not be forgotten.  This issue--bringing
American Military personnel home from Southeast Asia (dead or alive) as
quickly as possible--must be acted upon with greatest vigor by all those
U.S. Government officials responsible.  We urge you to get on with
support of the issue without delay.

(signed)                            (signed)
Russell E. Dougherty                John Peter Flynn
General, USAF (Ret.)                Lieut General, USAF (Ret.)

(signed)                            (signed)
Robert C. Kingston                  Lyman Kirkpatrick
General, USA (Ret.)

(Not present)                       (signed)
H. Ross Perot                       Robinson Risner
                                    Brig General, USAF (Ret.)


=========


                      DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
                        Washington, D.C.  20301


                                                        27 May 1986



To:  Senior Review Panel

         General Russell E. Dougherty, USAF (Ret.)
         Lieutenant General John P. Flynn USAF (Ret.)
         General Robert C. Kingston, USA (Ret.)
         Mr. Lyman Kirkpatrick
         Mr. H. Ross Perot
         Brigadier General Robinson Risner, USAF (Ret.)


SUBJECT: Tight Task Force Review of DIA PW/MIA Analysis Center

1.  Attached is the report of a lengthy and detailed examination of the
files and activities of the DIA PW/MIA Analysis Center to determine
whether or not it has met its obligations as regards analysis and
evaluation of Intelligence since September 1981.

2.  We ask that you review it--agree or disagree with the way it was
conducted--and its conclusions and recommendations and convey your
judgments to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency with those
of the Task Force.  The findings are not all that important; the issue
is vitally important.  You are eminently qualified to judge the
necessity for action.

                                   (signed)
                                   Eugene F. Tighe, Jr.
                                   Lieutenant General, USAF (Ret.)
                                   Chairmen

Enclosure a/s


==========

CONTENTS

                                                              PAGE
CHAIRMAN'S FOREWORD                                           1
CHAPTER
I          TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP                              6

II         DIA MISSION AND CHARTER                            10

III        DIA PROBLEMS                                       13

           A. STATUS QUO & STATUS QUO ANTE                    14

           B.  THE ANALYST'S APPROACH.                        16

           C.  BALANCING THE EVIDENCE                         16

           D.  UNDERSTANDING INTELLIGENCE METHODS             16

           E.  RELIANCE ON STALE DATA                         17

           F. COLLECTION                                      18

               1. DEARTH OF SOURCES/EEI'S                     19

               2.  ABSENCE OF ALL-SOURCE COLLECTION           20

               3.  INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY                    21

               4.  PRISON SYSTEM STUDY                        21

               5.  WARTIME POW SYSTEM                         22

               6.  FILE CONFUSION                             25

               7.  SEMANTIC. CONFUSION                        25

IV         FOLLOW-UP ANALYSIS                                 27

V          THE JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER (JCRC)        35

VI         THE INTERAGENCY REVIEW COMMITTEE                   37

VII            COVER-UP?                                      39

VIII           DISCUSSION                                     41

               A.  THE POLYGRAPH                              42

               B.  HEARSAY EVIDENCE                           42

               C. UNRESOLVED CASES                            43

               D. CLUSTER ANALYSIS                            44

               E..SOURCE MOTIVATION                           44

               F. QUALITY OF SOURCES AND INFORMATION          45

               G. MISINFORMATION/DECEPTION                    47

IX             THE PW/MIA CENTER STAFF                        48

X              COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUPPORT                    52

XI             OBSERVATIONS                                   55


==========


                          CHAIRMAN'S  FORWARD

==========


              A. SUBSTANTIVE OBSERVATIONS                    56

              B. FARM LABOR                                  56

              C.  CAPTIVE MOBILITY                           56

              D.  DODGING DESIGN                             57

              E.  STALE LEADS                                57

              F.  VIETNAM--LOWER PROBABILITY                 57

              G.  "BLOOD DEBT"  IMPETUS                      58

              H.  OPPORTUNITIES                              58

SUMMARY                                                      60

CONCLUSIONS                                                  65

RECOMMENDATIONS                                              68

EPILOGUE                                                     73

NOTE CONCERNING POLICY STATEMENT                             75

APPENDICES AND REFERENCES (AVAILABLE TO CONGRESSIONAL

COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN UPON REQUEST)


                          CHAIRMAN'S FOREWORD


P.O.W. Network Note -- Paragraphs marked with brackets "[ ]" ARE NOT
part of the original Tighe Report and appear to have been added after
the report was complete.  The P.O.W. Network feels that these remarks
may be rebuttals from the DIA or other affected agencies.


THE ISSUE OF WHETHER AMERICANS REMAIN. IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AGAINST THEIR WILL
NOT GO AWAY AS LONG AS THERE IS EVIDENCE INDICATING THEIR PRESENCE THERE.

    THE HANDLING OF THIS EVIDENCE, ITS EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS HAS FALLEN
LARGELY TO THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY - THE U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
ORGANIZATION DIRECTLY SUBORDINATE TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND CHAIRMAN
OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.

                   THE STRENGTH OF UNIVERSAL SUPPORT

    THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN EXTRAORDINARILY SUPPORTIVE
OF EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE - BRING AMERICANS HOME IF THEY ARE HELD BY
THE GOVERNMENTS OF VIETNAM, LAOS OR CAMBODIA. THERE IS NO DOUBT OF HIS
DESIRE TO

   PLACE THE HIGHEST PRIORITY POSSIBLE ON THIS EFFORT. CONGRESSMEN, BESET
WITH MYRIAD ACTIVITIES COMPETING FOR EVERY MOMENT OF THEIR WORKING DAYS,
HAVE DEVOTED THOUSANDS OF HOURS TO INVESTIGATION OF THIS ISSUE. REGARDLESS
OF THEIR PERSONAL VIEWS OF THE TRUTH OR FALSEHOOD OF THE CLAIM THAT AMERICAN
POw's ARE STILL ALIVE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA', THEIR NON-PARTISAN SUPPORT FOR'
CONTINUING INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE LARGE VOLUME OF REPORTING
STREAMING INTO .DIA, ON THIS SUBJECT, HAS BEEN STRONG AND PERSISTENT.

   GENERAL PEROOTS CALLED ME IN TO DIA FOR A LENGTHY DISCUSSION OF THIS
ISSUE SOON AFTER HE ASSUMED HIS POSITION AS DIRECTOR OF DIA ON 1 OCTOBER
1985. HE WAS DETERMINED TO ASSURE A THOROUGHLY PROFESSIONAL DIA EFFORT:
ASKED FOR MY HELP.  ON 10 OCTOBER 1985 CONGRESSMAN JOHN MCCAIN ASKED THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TO SOLICIT MY HELP IN RESOLVING INCREASINGLY PERSISTENT
CLAIMS OF A "COVERUP" OF THE TRUE FACTS OF THIS ISSUE BY THE DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE Agency- I AGREED TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION AT GENERAL
PERROOTS' REQUEST BECAUSE I BELIEVE THERE CAN BE NO MORE IMPORTANT
GOVERNMENT- SUPPORT FOR THE U.S. FIGHTING MAN THAN THE PROMISE THAT EVERY
EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO BRING HIM HOME TO LOVED ONES--AFTER THE FIGHTING IS
OVER--ALIVE OR DEAD.  THE UNITED STATES' CAN NEVER RENEGE ON THIS PROMISE.

                 THE CHARTER OF THIS INVESTIGATION

    SPECIFICALLY GENERAL PERROOTS ASKED ME TO:

     1.  "REVIEW ALL OF THE CURRENT CASE FILES AND HANDLING OF THOSE FILES,
 LOOKING FOR ANY INDICATION OF IMPROPRIETY OR "COVERUP-"

     2. "EVALUATE THE EVIDENCE REGARDING UNACCOUNTED FOR U.S. MILITARY
 PERSONNEL IN SOUTHEAST' ASIA AND PROVIDE EVALUATION OF DIA CONCLUSIONS AND:

     3. "FOCUS ON LIVE-SIGHTING REPORTS IN TERMS OF QUALITY OF INFORMATION,
 FOLLOW-UP INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION, AND
 DISPOSITION.

     4.   "RECOMMEND ACTION AS APPROPRIATE-"*

[ It is true that DIA personnel and resources have increased over the
years.  However, this increase was a result of heightened national
interest and Reagan Administration priorities, not a result of
increased evidence of American PWs. ]

     AS EVIDENCE GREW THAT NOT ALL AMERICAN MILITARY MEN ALIVE AT WAR'S END
 WERE BROUGHT HOME FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA, MY SUCCESSORS AT THE HELD OF DIA
 PLACED GREATER AND GREATER PERSONNEL AND OTHER RESOURCES IN THE HANDS OF
 THE DIA ELEMENT CHARGED WITH INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE PW/MIA
 ISSUE. ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT WAS MOVED EVER HIGHER IN THE ORGANIZATIONAL
 STRUCTURE TO ASSURE AS FEW LAYERS OF BUREAUCRACY AS PRACTICAL BETWEEN THE
 PW/MIA ELEMENT AND THE DIRECTOR OF DIA.

 *THE DIRECTOR OF DIA FURTHER' INSISTED THAT MY INVESTIGATION GO ANYWHERE MY
 FINDINGS TAKE IT.  THE GROUP HAS TRIED TO STAY WITHIN ITS WRITTEN CHARTER.


                       THE GROWTH OF FRUSTRATION

    AS A RESULT OF THE STEADILY GROWING NUMBER OF REPORTS ("LIVE-SIGHTING
REPORTS") WHICH DIA RECEIVED, THE INCREASING U.S. AWARENESS OF THE ISSUE
RESULTING FROM THE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL COMMITMENT, CONTINUAL ORGANIZATIONAL
RE-ALIGNMENT OF THE PW/MIA ELEMENT, FLOODS OF "FREEDOM OF INFORMATION"
REQUESTS FROM MEDIA AND PUBLIC, AND GREATER REQUIREMENTS TO BRIEF MEMBERS OF
CONGRESS, ETC., THE BURDENS OF THE DEDICATED AND EXTREMELY HARD-WORKING
PERSONNEL OF THE PW/MIA CENTER OVERWHELMED THEM.

[ The description of the personnel of the PW/MIA center as "frustrated and
depressed" is personal opinion and is inaccurate. ]

    UNDER THE BEST OF CIRCUMSTANCES, THESE DIA PERSONNEL COULD BUT GROW
FRUSTRATED AND DEPRESSED AS A HOSTILE HANOI PLAYED CAT AND MOUSE WITH THE
U.S. PUBLIC ON THIS MATTER, RELEASING A FEW BODILY REMAINS OF DEAD AMERICANS
TO THE U.S. FROM TIME TO TIME--FROM THE LARGE NUMBER THEY ARE KNOWN TO
POSSESS-- STRINGING U.S. CONGRESSMEN AND OTHER OFFICIAL AMERICAN DELEGATIONS
ALONG WHILE IT GHOULISHLY DRAGGED ITS OFFICIAL FEET.  FOR THIS REASON, SOME
DIA ANALYSTS IN THE PAST TENDED TO TREAT SOME "LIVE-SIGHTING" REPORTS AS
HOAXES OR SELF- SEEKING LIES, WHEN SOURCE BONAFIDES COULD NOT BE
ESTABLISHED.

[ Reports are not considered hoaxes and self-seeking lies.  In fact, each
report is considered reliable unless proven otherwise. ]

    OVER THE YEARS THE PERCEIVED MISSION OF THE PW/MIA CENTER AT DIA HAS
CHANGED, OFFICIALLY AND UNOFFICIALLY, FROM ANALYSIS OF THE INTELLIGENCE
FLOWING INTO DIA ON THIS  ISSUE TO "RESOLVING THE ISSUE" WHEREBY DOUBT IS
CAST ON THE VERACITY OF THE INTELLIGENCE.

[ The DIA mission has never been resolution of the PW/MIA issue.  Our
mission is to provide intelligence support to U.S. Government policymakers
and decisionmakers. ]

    THE MODUS OPERANDI OF THE PW/MIA CENTER EVOLVED TOWARD UNDUE EMPHASIS  IN
ESTABLISHING SOURCE BONAFIDES, AT THE EXPENSE OF ANALYZING, FROM EVERY ANGLE,
INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THESE SOURCES. THUS, DIA ANALYSTS MEASURED THE WORTH
OF INTELLIGENCE REPORTS ON LIVE POWS STILL HELD IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AS
"RESOLVED."

"CORRELATED TO INDIVIDUAL(S) ACCOUNTED FOR" OR FALSE INFORMATION, OR
"UNRESOLVED" MEANING "WE HAVEN'T YET PROVED THESE INTELLIGENCE  REPORTS
VALID. DIRECTOR DIA HAS FIXED THIS AND A NEW ANALYTICAL APPROACH HAS BEEN
IMPLEMENTED.  AN EXAMPLE OF THE EFFORT IS ONE CASE WHERE FOUR YEARS WERE
SPENT TRYING TO PROVE THAT A RE-EDUCATION CAMP WHICH WAS A KEY PART OF ONE
LIVE SIGHTING REPORT DID NOT EXIST (THIS TO DISPROVE REPORT), ONLY TO FIND
THAT THE CAMP DID INDEED EXIST. DURING THE INTERVENING YEARS THE REPORT WAS
NOT ANALYZED FOR ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE OVERALL ISSUE. CURRENTLY, CASES ARE
NO LONGER IDENTIFIED AS "OPEN", "CLOSED", "RESOLVED", "UNRESOLVED", ETC.
INSTEAD INFORMATION IS REVIEWED AND COMPARED WITH DATA BASE HOLDINGS.
ADDITIONAL COLLECT1ON IS CONDUCTED WHEN NECESSARY.  ANALYSIS FOCUSES ON WHO
OR WHAT A SOURCE SAW.  CASES ARE CATEGORIZED AS: (A) CURRENTLY HELD AMERICAN
PW (B) FORMER AMERICAN PW (C) AMERICAN NON-PW (D) NON-AMERICAN (E) CAUCASIAN

(F) MISCELLANEOUS.

                          COVERUP

    OUR INVESTIGATION HAS CERTAINLY NOT BEEN ALL-INCLUSIVE NOR HAS IT
VENTURED FAR BEYOND ITS CHARTER. IT HAS FOUND NO EVIDENCE THAT ANYONE IN DIA
(OR ANYWHERE ELSE IN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT INTENTIONALLY COVERED UP ANYTHING
ABOUT THE PW/MIA ISSUE. GENERAL PERROOTS HAD BEGUN TO COMPLETELY TURN AROUND
THE OPERATION AND PROCEDURES OF THE PW/MIA ANALYSIS CENTER BEFORE THIS TASK
FORCE STARTED ITS WORK.  HIS SPECIAL INVESTIGATION, HEADED BY COL. GAINES,
HAD DISCOVERED MANY OF THE FAULTS THIS TASK FORCE REPORTS.

                         THE GREATEST PROBLEM

OUR INVESTIGATION REVEALS THAT THE GREATEST PROBLEM ASSOCIATED WITH THIS
ISSUE WAS THE LACK OF PROFESSIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE.
IT WILL TAKE A GREAT DEAL OF TIME AND FAR MORE PERSONNEL AND RESOURCES THAN
CURRENTLY COMMITTED TO BUILD AN ADEQUATE AND PROFESSIONAL WORK FORCE.  ONE
ONLY HAS TO VISIT THE "RABBIT WARREN" CLUTTER AND CROWDING OF THE CURRENT
DIA PW/MIA CENTER TO DETERMINE HOW INADEQUATE THE ENVIRONMENT IS FOR A
"PRIORITY ONE" EFFORT.  THE FILES ARE FAR FROM THE QUALITY ONE HAS A RIGHT
TO EXPECT.  THAT CONGRESSIONAL, INSPECTOR GENERAL, AND INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY INVESTIGATION OF THESE FILES COULD HAVE FOUND THEM IN ACCEPTABLE
SHAPE OR THE EFFORT GOING WELL IS A MYSTERY.

[ While the spaces were cramped this was due to the fact that additional
manpower was added without a commensurate immediate workspace expansion.
DIA has now completed a workspace expansion project for the office which has
greatly improved the work environment. ]

==========
                                 CHAPTER 1

                                 MEMBERSHIP

==========

    THE CHARTER OF GEN PERROOTS WAS PLANNED SO THAT A REPORT WOULD BE
PREPARED BY A TASK FORCE OF INVESTIGATORS FOLLOWED BY A SENIOR REVIEW PANEL
REVIEW OF THEIR' WORK.  THE TASK FORCE:  THE CHAIRMAN SELECTED THE MEMBERS
OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE BASIS OF INTEGRITY, EXCELLENCE OF KNOWLEDGE OF
THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS AND KNOWLEDGE OF VIETNAM, TO ASSURE THE MOST
EXPEDITIOUS HANDLING OF THIS PROBLEM.  UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF LT GEN
EUGENE F. TIGHE, JR., USAF (RET), THE TASK FORCE CONSISTED OF:

   MAJ GENERAL JOHN S. MURRAY, USA (RET)
   CHIEF OF U.S. MILITARY  INTEREST IN VIETNAM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
   (1972-1974).   RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATION WITH JCRC AND VIETNAMESE 
   FORCES IN RETRIEVAL OF U.S. MIA REMAINS. LAWYER.

   COLONEL LESTER E. MCGEE, JR., USA, (RET) - STAFF DIRECTOR
   ARMY INTELLIGENCE SPECIALIST - (WORKED ON ORIGINAL CINCPAC FILES ON
   PW/MIA'S IN PREPARATION FOR "OPERATION HOMECOMING"); FORMER BATTALION
   COMMANDER IN VIETNAM.

