Revision 8.......................................................03/31/92
Revision 7                                                       03/30/92
Revision 6                                                       03/02/92

This document provides the abstract summaries of some 48 significant air
incidents or accidents from 1972 to 1989.  The list is not comprehensive, 
but includes:

Date of    Aircraft
Crash      Type          Registry  Des.  Closest City
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
05-30-72   DC-9-14       N3305L    DL    Fort Worth, TX
06-12-72   DC-10-10      N103AA    AA    Windsor, Ontario, Canada
06-29-72   DHC-6 ...     N4043B..  [1]   Appleton, WI
12-08-72   B-737-222     N9031U    UA    Chicago, IL.
12-12-72   B-707-331C    N788TW    TW    Jamaica, NY

12-29-72   L-1011        N310EA    EA    Miami, FL
08-28-73   B-707-331B    N8705T    TW    Los Angeles, CA
12-01-74   B-727-231     N54328    TW    Berryville, VA
06-24-75   B-727-225     N9945E    EA    Jamaica, NY
08-07-75   B-727-224     N88777    CO    Denver, Colorado

11-12-75   B-727         N8838E    EA    Raleigh, North Carolina
11-12-75   DC-10-30      N1032F    OV    Jamaica, NY
12-16-75   B-747-246     JA8122    JL    Anchorage, Alaska 
04-27-76   B-727-95      N1963     AA    St. Thomas, Virgin Islands
06-23-76   DC-9          N994VJ    AL    Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

11-16-76   DC-9-14       N9014     TI    Denver, Colorado
01-13-77   DC-8-62F      JA8054    JL    Anchorage, Alaska
04-04-77   DC-9-31       N1335U    SO    New Hope, Georgia
05-16-77   Si-S-61L      N619PA    [2]   New York, New York 
09-25-78   B-727         N533PS..  PS    San Diego, California
           C-172         N7711G    [9]   

12-28-78   DC-8-61       N8082U    UA    Portland, Oregon 
05-25-79   DC-10-10      N110AA    AA    Chicago, Illinois
05-30-79   DHC-6-200     N68DE     [3]   Rockland, Maine
09-17-79   DC-9-32       CF-TLU    AC    Boston, Massachusetts
11-11-79   DC-10-30      XA-DUH    AM    Luxembourg, Europe

02-06-80   F-111D ...    -         USAF  Clovis, New Mexico
05-02-80   DC-9-80       N980DC    MDC   Edwards AFB, California
06-19-80   DC-9-80       N1002G    MDC   Yuma , Arizona
09-22-81   L-1011-385    N309EA    EA    Colts Neck, New Jersey
01-13-82   B-737-222     N62AF     AF    Washington, D.C.

01-23-82   DC-10-30CF    N113WA    WO    Boston, Massachusetts
07-09-82   B-727-235     N4737     PA    Kenner, Louisiana 
02-19-85   B-747-SP      N4522V    CI    San Francisco, California
09-16-87   DC-9-82       N312RC    NW    Detroit, Michigan
11-15-87   DC-9-14       N626TX    CO    Denver, Colorado

07-19-89   DC-10-10      N1819U    UA    Sioux City, Iowa
09-08-89   B-737-200     N283AU    US    Kansas City, Missouri
09-27-89   DHC-6-300     N75PV     [5]   Tusayan, Arizona
10-28-89   DHC-6-300     N707PV    [4]   Hawaii Point, Molokai, Hawaii
12-26-89   BA-3101       N410UE    [10]  Tri-Cities Airport, Pasco, WA

01-18-90   727-225A      N8867E    EA    Atlanta, Georgia
           Beech A100    N44UE     [6]
01-25-90   B-707-321B    HK2016    AV    Cove Neck, New York
06-02-90   B-737-2X6C    N670MA    BF    Unalakleet, Alaska
11-25-90   Fuel fire     N/A       UA/CO Denver, CO
12-03-90   DC-9          N3313L    NW    Romulus, Michigan
           B-727         N278US    NW

02-01-91   B-737-300     N388US    US    Los Angeles, California
           SA-227-AC     N683AV    OO
02-07-91   DC-9-15       N565PC    XY    Cleveland, Ohio
04-04-91   PA-60         N3645D    [7]   Merion, Pennsylvania
           Bell 412SP    N78S      [8]


Operators, by two-letter ICAO identifiers:

AA     American
AC     Air Canada
AL     Allegheny
AV     Avianca
AM     Aeromexico
BF     MarkAir
CI     China Airlines
CO     Continetnal
DL     Delta
EA     Eastern
JL     Japan Air Lines
NW     Northwest Airlines
OO     SkyWest Airlines
OV     Overseas National Airways
PA     Pan Am
PS     Pacific Southwest Airways
SO     Southern Airways
TI     Texas International
TW     TWA
UA     United
US     USAir
WO     World Airways
XY     RyanAir

MDC    McDonnell Douglas Corporation
USAF   United States Air Force

[1]  Air Wisconsin
[2]  New York Airways
[3]  Downeast
[4]  Aloha IslandAir, Inc.
[5]  Grand Canyon Airlines
[6]  Epps Air Service
[7]  Lycoming Air Services, Inc.
[8]  Sun Company Aviation Department
[9]  Gibbs Flight Center, Inc.
[10] NPA, Inc. dba United Express

If you feel that a significant incident or accident should be included, 
send 
a copy of the abstract, in the format below, to:
     rdd@rascal.ics.utexas.edu (Robert Dorsett)
Any corrections or suggestions should also go to that address.


Contact addresses of interest:

NTSB: the folks who write the reports.
     National Transportation Safety Board
     Washington, D.C.  20594

NTIS: the folks who distribute them, often in exchange for unreasonable 
amounts of money:
     National Technical Information Service
     Springfield, VA  22151
     703-487-4600

Contributors:
     Tony Heatwole
     Mary Shafer

----------------------------------

Date: May 30, 1972
Type: McDonnell-Douglas DC-9-14
Registration: N3305L
Operator: Delta Airlines, Inc.
Where: Fort Worth, Texas 
Report No. NTSB-AAR-73-3
Report Date: March 13, 1973
Pages: 38

A Delta Air Lines, Inc., DC-9 crashed while attempting a go-around 
following a landing approach to Runway 13 at Greater Southwest 
International Airport, Ft. Worth, Texas, at 0724 c.d.t., May 30, 1972. 
Three Delta pilots and a Federal Aviation Administration air carrier 
operations inspector, the only occupants, were killed. The aircraft was 
destroyed by impact and fire. The landing approach was conducted 
following a McDonnell Douglas DC-10 which made a "touch and go" landing 
ahead of the DC-9.  The final approach phase of the DC-9 flight appeared 
normal until the aircraft passed the runway threshold. It then began to 
oscillate about the roll axis and,after several reversals, rolled rapidly 
to the right and struck the runway in an extreme right-wing-low attitude. 
Fire occurred shortly after initial impact. The National Transportation 
Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was an 
encounter with a trailing vortex generated by a preceding "heavy" jet 
which resulted in an involuntary loss of control of the airplane during 
the final approach. Although cautioned to expect turbulence the crew did 
not have sufficient information to evaluate accurately the hazard or the 
possible location of the vortex.

Existing FAA procedures for controlling VFR flight did not provide the 
same protection from a vortex encounter as was provided to flights being 
given radar vectors in either IFR or VFR conditions.



Date: June 12, 1972
Type: McDonnell Douglas DC-10-10
Registration: N103AA
Operator: American Airlines, Inc.
Where: Windsor, Ontario, Canada
Report No. NTSB-AAR-73-2
Report Date: February 28, 1973
Pages: 41

American Airlines, Inc., McDonnell Douglas DC-10-10, was damaged 
substantially when the aft bulk cargo compartment door separated from the 
aircraft in flight at approximately 11,750 feet mean sea level.  The 
separation caused rapid decompression, which, in turn, caused failure of 
the cabin floor over the bulk cargo compartment.

The separated door caused minor damage to the fuselage above the door and 
substantial damage to the leading edge and upper surface of the left 
horizontal stabilizer.

There were 56 passengers and a crew of 11 aboard the aircraft.  Two 
stewardesses and nine passengers received minor injuries.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable 
cause of this accident was the improper engagement of the latching 
mechanism for the aft bulk cargo compartment door during the preparation 
of the airplane for flight.  The design characteristics of the door 
latching mechanism permitted the door to be apparently closed when, in 
fact, the latches were not fully engaged, and the latch lockpins were not 
in place.



Date: June 29, 1972
Type: Allison Convair 340/440 and DHC-6
Registration: N90858 and N4043B
Operator: North Central Airlines, Inc. and Air Wisconsin, Inc.
Where: Appleton, Wisconsin
Report No. NTSB-AAR-73-9
Report Date: April 25, 1973
Pages: 33

A North Central Airlines Allison Convair 340/440 (CV-580) and an Air 
Wisconsin DHC-6, N4043B, collided over Lake Winnebago near Appleton, 
Wisconsin, at approximately 1037 c.d.t., June 29, 1972. The two 
passengers and three crewmembers aboard the CV-580 and the six passengers 
and two crewmembers aboard the DHC-6 were fatally injured. Both aircraft 
were destroyed as a result of the in-flight collision and the subsequent 
water impact. Both aircraft were proceeding in accordance with visual 
flight rules and were within minutes of landing at their respective 
destinations.  Visual meteorological conditions existed at the time and 
place of the accident.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable 
cause of this accident was the failure of both flightcrews to detect 
visually the other aircraft in sufficient time to initiate evasive 
action. The Board is unable to determine why each crew failed to see and 
avoid the other aircraft; however, the Board believes that the ability of 
both crews to detect the other aircraft in time to avoid a collision was 
reduced because of atmospheric conditions and human visual limitations.



Date: December 8, 1972
Type: Boeing 737-222
Registration: N9031U
Operator: United Air Lines
Where: Chicago-Midway Airport, Chicago, IL.
Report No. NTSB-AAR-73-16
Report Date: August 29, 1973
Pages: 60

A United Air Lines Boeing 737-222 crashed on December 8, 1972, at 1428 
c.s.t. while making a nonprecision instrument approach to Runway 31L at 
the Chicago-Midway Airport, Chicago, Illinois. The accident occurred in a 
residential area approximately 1.5 miles southeast of the approach end of 
Runway 31L. The aircraft was destroyed by impact and subsequent fire. A 
number of houses and other structures in the impact area were also 
destroyed.

There were 55 passengers and 6 crewmembers aboard the aircraft. Forty 
passengers and three crewmembers were killed. Two persons on the ground 
also received fatal injuries.

The aircraft was observed below the overcast in a nose-high attitude and 
with the sound of high engine power just before it crashed into 
structures on the ground.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable 
cause of this accident was the captain's failure to exercise positive 
flight management during the execution of a nonprecision approach, which 
culminated in a critical deterioration of airspeed into the stall regime 
where level flight could no longer be maintained.



Date: December 12, 1972
Type: Boeing 707-331C
Registration: N788TW
Operator: Trans World Airlines
Where: John F. Kennedy International Airport, Jamaica, NY.
Report No. NTSB-AAR-73-11
Report Date: May 2, 1973
Pages: 12

A Trans World Airlines, Inc., Boeing 707-331C, N788TW, operating as 
Flight 669, crashed during an ILS approach in IFR conditions to the John 
F. Kennedy International Airport, Jamaica, New York, at 2256 e.s.t., on 
December 12, 1972. The three flight crewmembers escaped without injury. 
There were no passengers. The airplane was destroyed.

The flight, operating between Baltimore, Maryland, and Jamaica, New York, 
had been conducting an autocoupled landing approach under Category II 
procedures. During the visual transition segment, the aircraft continued 
below the glide slope until it struck approach light bars that were 
mounted on a wooden pier in the threshold area. The aircraft crashed onto 
the runway and slid approximately 2,600 feet.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable 
cause of this accident was that the captain did not maintain a safe 
descent path by visual external reference during an instrument landing 
system approach.



Date: December 29, 1972
Type: Lockheed L-1011
Registration: N310EA
Operator: Eastern Air Lines
Where: Miami, FL
Report No. NTSB-AAR-73-14
Report Date: June 14, 1973
Pages: 45

An Eastern Air Lines Lockheed L-1011 crashed at 2342 eastern standard 
time, December 29, 1972, 18. 7 miles west-northwest of Miami 
International Airport, Miami, Florida. The aircraft was destroyed.  Of 
the 163 passengers and 13 crewmembers aboard, 94 passengers and 5 
crewmembers received fatal injuries. Two survivors died later as a result 
of their injuries.

Following a missed approach because of a suspected nose gear malfunction, 
the aircraft climbed to 2, 000 feet mean sea level and proceeded on a 
westerly heading. The three flight crewmembers and a jumpseat occupant 
became engrossed in the malfunction.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable 
cause of this accident was the failure of the flightcrew to monitor the 
flight instrument during the final 4 minutes of flight, and to detect an 
unexpected descent soon enough to prevent impact with the ground. 
Preoccupation with a malfunction of the nose landing gear position 
indicating system distracted the crew's attention from the instruments 
and allowed the descent to go unnoticed.