   ARTHUR G. KLOS
   VICE ASSISTANT DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE,
   DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. (DIA'S TOP SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
   EXPERT)

   JOHN FRANCIS MCCREARY,                            
   SENIOR WARNING SPECIALIST- U.S. NATIONAL STRATEGIC WARNING STAFF AND FAR
   EAST AREA SPECIALIST, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. LAWYER.
    
   ROBERTA CARPER MAYNARD
   FORMER NAVY PERSONNEL OFFICER, DIA MANAGEMENT SPECIALIST, DEFENSE
   INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

   THE REVIEW PANEL:  THE GROUP OF DISTINGUISHED AMERICAN LEADERS WHICH
   GEN TIGHE ASKED TO REVIEW THE FINDINGS OF THE TASK FORCE INCLUDE: -

   MR. LYMAN KIRKPATRICK. CIA (RETIRED)
   FORMER INSPECTOR GENERAL. CIA & BROWN UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR; FORMER
   PRESIDENT ASSOCIATION OF FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS (AFIO)

   GENERAL RUSSELL DOUGHERTY. USAF (RET)
   FORMER COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND; EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR. AIR
   FORCE ASSOCIATION. LAWYER.                                         

   GENERAL BOB KINGSTON. USA (BET)
   FORMER COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND. FORMER
   COMMANDER, JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER.

   BRIG GEN ROBBIE RISNER USAF (BET)
   DISTINGUISHED AIR FORCE FIGHTER PILOT; FORMER POW IN HANOI.

   MR. ROSS PEROT.
   CHAIRMAN. ELECTRONIC DATA SYSTEMS; GRADUATE. U.S. NAVAL ACADEMY

   LT GEN JOHN PETER FLYNN. USAF (BET) A DISTINGUISHED AIR FORCE FIGHTER
   PILOT; FORMER LEADER OF U.S. POW'S IN HANOI.  FORMER INSPECTOR GENERAL.
   U.S. AIR FORCE.

   TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:  SO THAT THE TASK FORCE WOULD HAVE THE BENEFIT OF
   UNQUESTIONED TECHNICAL SUPPORT. I ASKED THAT THE DIRECTOR. DIA AUTHORIZE
   OUTSIDE EXPERTISE AS FOLLOWS:

POLYGRAPH:             DR. CHRIS GUGAS. PHD.  PROMINENT POLYGRAPH EXPERT.
                       DIRECTOR "PROFESSIONAL SECURITY CONSULTANTS"- LOS
                       ANGELES. CA.

SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE:   MAJ GEN JOHN MORRISON. USAF (RET), FORMER CHIEF
                       N.F.I.B- SIGNAL COMMITTEE.

VIETNAM INTELLIGENCE:  HOANG LY - FORMER CHIEF OF VIETNAM AIR FORCE
                       INTELLIGENCE AND E.D.S EMPLOYEE.

PHOTO INTERPRETATION:  MR. DINO BRUGIONI, SKILLED PHOTO INTERPRETATION
                       SPECIALIST - CIA RETIRED.

==========
                                 CHAPTER II

                                    DIA

                            MISSION AND CHARTER
==========

                            MISSION AND CHARTER

    THE JCS ISSUED A 1983 MEMORANDUM (SM-718-83) ASSIGNING THE U.S. AIR
FORCE AS EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY WARTIME ESCAPE AND
EVASION TACTICS.

   IN THAT DIRECTIVE, THE DIRECTOR OF DIA IS REQUIRED TO:

   "(5) DEVELOP, MAINTAIN, AND DISSEMINATE INTELLIGENCE FROM ALL SOURCES:

       (A).  ON U.S PERSONNEL MISSING IN ACTION (MIA), PW, AND OTHER
   SELECTED PERSONNEL.

    (B)   ON THE LOCATION, DESCRIPTION, AND IDENTIFICATION OF PW CAMPS
AND DETENTION AREAS, AND ON THE PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES USED BY HOSTILE
FORCES IN THE TREATMENT, HANDLING AND CONFINEMENT OF PW'S." (APPENDIX I)
CLEARLY, THIS CHARTER FOR WARTIME SUPPORT IS INADEQUATE TO THE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR DIA AND THE MILITARY SERVICES TODAY- IT IS MEANT TO
SUPPORT ESCAPE AND EVASION, NOT DETERMINE LOCATION AND POSTWAR EXTRACTION OF
THOSE LEFT BEHIND AFTER THE WAR ENDED. THE LIMITS OF THE DIA'S PW/MIA
FUNCTION IS APPARENTLY NOT CLEAR TO THE PUBLIC NOR THE CONGRESS OR EVEN
WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. THE INTELLIGENCE ENCLOSURE, VAST AS IT IS,
IS CLEARLY CONFINED. DIA DOES NOT HAVE SWEEPING AUTHORITY IN THE PW/MIA
ISSUE.

     THE FUNDAMENTAL FENCE OVER WHICH THE DIA CANNOT LEAP WAS NO BETTER
 ENUNCIATED THAN BY THE DIRECTOR OF THE DIA, LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES A
 WILLIAMS, ON 8 AUGUST 1984, IN TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN
 AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS:

[ DIA is responsible for the analysis of information and has collection
tasking authority for the intelligence community.  This mission may be
misunderstood, particularly in the public arena. ]

   "THE COMMITTEE ASKED A QUESTION CONCERNING WHAT ACTION THE U.S.
   GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE TO EFFECT THE RELEASE OF AN AMERICAN IF CONFIRMED
   TO BE IN CAPTIVITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. I SUBMIT, MR. CHAIRMAN, THAT ANY
   ANSWER TO THAT QUESTION IS BEYOND THE PURVIEW OF DIA. OUR CHARTER IS TO
   PROVIDE THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE UPON WHICH DECISION MAKERS DEVELOP U.S.
   GOVERNMENT POLICY. WE ARE THE INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS, NOT
   THE POLICYMAKERS."

   THE DIA PUBLISHED A COMPREHENSIVE MISSION AND FUNCTIONS REGULATION, DIAR
15-4 DATED 31 JANUARY 1986. THIS COVERS MORE ADEQUATELY THE MISSION OF DIA
FOR PW/MIA ANALYSIS BUT AGAIN, UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF EVASION AND ESCAPE.

(APPENDIX II ).

[ No more JCS directives are necessary.  DIA has rewritten its own mission
statement for this issue and the rewritten statement is being staffed for
coordination. ]

   IT IS IMPORTANT TO THIS HIGH PRIORITY EFFORT THAT JCS ISSUE A
COMPREHENSIVE DIRECTIVE ASSIGNING DIA ALL THE MISSION FOR PW/MIA'S IT IS
EXPECTED TO PERFORM AND THAT THE DIRECTOR OF DIA THEN ISSUE A SEPARATE,
DISTINCT DIRECTIVE COVERING THIS MISSION ALONE TO ASSURE THAT ALL
APPROPRIATE PERSONNEL UNDERSTAND, AND PRECISELY AND COMPLETELY ACCOMPLISH
THE RESULTS INTENDED.

    THE PREVIOUS ORGANIZATIONAL CHART OF THE DIA DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS,
PLANS, AND TRAINING (VO), SHOWED THE SPECIAL OFFICE FOR PW/MIA AS PART OF
ITS ORGANIZATION BUT, DID NOT INCLUDE THE ACTIVITIES OF THAT OFFICE, NOR DID
IT MENTION PW/MIA IN ITS NARRATIVE MISSION STATEMENT, CASTING DOUBT THAT
THIS ACTIVITY ENJOYED HIGH PRIORITY IN THE DIRECTORATE.  IN MAY 1986 A NEW
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE CORRECTED THIS ADMINISTRATIVE OVERSIGHT.

==========
                              CHAPTER III

                              DIA PROBLEMS
==========

               A.  STATUS QUO AND STATUS QUO ANTE

    AS THE PW/MIA ISSUE HAS GROWN IN IMPORTANCE TO THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED
STATES AT PRESIDENTIAL URGING AND A LAUDABLE INCREASE IN ATTENTION BY THE
CURRENT ADMINISTRATION, THE DIRECTOR OF DIA ASSIGNED INCREASED MANNING TO
HANDLE THE WORKLOAD. UNFORTUNATELY THE AWARENESS AND DEMAND FOR INFORMATION
AND REPRESENTATION OUTSTRIPPED THE UNIT'S ABILITY TO DO ITS PRIMARY JOB OF
DATA BASE MAINTENANCE, INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS. ANALYSIS--THE MOST
IMPORTANT. FUNCTION ASSIGNED AND THE FUNCTION ESSENTIAL TO BRINGING LIVE
AMERICANS HOME--WAS CLOSE TO A HALT. IT HAS BEEN REENERGIZED.

[ It is imperative that the PW office continue liaison with other government
agencies.  It is the lifeline of our organization. ]

    IF THE PW/MIA CENTER OF DIA IS TO PROGRESS AS ITS NEW CHIEF COL KIMBALL
GAINES IS DETERMINED IT SHALL. IT MUST BE DIVESTED OF ITS RESPONSIBILITY TO
SERVE MORE THAN THE INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS FUNCTION. OUTSIDE AGENCIES AND
ORGANIZATIONS OUTSIDE THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MUST NOT BE DIRECTLY
INVOLVED IN THE EVALUATION OF FILES AND REPORTS OR HAVE ACCESS TO THEM.
LIAISON WITH OUTSIDE ORGANIZATIONS MUST BE CONSIDERED A "POLICY" PROCESS AND
HANDLED SEPARATELY BY OTHER DIA AND DOD ELEMENTS, OPERATING OUTSIDE THE
CENTER.

    ONLY DIA PERSONNEL, ASSIGNED TO THE PW/MIA CENTER FOR THE SPECIFIC
FUNCTIONS ASSIGNED BY THE JCS MEMORANDUM SHOULD HAVE ACCESS TO ITS FILES.
THERE IS NO WAY THE DIRECTOR OF DIA CAN PROPERLY MANAGE HIS RESOURCES IF
OUTSIDE ORGANIZATIONS ARE INTIMATELY INVOLVED IN THE INVESTIGATIVE AND
ANALYTIC FUNCTIONS OF DIA.  REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CIA, NSA AND THE STATE
DEPARTMENT'S BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO ASSIST IN
ANALYSIS AT DIA.

    ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT FOR THE PRIORITY APPROACH TO THIS ISSUE WHICH THE
PRESIDENT HAS EVERY RIGHT TO EXPECT, IS THE PROPER SCOPING OF THE TASKING
AHEAD. IN THE CONSIDERED VIEW OF THIS TASK FORCE, THE PW/MIA ELEMENT WILL
REQUIRE A RATHER SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN PERSONNEL, WORKING SPACE AND
COMPUTER SUPPORT IF IT IS PROPERLY TO ANALYZE THE MASS OF DATA PRESENTLY ON
HAND AND THE BACKLOG OF INTELLIGENCE NOT YET EXAMINED.

    NO LONGER SHOULD THE ANALYST BE ALL THINGS TO ALL MEN--TYPIST,
INVESTIGATOR, POLYGRAPH ASSISTANT, AND MANAGER.

    WE BELIEVE THE VOLUME OF RETIRED DATA, CURRENTLY STORED IN SUITLAND,
MD., RETIRED RECORDS VAULTS, SHOULD BE BROUGHT BACK TO THE PW/MIA CENTER
AND INTEGRATED INTO A COMPUTERIZED DATA BASE.

    A REVIEW OF THE PW/MIA CENTER FILES AND WORK PRODUCTS PROVIDES ANOTHER
CRITERIA, A POSTERIORI OF WHAT MANAGEMENT AND WORKERS JUDGED TO BE THEIR
TASK. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE PITFALLS IN DRAWING TOO MANY CONCLUSIONS FROM WORK
PRODUCT, AT LEAST IT REVEALS HOW THE MISSION WAS TRANSLATED INTO SPECIFIC
INTELLIGENCE TASKS.

THE CASE FILES LEAVE MUCH TO BE DESIRED.  OVERCLASSIFICATION, DUPLICATE AND
TRIPLICATE PAPERS, UNDATED, UNSIGNED AND ANONYMOUSLY WRITTEN MEMOS ABOUND:
NO REGULATIONS, NO SUSPENSE LIST NOR SYNOPSIS OF OUTSTANDING INQUIRIES.
THERE IS A TOTAL ABSENCE OF RIGOROUS, STANDARD, DISCIPLINED, PROFESSIONAL,
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES.

    THE LONG DELAYS IN THE INVESTIGATION AND THE EVALUATION PROCESS CAUSED
BY LACK OF TYPISTS IS INEXCUSABLE. IF ANALYSIS IS TO OCCUPY THE HIGHEST
PRIORITY IN THE FUTURE, THEN ALL OF THE SUPPORTING DATA AND RESOURCES WILL
HAVE TO BE AVAILABLE FOR THE ANALYST.

                         B.  THE ANALYSTS APPROACH

[ This assertion is not correct.  Analysis is conducted on the assumption
that live Americans may be held.  The fact that, from time to time,
fabricated or less than accurate reports are received and analyzed as such
does not mean that all reports are perceived negatively. ]

    THE TTF NOTES THAT THE ROUTINE APPROACH TO EACH SOURCE HAS BEEN IN ONE
DIRECTION.  ALWAYS THE DOUBT:  "HE'S PROBABLY WRONG."  NEVER THE INFERENCE:
"HE MAY BE RIGHT."   THE VERDICT OF FOLK WISDOM IS IGNORED, THAT IS,
"WHERE- THERE'S SMOKE THERE'S FIRE."

                         C. BALANCING THE EVIDENCE

    IT IS IMPORTANT TO RECOGNIZE THE STANDARD UNDERSTANDING OF EVIDENCE.
SEEKING EVIDENCE IS A TWO-WAY DISCIPLINE.  TWO WAYS IN WHICH WE PROVE OR
DISPROVE A FACT. INDICATIONS THAT SHOW THE POSITIVE EXISTENCE OF MIA'S MUST
BE AS CAREFULLY EXAMINED AND BALANCED AGAINST THE INDICATORS THAT DISCLOSE
THE NEGATIVE:  THE NON-EXISTENCE OF MIA'S.  AMONG THE CASE FILES THERE
APPEARS A DOMINANT EMPHASIS ON THE NEGATIVE.  NO ACCENT ON THE POSITIVE.
BALANCE OF EXAMINATION OF THE EVIDENCE IS NOT APPARENT.

                  D.  UNDERSTANDING INTELLIGENCE. METHODS

    CLUES OF THIS FUNDAMENTAL MISUNDERSTANDING OF INTELLIGENCE ARE
REINFORCED BY COPIES OF BRIEFINGS AND MEMOS IN THE "CASE" FILES. THE PW/MIA
CENTER HAS MIXED INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS WITH INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS TO THE
VIRTUAL EXCLUSION OF ANALYSIS. INTELLIGENCE HAS ALWAYS RELIED ON DOUBTFUL
SOURCES FOR INFORMATION THAT SEPARATELY MIGHT HAVE ENORMOUS RELEVANCE TO
PLANS, POLICIES AND INTERESTS. THE SEPARATION OF COLLECTION FROM ANALYSIS
ACTS AS SURETY THAT DISREPUTABLE PERSONS AND ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY NEITHER
OBSCURE NOR EXAGGERATE THE VALUE OF INFORMATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY.

     THESE PRINCIPLES, THE PHILOSOPHY BRED OF EXPERIENCE UNDERLYING THEM,
THE DANGERS IN THEIR VIOLATION WERE NOT REFLECTED IN THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
PW/MIA CENTER IS ELOQUENT TESTIMONY TO THE CONTINUING VITALITY AND VALIDITY
OF THE PRINCIPLES.  EXCESSIVE CONCENTRATION ON SOURCE EVALUATION HAS
FRUSTRATED ASSESSMENT OF THE SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT OF THE REPORTS.

                   E.  RELIANCE ON STALE DATA

[ The characterization of DIA analysis as relying on "stale date" only is a
distortion.  Reporting must be evaluated initially in terms of contemporary
reporting i.e., 1979 reporting first must be compared with 1979 information.
Refugees are not the only source of information.  The national intelligence
community has as a highest priority, the collection of information on this
issue using all means of collection. ]

     THE PW/MIA CENTER IS A SINGLE SOURCE OPERATION.  MOST EVERY FILE BEGINS
WITH A JCRC INTERVIEW OR FEATURES ONE. THE MOST COMMON FOLLOW UP TASK IS TO
ASK JCRC TO SEEK THE ANSWERS TO MORE QUESTIONS FROM THE SAME SOURCE, MOST
OFTEN ABOUT INFORMATION THAT IS SOMETIMES A DECADE OLD. THIS POINTLESS WASTE
OF TIME IS SOMETIMES SUPPLEMENTED BY A REVIEW OF OLD  (SANITIZED)

[ The PW/MIA office does not engage in activities that are a "pointless
waste of time."  Requests for information, either original or follow-up, are
carefully reviewed by several levels of analysts and managers to insure that
precious collection resources are not being squandered on unnecessary
collection.  In most cases, follow-up collection is requested to exploit
further a source's knowledge as revealed by the initial report -- a standard
analytic-collection interface. ]

     TO ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE OF PLACES AND CAMPS. THESE TASKINGS MAINLY
HAVE RELEVANCE IN A SOURCE EVALUATION PROGRAM. THEY ARE ONLY MARGINALLY
USEFUL IN AN INVESTIGATION OF THE PLAUSIBILITY OF INTELLIGENCE GENERALLY,
AND MUCH LESS IN A SEARCH FOR THE PRESENT, LIKELY LOCATION OF PERSONS
DESCRIBED FROM A DISTANT MEMORY. USE OF (SANITIZED) IN THE JUNGLE DURING THE
WAR WAS NOT VERY EFFECTIVE: A RETROSPECTIVE SEARCH FOR A VILLAGE COULD
HARDLY BE MORE PROFITABLE. YET IT IS TO THE CREDIT OF THE PHOTO INTERPRETERS
THAT SOME HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED. THE PW/MIA ELEMENT SIMPLY LACKED A CONCEPT
FOR WORKING WITH SO CALLED UNRESOLVED CASES EXCEPT TO TRY ROUTINELY TO BRAND
THEM AS FABRICATIONS. THIS TREND HAS BEEN REVERSED AND ANALYSIS IS
PROCEEDING IN A POSITIVE MODE.