As a result of the investigation of this accident, the Safety Board has 
made recommendations to the Administrator of the Federal Aviation 
Administration.



Date: August 28, 1973
Type: Boeing 707-331B
Registration: N8705T
Operator: Trans World Airlines
Where: Los Angeles, California
Report No. NTSB-AAR-74-8
Report Date: July 10, 1974
Pages: 43

A Trans World Airlines, Inc., Boeing 707-331B porpoised while descending 
approximately 35 miles west of Los Angeles, California, at 2150 p. d. t. 
on August 28, 1973. The flight was bound for the Los Angeles 
International Airport.

The longitudinal instability persisted for about 2 minutes during which 
more than 50 pitch oscillations occurred. Peak acceleration forces of +2. 
4g to -0.  3g were measured at the aircraft's center of gravity.

There were 141 passengers and 11 crewnlembers aboard. As a result of the 
accident, one passenger was injured fatally; one flight attendant and two 
other passengers were injured seriously.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable 
cause of this accident was a combination of design tolerances in the 
aircraft's longitudinal control system which, under certain conditions, 
produced a critical relationship between control forces and aircraft 
response. The atypical control force characteristics which were present 
in this particular aircraft's control system were conducive to 
overcontrol of the aircraft by the pilot.  The pilot's normal reaction to 
an unexpected longitudinal disturbance led to a pitching oscillaticn 
which was temporarily sustained by his subsequent application of control 
column forces to regain stable flight.



Date: December 1, 1974
Type: Boeing 727-231
Registration: N54328
Operator: Trans World Airlines, Inc.
Where: Berryville, Virginia
Report No. NTSB-AAR-75-16
Report Date: November 26, 1975
Pages: 111

At 1110 e.g.t., December 1. 1974, Trans World Airlines, Inc., Flight 514, 
a Boeing 727-231, N54328, crashed about 25 nautical miles northwest of 
Dulles International Airport, Washington, D. CO The accident occurred 
while the flight was descending for a W R/DME approach to runway 12 at 
Dulles in instrument meteorological conditions. The 92 occupants -- 85 
passengers and 7 crewmembers were killed, and the aircraft was destroyed.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable 
cause of the accident was the crew's decision to descend to 1,800 feet 
before the aircraft had reached the approach segment where that minimum 
altitude applied. The crew's decision to descend was a result of 
inadequacies and lack of clarity in the air traffic control procedures 
which led to a misunderstanding on the part of the pilots and of the 
controllers regarding each other's responsibilities during operations in 
terminal areas under instrument meteorological conditionsO Nevertheless, 
the examination of the plan view of the approach chart should have 
disclosed to the captain that a minimum altitude of 1,800 feet was not a 
safe altitude.

Contributing factors were: (1) The failure of the FAA to take timely 
action to resolve the confusion and misinterpretation of air traffic 
terminology although the Agency had been aware of the problem for several 
years; (2) the issuance of the approach clearance when the flight was 44 
miles from the airport on an unpublished route without clearly defined 
minimum altitudes; and (3) inadequate depiction of altitude restrictions 
on the profile view of the approach chart for the VOR/DME approach to 
runway 12 at Dulles International Airport.

As a result of the accident the Safety Board submitted 14 recommendations 
to the Federal Aviation Administraion.



Date: June 24, 1975
Type: Boeing 727-225
Registration: N9945E
Operator: Eastern Airlines
Where: John F. Kennedy International Airport, Jamaica, NY.
Report No. NTSB-AAR-76-8
Report Date: March 12, 1976
Pages: 52

About 1605 e.d.t. on June 24, 1975, Eastern Air Lines Flight 66, a Boeing 
727-225, crashed into the approach lights to runway 22L at the John F. 
Kennedy International Airport, Jamaica, New York.  The aircraft was on an 
ILS approach to the runway through a very strong thunderstorm that was 
located astride the ILS localizer course.  Of the 124 persons aboard, 113 
died of injuries received in the crash.  The aircraft was destroyed by 
the impact and fire.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable 
cause of this accident was the aircraftUs encounter with adverse winds 
associated with a very strong thunderstorm located astride the ILS 
localizer course, which resulted in a high descent rate into the 
nonfrangible approach light towers.  The flightcrew's delayed recognition 
and correction of the high descent rate were probably associated with 
their reliance upon visual cues rather than on flight instrument 
references.  However, the adverse winds might have been too severe for a 
successful approach and landing even had they relied upon and responded 
replidly to the indications of the flight instruments.

Contributing to the accident was the continued use of runway 22L when it 
should have become evident to both air traffic control personnel and the 
flightcrew that a severe weather hazard existed along the approach path.



Date: August 7, 1975
Type: Boeing 727-224
Registration: N88777
Operator: Continental Air Lines, Inc.
Where: Stapleton International Airport, Denver, Colorado
Report No. NTSB-AAR-76-14
Report Date: May 5, 1976
Pages: 43

About 1611 m.d.t., on August 7, 1975, Continental Air Lines Flight 426, 
crashed after takeoff from the Stapleton International Airport, Denver, 
Colorado.  The aircraft climbed to about 100 feet above runway 35L and 
then crashed near the departure end of the runway.  The 134 persons 
aboard the aircraft survived the crash; 15 persons were injured 
seriously.  The aircraft was damaged substantially.

At the time of the accident, a thunderstorm with associated rainshowers 
was moving over the northern portion of the airport.  The thunderstorm 
was surrounded by numerous other thunderstorms and associated rainshowers 
but none of these were in the immediate vicinity of the airport.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable 
cause of this accident was the aircraftUs encounter, immediately 
following takeoff, with severe wind shear at an altitude and airspeed 
which precluded recovery to level flight; the wind shear caused the 
aircraft to descend at a rate which could not be overcome even though the 
aircraft was flown at or near its maximum lift capability throughout the 
encounter.  The wind shear was generated by the outflow from a 
thunderstorm which was over the aircraft's departure path.



Date: November 12, 1975
Type: Boeing 727
Registration: N8838E
Operator: Eastern Airlines
Where: Raleigh, North Carolina.
Report No. NTSB-AAR-76-19
Report Date: May 19, 1976
Pages: 26

About 2002 e.s.t. on November 12, 1975, Eastern Air Lines, Inc., Flight 
576 struck the ground about 282 feet short of runway 23 at the Raleigh-
Durham Airport, Raleigh, North Carolina, bounced up onto the runway and 
slid to a stop 4,150 feet past the runway threshold. The accident 
occurred during an instrument landing system approach in heavy rain 
showers. The aircraft was damaged substantially. Of the 139 persons 
aboard the aircraft, 8 were injured; one of the injuries was serious.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable 
cause of the accident was the pilot's failure to execute a missed 
approach when he lost sight of the runway environment in heavy rain below 
decision height.



Date: November 12, 1975
Type: Douglas DC-10-30
Registration: N1032F
Operator: Overseas National Airways, Inc
Where: John F. Kennedy International Airport, Jamaica, New York
Report No. NTSB-AAR-76-19
Report Date: December 16, 1976
Pages: 50

At 1310 e.s.t., November 12, 1975, Overseas National Airways Inc. Flight 
032, a Douglas DC-10-30 (N1032F) crashed while attempting to take off 
from runway 13R at JFK Airport, New York. During the takeoff roll, the 
aircraft struck sea gulls and the takeoff was rejected. The right engine 
disintegrated and caught fire; several tires and wheels disintegrated; 
and the aircraft did not decelerate as expected. Near the end of the 
runway, the captain steered the aircraft onto a taxiway; the landing gear 
collapsed, and most of the aircraft was consumed by the fire. Of the 139 
persons on the aircraft, 2 were seriously inured and 30 were slightly 
injured.

The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable 
cause of the accident was the disintegration and subsequent fire in the 
No. 3 engine when it ingested a large number of sea gulls. Following the 
disintegration of the engine, the aircraft failed to decelerate 
effectively because: (l) The No. 3 hydraulic system was inoperative, 
which caused the loss of the No. 2 brake system and braking torque to be 
reduced 50 percent; (2) the No. 3 engine thrust reversers were 
inoperative; (3) at least three tires disintegrated; (4) the No. 3 system 
spoiler panels on each wing could not deploy; and (5) the runway surface 
was wet.

The following factors contributed to the accident: (l) The bird-control 
program at JFK Airport did not effectively control the bird hazard on the 
airport; and (2) the FAA and the General Electric Company failed to 
consider the effects of rotor imbalance on the abradable epoxy shroud 
material when the engine was tested for certification.



Date: December 16, 1975
Type: Boeing 747-246
Registration: JA8122
Operator: Japan Air Lines Co., Ltd.
Where: Anchorage, Alaska
Report No. NTSB-AAR-76-12
Report Date: March 31, 1976
Pages: 28

About 2055 Alaska standard time, December 16, 1975, Japan Air Lines Co., 
Ltd., Flight 422, slid off the north side of the east-west taxiway of 
Anchorage International Airport while taxiing out for a takeoff on runway 
6R. The aircraft weathercocked about 70! to the left and slid backward 
down a snow-covered embankment with an average slope of -13 degrees. The 
aircraft came to rest on a heading of 150! on a service road 
approximately 250 feet from, and 50 feet below, the taxiway surface.

Of the 121 persons on board, 2 were inured seriously. The aircraft was 
damaged substantially by impact; there was no fire.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable 
cause of this accident was the loss of directional control during taxi as 
a result of ice on the taxiway and strong, direct crosswinds.

Contributing to the accident were 1) the captain's decision to take off 
from runway 6R after receiving reports that taxiing conditions were 
deteriorating, and (2) failure of airport management to anticipate 
predictable unsafe icing conditions on the airport. This failure to 
anticipate these conditions resulted in delayed and insufficient 
preventive action.



Date: April 27, 1976
Type: Boeing 727-95
Registration: N1963
Operator: American Airlines, Inc.
Where: St. Thomas, Virgin Islands
Report No. NTSB-AAR-77-1
Report Date: December 16, 1976
Pages: 61

About 1510 A.s.t. on April 27, 1976, American Airlines, Inc., Flight 625 
overran the departure end of runway 9 after landing at the Harry S Truman 
Airport, Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas, Virgin Islands. The aircraft 
struck the instrument landing system localizer antenna, crashed through a 
chain link fence, and came to rest against a building located about 1,040 
feet beyond the departure end of the runway. The aircraft was destroyed. 
Of the 88 persons aboard the aircraft, 35 passengers and 2 flight 
attendants were killed. Thirty-eight other persons received injuries 
which ranged from minor to serious. One person on the ground was injured 
seriously.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable 
cause of the accident was the captain's actions and his judgment in 
initiating a go-around maneuver with insufficient runway remaining after 
a long touchdown. The long touchdown is attributed to a deviation from 
precribed landing techniques and an encounter with an adverse wind 
condition, common at the airport.

The nonavailability of information about the aircraft's go-around 
performance capabilities may have been a factor in the captain's abortive 
attempt to go-around after a long landing.



Date: June 23, 1976
Type: Douglas DC-9
Registration: N994VJ
Operator: Allegheny Airlines, Inc.
Where: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Report No. NTSB-AAR-78-2
Report Date: January 19, 1978
Pages: 54

About 1712 e.d.t. on June 23, 1976, Allegheny Airlines, Inc., Flight 121. 
a Douglas DC-9-31, crashed on the Philadelphia International Airport, 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; the wreckage came to rest about 6,000 ft 
beyond the threshold and about 350 ft to the right of the centerline of 
runway 27R. Of the 106 persons onboard, 86 persons were injured; there 
were no fatalities.

The captain of Flight 121 had conducted an instrument approach to runway 
27R in visual conditions as a thunderstorm passed over the airport in a 
north-northeasterly direction. When near the threshold the captain 
initiated a go-around from a low altitude and entered rain of increasing 
intensity. Shortly thereafter, the aircraft was seen descending in a 
noseup attitude with the landing gear retracted. After striking tail 
first on a taxiway about 4,000 ft beyond the threshold of runway 27, the 
aircraft slid about 2,000 ft and stopped.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable 
cause of this accident was the aircraft's encounter with severe 
horizontal and vertical wind shears near the ground as a result of the 
captain's continued approach into a clearly marginal severe weather 
condition. The aircraft's ability to cope under these conditions was 
borderline when flown according to standard operating procedures, 
however, if the aircraft's full aerodynamic and power capability had been 
used, the wind shear could probably have been flown through successfully. 
Contributing to the accident was the tower controller's failure to 
provide timely below-minimum RVR information.



Date: November 16, 1976
Type: Douglas DC-9-14
Registration: N9014
Operator: Texas International Airlines, Inc.
Where: Denver, Colorado
Report No. NTSB-AAR-77-10
Report Date: October 27, 1977
Pages: 48

On November 16, 1976, Texas International Flight 987, a McDonnell Douglas 
DC-9-14, crashed after rejecting a takeoff from runway 8 right at 
Stapleton International Airport, Denver, Colorado. The takeoff was 
reected when the stall warning stick-shaker activated after the aircraft 
had rotated for takeoff. When the pilot was unable to stop the aircraft 
within the confines of the runway, it overran the runway, traversed 
drainage ditches, struck approach light stanchions, and stopped.