                               F.  COLLECTION

    INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SIGHTING OF LIVE AMERICANS IN
INDOCHINA IS RECEIVED BY THE PW/MIA CENTER PRIMARILY IN THE FORM OF
KNOWLEDGEABILITY BRIEFS (KB'S) FROM A SINGLE SOURCE--REFUGEES INTERROGATED
BY THE JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER (JCRC ELEMENT LOCATED IN THAILAND).
THERE IS A BODY OF REPORTING - ALBEIT SMALL - FROM CIA, DEFENSE ATTACHES,
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, JOINT VOLUNTEER AGENCIES, THE LEAGUE OF FAMILIES,
MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, AND CONCERNED CITIZENS AND CITIZEN GROUPS- THIS
INFORMATION RECEIVES THE SAME ATTENTION AS THAT FROM THE JCRC.

     BASED ON THE QUALITY AND SCOPE OF INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE JCRC, IT
 IS CLEARLY EVIDENT THAT THE JCRC NEEDS BETTER COLLECTION GUIDANCE AS WELL
 AS A DATA BASE TO PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR MORE DETAILED INTERVIEWS AT FIRST
 OPPORTUNITY. THESE OUTSTANDING PERSONNEL NEED HELP.

     IN THE PAST JCRC WAS DIRECTED TO HOME IN ON SOURCE'S BONAFIDES- INITIAL
 INTERVIEWS WERE FOLLOWED UP WITH EXTENSIVE REQUESTS FOR SOURCE BIOGRAPHIC
 DATA, CORROBORATION OF INFORMATION PROVIDED FROM OTHER SOURCE, AND ON
 OCCASIONS REQUESTS FOR POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION TO DETERMINE SOURCE
 VERACITY, ETC. NOW THE EFFORT IS IN DEVELOPING AND ANALYZING THE
 SUBSTANTIVE INFORMATION ELICITED AND MORE POSITIVE RESULTS WILL BE
 FORTHCOMING.

                     1. DEARTH OF SOURCES AND EEI'S

     THE DEARTH OF ANY OTHER SOURCE REPORTING IS PUZZLING AT BEST. UNTIL
 RECENTLY, THERE WERE NO EEI'S IN THE NATIONAL HUMINT COLLECTION PLAN
 (NHCP).

     IN MARCH 1985, DIA PUBLISHED A CONTINUING INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENT
 (SANITIZED) DERIVED FROM (SANITIZED) WHICH ESTABLISHED EEI CONCERNING
 AMERICAN PW/MIA'S BEING DETAINED IN INDOCHINA AND GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND
 LEADERSHIP ATTITUDES VIS-A-VIS THE PW/MIA PROBLEM. SUBSEQUENTLY, A MORE
 DETAILED DOD (SANITIZED) WAS PUBLISHED IN OCTOBER 198S WITH INTERNAL
 GUIDANCE TO THE EFFECT THAT ADDRESSEES WOULD RECEIVE TAILORED GUIDANCE
 PERTINENT TO THE REQUIREMENT BY SEPARATE DOD HUMINT TASKING MESSAGE FROM
 THE APPROPRIATE DIA-ATTACHE GEOGRAPHICAL/FUNCTIONAL DIVISION.

      THIS TAILORED GUIDANCE WAS INITIALLY PROMULGATED IN NOVEMBER 1985 AND
 CONTINUES.

[ (sanitized) tasking in support of PW/MIA analysis is done with a
combination of standing and ad hoc problems sets including point and broad
area search targets.  Ad-hoc coverage is frequently used in response to
incoming reporting and in response to analytic findings.  The single purpose
of (sanitized) collection is to provide the (sanitized) component of an
all-source collection effort to find live Americans. ]

      THE RECORD IS UNCLEAR AS TO THE EXISTENCE OF ANY CONTINUING
(SANITIZED) TASKING REQUIREMENTS. THERE APPEARS TO BE A CURRENT TASKING
WHICH INCLUDES 21 (SANITIZED) TARGETS, BUT THE RATIONALE FOR THE TARGETS IS
ABSENT FROM THE FILES. I (SANITIZED) HAS BEEN USED IN THE PAST FOR THE
PURPOSE OF PROVING THE VERACITY OF A SOURCE RATHER THAN AN ATTEMPT TO LOCATE
PW/MIA'S. (SANITIZED) WOULD BE REVIEWED IN CONNECTION WITH DETERMINING A
SOURCE'S RECOLLECTION OF A PARTICULAR AREA,  THEREBY  USING  (SANITIZED)
TO ESTABLISH THE VERACITY OF THE SOURCE, NOT TO LOCATE PW/MIA'S.

    A REVIEW OF THE FILES GIVES A CLEAR INDICATION THAT THE PW/MIA COLLECTION
MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN, AT BEST, UNDERTAKEN ON AN AD HOC BASIS,..
RESULTING IN A DETRIMENTAL EFFECT ON THE ANALYTICAL EFFORTS OF THE ELEMENT.-'
ALL EVIDENCE INDICATES THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO DISCIPLINED, COHERENT, ALL-
SOURCE INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT PLAN OR APPROACH WHICH ACTIVELY ENGAGES THE
ENTIRE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY- IT IS QUITE EVIDENT THAT THE PW/MIA
CENTER HAS BEEN OPERATING OUTSIDE THE MAINSTREAM OF THE DIA INTELLIGENCE--
COLLECTION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM.

    IN RECOGNITION OF THIS SHORTCOMING LT GENERAL PERROOTS HAS ALREADY
IMPLEMENTED CORRECTIVE-ACTION.

    2. ABSENCE OF ALL-SOURCE COLLECTION

[ All-source collection is, and has been, in place.  An all-source
collection plan is being coordinated that will more formally involve the
entire national intelligence community.  Over 100 specific taskings on
individual EEI have been issued since March 1986 over and above standing
requirements. ]

    THERE IS LITTLE HOPE THAT ANY MEANINGFUL ANALYSIS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED
WITHOUT MEANINGFUL COLLECTION ACTIVITIES DIRECTED AGAINST THE PW/MIA TARGET.
AN INFORMATION STRATEGY SHOULD BE DEVELOPED FIRST. THEN AN ALL-SOURCE
COLLECTION PLAN DEVOTED SOLELY TO PW/MIA SUBJECTS COULD BE PREPARED IN
COLLABORATION WITH THE RESPONSIBLE DIA STAFF ELEMENTS. BASED ON THIS
COLLECTION PLAN, CURRENT AND CONTINUING COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENTS
SHOULD BE PREPARED AND VALIDATED WITHIN THE PROPER INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
STRUCTURE IN ORDER TO BRING ALL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ASSETS TO
BEAR ON THE TARGET.  ADDITIONALLY, EXPANDED KB'S, TAILORED TO THE PW/MIA
ISSUE, SHOULD BE PREPARED AND FORWARDED TO THE JCRC.

   3. INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY

    ALL PENAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD ARE DERIVED FROM A HANDFUL OF MODELS.
PATTERNS OF TREATMENT, MOVEMENT, SUBORDINATION AND SO ON, TEND TO BE
BORROWED. VIETNAM'S APPEARS TO DERIVE FROM THE FRENCH OR SOVIET MODEL
MODIFIED BY ASIAN TRADITIONS. IN ESTABLISHING THE CONTEXT OF A SIGHTING,
CREDIBILITY OF THE SIGHTING AND THE INVESTIGATION WOULD BE ENHANCED IN THE
EVENT THAT OBSERVED BEHAVIORS FIT THE PATTERN OF KNOWN PENAL PRACTICES IN
THE SOVIET UNION, CHINA OR ELSEWHERE.

    4.  PRISON SYSTEM STUDY

[ The Tighe Task Force implies that the PW/MIA center has been lax regarding
prison system.  This is unfair, and unfortunate, because it is one area
wherein DIA excels.  The PW/MIA center has not studied prison labor on the
Soviet Siberian pipeline or made a study of penal systems in general,
however it has constructed paradigms of the Vietnamese prison complex.  This
was fundamental to analysis, and has enabled DIA, through all source
intelligence collection, to stay current on the Vietnamese prison system
during and after the war; to focus on U.S. prisoners, Vietnamese military
and civilian prisoners; and to accrue biographic data on Vietnamese
personnel managing the prison system.  The PW/MIA center has on file
recurring studies and (sanitized) reports on confirmed and possible camps.
The PW/MIA center is the recognized authority within the U.S. intelligence
community on Southeast Asian prison systems. ]

    THE PW/MIA CENTER HAS PROVIDED NO ASSURANCE OR EVIDENCE THAT IT HAS
INVESTIGATED OTHER PENAL SYSTEMS TO HELP ITS INVESTIGATION OF VIETNAMESE OR
LAOTIAN HANDLING OF PRISONERS. THERE IS SOME REASONABLE PROSPECT THAT THESE
COMMUNIST AUTHORITIES FOLLOW ADVICE GIVEN BY PACT SECURITY AND POLICE
ADVISORS. THIS TASK FORCE OBSERVED THAT THE PW/MIA CENTER'S ISOLATION AND
COMPARTMENTATION RESULTED IN A DENIAL OF OTHER USEFUL EXPERIENCE-WITHIN THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONCERNING THE INVESTIGATION AND MONITORING OF PENAL
SYSTEMS IN HOSTILE ENVIRONMENTS.  AT A MINIMUM THE INTERAGENCY STUDIES OF
PRISON LABOR ON THE SOVIET SIBERIAN PIPELINE MIGHT HAVE AFFORDED SOME
BENEFIT. IF THOSE OR OTHER SOURCES WERE CONSULTED, THE FILES DO NOT SHOW IT.

     IN A RELATED DIMENSION, THE SHEER VOLUME AND COMPLEXITY OF REPORTING
AND DATA OUGHT TO HAVE LED MANAGEMENT OR ANALYSTS TO SEEK THE HELP OF
OPERATIONS RESEARCHERS, STATISTICIANS AND METHODOLOGISTS.  THESE FUNCTIONAL
SPECIALISTS MIGHT HAVE HELPED CLARIFY THE ANALYTIC PROBLEMS AND MATERIALLY
FACILITATED AND ABETTED THE PROCESSING OF REPORTS WHICH THE PW/MIA CENTER
NEVER SEEMS TO HAVE SURMOUNTED.

   5. WARTIME POW SYSTEM

[ Previous comments applies ]

    CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS AND INTERROGATION OF RETURNED POW'S OFFER THE
RECONSTRUCTION AND VISUALIZATION OF THE CURRENT TRI-COUNTRY (VIETNAM-LAOS-
CAMBODIA) PRISONER COMPLEX. THIS STRUCTURE AND SYSTEM CAN SERVE BOTH TO
CORROBORATE THE VALIDITY, AND DETECT THE MECHANICS OF A COVERT SYSTEM
DESIGNED TO MASK THE EXISTENCE OF MIA HIDING PLACES. IRONICALLY, MANY WERE
CONSTRUCTED BY THE U.S. DATA IS AVAILABLE WHICH SHOWS THAT EIGHT HUNDRED
SIXTY-TWO (862) LANDING ZONES AND FIRE SUPPORT BASES WERE CONSTRUCTED BY THE
U.S. IN VIETNAM, LAOS AND CAMBODIA. THE VAST NETWORK OF ENEMY UNDERGROUND
TUNNELS, HOSPITALS, COMMAND POSTS AND LIVING QUARTERS HAS TO BE EXPOSED.
THOUSANDS HAVE LIVED THERE UNDERGROUND.

[ The Tighe Task Force comments on the wartime PW system is an assortment of
miscellaneous statements mixing partial descriptions of the Vietnamese
systems for U.S. PWs, ARVN PWs, and civil and political prison systems.
This section reflects a serious misunderstanding of the Vietnamese prison
system on the part of the Tighe Task Force. ]

    THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF A DIA EFFORT TO RECONSTRUCT THE CURRENT PW/MIA
SYSTEM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, THE ASSUMPTION BEING THAT THIS IN-COUNTRY
COMMUNIST COMPLEX, DOMINATED BY THE VIETNAMESE, IS A FORMIDABLE APPARATUS
FOR DISGUISING MOTIVES AND REALITY.

    DURING THE WAR, IN THE NORTH AND SOUTH, CAPTURED AMERICANS WERE
GENERALLY PLACED IN A DIFFERENT PRISON WORLD. JUST AS THEY WERE DOMINATELY
IN A DIFFERENT MILITARY SERVICE, AND CATEGORIZED ACCORDING TO ENLISTED AND
OFFICER STATUS.

    SIXTY-SEVEN PERCENT OF THE AMERICANS CAPTURED IN THE SOUTH WERE ENLISTED
ARMY AND MARINE CORPS PERSONNEL. FIVE OR SIX AMERICANS WERE PLACED IN SMALL
MOBILE CAMPS OF ABOUT 25 PRISONERS (MOSTLY ARVN). THE "CAMP" WAS
CONTINUOUSLY ON THE MOVE.  PRISONERS WERE HELD IN CAVES, BAMBOO HUTS, CAGES
OR THE UNDERGROUND SYSTEMS AND CHAINED AT NIGHT.  ABOUT 30 PERCENT DID NOT
SURVIVE CAPTIVITY.  THE PRISONERS WERE CONSTANTLY SHIFTED.

    NINETY-EIGHT PERCENT OF THE CAPTURED AMERICANS IN THE NORTH WERE NAVY
AND AIR FORCE OFFICERS.  THOSE WHO CAME HOME USUALLY WERE HELD WITHIN A
FORMAL PRISON SYSTEM.  ROUGHLY FROM A PERIOD OF A FEW WEEKS TO AS LONG AS
FOUR YEARS. MANY WERE FIELD IN SOLITARY CONFINEMENT.  SOLITARY WAS USUALLY
A CONCRETE CELL. 8'x8', BARE BOARDS, PEEP-HOLED DOOR, SMALL WINDOW. THREE-
AND FOUR-MAN CELLS WERE ALSO COMMON AS WELL AS LARGER BARRACK-TYPE CELLS.

    IN LAOS, THE USE OF CAVES WAS COMMON.  CAMBODIA WAS SIMILAR.  MANY
CURRENT REPORTS CONTINUE TO REFER TO CAVES AS POW CAMPS IN LAOS.  CAVES ARE
AMPLE AND THE CHEAPEST KIND OF CONCEALMENT.  THE STANDARD OPERATING
PROCEDURES AND STRUCTURE FOR THE NORTH VIETNAMESE PRISON SYSTEM DIVIDED THE
PRISONERS OF WAR CAMP SYSTEM INTO THREE CATEGORIES:

     A.  MIDDLE LINE POW CAMPS

     B.  REAR POW CAMPS

     C.  STATE PRODUCTION CAMPS

THE MIDDLE LINE CAMPS ENGAGED IN AN INITIAL INDOCTRINATION OF 20 DAYS TO ONE
MONTH DURING WHICH THERE WAS SELECTION OF THOSE WHO WOULD JOIN THE NVA,
"LIBERATION ARMY." FROM HERE, SERGEANTS AND ABOVE WERE LOCATED TO THE REAR
POW CAMPS. THE REAR POW CAMPS ENGAGED IN LONG-RANGE REINDOCTRINATION.

    THE STATE PRODUCTION CAMPS WERE IN THE NATURE OF STATE FARMS TO GENERATE
FOOD, SUCH AS RICE, MANIOC AND LIVESTOCK.  A PRODUCTION QUOTA WAS
ESTABLISHED.  ROUTINE SWITCHING OF PRISONERS BETWEEN POW CAMPS WAS
INCORPORATED AS PART OF THE SYSTEM.

    WITH THE ADVENT OF THE COMMUNIST SUCCESS AND WITH THE WAR OVER, IT IS
REASONABLE TO ASSUME THAT THE SMALL CELL; MOBILE POW UNITS QUICKLY
DISAPPEARED IN FAVOR OF THE DESIGNED SYSTEM AUGMENTED BY THE GULAGS CALLED
"RE-EDUCATION CAMPS."

    IT IS ASSUMED THAT BOTH THE QUICK AND THE DELAYED PURGING OF CONVERTS
AND RECOGNIZED POLITICALLY. INDIFFERENT PRISONERS CREATED A RAPID DECLINE IN
THE IMPRISONED POPULATION, AND WITH IT, ESPECIALLY SINCE THERE IS NO LONGER
AN EXODUS OF U.S. INMATES, AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE SYSTEM'S CAPABILITY TO
CONTROL AND HIDE WHAT'S GOING ON.

    A VAST TUNNEL SYSTEM, CAVES, AND TRIPLE CANOPY JUNGLE,  (REDUCED 15
PERCENT BY HERBICIDES 15 YEARS AGO), IS NOW BACK TO ITS OLD PROTECTIVE STATE
OF COVERING THE SCENERY [SANITIZED] THIS GROWING MEANS TO HIDE MIA'S, AIDED
BY THE OLD PROCESS OF SHIFTING POW'S FROM ONE PLACE TO ANOTHER INDICATES
THAT AN UP-TO-DATE SNAPSHOT, ANALYSIS, AND CURRENT EVALUATION OF HOW THE POW
SYSTEM OPERATES IS IN ORDER TO HELP PROVE OR DISPROVE THE EXISTENCE AND
WHEREABOUTS OF LIVE U.S. MIA'S.