Eighty-one passengers and five crewmembers evacuated the aircraft, which 
had been damaged severely by impact and fire; 14 persons were inured.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable 
cause of this accident was a malfunction of the stall warning system for 
undetermined reasons which resulted in a false stall warning and an 
unsuccessful attempt to reect the takeoff after the aircraft had 
accelerated beyond refusal and rotation speeds.

The decision to reect the takeoff, although not consistent with standard 
operating procedures and training, was reasonable in this instant case 
based upon the unusual circumstances in which the crew found themselves, 
the minimal time available for decision. and the crew's judgment 
concerning a potentially catastrophic situation.



Date: January 13, 1977
Type: McDonnel-Douglas DC-8-62F
Registration: JA 8054
Operator: Japan Air Lines, Company, Ltd.
Where: Anchorage, Alaska
Report No. NTSB-AAR-78-7
Report Date: January 16, 1979
Pages: 75

At 0635:39 A.s.t. on January 13, 1977, Japan Air Lines Co., Ltd., JA 8054
crashed shortly after takeoff from runway 24L at Anchorage International 
Airport, Anchorage, Alaska. The cargo consisted of live beef cattle for 
deliverv to Japan.  The three crewmembers and the two cargohandlers 
aboard the aircraft died in the accident and the aircraft was destroyed.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable 
cause of the accident was a stall that resulted from the pilot's control 
inputs aggravated by airframe icing while the pilot was under the 
influence of alcohol. Contributing to the cause of this accident was the 
failure of the other flightcrew members to prevent the captain from 
attempting the flight.



Date: April 4, 1977
Type: DC-9-31
Registration: N1335U
Operator: Southern Airways, Inc.
Where: New Hope, Georgia
Report No. NTSB-AAR-78-3
Report Date: January 26, 1978
Pages: 106

At 1619 e.s.t. April 4, 1977, a Southern Airways, Inc., DC-9, Flight 242, 
crashed in New Hope, Georgia. After losing both engines in flight, it 
attempted an emergency landing on a highway. Of the 85 persons aboard 
Flight 242, 62 were killed, 22 were seriously injured, and 1 was slightly 
injured. Eight persons on the ground were killed and one person was 
seriously injured; one person died about 1 month later.

Flight 42 entered a severe thunderstorm between 17,000 feet and 14,000 
feet near Rome, Georgia, en route from Huntsville to Atlanta. Both 
engines were damaged and all thrust was lost. The engines could not be 
restarted and the flightcrew was forced to make an emergency landing.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable 
cause of this accident was the total and unique loss of thrust from both 
engines while the aircraft was penetrating an area of severe 
thunderstorms.  The loss of thrust was caused by the ingestion of massive 
amounts of water and hail which in combination with thrust lever movement 
induced severe stalling in and major damage to the engine compressors.

Major contributing factors included the failure of the company's 
dispatching system to provide the flightcrew with up-to-date severe 
weather information pertaining to the aircraft's intended route of 
flight, the captain's reliance on airborne weather radar for penetration 
of thunderstorm areas, and limitations in the Federal Aviation 
Administration's air traffic control system which precluded the timely 
dissemination of real-time hazardous weather information to the 
flightcrew.



Date: May 16, 1977
Type: Sikorsky S-61L
Registration: N619PA
Operator: New York Airways, Inc.
Where: Pan Am Building Heliport, New York, New York
Report No. NTSB-AAR-77-9
Report Date: October 13, 1977
Pages: 32

About 1735 e.d.t., on May 16, 1977, the right landing gear of a New York 
Airways, Inc., Sikorsky 5-61L, N619PA, failed while the aircraft was 
parked, with rotors turning, on the rooftop heliport of the Pan Am 
Building in New York, New York.  The aircraf t rolled over on its right 
side and was substantially damaged.  At the time of the accident four 
passengers had boarded the aircraft and other passengers were in the 
process of boarding. The passengers and the three crewmembers onboard 
received either minor or no injuries; however, four passengers who were 
still outside the aircraft and were waiting to board were killed and one 
was seriously injured.  One pedestrian on the corner of Medison Avenue 
and 43rd Street was killed and another was seriously injured when they 
were struck by a separated portion of one of the main rotor blades of the 
aircraft.

The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable 
cause of the accident was the fatigue failure of the upper right forward 
fitting of the right main landing gear tube assembly. Fatigue originated 
from a small surface pit of undetermined source. All fatalities were 
caused by the operating rotor blades as a result of the collapse of the 
landing gear.



Date: September 25, 1978
Type: B-727 and Cessna 172
Registration: N533PS and N7711G
Operator: Pacific Southwest Airlines, Inc.
Where: San Diego, California
Report No. NTSB-AAR-79-5
Report Date: April 20, 1979
Pages: 74

About 0901:47, September 25, 1978, Pacific Southwest Airlines, Inc., 
Flight 182, a Boeing 727-214, and a Gibbs Flite Center, Inc., Cessna 172, 
collided in midair about 3 nautical miles northeast of Lindbergh Field, 
San Diego, California. Both aircraft crashed in a residential area. One 
hundred and thirty-seven persons, including those on both aircraft were 
killed; 7 persons on the ground were killed; and 9 persons on the ground 
were injured. Twenty-two dwellings were damaged or destroyed. The weather 
was clear, and the visibility was 10 miles.

The Cessna was climbing on a northeast heading and was in radio contact 
with the San Diego approach control. Flight 182 was on a visual approach 
to runway 27.  Its flightcrew had reported sighting the Cessna and was 
cleared by the approach controller to maintain visual separation and to 
contact the Lindbergh tower.  Upon contacting the tower, Flight 182 was 
again advised of the Cessna's position.  The flightcrew did not have the 
Cessna in sight. They thought they had passed it and continued their 
approach. The aircraft collided near 2,600 ft m.s.l.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable 
cause of the accident was the failure of the flightcrew of Flight 182 to 
comply with the provisions of a maintain-visual-separation clearance, 
including the requirement to inform the controller when they no longer 
had the other aircraft in sight.

Contributing to the accident were the air traffic control procedures in 
effect which authorized the controllers to use visual separation 
procedures to separate two aircraft on potentially conflicting tracks 
when the capability was available to provide either lateral or vertical 
radar separation to either aircraft.