     CLOSE EXAMINATION OF THE PRESENT PRISONER COMPLEX WILL MAP AND BRIDGE
THE ROAD FROM HYPOTHESIS TO PROOF OR DISPROOF. ONE THING IS CLEAR. UNDER THE
COMMUNIST SYSTEM AND IN THE PRIMITIVE, MOUNTAINOUS AND JUNGLE COUNTRY
DESIGNED BY NATURE AND BY WAR FOR OVER A QUARTER OF A CENTURY TO PROTECT
AGAINST REVELATION OF MEN AND THEIR MOVEMENTS, IT IS NOT AT ALL DIFFICULT TO
DO SO.  SECRECY, MYSTERY AND THE UNKNOWN ARE NOT JUST FEATURES OF THE
SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMUNIST REGIMES, THEY ARE ENDEMICALLY FASHIONABLE.

     6. FILE CONFUSION

    THE ORGANIZATION OF THE "LIVE' SIGHTING' REPORTS REFLECTS THE
FUNDAMENTAL OUTLOOK ON THE INTELLIGENCE JOB.  ALL FILES ARE SOURCE FILES,
AND ALL DATA IS SORTED BY SOURCE OF ORIGIN. THE TASK FORCE CONCLUDES THAT
PW/MIA CENTER PERSONNEL CONSIDERED THEIR MAJOR INTELLIGENCE TASK TO BE
REVIEWING SOURCES OF INFORMATION.  DURING THIS REVIEW, THIS M.O. WAS
REVERSED AND POSITIVE FIXES ARE IN PLACE.

    7.  SEMANTIC CONFUSION

[ There is no semantic confusion in DIA analysis.  Analysis focuses on the
information to determine if that information pertains to an unaccounted for
American.  Analysts use data from all sources as appropriate.  The focus is
not on the source and sources are not classified as "good" or "bad".  This
passage is a rehash of the charge that DIA emphasizes source bona fides over
information. ]

    THERE IS SOME CONFUSION, HOWEVER, AS TO JUST WHAT THE TERMS MENTIONED
ABOVE MEAN.  ANALYSIS AS USED BY THE PW/MIA CENTER IS "SOURCE EVALUATION."
THE OUTCOME OF THE ANALYTICAL WORK IS ALWAYS A DETERMINATION ABOUT THE
SOURCE. EVEN WHEN THE SOURCE OBSERVATIONS ARE CORROBORATED, THE RESULT 1S
SIMPLY A DETERMINATION THAT THE SOURCE IS A "GOOD" SOURCE.

    CONVERSELY, WHEN THE EVALUATION0N TECHNIQUE IS APPLIED IN AN ATTEMPT TO
INVALIDATE A STORY, ONLY THE SOURCE IS DEGRADED IN SOME RESPECT, NOT
NECESSARILY THE STORY: THE ACCURACY OF THE INFORMATION IS NEVER PUT TO THE
ANALYTIC TEST.  IN OTHER WORDS, THE SOURCE EVALUATION PROCESS WILL ONLY
REVEAL WHAT IS ALREADY KNOWN; IT DOES NOT UNCOVER NEW LEADS--SOURCE
EVALUATION NEVER DOES--BECAUSE THE QUALITY OF THE SOURCE ONLY EMERGES WITH
REFERENCE TO WHAT IS KNOWN.

    PAST ANALYTICAL PROCESS AND ORGANIZATION OF THE PW/MIA CENTER FILES
SIMPLY COULD NOT READILY DISCOVER NEW INFORMATION ABOUT PEOPLE STILL IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA, AND IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THIS WAS ACKNOWLEDGED AND
CORRECTIVE ACTION INSTITUTED.

    IN SUMMARY, THE PW/MIA CENTER OF DIA MUST BE SHORN OF ALL BUT THOSE
FUNCTIONS DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE ANALYTIC FUNCTION: SIGNIFICANT INCREASES
IN PERSONNEL EXPERIENCED IN THE ANALYTIC, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND ADP FIELDS
MUST BE ASSIGNED (INITIALLY ON 180-DAY TEMPORARY DUTY TOURS, IF NECESSARY).
SIGNIFICANT ADDITIONAL FLOOR SPACE MUST BE FURNISHED. THE JOB WILL GET
BIGGER, IT WON'T GO AWAY.

==========
                                 CHAPTER IV

                             FOLLOWUP ANALYSIS
==========

                             FOLLOWUP ANALYSIS
  
    THIS TASK FORCE IS SENSITIVE TO THE CHARGE OF "SECOND GUESSING" THE
PEOPLE WHO HAVE WORKED THIS PROJECT DURING THE PAST DOZEN YEARS. INDEED,
HINDSIGHT IS ONLY ONE KIND OF WISDOM.

    WHAT HAS PROMPTED A CLOSE SCRUTINY OF THE QUALITY OF ANALYSIS IS A
CATEGORY OF UNRESOLVED "CASES" IN WHICH THE EYEWITNESS SIGHTING CAN NEITHER
BE DISCOUNTED NOR CORROBORATED BY KNOWN EVENTS, PERSONS OR TECHNIQUES USED
BY VO- PW. THIS TASK FORCE HAS ENCOUNTERED SEVERAL OF THESE, WITH VARIOUS
DATES OF INFORMATION. THIS CATEGORY INCLUDES SIGHTINGS IN LAOS WHEREIN THE
NON-ASIANS ARE ENGAGED IN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY -- PLOWING, MINING OR
CONSTRUCTION -- AND UNDER VIETNAMESE CONTROL.

[ The Tighe Group description of the shortcoming's in the analytic process
is somewhat exaggerated.  In a more balanced form, the shortcomings in the
past analytical process did include overemphasis on source reliability to
the point that little was done with the information until the reliability
question was settled.  This was often a lengthy process and in some cases
was taken to the extreme.  This stemmed more from a zeal to be correct than
any personal biases against refugee credibility.  Whether this ever resulted
in lost opportunity is impossible to answer at this late date.  Prior to the
Tighe review, however, a new analytic process was implemented which
emphasizes analysis of the refugee information based on its own merits and
relegates source reliability to a subordinate but still important position
in the analytic process. ]

    FACED WITH NO FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THESE SIGHTINGS, WE EXAMINED THE
ANALYTICAL QUESTIONS THAT PW/MIA ANALYSTS POSED TO THEMSELVES. THESE REVEAL
THE ANALYSTS' UNDERSTANDING OF THEIR ANALYTICAL TASKS AND POINT TOWARD THE
APPROPRIATE STRATEGIES FOR PROBLEM SOLVING.

   THE QUESTIONS MOST OFTEN RAISED ARE

   --IS THE SOURCE RELIABLE?

   --WHO ELSE SAW THE SOURCE OR KNOWS HIM/HER?

   --IS THE LOCATION A GENUINE CAMP, PRISON OR KNOWN CONFINEMENT SITE?

   --CAN THE SOURCE PASS A [SANITIZED]  TEST?

   --WHY DIDN'T THE SOURCE COME FORWARD SOONER?
                       
   --DOES THE SIGHTING INFORMATION CORRESPOND TO KNOWN EVENTS?

    AS ANALYTICAL TASKS, THESE QUESTIONS HAVE SEVERAL FEATURES IN COMMON.
FIRST, MOST ARE YES OR NO QUESTIONS. THIS MEANS THE PROBLEM IS
DETERMINISTIC- -ONE FOR WHICH THERE IS ONLY A SINGLE CORRECT ANSWER. IT IS
PRECISELY THE

( P.O.W. Network Note -- Page 29 of this report was missing but the DIA
rebuttal was provided )

[ This passage is repetitious of previous passages that the analytical
effort is directed at proving a source to be a liar.  This assertion is
simply not true.  Exhaustive efforts are made to determine exactly who or
what a source observed.  Making such a determination requires that a myriad
of possibilities be examined, thus hypotheses testing of the source reporting
must be conducted.  The fact that an analyst develops alternate
explanations for a sighting does not mean that the source's veracity is
being questioned.  A report is determined to be a fabrication only after
extensive research and attempts to give the source the benefit of the doubt. ]

   EVIDENTLY THE ANALYSTS HAVE NO CRITERIA FOR JUDGING THE PROBITY OR
CREDIBILITY OF INFORMATION, INDEPENDENT OF ITS SOURCE. THIS POSES SERIOUS
PROBLEMS WHEN DEALING WITH SOURCES WHOSE MOTIVATIONS ARE SUSPECT.

     BUT A BAD SOURCE CAN BESPEAK AN ILLUMINATING TRUTH. JUDAS ERRED AND
PRONOUNCED IT WITH HIS ROPE.

     THE FILES REFLECT FEW JUDGMENTS ABOUT CLARITY, SPECIFICITY, AMOUNT OF
DETAILS; FEW CORRELATIONS IN PLACE, TIME, ACTIVITY; AND NO HYPOTHESES AS TO
THE REAL SUBSTANCE BEHIND A SIGHTING OR OTHER REPORT.  THESE ARE BASIC
EVIDENTIARY TASKS.

     THE MOST COMMON MANIPULATION OF DATA IS TO CUMULATE AND MATCH REPORTS.
THE SIGHTING OF A DOWNED PILOT IN NORTHERN VIETNAM WHOSE IDENTITY WAS
CONFIRMED ILLUSTRATED ONE APPLICATION OF THIS TECHNIQUE.  USING THE SAME MIX
AND MATCH TECHNIQUE.  A SIGHTING OF A PERSON OF SIMILAR PHYSICAL
CHARACTERISTICS IN SOUTHERN VIETNAM WAS JUDGED TO BE A MONGOLIAN!!  YET
ANOTHER SIGHTING WAS ULTIMATELY ASSESSED TO BE A KNOWN CRIMINAL.  AS
REFLECTED IN THE RECORD THE ANALYTICAL PROCESS IS MOSTLY COUNTING AND
MATCHING CUMULATIVE MATCHING OF THIS TYPE IS A SIMPLISTIC USE OF EVIDENCE.

WE CANNOT DETERMINE THE TRUTH BEHIND THE TWO DISCOUNTED SIGHTINGS, BUT THE
DATA IS, SUFFICIENT FOR MORE SKILLED ANALYSIS AND INVESTIGATION, ALTHOUGH
THE SOURCES MAY BE UNSAVORY.  THE PW/MIA RECORDS CONTAIN NO AUDIT TRAIL THAT
FORECLOSES FURTHER STUDY.  PASSAGE OF TIME PROBABLY MAKES THESE SPECIFIC
SIGHTINGS COLD AND STALE, NEVERTHELESS, THE RESULTS WOULD BE THE SAME
APPLYING THIS TECHNIQUE TO A NEW SIGHTING REPORT: THE "CASE" WOULD BE
"RESOLVED" AS A FABRICATION OR OTHERWISE EXPLAINED AWAY.

    IN OTHER INSTANCES, INVESTIGATIVE LEADS JUST ARE NOT PURSUED -- PLACES
ARE NOT LOCATED, PERSONS NOT IDENTIFIED, ACTIVITIES NOT VALIDATED QUICKLY.
THESE RESULTS ARE PRODUCTS OF A FAILURE CAUSED BY DECOMPOSITION OF EVIDENCE.
WITHOUT BREAKING A STORY APART. AND REASSEMBLING IT, THE ANALYST HAS NO WAY
TO MAKE JUDGMENTS ABOUT THE ACCURACY.  RELEVANCE AND WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE
EVEN FROM A RELIABLE SOURCE.  THE PW/MIA CENTER STOPPED ONE INVESTIGATION
WHEN A POLYGRAPH REPORTED "PARTIAL DECEPTION".   BUT THE FOCUS OF THE LIE
WAS NOT NARROWED; FACT NEVER SEPARATED FROM FABRICATION AND FAILURE TO
RECOGNIZE THAT THE LIE DETECTOR IS AN ANXIETY INDEX. AND THE BACKED-UP WORD
OF AN EXPERT ON ITS USE THAT THE ODDS OF A "TRUTHFUL DEFENDANT WILL FAIL THE
CONTROL QUESTION POLYGRAPH TEST ARE ABOUT 1 IN 2.  I.E.. ROUGHLY 3 TIMES
WORSE THAN THE ODDS IN RUSSIAN ROULETTE".

    THE INFERENCING PROCESSES REFLECTED IN THE FILES ARE FLAWED BY VARIOUS
BIASES.  IN THE CASE OF THE SIGHTING OF A CAUCASIAN DUBBED A KNOWN CRIMINAL.
SEVERAL UNDISPUTED ALLEGATIONS BY THE SOURCE STRONGLY UNDERCUT PW/MIA
CENTER'S "RESOLUTION" OF THE "CASE".   THE ANALYST'S CONCLUSION WAS FOUNDED
ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT WAS NOT DIRECTLY NOR NECESSARILY RELEVANT AT
ALL. MOREOVER, THE SOURCE FLATLY DENIED SEEING THE PERSON THE PW/MIA CENTER
CONCLUDED HE SAW.  IN OUR JUDGMENT, THE PW/MIA CENTER'S CONCLUSION WAS ONE
OF SEVERAL POSSIBILITIES. ACTUALLY THE WEAKEST OF THEM.

    OTHER FORMS OF BIAS ARE STRONGLY EVIDENT IN THE FILES.  ONE IS
COGNITIVE, I.E.. REFERRING TO THE WORKING OF THE MIND.  THE PROCESSES OF
SEEING LINKAGES BETWEEN FACT AND ALLEGATION, AND OF CONSTRUCTING HIGHER
LEVEL HYPOTHESES BY COMBINING EVIDENCE DO NOT SEEM TO GET OFF THE GROUND.
COGNITIVE BIAS WOULD INEVITABLY LEAD TO VERIFICATION OF EVENTS ALREADY KNOWN
BY APPLICATION OF SIMPLISTIC ANALYTICAL STRATEGIES.

    A MORE BASIC PROBLEM IS THE BIAS IN EXPECTATIONS THAT REFUGEES ARE NOT
RELIABLE REPORTERS UNLESS PROVEN TO BE SO. THIS CONTRADICTS THE ASSERTION BY
PW/MIA CENTER PERSONNEL THAT, "WE TREAT ALL REPORTS AS VALID UNLESS
DISCOUNTED."  WE FOUND PRECISELY THE OPPOSITE APPROACH TO BE THE TRUTH OVER
AND OVER.  ONE REFUGEE DECLINED TO CONTINUE HELPING THE PW/MIA CENTER WHEN
IT PERSISTED IN QUESTIONING HIS VERACITY DESPITE HIS HAVING PASSED TWO
POLYGRAPH AND ONE HYPNOSIS TEST, THUS, THE PASSING OR NOT PASSING OF A
POLYGRAPH TEST, EITHER WAY, IS USED AGAINST BELIEF IN THE SOURCE.  LABORING
UNDER SUCH A BIAS, NO ANALYST COULD TREAT THE EVIDENCE FAIRLY. YET REFUGEE
ACCOUNTS ARE THE MAJOR DATA BASE.

    FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE USERS OF THIS REPORT, THE REVIEW TASK FORCE
PROVIDES BELOW ITS VIEWS ON THE ANALYTIC TASK.  THE PW/MIA CENTER SHOULD BE
CLEAR THAT ITS LARGEST ANALYTICAL QUESTION IS WHETHER AMERICANS REMAIN ALIVE
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AGAINST THEIR WILL.

    THIS IS THE OBJECT, FRAMEWORK AND YARDSTICK FOR WEIGHING ALL REPORTS ON
THIS TOPIC.   NO ONE KNOWS THE ANSWER TO THE QUESTION FOR SURE, HENCE IT IS
AUTOMATICALLY A MODERATELY RANDOM TYPE OF PROBLEM.   ADDITIONALLY, DESPITE
THE PW/MIA CENTER'S LIST OF MIA'S AND OTHER RESOURCES, THERE IS SUFFICIENT
VAGUENESS IN THE INFORMATION SO AS TO MAKE THIS A SEVERELY RANDOM PROBLEM.
NO ONE KNOWS THE ANSWER, AND THERE MAY BE MANY ANSWERS.

    THE FORMULATION OF THE QUESTION, AS NOTED ABOVE, SPECIFIES THE MAIN
SOLUTION STRATEGY, THOUGH OTHER STRATEGIES MAY BE USED IN COMBINATION TO
SUPPORT THE MAIN LINE OR LINES OF ARGUMENT. IN MODERATELY RANDOM PROBLEMS,
FACTS AND DATA LISTS ARE OF MODEST VALUE COMPARED TO JUDGMENT.  THE MAIN
ANALYTIC TASK IS TO GENERATE PROJECTIONS WITH ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS AND
ATTACHED PROBABILITIES.  PROBABILITY AND UTILITY TECHNIQUES IN SUPPORT OF
DECISION THEORY ARE ALSO APPROPRIATE INSTRUMENTS AND METHODS.  WHAT THIS
MEANS IS THAT THE PW/MIA CENTER'S PROBLEM-SOLVING STRATEGY DOES NOT FIT THE
PROBLEM, WHICH MEANS, NO SOLUTION CAN POSSIBLY RESULT.

    THESE NORMS AND TECHNIQUES, TAUGHT BOTH AT INTELLIGENCE SCHOOLS AND IN
MOST REPUTABLE LOCAL UNIVERSITIES, COMPEL THE DEVELOPMENT OF A BATTERY OF
ANALYTICAL: TOOLS AND DATA BASES FOR POW/MIA ANALYSIS, WHICH DO NOT NOW
EXIST. MODELS OF THE VIETNAMESE AND LAOTIAN PENAL SYSTEMS SHOULD BE DEVISED,
INCORPORATING THE STRUCTURE OF CONFINEMENT AS A SYSTEM; MOVEMENT PATTERNS;
TREATMENT PATTERNS; PERSONALITIES; CAMP ROUTINES, SUBORDINATION AND COMMAND
AND CONTROL. IN SEVERAL LAOTIAN SIGHTINGS, OBSERVED ALLEGED AMERICANS WERE
USED AS A HARNESSED TEAM TO PULL A PLOW.  OTHER STORIES RECOUNTED AMERICANS
WHO WERE KEPT TO PERFORM TECHNICAL CHORES, KEEP MACHINERY RUNNING AND SO
FORTH.  THESE AND NUMEROUS OTHER DETAILS ENABLE DATA BASE DEVELOPMENT AND
SOLID AUDIT TRAILS.  THEY ARE NOT JUST INTERESTING BY-PRODUCTS OF THE
RESEARCH EFFORT, THEY MAKE IT POSSIBLE. THEY ARE THE TOOLS OF THE
INTELLIGENCE TRADE FOR RANDOM PROBLEMS.