Date: December 28, 1978
Type: DC-8-61
Registration: N8082U
Operator: United Airlines, Inc.
Where: Portland, Oregon
Report No. NTSB-AAR-79-7
Report Date: June 7, 1979
Pages: 62

About 1815 Pacific standard time on December 28, 1978, United Airlines, 
Inc., Flight 173 crashed into a wooded, populated area of suburban 
Portland, Oregon, during an approach to the Portland International 
Airport. The aircraft had delayed southeast of the airport at a low 
altitude for about 1 hour while the flightcrew coped with a landing gear 
malfunction and prepared the passengers for the possibility of a landing 
gear failure upon landing.  The plane crashed about 6 nmi southeast of 
the airport. The aircraft was destroyed; there was no fire. Of the 181 
passengers and 8 crewmembers aboard, 8 passengers, the flight engineer, 
and a flight attendant were killed and 21 passengers and 2 crewmembers 
were injured seriously.

The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable 
cause of the accident was the failure of the captain to monitor properly 
the aircraft's fuel state and to properly respond to the low fuel state 
and the crewmember's advisories regarding fuel state. This resulted in 
fuel exhaustion to all engines. His inattention resulted from 
preoccupation with a landing gear malfunction and preparations for a 
possible landing emergency.

Contributing to the accident was the failure of the other two flight 
crewmembers either to fully comprehend the criticality of the fuel state 
or to successfully communicate their concern to the captain.



Date: May 25, 1979
Type: DC-10-10
Registration: N110AA
Operator: American Airlines, Inc.
Where: Chicago-OUHare International Airport
Report No. NTSB-AAR-79-17
Report Date: December 21, 1979
Pages: 103

About 1504 c.d.t., May 25, 1979, American Airlines, Inc., Flight 191, a 
McDonnell-Douglas DC-10-10 aircraft, crashed into an open field just 
short of a trailer park about 4,600 ft northwest of the departure end of 
runway 32R at Chicago-O'Hare International Airport, Illinois.

Flight 191 was taking off from runway 32R. The weather was clear and the 
visibility was 15 miles. During the takeoff rotation, the left engine and 
pylon assembly and about 3 ft of the leading edge of the left wing 
separated from the aircraft and fell to the runway. Flight 191 continued 
to climb to about 325 ft above the ground and then began to roll to the 
left. The aircraft continued to roll to the left until the wings were 
past the vertical position, and during the roll, the aircraft's nose 
pitched down below the horizon.

Flight 191 crashed into the open field and the wreckage scattered into an 
adjacent trailer park. The aircraft was destroyed in the crash and 
subsequent fire.  Two hundred and seventy-one persons on board Flight 191 
were killed; two persons on the ground were killed, and two others were 
injured. An old aircraft hangar, several automobiles, and a mobile home 
were destroyed.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable 
cause of this accident was the asymmetrical stall and the ensuing roll of 
the aircraft because of the uncommanded retraction of the left wing 
outboard leading edge slats and the loss of stall warning and slat 
disagreement indication systems resulting from maintenance-induced damage 
leading to the separation of the No. 1 engine and pylon assembly at a 
critical point during takeoff. The separation resulted from damage by 
improper maintenance procedures which led to failure of the pylon 
structure.

Contributing to the cause of the accident were the vulnerability of the 
design of the pylon attach points to maintenance damage; the 
vulnerability of the design of the leading edge slat system to the damage 
which produced asymmetry; deficiencies in Federal Aviation Administration 
surveillance and reporting systems which failed to detect and prevent the 
use of improper maintenance procedures; deficiencies in the practices and 
communications among the operators, the manufacturer, and the FAA which 
failed to determine and disseminate the particulars regarding previous 
maintenance damage incidents; and the intolerance of prescribed 
operational procedures to this unique emergency.



Date: May 30, 1979
Type: DeHavilland DHC-6-200
Registration: N68DE
Operator: Downeast Airlines, Inc.
Where: Rockland, Maine
Report No. NTSB-AAR-80-5
Report Date: May 12, 1980
Pages: 36

About 2055 e.d.t., on May 30, 1979, Downeast Airlines, Inc., Flight 46 
crashed into a heavily wooded area about 1.2 mi southouthwest of the Knox 
County Regional Airport, Rockland, Maine. The crash occurred during a 
nonprecision instrument approach to runway 3 in instrument meteorological 
conditions. Of the 16 passengers and 2 crewmembers aboard, only 1 
passenger survived the accident. The aircraft was destroyed.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable 
cause of the accident was the failure of the flightcrew to arrest the 
aircraft's descent at the minimum descent altitude for the nonprecision 
approach, without the runway environment in sight, for unknown reasons.

Although the Safety Board was unable to determine conclusively the 
reason(s) for the flightcrew's deviation from standard instrument 
approach procedures, it is believed that inordinate management pressures, 
the flrst officer's marginal instrument proflciency, the captain's 
inadequate supervision of the flight, inadequate crew training and 
procedures, and the captain's chronic fatigue were all factors in the 
accident.



Date: September 17, 1979
Type: DC-9-32
Registration: CF-TLU
Operator: Air Canada
Where: East of Boston, Massachusetts
Report No. NTSB-AAR-80-13
Report Date: January 30, 1981
Pages: 21

At 1212 e.d.t., on September 17, 1979, Air Canada Flight 680, a scheduled 
passenger flight to Yarmouth, Nova Scotia, Canada, departed Logan 
International Airport, Boston, Massachusetts.  About 14 min. after 
takeoff, at an altitude of about 25,000 ft m.s.l., the tailcone along 
with the aft cabin pressure acess door and a portion of the aft cabin 
pressure bulkhead separated from the aircraft causing rapid decompression 
of the passenger and flightcrew compartments.  The aircraft was landed 
safely at Logan International Airport about 38 minutes after takeoff.  Of 
the 45 persons aboard, one flight attendant received minor injuries 
during the decompression.  The aircraftUs oxygen system and its elevator 
control and engine control systems were damaged.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines taht the probable 
cause of the accident was a fatigue fracture of the aft cabin pressure 
bulkhead which resulted in a rapid decompression of the aircraftUs cabin 
area.  This fracture initiated from a crack below the aft bulkhead access 
door which was discernible on the X-rays taken during the aircraftUs last 
maintenance inspection but was not detected by the inspectors.



Date: November 11, 1979
Type: DC-10-30
Registration: XA-DUH
Operator: Aeromexico.
Where: Luxembourg, Europe
Report No. NTSB-AAR-80-10
Report Date: November 7, 1980
Pages: 32

About 2138, on November 11, t979, AEROMEXICO, Flight 945, XA-DUH, 
McDonnell-Douglas DC-10-30 aircraft, entered a prestall buffet and a 
sustained stall over Luxembourg, Europe, at 29,800 ft while climbing to 
3t.000 ft en route to Miami, Florida, from Frankfurt, Germany. Stall 
recovery was effected at 18,900 ft. After recovery, the crew performed an 
inflight functional check of the aircraft and, after finding that it 
operated properly, continued to their intended destination.