    EVERY SIGHTING SHOULD HAVE SOME CONTEXT OF LINKAGES AND RELATIONSHIPS,
COMMAND AND CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND SO ON, IN WHICH THE SIGHTING EVENT
FITS OR DOES NOT.  PEOPLE.DO NOT LIVE IN A VACUUM.  EVEN IF A SOURCE ADMITS
TO A FABRICATION -- WHATEVER THAT MEANS TO A PERSON FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA --
ANALYSIS OF THE INFORMATION SHOULD VERIFY THE LIE BY SHOWING NO PLAUSIBLE
CONTEXT FOR THE STORY.   FAILURE TO BUILD CONTEXT RISKS THAT THE SOURCE'S
ADMISSION OF GUILT IS NO MORE OR LESS TRUTHFUL THAN HIS STORY ITSELF.  AND
IT'S THE STORY THAT IS THE OBJECT OF THE INVESTIGATION.

==========
                                 CHAPTER V

                    THE JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER

                                   (JCRC)
==========


                THE JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER (JCRC)

    THERE IS A CURIOUS CONTRADICTION IN THE ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE OF
THE JCRC, WHICH HAS BECOME THE PRIME INFORMATION GATHERING ENITY ON THE
PW/MIA ISSUE.  WHEN THE JCRC WAS ESTABLISHED ITS SUBSTANTIAL HEADQUARTERS
AND ALL ITS PERSONNEL WERE LOCATED AND OPERATED IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.  ITS
COMMANDER WAS A WIDELY RESPECTED, HIGHLY DECORATED COMBAT GENERAL WHO
BREATHED GRID COORDINATES.  THE NATIONAL INTEREST AT THE TIME WAS NOT AS
INTENSE NOR FRUSTRATED OVER THE PW/MIA ISSUE.  NOW, AS THE NATION ESCALATES
ITS INTEREST, THE JCRC ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE DECLINES.

    THE JCRC HAS ONLY 14 PERSONNEL.  ITS HEADQUARTERS IS LOCATED IN HAWAII.
IT IS NOW COMMANDED BY A LIEUTENANT COLONEL.  ELEVEN OF HIS MEMBERS ARE
STATIONED IN HAWAII; ONLY 3 OF THEM ARE STATINED IN (SANITIZED).

    COLLECTION OF INFORMATION FROM REFUGEES WANES AS CONGRESSIONAL AND
PUBLIC FRUSTRATION RISES.  AS THE INTENSITY OF BOILING POINT INQUIRIES AND
ALLEGATIONS INCREASES ON THE PW/MIA AND AS THE PRESIDENT ANNOUNCES THE
HIGHEST PRIORITY, THE FIELD SUPPORT INEXPLICABLY DROPS.  ALTHOUGH THE 3 JCRC
PERSONNEL (SANITIZED) PERFORM MAGNIFICIENTLY, NONETHELESS THEY ARE A TINY
NET IN A SEA OF POTENTIAL INFORMATION.

==========
                                 CHAPTER VI

                      THE INTERAGENCY REVIEW COMMITTEE
==========

    TO GAIN COHESIVENESS, INCORPORATE VARIOUS SKILLS, INTENSIFY CASE REVIEW
AND ELEVATE DECISION MAKING, THE DIA HAS RECENTLY ESTABLISHED AN
"INTERAGENCY REVIEW COMMITTEE ON VIETNAM PW/MIAS."  THE COMMITTEE IS
CURRENTLY CHAIRED BY BRIGADIER GENERAL JAMES W. SHUFELT, USA, DEPUTY
DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS, PLANS, AND TRAINING, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
THIS INTERAGENCY REVIEW COMMITTEE IS A NEEDED MECHANISM AND DIA SHOULD BE
COMPLIMENTED FOR ITS CREATION, HOWEVER, IT HAS WEEKNESSES.  FOR EXAMPLE, THE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVE IS A SURROGATE OF CINCPAC AND THE JCRC.
BUT THE RELATIVELY LOW RANK OF THE OFFICER NOW ATTENDING, HOWEVER TALENTED
HE IS, ASSURES THAT THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF IMPACT ON THE PROCESS WILL BE
LESS THAN OPTIMAL.  FURTHER MORE, IT IS NOTED THAT THE MISSIONS AND
FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERAGNECY COMMITTEE (DIAR 15-4) LAY DOWN A REQUIREMENT
FOR FLAG RANK OR SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE LEVEL REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE
NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE REPRESENTATION.  UNLESS THE AGENCIES INVOLVED
SHOW GREATER INTEREST IN THIS DIA INITIATIVE, IT TOO SHALL PASS AS AN
EFFECTIVE ELEMENT OF THE PROCESS.

==========
                                CHAPTER VII

                                 COVER-UP?
==========

                                  COVER-UP

    THERE ARE THOSE WHO WOULD DEFINE COVER-UP DIFFERENTLY THAN WE HAVE.
NONETHELESS, WHATEVER DEFINITION IS CHOSEN IT IS CERTAIN THAT THIS TASK
FORCE HAS FOUND NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER THAT ANY AMERICAN INVOLVED IN THE
PW/MIA EFFORT HAS TRIED TO COVER-UP ANY FACET OF THIS PAINFUL BUSINESS.
THAT'S THE FIRST IMPORTANT FINDING OF THIS TASK FORCE.

    "COVER-UP", IN THE SENSE OF PROVING BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THERE
IS INTENT TO COMMITT A CRIME, IS NOT EVIDENT.  THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS OF
INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY IN A CIVIL CAST IN TORT (AS IN NEGLIGENCE OR FRAUD)
THAT CAN BE ESTABLISHED BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE, AS WELL.

    AS FOR THE DIA ITSELF, THERE ARE SERIOUS INDICATIONS THAT AT BEST IT HAS
NOT FULFILLED ITS PROMISE TO CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES THAT IT
"VIGOUOUSLY PURSUES EACH AND EVERY REPORT WHICH COULD HELP RESOLVE THESE
ISSUES" (8 AUGUST 1984 HEARINGS).

==========
                                CHAPTER VIII

                                 DISCUSSION
==========

                        A.   THE POLYGRAPH

    THE INTELLIGENCE AND LEGAL PROFESSIONS HAVE LONG AGO DEVELOPED THE MAJOR
CRITERIA FOR SOURCE EVALUATION. THE PW/MIA CENTER EVIDENTLY DEVELOPED ITS
OWN SHORTHAND APPROACH, APPLYING TECHNOLOGY AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR CRITICAL
ANALYSIS. THE USE OF TECHNOLOGY -- THE POLYGRAPH -- BY THE CENTER HAS BEEN
WITHOUT SUFFICIENT, SENSITIVITY TO ITS LIMITATIONS.  ONE WITNESS WAS EVEN
SUBJECTED TO HYPNOSIS, AFTER HAVING PASSED A SIMPLISTIC POLYGRAPH TEST.

[ The statement on substitution of technology for critical analysis is
fallacious.  The use of the polygraph on firsthand live sighting sources has
been quite limited.  A total of 47 of those sources have been polygraphed
from  total of 893 sources or 5 percent.  There is nothing simplistic about
a polygraph test and, furthermore, the results of a polygraph test are not,
under DoD rules considered conclusive evidence of anything, and may not be
used as a sold basis for decisions.  The polygraph is merely an adjunct to
investigation.  Additionally, technical methods of assisting debriefings
i.e. polygraph, hypnosis are only done with the express consent of the
subject. In the case of hypnosis cited by Tighe the implication of coercion
by his use of the word "subjected" is just not true.  The source agreed to
respond under hypnosis in order to acquire additional information that might
have been buried in his subconscious. ]

    EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE TASK FORCE INDICATES THE USE OF LEADING
QUESTIONS IN THE POLYGRAPH, CULTURAL BARRIERS IN TRANSLATION AND
UNDERSTANDING AND NO APPARENT AWARENESS OF THE FRAILTIES OF THE TEST. FOR
EXAMPLE, THE PW/MIA CENTER DOES NOT SEEM CAPABLE OF COPING WITH A SOURCE
WHOSE OBSERVATIONS WERE NOT CONFIRMED BY KNOWN EVENTS, BUT WHO PASSED THE
TECHNOLOGY TEST, I.E., PROVED TO BE A GOOD SOURCE.

[ A distorted portrayal of handling of heresay evidence.  New analytical
approach requires that heresay sightings receive the same attention as so
called firsthand sightings.  Lesser attention given heresay reports in the
past was due primarily to limited resources which had to focus on first hand
live sightings. ]

    THE GENERAL ASSUMPTION ON POLYGRAPHS IS WRONG. REFUSAL TO BE POLYGRAPHED
IS NOT AN INDICATION OF UNRELIABILITY. (SEE APPENDIX V. ) WE ARE TOLD ALSO
THAT A GOOD LIAR CAN REGULARLY PASS THE POLYGRAPH.

    OUR SECRETARY OF STATE HAS PUBLICLY REFUSED A POLYGRAPH. THAT DOES NOT
MAKE HIM SUSPECT AS TO HIS VERACITY. THE SAME EXCULPATION ENTITLEMENT GOES
TO LAOTIAN PEASANTS, EX-ARVN SOLDIERS, AND KHMER PEDDLERS.

                        B. HEARSAY EVIDENCE

    THIS REVIEW TASK FORCE HAS BEEN UNABLE TO FIND EVIDENCE THAT THE PW/MIA
CENTER HAS A METHOD FOR FOLLOWING UP SUCH INFORMATION OTHER THAN TO HAN TO
REINTERVIEW THE SAME SOURCE OR OTHERS WHO MIGHT HAVE KNOWN THE PERSON. THIS
TECHNIQUE, IN THE CULTURAL ENVIRONMENT OF SOUTHEAST ASIA, HAS INVARIABLY,
CONSISTENTLY AND PREDICTABLY RESULTED IN THE DISCREDITING OF THE SOURCE.
CONSEQUENTLY ONE TENDS TO DOUBT EVERY RESOLUTION OF A CASE LABELED AS A
FABRICATION. WE FIND MOST OF THESE JUDGMENTS WITHOUT MEANING, AND
UNTRUSTWORTHY. SIMILARLY MINIMAL ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE HEARSAY INFORMATION ARE
UNDERTAKEN. AS FAR AS THE PW/MIA CENTER IS CONCERNED, SOURCE EVALUATION
TECHNIQUES ARE IRRELEVANT TO HEARSAY BECAUSE A HEARSAY REPORT IS ALREADY
IMPEACHED. THIS APPROACH, WHICH EXPLAINS THE ENORMOUS VOLUME OF UNPROCESSED
HEARSAY REPORTS, IS A GROSS, IF NOT IRRESPONSIBLE DISTORTION OF THE MEANING
OF EVIDENTIARY CLASSIFICATIONS AND THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESSES OF DEALING
WITH INFORMATION.

    AMERICAN COURTS, NOT KNOWN FOR ALLOWING SUSPECT EVIDENCE TO BE ADMITTED,
HAVE LONG ACCEPTED HEARSAY EVIDENCE UNDER CONDITIONS SUPPORTING ITS
RELIABILITY. THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM HAS A LONG LIST OF EXCEPTIONS TO THE
HEARSAY RULE THAT SURVIVE IN ADVERSARY PROCEEDINGS. IT NEED NOT BE SAID THAT
THE COURTS ARE FOUNDED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF AVOIDING BIAS AND ENSURING
FAIRNESS.

                        C. UNRESOLVED CASES

AS A PART OF THE REVIEW PROCESS, THE TASK FORCE EXAMINED A REPRESENTATIVE
SAMPLE OF "UNRESOLVED CASES" CURRENTLY BEING PROCESSED IN THE PW/MIA CENTER.
USING WORKSHEETS DEVELOPED BY THE TASK FORCE, EACH MEMBER CONDUCTED AN
INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS OF EACH FILE.  THIS CONSISTED OF NOT ONLY AN EVALUATION
OF THE INFORMATION ITSELF, BUT ALSO OF THE PW/MIA CENTER'S CONCLUSIONS. A
MATHEMATICAL PROCEDURE WAS APPLIED TO DETERMINE WHICH OF THE REPORTS, IN THE
COLLECTIVE JUDGMENT OF THE TASK FORCE, WERE THE MORE BELIEVABLE. MEMBERS OF
THE TASK FORCE WERE VIRTUALLY UNANIMOUS IN THEIR CONCLUSIONS.

                        D. CLUSTER ANALYSIS

    A REVIEW WAS UNDERTAKEN OF SELECTED GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS IN WHICH SEVERAL
SIGHTINGS HAD BEEN REPORTED OVER A PERIOD OF TIME. EACH PANEL MEMBER
CONDUCTED A SEPARATE ANALYSIS OF THESE AREAS TO DETERMINE WHAT IF ANY
CORRELATION THERE WAS IN THESE SIGHTINGS. IN SOME AREAS THE RESULTS WERE
INCONCLUSIVE. IN OTHER AREAS A HIGH CORRELATION WAS DISCOVERED AND LED
PANEL MEMBERS TO BELIEVE THAT IN THESE AREAS A STRONG POSSIBILITY EXISTS
THAT THE SIGHTINGS HAVE VALIDITY.

                        E. SOURCE MOTIVATION

     SOME OF THE SOURCES OBVIOUSLY ENGAGED IN A MISCONCEIVED ATTEMPT TO
 FINAGLE THEIR WAY INTO AMERICA'S GOOD GRACES, AND CAPITALIZE ON THE KNOWN
 U.S. COMPASSION FOR ITS MISSING SERVICEMEN AND THE FRUSTRATION OVER AN
 ACCOUNTING.

     WHILE SOME SOURCES ARE INVENTIVE, SELF-SERVING AND CONSEQUENTLY
 UNTRUSTWORTHY, OTHERS ARE EYEWITNESSES, MILITARY OFFICERS AND PEASANTS
 WITHOUT ULTERIOR MOTIVES AND IN ENOUGH NUMBERS TO MAKE ONE UNEASY ABOUT
 DISCOUNTING TESTIMONY THAT SMACKS OF AN AUTHENTICITY THAT COULD SATISFY A
 GRAND JURY.

     FOR THE RECORD WE NOTE THAT NOT ALL REFUGEES ARE SINCERE, NOT ALL
 RESISTANCE FIGHTERS ARE FIGHTERS AT ALL, AND ALL SORTS OF CHARLATANS,
 FRAUDS, PIRATES AND BANDITS HAVE EMERGED TO EXTORT FUNDS OR OTHER BENEFITS
 BASED ON PW/MIA'S INFORMATION.  EVEN SO, NOT ALL OF THE INFORMATION IS BAD,
 DESPITE THE UNSAVORY SOURCES, THE BRAZENNESS OF THE WORST MAKES THEM EASY
 TO SPOT.

                        F. QUALITY OF SOURCES AND INFORMATION

   THE REFUGEE COMMUNITY THAT HAS PROVIDED THE BULK OF THE EYEWITNESS
REPORTS STRIKES US AS POSSIBLY THE FINEST HUMAN INTELLIGENCE DATA BASE IN
THE U.S. POST WORLD WAR II EXPERIENCE.

     IN OUR REVIEW WE MEASURED THEIR POWER OF OBSERVATION BY THE CLARITY AND
DETAIL OF THE ACCOUNTS. THEIR MEMORY WAS ALSO JUDGED AGAINST CORRESPONDENCE
OF THE ACCOUNT TO REAL PLACES, PERSONS AND EVENTS. DESPITE THE PASSAGE OF
TIME, THE ACCOUNTS CONTAINED SUFFICIENT DETAILS TO ESTABLISH HIGH DEGREE OF
PLAUSIBILITY AND FREQUENTLY CORRELATE TO KNOWN PLACES OR EVENTS.

[ The assertion that sources easily distinguish Americans is not supported
by evidence.  The PW/MIA Special Office has several cases in which an
individual, later proven to be Eurasian, French, or other non-American was
identified by several sources as an American. ]

    OTHER FEATURES OF THE SOURCES BEAR MENTIONING. MOST KNOW WHAT THEY SAW,
EVEN THOUGH POW/MIA ANALYSTS CONCLUDED THE OPPOSITE. WE FOUND SOURCES WHO
EASILY DISTINGUISHED AMERICAN CAUCASIANS FROM RUSSIANS OR GERMANS AND
ESPECIALLY FROM FAIR-SKINNED ASIANS.  IN ONE "RESOLVED" CASE: THAT OF A
SIGHTING OF (SANITIZED) A RETURNED PW, THE ACCOUNT WAS OUTSTANDINGLY
ACCURATE DESPITE THE PASSAGE OF 20 YEARS.

    THIS SOURCES UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT THEY HAVE OBSERVED, MOST
OFTEN TELL CONSISTENT STORIES IN MAJOR PART AND LEAVE THEMSELVES VULNERABLE
TO ALL SORTS OF INDEPENDENT CHECKS OF THEIR STORY.  THIS IS SINGULAR IN
ITSELF, AND HIGHLY PROHIBITIVE.

[ The Tighe Task Force statement quoting General Williams is a complete
misrepresentation of the facts.  The testimony cited refers to statements
regarding polygraphs of sources of live sightings which were resolved and
correlated to accounted for individuals.  Admiral Paulson said that in 92
percent of these correlated cases, polygraphs were not used.  In General
Williams' 1984 testimony he clearly states that 17 percent of the live
sighting reports had been demonstrated to be false. At no time was it said
that 92 to 97 percent of the entire body of refugee accounts were accurate.
In fact, 62 percent of the firsthand refugee reports can be termed truthful,
having been correlated to living returnees, individuals whose remains have
been returned, and a small number of individuals who remained behind for a
short time after the fall of South Vietnam. ]

     WE ARE NOT ALONE IN REACHING OUR FINDINGS- IN 1983 AND 84 TESTIMONIES
BEFORE CONGRESS, BOTH ADMIRAL PAULSON AND GENERAL WILLIAMS TESTIFIED THAT 92
TO 97 PERCENT OF THE REFUGEE ACCOUNTS WERE TRUTHFUL. THIS TESTIMONY
CONSTITUTES A SENSITIVITY CHECK ON THE ACCURACY AND RELIABILITY OF THIS DATA
SOURCE. IT ESTABLISHES A PROBABILITY AND A PRESUMPTION THAT AT LEAST 92 OF
EVERY 100 REFUGEE SIGHTINGS WILL BE TRUTHFUL. REGARDLESS OF MOTIVE OR OTHER
CIRCUMSTANCE.

[ This paragraph is replete with serious factual errors.  The statistics
cited in the Tight Task Force report are not correct. The correct statistics
are:

Firsthand live sighting reports

   - 893 since 1975

   - 83% resolved

         554 individual previously accounted for (62%)
         191 fabrications (21%)

         745 Total

   - 17% unresolved

         90 prisoner situation
         58 non-prisoner situation

        148 Total

[ Thus, only 21 percent of the sighting reports representing 25 percent of
the resolved cases are judged to be fabrications, not "... 60 percent of the
'resolved cases'" as stated in the Tighe Task Force report. ]

[ There is no basis for the statement that "20 percent of the flawed
sightings subsequently proved to be accurate." }

[ Citing a case in which an individual was freed from Laos before KIA began
its investigation is an absolute "cheap shot" on the part of the Tighe Task
Force.  A Greek citizen was arrested by the Lao in September 1983  and
released in May 1984.  DIA did not receive the report until August 1985.
Obviously, DIA's investigation could not begin until after the report was
received -- which was 15 months after the individual was released. ]

    PUTTING THIS DATUM TO THE TEST. WE FOUND EVIDENCE OF A PRESUMPTION OF
MENDACITY IN EVERY "CASE" FILE.  FULLY, 50 PERCENT OF THE "RESOLVED CASES"
WERE FOUND BY DIA TO BE FABRICATIONS. AND ANOTHER 25 PERCENT WERE CASES OF
MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION--75 PERCENT OF THE OBSERVATIONS WERE JUDGED TO BE
INACCURATE, UNRELIABLE OR UNTRUTHFUL.  THIS CONTRADICTS THE TESTIMONY BY
DIA'S FLAG OFFICERS.  ADDITIONALLY, IT IS SUSPECT BECAUSE 20 PERCENT OF THE
FLAWED SIGHTINGS SUBSEQUENTLY PROVED TO BE ACCURATE.  IN ONE CASE, DIA
JUDGED A SIGHTING TO BE A FABRICATION. ONLY TO LEARN THE PERSON SIGHTED
ACTUALLY EMERGED FROM LAOS TO FREEDOM.  BEFORE DIA REALLY BEGAN ITS
INVESTIGATION. ANOTHER REFUGEE ACCOUNT WAS SIMILARLY DISMISSED ON THE BASIS
OF VAGUENESS ABOUT HIS CLAIM TO HAVE BEEN EMPLOYED BY AN AGENCY OF THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT SUBSEQUENTLY, THE REFUGEE'S ACCOUNT WAS VERIFIED.  THE "CASE" IS
NOW "UNRESOLVED."

     INDEPENDENT OF THE SOURCE. THE REPORTED INFORMATION IS NOTEWORTHY FOR
ITS PRECISION, CLARITY OF DETAIL, AND VOLUME.  THERE ARE SUFFICIENT FACTS TO
PROVIDE FOUR OR FIVE RESEARCH LEADS IN MOST OF THE SIGHTINGS.  WE ARE AWARE
OF NO OTHER INTELLIGENCE DATA BASE THAT HAS A 97 PERCENT RECORD OF ACCURACY.
THE INTELLIGENCE VALUE OF THIS INFORMATION IS ENORMOUS AND MOSTLY
UNEXPLOITED.

     THE "MORTICIAN" CASE REPRESENTS HIGHLY INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE.
BETWEEN THIS CASE AND THOSE WITHOUT MERIT ARE MANY GOOD CASES AND CASES WITH
SCINTILLAS OF EVIDENCE.  JUST ENOUGH TO SPARK SUSPICION THAT THERE IS
SOMETHING TO THEM. PUTTING THESE IN-BETWEEN CASES IN TARGET PRIORITY MAY
HELP TO HIT A FEW "BULL'S EYES."

                        G. MISINFORMATION--DECEPTION

    MANY LIVE SIGHTING REPORTS ARE OBVIOUSLY THE PRODUCT OF ORGANIZED
DECEPTION. PARTICULARLY BLATANT ARE REPORTS--MANY WITH REMARKABLE
SIMILARITY- -WHICH ORIGINATE FROM SO-CALLED "RESISTANCE" GROUPS. GENERALLY.
SPEAKING, THESE STEM FROM ATTEMPTS TO GET U.S. SUPPORT FOR GROUPS WHICH
GENUINELY STRUGGLE TO TURNOVER SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIMES. OTHERS MAY WELL BE
THE PRODUCT OF GROUPS CONTROLLED BY THE SRV GOVERNMENT IN HANOI--SEEKING TO
EXTEND THE PAIN AND SUFFERING OF AMERICANS FOR THEIR PARTICIPATION IN WAR
AGAINST THEM AND, BY CONSTANT EXTENSION AND WITHDRAWAL OF THE PROVERBIAL
"CARROT," ASSURE THAT EVENTUALLY THE U.S. WILL PAY THE MAXIMUM FOR THE
RETURN OF THE U.S. MISSING, ALIVE OR DEAD, FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA. NONE OF
THESE REPORTS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO OBSCURE  GENUINELY OBVIOUS REPORTS OF
THOSE WHO CONTINUE TO SIGHT LIVE, ALLEGED CAPTIVE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA.

    SUBTLE SHAMS AND SCHEMES ARE AT WORK INCLUDING ONE INVOLVING DOG TAGS
AND BITS OF REMAINS. PETTY VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS SEEM TO BE IN COMPLICITY
WITH LOCAL THUGS AND CROOKS, BUT WE FOUND NO OTHER EVIDENCE LINKING SUCH
SCAMS TO THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM.  THERE ARE MANY REASONS FOR HANOI TO NOT
ENGAGE IN THIS ACTIVITY, EVEN THOUGH IT MIGHT CONDONE AND PERMIT IT.
NONETHELESS, THE OFFICIAL NATIONAL ATTEMPT AT EXTORTION OF THE U.S. COULD
HARDLY BE SUPPRESSED AS GUIDANCE FOR ENTERPRISING SCOUNDRELS THROUGHOUT THE
COUNTRY, WHO WOULD TAKE THEIR ENTREPRENEURIAL CUE FROM THE PARTY LINE.  SUCH
A PHENOMENON HAS OCCURRED IN OTHER PARTS OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD.  THESE ARE
THE DOGS OF WAR AT THEIR PREDICTABLE WORST.

==========
                                 CHAPTER IX

                             THE PW/MIA CENTER
==========

    THE PW/MIA PROFESSIONAL STAFF HAS DEMONSTRATED A HIGH DEGREE OF
INITIATIVE, DEDICATION AND INTEGRITY.  THEIR BACKGROUNDS ARE VARIED AND HAVE
BROUGHT ACADEMIC WEALTH TO DIA TO INCLUDE TEN MASTER AND BACHELOR DEGREES
WITH MAJORS IN PHYSICAL EDUCATION, BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, PSYCHOLOGY,
LANGUAGES, POLITICAL SCIENCE, AND HISTORY.  FOUR FORMER MILITARY PERSONNEL
HAVE BROUGHT YEARS OF EXPERIENCE TO THE STAFF IN SUCH AREAS AS COLLECTION OF
INTELLIGENCE FROM HUMAN RESOURCES, INTERVIEWING, INTELLIGENCE ADVISOR IN
VIETNAM, RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS, AND AN INTELLIGENCE STAFF ASSIGNMENT.  THEY
HAVE ADDED TO THEIR KNOWLEDGE BY TAKING JOB-RELATED COURSES OFFERED BY DIA
AND EXTERNAL AGENCIES.  THIS IS THE GOOD NEWS.  THE BAD NEWS IS THAT THIS
TALENT IS MISPLACED, OR NEED TO BE EDUCATED FOR ITS CURRENT PLACEMENT.  IT
IS NOTICEABLE THAT QUALIFICATIONS IN THE FIELDS OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AND
RESEARCH ARE PROMINENTLY LACKING.  TO COMPOUND THE OBVIOUS LACK OF
ANALYTICAL CAPABILITIES, NO TRAINING PROGRAM EXISTS IN DIA FOR PERSONNEL TO
DEVELOP THIS NEEDED REQUIREMENT.

[ When the Tighe Task Force began their review in April 1986, the PW/MIA
staff consisted of 18 personnel.  There are presently 28 and additional
personnel are being considered.  Analytical capabilities are being enhanced
by formal training, primarily at the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center.
In sum, training, augmentation, and organizational and functional
realignment will result in an upgraded analytical capability. ]

    THE CURRENT DUTIES INDICATE THAT THREE OF THE TWELVE PROFESSIONAL
STAFFERS ARE DESIGNATED AS SUPERVISORS.  IN ADDITION TO THEIR SUPERVISORY
RESPONSIBILITIES, THEY PERFORM ADMINISTRATIVE TASKS, PREPARE CORRESPONDENCE,
PROVIDE SUPPORT TO NINE EXTERNAL OFFICES, AND SUPPORT THE RESEARCH EFFORT.

[ The figures cited on analytical personnel are not correct.  Fifteen
professional analyst are involved in research and analysis, Freedom of
Information Act requests, Congressional support and external relations, with
two of the fourteen acting supervisors, mentors and teachers. ]

    SEVEN STAFFERS ARE INVOLVED IN RESEARCH, ANALYSIS, AND THE PREPARATION
OF REPORTS.  iN ADDITION, THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES INCLUDE INTELLIGENCE
SUPPORT TO CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL STAFFERS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, THE
MILITARY SERVICES, NSA, OSD(ISA), AND PROVIDE THE RESPONSES TO FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION REQUESTS.  ONE ANALYST SERVES AS THE PW/MIA LIAISON OFFICER AS
WELL AS A WRITER/EDITOR.  TO SUPPORT THE ADP FILES AND TO PREPARE THE
DIVISION'S ANNUAL BUDGET, ONE ANALYST IS DESIGNATED TO MANAGE THESE
FUNCTIONS.  FURTHER, HE IS ALSO RESPONSIBLE FOR DEVELOPING LONG RANGE PW/MIA
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PLANS AND POLICIES AND COMPILES ANALYTICAL DATA ON
PW/MIA'S.  THIS IS AN IMPOSSIBLE COLLECTION OF RESPONSIBILITIES, IF ONE
SERIOUSLY EXPECTS USEFUL RESULTS.

    AS A RESULT OF THE DIVISION OF LABOR, MORE THAN HALF OF THE PW/MIA
CENTER PERSONNEL WORKTIME IS SPENT IN OTHER THAN INTELLIGENCE WORK. (SEE
EVALUATION)

                            DIA PW/MIA DIVISION

                                                 STAFF:  1 DIVISION CHIEF
                                                        12 PROFESSIONAL
                                                         4 NON-PROFESSIONAL

PERSONNEL W/ BACKGROUND                   CLERICAL PERSONNEL &
EXPERIENCE IN INTELL ANALYSIS*            ANALYSTS WITHOUT INTELL BACKGROUND

         4 PROFESSIONAL                               4 NON-PROFESSIONAL
                                                      7 ???

  TOTAL  4                                           11

  1 PROFESSIONAL RECORD INCOMPLETE
    NO QUALIFICATIONS LISTED
    NO JOB DESCRIPTION

PERCENTAGE OF HOURS ON INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS VICE LIAISON, ETC.  (BASED ON
40 HR WEEK) ESTIMATED ON THE BASIS OF JOB DESCRIPTION/QUALIFICATION RECORD
OF 11 INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH SPECIALISTS.

                                  LIAISON (EXTERNAL AGENCIES, SUPERVISION,
  INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS                    FOIA, WRITING, TRANSLATION)

      185 HOURS  (42%)               225 HOURS  (85) = 440 HOURS (100%)

ESTIMATING THAT ABOUT 40% OF THE TIME IN A GIVEN WEEK IS SPENT ON
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS; 60% SPENT ON LIAISON AND OTHER ASSOCIATED DUTIES.

* THE TERM INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS IS USED TO SUMMARIZE THE TIME SPENT ON
REVIEWING AND EVALUATING THE INFORMATION.

[ The information presented on this page does not reflect the additional
personnel already in place at the time of the Tighe Task Force report. ]

==========
                                 CHAPTER X

                        COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUPPORT
==========

                        COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

    IN VERIFYING LEADS CONTAINED IN THE PW/MIA CENTER DATA BASE, FILES OF
THE DIA COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) DIVISION INDICATE THAT ON OCCASION IT HAS
BEEN REQUESTED TO MAKE "NAME CHECKS" WITH NATIONAL-LEVEL INTELLIGENCE AND
INVESTIGATIVE AGENCIES OF SUSPECTED FABRICATORS OF PW/MIA INFORMATION OR
PERSONS BELIEVED TO BE INVOLVED WITH THE VIETNAMESE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES.

    IN NOVEMBER 1985, THE PW/MIA CENTER PROPOSED A NUMBER OF INITIATIVES FOR
INCREASED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUPPORT, INCLUDING ASSIGNMENT FULLTIME OF
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OFFICERS TO THE CENTER TO CONCENTRATE ON AN ALLEGED
MISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN BY HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES.

    IN MARCH 1985, AT THE DIRECTION OF THE DIRECTOR, DIA, AND IN AN EFFORT
TO PROVIDE DEDICATED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE STAFF ASSISTANCE TO THE PW/MIA
CENTER, THE OFFICE OF SECURITY APPOINTED THREE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL
TO "RESEARCH THE OPERATIONS OF THE PW/MIA CENTER, EXAMINE EXISTING POLICIES
AND PROCEDURES, REVIEW THE MANAGEMENT OF THE FILES AND RECORDS, ASSESS
OPERATIONS SECURITY AND SOURCE-CONTROL MEASURES, EVALUATE OVERALL
OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS FROM A COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VIEWPOINT."  OWING TO
OTHER MORE DEMANDING PRIORITIES, THIS STAFF ASSISTANCE WAS NEVER FULLY
PROVIDED AND NO MEASURABLE SUPPORT WAS RENDERED TO THE PW/MIA CENTER.

                               NEW INITIATIVE

    IN AN EFFORT TO BE RESPONSIVE TO THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE NEEDS OF THE
CENTER THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIVISION DEVELOPED A NEW PROGRAM/BUDGET
INITIATIVE FOR FY88 ENTITLED "CI SUPPORT TO PW/MIA."  THE PROPOSAL CALLED
FOR TWO CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS SPECIALISTS TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO
DIA'S EFFORT TO IDENTIFY HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE INVOLVEMENT IN DISINFORMATION
RELATING TO PW/MIA'S.  THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THIS INITIATIVE WAS BASED ON
INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE DIRECTOR, DIA, THAT THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIVISION
PROVIDE SUSTAINED STAFF ASSISTANCE TO THE PW/MIA CENTER.  THIS INITIATIVE
WAS LISTED BY THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIVISION AS "PRIORITY NUMBER THREE" IN
A LIST OF ELEVEN NEW INITIATIVES FOR FY88.  THE CHIEF, OFFICE OF SECURITY,
REORDERED THE PRIORITIES BEFORE SUBMISSION TO THE DIA SENIOR REVIEW BOARD
(SRB): SUPPORT TO PW/MIA WAS CHANGED TO "PRIORITY 10" IN THE LIST OF ELEVEN
PROJECTS.

    RECORDS OF THE RESULTS OF THE SENIOR REVIEW BOARD'S DELIBERATIONS
REFLECT THAT ONLY EIGHT OF THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES WERE APPROVED
FOR SUBMISSION TO THE DIRECTOR, DIA.  AMONG THE THREE PROPOSALS NOT APPROVED
BY THE BOARD WAS "CI SUPPORT TO PW/MIA."  THEREFORE, EVEN THOUGH THE
DIRECTOR, DIA, INSTRUCTED THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIVISION TO PROVIDE
DEDICATED SUPPORT TO PW/MIA ACTIVITIES, FOR REASONS STILL UNKNOWN THIS WAS
DISAPPROVED BY THE SENIOR REVIEW BOARD.

    THE CURRENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUPPORT CAPABILITY OF ONE CIVILIAN AND
ONE MILITARY OFFICER PART-TIME, USING ABOUT TEN PERCENT OF AVAILABLE TIME,
WILL MOST LIKELY CONTINUE.  THE PW/MIA EFFORT WILL CONTINUE TO LACK ADEQUATE
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO PW/MIA RELATED STAFF ACTIONS, INVESTIGATIONS
AND OPERATIONS.  AS STATED IN THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIVISION'S PROJECT
JUSTIFICATION, "NO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS OF OUTSTANDING PW/MIA CASES
WILL BE POSSIBLE; THUS OPERATIONAL OR INVESTIGATIVE LEADS MAY BE OVERLOOKED
OR OPPORTUNITIES TO EXPLOIT SUCH LEADS MAY BE LOST."