After arrival at Miami, Florida, it was discovered that portions of both 
outboard elevators and the lower fuselage tail area maintenance access 
door were missing. There were no injuries to the 311 persons on board 
Flight 945. No injuries or damage to personnel or property on the ground 
was reported.

Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the incident.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable 
cause of this incident was the failure of the flightcrew to follow 
standard climb procedures and to adequately monitor the aircraft's flight 
instruments. This resulted in the aircraft entering into a prolonged 
stall buffet which placed the aircraft outside the design envelope.



Date: February 6, 1980
Type: F-111D and Cessna TU-206G
Registration: N7393N
Operator: United States Air Force
Where: Clovis, New Mexico
Report No. NTSB-AAR-82-10
Report Date: August, 24, 1982
Pages: 40

About 1026, on February 6, 1980, a Cessna TU-206G, N7393N, and a United 
States Air Force tactical aircraft, a General Dynamics F-lllD, collided 
in midair about 11 nmi northeast of Cannon Air Force Base. The Cessna had 
departed Alemeda Airport, Albuquerque, New Mexico, had made an en route 
stop at Tucumcari, New Mexico, and was destined for Clovis, New Mexico. 
On the morning of February 6, the General Dynamics F-lllD had departed 
Cannon Air Force Base, located about 13 miles southwest of the Clovis 
Municipal Airport, on a cross country training flight. The F-111D was 
returning to Cannon Air Force Base to complete the mission. The two 
aircraft collided near 5,800 feet m.s.l. The pilot and passenger aboard 
the Cessna and both crewmembers of the F-lllD were killed. The weather 
was clear and the visibility was reported as 30 miles.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable 
cause of this accident was the failure of both aircraft to request radar 
traffic advisories, the failure of the F-111D flightcrew to see and avoid 
the Cessna TU-206G, and the failure of the RAPCON controllers to observe 
the Cessna radar target and to issue traffic advisories to the F-111D.  
Contributing to the accident were the limitations of the see and avoid 
concept in a terminal area with low speed/high speed traffic.



Date: May 2, 1980
Type: DC-9-80
Registration: N980DC
Operator: McDonnell Douglas Corporation
Where: Edwards Air Force Base, California
Report No. NTSB-AAR-82-2
Report Date: February 9, 1982
Pages: 23

About 0634 P.d.t, May 2, 1980, a McDonnell-Douglas, Inc., DC-9-80, 
N980DC, crashed while trying to land on runway 22 at Edwards Air Force 
Base, California.

The aircraft was on a certification test flight to determine the 
horizontal distance required to land and bring the aircraft to a fu]l 
stop as required by 14 CFR 25.125 when the accident occurred.

The aircraft touched down about 2,298 feet beyond the runway threshold. 
The descent rate at touchdown exceeded the aircraft's structural 
limitations; the empennage separated from the aircraft and fell to the 
runway. The aircraft came to rest about 5,634 feet beyond the landing 
threshold of runway 22 and was damaged substantially. Seven crewmembers 
were on board; one crewmember, a flight test engineer, broke his left 
ankle when the aircraft touched down.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable 
cause of this accident was the pilot's failure to stabilize the approach 
as prescribed by the manufacturer's flight test procedures. Contributing 
to the cause of the accident was the lack of a requirement in the flight 
test procedures for other flight crewmembers to monitor and call out the 
critical flight parameters. Also contributing to this accident were the 
flight test procedures prescribed by the manufacturer for demonstrating 
the aircraft's landing performance which involved vertical descent rates 
approaching the design load limits of the aircraft.



Date: June 19, 1980
Type: DC-9-80
Registration: N1002G
Operator: McDonnell Douglas Corporation
Where: Yuma, Arizona
Report No. NTSB-AAR-81-6
Report Date: September 15, 1981
Pages: 32

About 1849 m.s.t., June 19, 1980, a McDonnell Douglas DC-9-80, N1002G, 
skidded off the right side of runway 21R while attempting a simulated 
hydraulic-systems-inoperative landing at the Yuma International Airport, 
Yuma, Arizona. The aircraft came to rest about 6,700 feet beyond the 
landing threshold of the runway. The aircraft was damaged substantially, 
however the three flightcrew members were not injured.  There were no 
passengers. The weather was clear.

The aircraft was on a certification test flight. The purpose of the 
flight was to show that the aircraft could be controlled adequately and 
landed safely with a complete failure of its hydraulic systems. The 
aircraft landed about 1,735 feet beyond the threshold of runway 21R, and 
the pilot deployed the thrust reversers and applied reverse thrust before 
the nosewheel touched down. The aircraft began to yaw, continued to yaw 
after the nosewheel touched down, and then ground looped to the right and 
slid off the right side of the runway.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable 
cause of this accident was the inadequate procedure established for the 
certification test flight, and the pilot's mismanagement of thrust 
following the initial loss of directional control.



Date: September 22, 1981
Type: Lockheed L-1011-385
Registration: N309EA
Operator: Eastern Airlines Flight 935
Where: Colts Neck, New Jersey
Report No. NTSB-AAR-82-5
Report Date: June 1, 1982
Pages: 40

About 1140 e.d.t. on September 22, 1981, the No. 2 engine, a Rolls-Royce 
RB-211-22B, failed as Eastern Airlines Flight 935, a Lockheed L-1011-385 
(N309EA), was climbing through 10,000 feet after departing Newark 
International Airport, Newark, New Jersey, for San Juan, Puerto Rico. The 
displacement of the fan module in the course of the engine failure 
sequence caused loss of hydraulic systems A, B, and D and jammed the 
captain's and first officer's rudder pedals in the neutral position. The 
flightcrew performed the appropriate emergency procedures, requested an 
immediate landing at John F. Kennedy International Airport, Jamaica, New 
York, and dumped about 48,000 pounds of fuel. The aircraft, with 11 
crewmembers and 190 passengers aboard, landed on runway 22L at 1212 
e.d.t. without further incident. No one aboard was injured, and there was 
no damage to property or injury to persons on the ground. The aircraft 
was substantially damaged.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable 
cause of the accident was thermally induced degradation and consequent 
failure of the No. 2 engine low pressure location bearing because of 
inadequate lubrication. Oil leaks between the abutment faces of the 
intermediate pressure compressor rear stubshaft and the low pressure 
location bearing oil weir and between the intermediate pressure location 
bearing inner front flange and the intermediate pressure compressor rear 
stubshaft reduced the lubricating oil flow to the low pressure location 
bearing which increased operational temperatures, reduced bearing 
assembly clearance, and allowed heat to build up in the bearing's balls 
and cage. The bearing failure allowed lubricating oil to spray forward 
into the low pressure fan shaft area where it ignited into a steady fire; 
the fire overheated the fan shaft and the fan fail-safe shaft both of 
which failed, allowing the fan module to move forward and break through 
the No. 2 engine duct.  This caused extensive damage to the aircraftUs 
structure and flight control systems.  The oil leaks were most likely 
caused by poor mating of the abutment surfaces.