==========
                                 CHAPTER XI

                                OBSERVATIONS
==========

                        A. SUBSTANTIVE OBSERVATIONS

    ALTHOUGH LIVE SIGHTINGS THROUGH 1985 CONTINUE FLOWING INTO DIA, THE
EVIDENCE IS COMPELLING THAT AT LEAST BETWEEN 1975 AND 1979, AMERICAN
MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE HELD IN CAPTIVITY IN LAOS BY VIETNAMESE TROOPS. IN
REACHING THIS JUDGMENT WE HAVE LOOKED AT THE SOURCES AND THEIR INFORMATION
AND MADE CORRELATIONS WITH OTHER KNOWN EVENTS, PERSONS AND INFORMATION ABOUT
VIETNAMESE BEHAVIOR.

                        B. FARM LABOR

     OUR SAMPLES ARE HARDLY COMPREHENSIVE, BUT WE PLACE IMPORTANT WEIGHT ON
REFUGEE OBSERVATIONS OF AMERICANS TILLING RICE FIELDS, PULLING PLOWS IN
HARNESS AND DOING CONSTRUCTION WORK OR MINING.  THESE ACTIVITIES REFLECT
VIETNAMESE DIRECTIVES ON HANDLING PRISONERS THAT DATE AS FAR BACK AS 1968.
THE AIM OF THE DIRECTIVES IS TO LIGHTEN THE BURDEN OF PRISONER SUSTENANCE ON
THE PEOPLE BY PUTTING THE PRISONERS TO WORK. THESE ACTIVITIES WERE
SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED.

[ In DIA's judgment the statement of "compelling" evidence is not supported
by the wright of information. ]

    ANOTHER CORRELATION IS THE OBSERVED PRACTICE OF KEEPING PRISONERS IN
CAVES IN LAOS.  THE REFUGEE REPORTS WE READ ARE STRIKINGLY REFLECTIVE OF
CIRCUMSTANCES AND PRACTICES KNOWN TO BE FOLLOWED IN LAOS BY THE VIETNAMESE.
THERE IS A THRESHOLD PRESUMPTION OF CREDIBILITY TO THE REPORTING WE HAVE
SEEN BASED ON THESE CORRELATIONS. (SEE APPENDIX IV.)

[ Debriefings of returned PWs do not support, in any way, the assertion that
U.S. PWs were used for labor, agricultural or otherwise. ]

                        C. CAPTIVE MOBILITY

    IN OUR OBSERVATIONS THE GUARDS HAVE ALMOST ALWAYS BEEN VIETNAMESE
(SOMETIMES OVERSEEING LAOTIAN GUARDS).  THE MOST SUSPICIOUS SIGHTINGS ARE
THOSE THAT CLAIM THE LAOTIANS ARE HOLDING PRISONERS.  THE ACTIVITIES IN OUR
SAMPLES SUPPORT A STRONG INFERENCE THAT THE VIETNAMESE ARE IN CONTROL AND
ARE TREATING THE PEOPLE THEY HELD AT THE TIME OF THE SIGHTINGS AS THEY
TREATED THEM ELSEWHERE.  THE ACTIVITIES ARE NOT RANDOM, BUT PURPOSEFUL.
MOREOVER, THE EVIDENCE SUGGESTS THE POSSIBILITY OF DELIBERATE MOVEMENTS BACK
AND FORTH BETWEEN VIETNAM AND LAOS.  THESE ARE TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS, BUT ARE
NOT ADDRESSED IN ANY STUDIES OF THE PROBLEM AVAILABLE TO THE REVIEW TASK
FORCE.

                        D. DODGING DESIGN

    AT THE LEAST, THESE ARE NOT LIKELY TO PROVE PRODUCTIVE IN DISCOVERING
ANY PERSONS OR REMAINS THE VIETNAMESE HAVE NOT APPROVED BEFOREHAND.
ADDITIONALLY, THERE IS A STRONG IMPLICATION THAT THE LAOTIAN CAMP SYSTEM IS
A SEPARATE SYSTEM UNDER VIETNAMESE CONTROL.

                        E. STALE LEADS

    WE CANNOT JUDGE WHETHER PEOPLE ALIVE IN 1979 REMAIN ALIVE.  IF SO,
THEY CERTAINLY REMAIN IN CUSTODY.  A FAILURE TO PURSUIT OF THE
INFORMATION HAS CLEARLY, IN SOME CASES, RESULTED IN STALE INFORMATION
LEADS AND COLD TRAILS.  BUT WE JUDGE THAT AMERICANS WERE HELD ALIVE
AGAINST THEIR WILL AS LATE AS 1979, AND CREDIBLE REPORTS WITH DATES OF
OBSERVATION AS LATE AS 1984 CONTINUE TO COME IN TO DIA.

[ Contrast Tighe's current statement on live Americans being held
against their will as late as 1979 with his sworn testimony before the
House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, June 25, 1981 "Based on
detailed research efforts utilizing reported information, confirmed
data, and all intelligence collection disciplines, we simply cannot
professionally say -- frustrating as it may be -- that we know in fact
that Americans are being held against their will there."  The current
DIA position has not changed from that which Tighe testified to in June
1981. ]

                        F. VIETNAM -- LOWER PROBABILITY

    AS TO VIETNAM, OUR ANALYSIS SUPPORTS A SOMEWHAT LOWER BUT COMPARABLE
CONCLUSION.  ONE REFUGEE ACCOUNT OF A SIGHTING CONTAINED NUMEROUS
CORRELATIONS TO THE REAL WORLD EVENTS THAT YEAR WHEN CHINA INVADED
NORTHERN VIETNAM.  VIETNAMESE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OBSERVED BY THIS
SOURCE WAS CONSISTENT WITH ITS DEFENSIVE MEASURES THROUGHOUT THE NORTH.
THE TIME WAS PRECISELY ACCURATE AS WELL.  OUR SAMPLE WAS LIMITED SO WE
ARE UNABLE TO MAKE FURTHER FINDINGS ABOUT THIS EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT.  IF
THESE PERSONS REMAIN ALIVE, THEY ARE IN CUSTODY.

[ A "lower but comparable conclusion" is meaningless.  Additionally, the
refugee account given here, while correct on the widely known fact of
the Chinese invasion, was demonstrably incorrect on other factors which
are key to credibility of the story.  DIA has evaluated this story as a
fabrication.  The statement on limited sample is a gross understatement.
Of the total firsthand live sightings 893, the Tighe group only examined
43, or 5 percent.  The Vietnamese portion of the total report population
is 87 percent, but Tighe only looked at 3 percent.  The Lao portion of
the total report population is 9 percent, and Tighe looked at a total of
2 percent.  Based on this technique of fact gathering the best that can
be said about any of Tighe's conclusions based on refugee reports is
that they are of questionable validity.  The worst that can be said is
that opinions held by the Tighe group on the presence of live PWs in
Southeast Asia could not legitimately have been formed from the data in
the case files they reviewed. ]

                        G. "BLOOD DEBT" IMPETUS

    THE EVIDENCE IS CLEAR THAT VIETNAM CONTROLS THE HANDLING OF THIS
ISSUE.  WE KNOW THAT VIETNAM HOLDS THE REMAINS OF SOME 400 AMERICANS IN
THE HANOI AREA.  STATISTICAL PROBABILITIES MAKE IT HIGHLY LIKELY THAT
OTHER SUCH STORIES MAY EXIST AS WELL.

[ DIA analysts are fully cognizant of terminology used by the Vietnamese
to describe various categories of prisoners and of the implications of
these categories.  No member of the Tighe Task Force ever discussed this
matter with DIA analysts.  DIA analysts are not aware of directives that
make reference to a "blood debt" in the context of American PWs. ]

    WHAT IS IMPLIED IS THAT THERE IS MORE HERE AND THAT THE ULTIMATE
VIETNAMESE TRUMP HAS YET TO BE PLAYED.  AT THE PRESENT PACE OF
DEVELOPMENT ON THIS ISSUE, IT WILL BE QUITE A TIME BEFORE IT IS
REVEALED.

    WE HAVE SEEN SOME EVIDENCE THAT THE VIETNAMESE HAVE THE KINDS OF
DECEPTIVE CLASSIFICATIONS AND CATEGORIZATIONS THAT HAVE FRUSTRATED PAST
U.S. SEARCHES FOR ITS MIA'S IN ALL THE WARS THIS CENTURY.  WE FIND NO
TESTING OF VIETNAMESE DEFINITIONS OF POW, WAR CRIMINAL, TRAITOR, AND SO
ON IN THE WORK WE HAVE OBSERVED.  WE FIND SPECIAL DIRECTIVES FOR
HANDLING THOSE WHO OWE A "BLOOD DEBT" BUT NO ATTENTION TO WHAT THIS TERM
MEANS.

                        H. OPPORTUNITIES

    OUR RESEARCH REVEALS SERIOUS AND LONGSTANDING GAPS IN INTELLIGENCE.
THEY INCLUDE INVESTIGATION OF THE CAMP SYSTEM IN LAOS, EXPLORATION OF
ALTERNATIVE CATEGORIES OF INCARCERATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OF THE
COMPLETE STRUCTURE OF IMPRISONMENT.  THE CENTRALIZATION AND
PURPOSEFULNESS OF VIETNAMESE ACTIONS PROVIDES MANY TARGETS FOR ANALYSIS
THAT HAVE DIRECT BEARING ON THE LIKELY FATE OF AMERICANS MISSING IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA.

    WE ALSO SUGGEST THAT THERE ARE COLLECTION OPPORTUNITIES NOT
GENUINELY EXPLORED.  THE U.S. PRESENCE IN VIETNAM APPEARS NIL.  THE
(SANITIZED) HAVE SOURCES THAT THEY HAVE SIMPLY NOT TAPPED TO HELP THIS
SEARCH.  BUSINESSMEN FROM MANY PARTS OF THE WORLD ARE ALSO IN FREQUENT
CONTACT WITH VIETNAM.  (SANITIZED) JOURNALISTS APPEAR TO HAVE
SUBSTANTIAL FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN THE SRV.  NO COLLECTION STRATEGY HAS
BEEN DRAWN UP TO TAP THESE SOURCES.  THE CAMPS ARE LINKED HORIZONTALLY
AND VERTICALLY BY COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS THAT SHOULD AT LEAST BE
INVESTIGATED FOR COLLECTION.  WITH MORE TIME AND STUDY, WE BELIEVE THAT
EVER MORE POTENTIAL SOURCES COULD BE DEVELOPED.

[ All-source collection activities are in place and do exploit the
opportunities specified here.  Furthermore, (sanitized) collection
initiatives are underway. ]

==========
                                  SUMMARY

==========

    OURS HAS BEEN A REASONABLY COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF THE INTELLIGENCE, THE
MECHANISMS AND THE ISSUES CONNECTED WITH THE U.S. PRISONERS OF WAR AND
MISSING IN ACTION IN SOUTHEAST.  WE HAVE EXAMINED, FOR EXAMPLE, NUMEROUS
EYEWITNESS REPORTS FROM REFUGEES, BUT BARELY LOOKED AT SECOND AND THIRD
PARTY REPORTS EXCEPT TO GET A FLAVOR FOR THEIR CONTENT.  WE READ PUBLIC
TESTIMONY AND POLICY STATEMENTS, BUT HAVE NOT HAD ACCESS TO NOR REQUESTED
SENSITIVE POLICY PAPERS THAT MIGHT EXIST.  OUR FORAYS INTO INFORMATION FROM
YEARS PRIOR TO 1981 HAVE BEEN OCCASIONED BY A PERCEIVED NEED TO ADD CONTEXT
AND TEXTURE TO OUR REVIEW OF LATER EVENTS AND REPORTS.

    AS REQUESTED, WE HAVE APPLIED RIGOROUS PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS IN
REVIEWING A RANDOM SAMPLE OF REPORT TYPES SUFFICIENT IN NUMBER AND DETAIL TO
SUPPORT A JUDGMENT ON THE CHARGE OF "COVER-UP".  WE JUDGE THERE IS NO
COVERUP BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, NOR THE DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

    OUR PROCESS OF REACHING THIS JUDGMENT TOOK US DOWN MANY AVENUES OF
INVESTIGATION THAT TOUCHED ON MOST OF THE IMPORTANT SUBSTANTIVE AND
PROCEDURAL ISSUES IN SOME FASHION, INCLUDING SYSTEMIC VULNERABILITIES.  WHAT
WE FOUND, BOTH SAD AND ENCOURAGING, IS OF GRAVE IMPORTANCE TO THE CONTINUING
U.S. EFFORT TO HEAL THIS OPEN WOUND IN AMERICA'S PUBLIC CONSCIOUSNESS.

[ The assertion that Vietnam holds U.S. prisoners as bargaining chips
continues to lose validity with the passage of time and the failure of the
Vietnamese to use these "Chips".  In fact, the Vietnamese proved themselves
to be astute observers and manipulators of U.S. public opinion.  They must
know that to continue to hold U.S. personnel would be viewed by the American
public as a barbaric act and would insure that Vietnam would receive nothing
of any value from the U.S. ]

    THERE IS INFORMATION, EVEN IN OUR LIMITED SAMPLE, WHICH ESTABLISHES THE
STRONG POSSIBILITY OF AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR BEING HELD IN LAOS AND
VIETNAM.  THIS JUDGMENT IS BASED ON A CATEGORY OF EYEWITNESS REPORTS WHICH
THE BEST U.S. ANALYTIC EFFORTS HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO DISPROVE; ALLEGATIONS BY
DEFECTORS AND ESCAPEES OF VIETNAM'S INTENT TO HOLD SOME PRISONERS AS
BARGAINING CHIPS WITH THE U.S.; AND "SIGNALS" IN THE REFUGEE COMMUNITY
PROBABLY ORIGINATING WITH THE VIETNAMESE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES THAT HANOI IS
CARRYING OUT ITS STATED INTENTION TO BLACKMAIL THE U.S.  OURS IS A COLLECTIVE
JUDGMENT OF THE ENTIRE BODY OF EVIDENCE WE REVIEWED.

[ The DIA judgment cannot mirror the judgment presented here.  An exhaustive
analysis of information collected during and after the war has not developed
evidence of Americans remaining in captivity in Southeast Asia. ]

    A LONGSTANDING LAPSE IN DILIGENT INTELLIGENCE WORK HAS PRODUCED SERIOUS
GAPS IN OUR KNOWLEDGE ABOUT VIETNAM'S AND OTHERS BEHAVIOR RELATIVE TO
PRISONERS OF WAR. PROMINENT AMONG THEM IS THE ABSENCE OF ANY ANALYTICAL
TREATMENT OF VIETNAMESE-CONTROLLED CONFINEMENT FACILITIES OR CAMPS IN LAOS.
ADDITIONALLY, U.S. INTELLIGENCE EVIDENTLY HAS NO COMPILATION OF "DECREES"
AND "DIRECTIVES" CONCERNING PRISONERS AND NO THOROUGH KNOWLEDGE OF THE
STRUCTURE OF CONFINEMENT.  THE FACT OF CUBAN, NORTH KOREAN, CHINESE AND
SOVIET INVOLVEMENT WITH U.S. PRISONERS IS KNOWN, INCLUDING AT INTERROGATION
SESSIONS, BUT NOT THE NATURE OF THIS INVOLVEMENT NOR ITS EXTENT.  THIS
SAMPLE COULD BE MUCH LARGER.

    AS A SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION, THE REFUGEE COMMUNITY IS
DISTINCTIVE.  BY ANY MEASUREMENT THE REFUGEES HAVE REMARKABLE POWERS OF
OBSERVATION AND MEMORY.  EYEWITNESSES UNDERSTAND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THEIR
OBSERVATIONS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF SUBTLE DIFFERENCES IN DETAIL, BEHAVIOR
AND CONFINEMENT CONDITIONS.  AS A BODY, THEIR REPORTING ACCURACY MAY EXCEED
THAT OF ANY COMPARABLE HUMAN SOURCE DATA BASE OF WHICH THIS TASK FORCE IS
AWARE.

[ There is nothing distinctive about the Southeast Asian refugee reports.
DIA has had extensive experience in the debriefing of thousands of refugees
and the same limitations apply irrespective of ethnic origin. ]

    AT THE SAME TIME, THE REFUGEE AND RESISTANCE GROUPS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
INCLUDE A VOLUBLE AND VISIBLE CHARLATAN ELEMENT.  MOTIVES ARE SUSPECT, MIXED
WITH OUTRAGEOUS EXTORTION ATTEMPTS, BARGAINING INFORMATION FOR FAVORS, FUNDS
AND PERKS.  WE CONSIDER THESE AND OTHER SELF-HELP GROUPS TROUBLESOME BUT
TYPICAL OF THE BACKWASH OF WARFARE. UNSAVORY CHARACTERS AND SELF-SERVING
MOTIVES IN NO WAY OBSCURE THE OVERALL QUALITY OF INFORMATION COMING FROM THE
REFUGEE COMMUNITY, A FACT CONFIRMED IN TESTIMONY BY INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITIES
REPEATEDLY. MOREOVER, SUCH CONDITIONS DO NOT IMPEDE THE APPLICATION OF
ADDITIONAL INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES TO THE PURSUIT
OF INFORMATION ABOUT AMERICANS STILL IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND IN CUSTODY.

    THE VIETNAMESE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, POSSIBLY WITH SOVIET ADVICE, ARE
USING THE REFUGEE COMMUNITY AND SYMPATHETIC GROUPS TO MANIPULATE AMERICAN
PERCEPTIONS AND KEEP THE ISSUE PROMINENT.

    THE DIA PW/MIA CENTER MUST TRY TO GET OUT OF PUBLIC RELATIONS, LEGAL
RESEARCH, CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON, AND PUBLIC-ORGANIZATIONAL LIAISON
ACTIVITIES.  THE DISTRACTION AND PRESSURE OF THESE ADDITIONAL DUTIES HAVE
IMPOSED ENORMOUS COSTS IN TIME AND MONEY; DISSIPATED TALENT AND ENERGY IN
NON-PRODUCTIVE PURSUITS; DIVERTED PERSONNEL AND MANAGEMENT FROM THE PRIMARY
JOB OF ANALYSIS; AND ERODED MORALE.  SUCCESSIVE DIRECTORS OF DIA HAVE URGED
THEY BE RELIEVED OF THESE COLLATERAL DUTIES SO AS TO CONCENTRATE EXCLUSIVELY
ON INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS.  THE PRESENT DIRECTOR OF DIA, LIEUTENANT GENERAL
PERROOTS, PERSISTS IN SEEKING A WAY OUT OF THIS MAZE, SO FAR TO NO AVAIL.

    GENERAL PERROOTS HAS INHERITED A PW/MIA ORGANIZATION CHARGED WITH
DEVELOPING AND MAINTAINING THE DATA BASE AND PROVIDING SUPPORT IN
DETERMINING THE FATE OF AMERICANS STILL MISSING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, BUT IS
HEIR TO A FAIRLY EMPTY LEGACY.  AMONG THE MORE GLARING PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN A
MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE MISSION BY MID-LEVEL MANAGERS AND WORKING ANALYSTS,
AGGRAVATED BY POORLY WRITTEN MISSION STATEMENTS; POOR EXECUTIVE OVERSIGHT;
STAFF OBSTRUCTION OF EXTENSIVE INTENT; ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES; THE ABSENCE
FOR MORE THAN FOUR YEARS OF PROFESSIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE SUBSTANTIVE
INTELLIGENCE DATA; POORLY TRAINED ANALYSTS; INADEQUATE SPACE, PERSONNEL AND
EQUIPMENT SUPPORT.

    WE CREDIT LIEUTENANT GENERAL PERROOTS FOR PLACING HIS HIGHEST PRIORITY
IN WORD AND DEED ON A THOROUGH REVIEW OF THIS ISSUE BEFORE THIS TASK FORCE
BEGAN ITS WORK.  CHANGE AND IMPROVEMENT WILL TAKE A LONG TIME.  GENERAL
PERROOTS' SUBORDINATES, REAR ADMIRAL TOM BROOKS AND COLONEL KIMBALL GAINES,
DESERVE RESPECT AND COMMENDATION FOR CONDUCTING CRITICAL REVIEWS OF THIS
INTELLIGENCE EFFORT. WE APPLAUD THEIR FINDINGS AND THEIR EFFORTS TO CORRECT
THE MANY FAULTS THAT THEIR AND OUR REVIEWS HAVE UNCOVERED.

    WE HOPE THAT CURRENT DEDICATION AND REORIENTATION OF THE ENTIRE PW/MIA
STAFF BACK TO ANALYSIS WILL PERSIST BEYOND THE INCUMBENTS AT DIA.

==========

                        CONCLUSIONS

==========

                   "CONCLUSIONS" OF "THE TIGHE REPORT"
                             DATED: "27 MAY 86"

"1. WE HAVE FOUND NO EVIDENCE OF "COVER-UP" BY DIA.

2. IT IS SELF-EVIDENT THAT A LARGE NUMBER OF MIA'S MAY NEVER BE PROPERLY
ACCOUNTED FOR.

3. DIA HOLDS INFORMATION THAT ESTABLISHES THE STRONG POSSIBILITY OF AMERICAN
PRISONERS OF WAR BEING HELD IN LAOS AND VIETNAM.

4. THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM HOLDS A LARGE NUMBER OF REMAINS, SOME
400 AT LEAST, OF U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL SOLELY FOR CONTINUED BARGAINING
POWER.

5. AS THE DIA TASK FORCE FOUND EARLIER, MAJOR IMPROVEMENTS IN PROCEDURES AND
RESOURCES ARE REQUIRED FOR THE DIA PW/MIA CENTER TO EVALUATE INFORMATION
PROPERLY.

6. UNTIL THE RECENT REORGANIZATION OF THE DIA PW/MIA CENTER, DIA HAD NO
COHERENT APPROACH FOR HANDLING THE COLLECTION, ANALYSIS, EVALUATION AND
DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION CONCERNING PW/MIA'S; NO DISCIPLINED, COHERENT
COLLECTION MANAGEMENT PLAN AND NO RIGOROUS, DISCIPLINED METHODICAL ANALYSIS
AND EVALUATION OF INFORMATION.  ALTHOUGH IT IS TOO EARLY TO JUDGE THE
POTENTIAL SUCCESS OF THE NEW DIA INITIATIVES, THEY APPEAR TO BE ON THE RIGHT
TRACK.

7. THE PRIMARY DATA BASE BY THE DIA PW/MIA CENTER CONSISTS OF REFUGEE
REPORTS.  THE COLLECTION PRIORITY IS LOW.  U.S. INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS
RELY ON DATA/INFORMATION/INTELLIGENCE VOLUNTARILY PASSED TO THEM BY
REFUGEES.

8. BEFORE THE RECENT REORGANIZATION OF THE DIA PW/MIA CENTER, THERE WERE
LONGSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE DEFICIENCIES: LACK OF QUALIFIED PERSONNEL,
LITTLE ANALYTICAL EXPERTISE, SEVERE LACK OF ADP SUPPORT, INADEQUATE WORKING
SPACE, EXTERNAL DEMANDS ON PERSONNEL AND LACK OF DYNAMIC MANAGEMENT.

9. THE HARDWORKING, DEDICATED PERSONNEL OF THE DIA PW/MIA CENTER WERE
BURDENED BY AND FRUSTRATED WITH THE FLOOD OF EVIDENCE AND TENDED TOWARD
DISPOSAL RATHER THAN ANALYSIS.

10. THE SPECIALIZED TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ANALYST MUST BE ACCORDED
THE HIGHEST PRIORITY.

11. MANY PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO THE PW/MIA CENTER WORK AT TASKS UNRELATED TO
ANALYSIS.

12. THE DIA PW/MIA CENTER IS ORGANIZATIONALLY MISPLACED AND PROBABLY WILL
PERFORM BETTER DIRECTLY UNDER THE DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

13. THE JCRC FORWARD FIELD ORGANIZATION IS WOEFULLY UNDERMANNED.

14. THE GOVERNMENT HANDLING OF THE PW/MIA ISSUE IS CONSTANTLY HARASSED BY
PHONIES AND PROFITEERS.  EFFORTS BY PRIVATE MERCENARIES CONTINUE TO HAZARD
THE SUCCESSFUL PROSECUTION OF THIS ISSUE AND INDEED, PROBABLY JEOPARDIZE THE
LIVES OF AMERICANS.

15. STUDIES ARE IN BEING TO BRING UP-TO-DATE THE PICTURE
OF THE PW/MIA COMPLEX IN SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES IN THE POST-WAR
ENVIRONMENT.

16. THE DIA IS NOW FULFILLING ITS OWN MISSION AS DESCRIBED IN DIA REGULATION
15-4, PARTICULARLY AS TO THE IDENTIFICATION OF PW CAMPS AND LOCATIONS,
INITIATING AND LEVYING REQUIREMENTS ON APPROPRIATE AGENCIES, DETERMINING
INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND TASKING POSITIVE ACTION TO CLOSE SUCH GAPS."

==========
                        RECOMMENDATIONS
==========

1.  DISSEMINATE THE UNCLASSIFIED PORTIONS OF THE REPORT BY THIS TASK FORCE
TO ALL APPROPRIATE ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUAL PARTIES TO DISPEL REPORTS OF
DELIBERATE "COVER-UP."

2.  ASSURE THAT THE COMPLETE OVERHAUL OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE DIA PW/MIA
CENTER CONTINUES, INCLUDING:

    A.  STAFFING WITH SKILLED AND OBJECTIVE ANALYSTS;
    B.  AUGMENTATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL;
    C.  ASSIGNMENT OF PHOTO INTERPRETATION AND MAPPING, CHARTING AND
        GEODETIC PERSONNEL;
    D.  AUTOMATION OF ALL FILES, AND THE INSTALLATION OF ACCESS TERMINALS TO
        THE COMBINED DATA FILE FOR EACH ANALYST;
    E.  PROVISION OF ADEQUATE FLOORSPACE FOR THE DIA PW/MIA CENTER;
    F.  INTEGRATION OF CIA, STATE-INR AND NSA ANALYSTS WITH THE DIA PW/MIA
        CENTER WORK FORCE.

3.  REASSIGN ALL FUNCTIONS EXCEPT INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, REPORTING AND
    ANALYSIS FROM THE CENTER.

4.  CENTRALIZE ALL SUBSTANTIVE REPORTS INTO THE DATA BASE OF THE DIA PW/MIA
CENTER TO INCLUDE THOSE IN "RETIRED" STORAGE IN SUITLAND, MARYLAND, AND
THOSE OF THE JCRC; INDEX THEM IN A MANNER AS THOROUGH AS POSSIBLE, I.E., BY
GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES, DATE, TIME OF DAY, CIRCUMSTANCES, DESCRIPTIVE HUMAN
TERMS, NUMBERS, SOURCE DESCRIPTION, BOAT NUMBERS, REFUGEE CAMP LOCATIONS,
RELATIVE'S NAMES AND ADDRESSES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

5.  REQUEST JCS/OSD APPROVE A COMPLETE AND ACCURATE FUNCTIONAL DIRECTIVE AND
CHARTER FOR DIA'S PW/MIA ANALYSIS FUNCTION.

6.  SUBORDINATE THE DIA PW/MIA CENTER DIRECTLY UNDER THE DIRECTOR, DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

7.  ESTABLISH RESEARCH PROJECTS ON INDIVIDUAL SIGHTINGS AND GROUPINGS BY
AREA FOR DIA ANALYSTS AND POSSIBLY FOR STUDENTS AT THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE
COLLEGE; DIRECT THE RESEARCH INTO SUCH OTHER RELATED AREAS AS:

    A.  THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM PRISON SYSTEM, INCLUDING RULES AND
    DIRECTIVES GOVERNING PW'S;

    B.  THE COMMUNIST HANDLING OF MILITARY PRISONERS;

    C.  THE TOTAL IDENTIFICATION OF ALLIED MIA'S FROM 1964 - 1975 IN
    VIETNAM, LAOS AND CAMBODIA; BY NATION -- US, KOREA, THAILAND, ETC.;

    D.  THE LAOTIAN HANDLING OF PW'S FROM 1962 - 1975; DISPOSITION,
    POLITICAL DISCUSSION, ETC.;

    E.  WHAT PROVISIONS OF THE US/SRV PEACE AND TRUCE AGREEMENTS REMAIN
    UNSETTLED AND UNRESOLVED.

8.  SUBMIT COMPREHENSIVE PW/MIA CENTER REPORTS TO THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, AND DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE EACH
MONTH TO INCLUDE EVIDENTIAL BASE BY LOCATION AND NUMBER, OF LIVE PRISONERS
ACCOMPANIED BY LARGE SCALE MAP PLOTS, (SANITIZED) AND OTHER ADDITIONAL DATA.

9.  REQUEST JCRC BE AUGMENTED WITH SUBSTANTIAL PERSONNEL FOR THE PURPOSE OF
INTERVIEWING REFUGEES.  ADDITIONAL COLLECTION EFFORTS BY PERMANENT OR
TEMPORARY DUTY TEAMS SHOULD ALSO BE CONSIDERED.

10. EMPHASIZE IN ALL PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY THAT DIA
IS A FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS ORGANIZATION.

11. DIRECT FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF A NEW ANALYTIC STRATEGY WHICH IS ALL
SOURCE INFORMATION FOCUSED RATHER THAN SOURCE FOCUSED ONLY.

12. SUPPORT EACH ANALYST WITH A RESEARCH TECHNICIAN WHO CAN CROSS CHECK
REFERENCES, CORRELATE DATA, LEVY NEW COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS AND OBTAIN
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ADVICE, ETC.

13. DEVELOP TECHNIQUES FOR PURSUING PW/MIA ANALYSIS.

14. EVALUATE THE CURRENT VIETNAMESE PRISON COMPLEX; ITS DESIGN, FUNCTIONS
AND ITS SHIFTING POPULATION FOR INDICATIONS OF MASKING PRISONERS.

15. DIRECT PROGRAM/BUDGET PRIORITY FOR RESOURCES SUPPORTING THE PRISONER
ISSUE AND INSURE PROPER PRIORITY CONSIDERATION OF THESE REQUESTS AT EACH
LEVEL OF THE PROGRAM/BUDGET REVIEW PROCESS.

16. ASSURE THAT DIA PW/MIA CENTER PERSONNEL REGULARLY REVIEW DIA REGULATION
15-4 TO INSURE THAT THEY ARE AWARE OF ITS AIMS AND THAT THE DIRECTOR,
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, PROVIDE THE RESOURCES ADEQUATE TO FULFILL THEM.

==========
                        EPILOGUE
==========

                        EPILOGUE

    THE 1954 SENATE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON "KOREAN WAR ATROCITIES" LISTED AMONG ITS FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS THAT:

    "VII   (4) SEVERAL THOUSAND AMERICAN SOLDIERS WHO HAVE NOT BEEN
REPATRIATED WERE VICTIMS OF WAR CRIMES, DIED IN ACTION, OR ARE PRESENTLY
CONFINED BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN."

    "VIII  (6) COMMUNIST FORCES VIOLATED THE "LITTLE SWITCH" AGREEMENT BY
FAILING TO REPATRIATE THE SICK AND WOUNDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PANMUNJOM
TRUCE."

    GENERAL MARK CLARK, OUR LAST U.N. COMMANDER IN KOREA, IN PUBLIC SPEECHES
IN 1954 LONG AFTER THE EXCHANGE OF POW'S SAID, "IN KOREA WE FOUND THE MOST
DESPICABLE FOE I HAD YET ENCOUNTERED, ONE WHO CONFORMED TO NONE OF THE
RECOGNIZED RULES OF WARFARE, ONE WHO MURDERED OUR WOUNDED AS THEY LAY ON THE
FIELDS OF BATTLE, ONE WHO TORTURED OUR PRISONERS OF WAR AND WHO NOW, IN MY
OPINION, STILL HOLDS 3000 OF OUR MEN BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN."  NONE WAS
EVER RELEASED.  A U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT COMMENT ON WHAT HAD HAPPENED TO
U.S. POW'S WHO HADN'T RETURNED SAID, "A PATTERN FINALLY EMERGED OUT OF THE
LONG AND EXTENSIVE PROBING, THAT SHOWED NOT ONLY SYSTEMATIC ATROCITIES AND
DEATHS BUT SLAVERY AS WELL.

    "THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS DID NOT WANT AMERICANS TO WORK IN THE SALT BEDS
OF SHANTUNG OR THE URANIUM MINES OF SINKIANG.  THEY PRIMARILY WANTED - AND
GOT AMERICANS WHO COULD HANDLE THE SENSITIVE AND COMPLEX INSTRUMENTS OF
MODERN WAR SUCH AS RADAR, AIRBORNE AND GROUND, AND INFRARED INSTRUMENTS FOR
NIGHT COMBAT.  THEY WERE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN AIRMEN WITH TECHNICAL
TRAINING, AND IN ARTILLERYMEN WHO KNOW THE SECRETS OF INTRICATE FUSES."

    ON 27 JULY 1983, A PENTAGON STATEMENT WAS ISSUED, MARKING THE
ANNIVERSARY OF THE KOREAN ARMISTICE.  IT NOTED THAT "ALTHOUGH 30 YEARS HAVE
PASSED, THE NORTH KOREANS HAVE STEADFASTLY REFUSED TO COOPERATE WITH US IN
OUR ATTEMPTS TO ACCOUNT FOR AMERICANS WHO WERE LOST DURING THAT CONFLICT.

    "THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS COMMITTED TO OBTAINING THE FULLEST POSSIBLE
ACCOUNTING OF THESE AMERICANS AND WE ARE PRESSING THE NORTH KOREANS FOR
THEIR COOPERATION TO RESOLVE THIS HUMANITARIAN MATTER."

    WE WATCH OUR MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES AS THEY MEET PERIODICALLY WITH
NORTH KOREAN OFFICERS AT PANMUNJOM IN THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE SEPARATING
NORTH AND SOUTH (OUR ONLY PUBLIC OFFICIAL CONTACT WITH NORTH KOREA TODAY).
NONE CAN BE HEARTENED THAT OUR EFFORTS THERE REPRESENT THE NATION'S TOP
PRIORITY.  THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE CURRENT JCS DIRECTIVE TO DIA WAS
MEANT TO COVER ANY OBLIGATION AS REGARDS KOREAN PW/MIA'S.  THE CURRENT DIA
DIRECTIVE GOVERNING THE FUNCTION OF PW/MIA INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AND
ANALYSIS DEALS ONLY WITH THOSE WHO FAILED TO RETURN FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA.

    HISTORY REPEATS WITH INCREASING FREQUENCY THE MISTAKES OF THE MEN WHO
FORGET OR WHO FAIL TO READ.  THE PRIORITIES DROP, THE ATTENTION FADES AND
MEMORY DIMS.  WE START AGAIN.

[PROVIDED BY THE FORGET ME NOT'S POW/MIA BBS 908-787-8383]
                     [FIDONET 107/450]