Date: January 13, 1982
Type: B-727-222
Registration: N62AF
Operator: Air Florida, Inc.
Where: Washington National Airport, Washington, D.C.
Report No: NTSB-AAR-82-8
Report Date: August 10, 1981
Pages: 141

On January 13, 1982, Air Florida Flight 90, a Boeing 737-222 (N62AF), was 
a scheduled flight to Fort Lauderdale, Florida, from Washington National
Airport, Washington, D.C.  There were 74 passengers, including 3 infants,
and five crew-members on board.  The flight's scheduled departure time 
was delayed about 1 hour 45 minutes due to a moderate to heavy snowfall
which necessitated the temporary closing of the airport.

Following takeoff from runway 36, which was made with snow and/or ice
adhering to the aircraft, the aircraft at 161 e.s.t. crashed into the
barrier wall of the northbound span of the 14th Street Bridge, which
connects the District of Columbia with Arlington County, Virginia, and
plunged into the ice-covered Potomac River.  It came to rest on the west
side of the bridge 0.75 nmi from the departure end of runway 36.  Four
passengers and one crewmember survived the crash.  

When the aircraft hit the bridge, it struck seven occupied vehicles and
then tore away a section of the bridge barrier wall and bridge railing.
Four persons in the vehicles were killed; four were injured.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable 
cause of this accident was the flight crew's failure to use engine anti-
ice during ground operation and takeoff, their decision to take off with
snow/ice on the airfoil surfaces of the aircraft, and the captain's 
failure to reject the takeoff during the early stage when his attention 
was called to anomalous engine instrument readings.  Contributing to the
accident were the prolonged ground delay between deicing and the receipt 
of ATC takeff clearance during which the airplane was exposed to continual
precipitation, the known inherent pitchup characteristics of the B-737
aircraft when the leading edge is contaminated with even small amounts of
snow or ice, and the limited experience of the flightcrew in jet transport
winter operations.



Date: January 23, 1982
Type: DC-10-30CF
Registration: N113WA
Operator: World Airways, Inc.
Where: Boston-Logan International Airport, Boston, Massachusetts
Report No. NTSB-AAR-82-15
Report Date: December 15, 1982
Pages: 109

On January 23, 1982, World Airways, Inc., Flight 30H, a McDonnell Douglas 
DC-10-30, was a regularly scheduled passenger flight from Oakland, 
California, to Boston, Massachusetts, with an en route stop at Newark, 
New Jersey. Following a nonprecision instrument approach to runway 15R at 
Boston-Logan International Airport, the airplane touched down about 2,500 
feet beyond the displaced threshold of the 9,191-foot usable part of the 
runway. About 1936:40, the airplane veered to avoid the approach light 
pier at the departure end of the runway and slid into the shallow water 
of Boston Harbor. The nose section separated from the forward fuselage in 
the impact after the airplane dropped from the shore embankment. Of the 
212 persons on board, two are missing and presumed dead.  The others 
evacuated the airplane safely, but with some injuries.

The weather was 800-foot overcast, 2 t/2-mile visibility, with light rain 
and fog. The temperature was 38! with the wind from 165! at 3 kns. The 
surface of runway 15R was covered with rain, hard-packed snow, and glaze 
ice. At 1736, 2 hours before the accident, runway braking was reported by 
a ground vehicle as "fair to poor;" subsequently, several pilots had 
reported braking as poor, and one pilot had reported braking as "poor to 
nil" in the hour before the accident.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable 
cause of this accident was the pilot landed the airplane without 
sufficient information as to runway conditions on a slippery, ice-covered 
runway, the condition of which exceeded the airplane's stopping 
capability. The lack of adequate information with respect to the runway 
was due to the fact that (1) the FAA regulations did not provide guidance 
to airport management regarding the measurement of runway slipperiness 
under adverse conditions; (2) the FAA  regulations did not provide the 
flightcrew and other personnel with the means to correlate contaminated 
surfaces with airplane stopping distances; (3) the FAA regulations did 
not extend authorized minimum runway lengths to reflect reduced braking 
effectiveness on icy runways; (4) the Boston-Logan International Airport 
management failed to exercise maximum efforts to assess and improve the 
conditions of the ice-covered runways to assure continued safety of heavy 
jet airplane operations; and, (5) tower controllers failed to transmit 
available braking information to the pilot of Flight 30H.

Contributing to the accident was the failure of pilot reports on braking 
to convey the severity of the hazard to following pilots.

The pilot's decision to retain autothrottle speed control throughout the 
flare and the consequent extended touchdown point on the runway 
contributed to the severity of the accident.



Date: July 9, 1982
Type: Boeing 727-235
Registration: N4737
Operator: Pan American World Airways, Inc.
Where: Kenner, Loisiana
Report No. NTSB-AAR-83-02
Report Date: March 21, 1983
Pages: 119

On July 9, 1982, Pan American World Airways, Inc., Flight 759 (Clipper 
759), a Boeing 727-235, N4737, was a regularly scheduled passenger flight 
from Miami, Florida, to Las Vegas, Nevada, with an en route stop at New 
Orleans, Louisiana. About 1607:57 central daylight time, Clipper 759, 
with 7 crewmembers, 1 nonrevenue passenger on the cockpit jumpseat, and 
137 passengers on board, began its takeoff from runway 10 at the New 
Orleans International Airport, Kenner, Louisiana.

At the time of Flight 759's takeoff, there were showers over the east end 
of the airport and to the east of the airport along the airplane's 
intended takeoff path. The winds at the time were gusty, variable, and 
swirling. Clipper 759 lifted off the runway, climbed to an altitude of 
between 95 feet to about 150 feet above the ground, and then began to 
descend.  The airplane struck a line of trees about 2,376 feet beyond the 
departure end of runway 10 at an altitude of about 50 feet above the 
ground. The airplane continued on an eastward track for another 2,234 
feet hitting trees and houses and then crashed in a residential area 
about 4,610 feet from the end of the runway.

The airplane was destroyed during the impact, explosion, and subsequent 
ground fire.  One hundred forty-five persons on board the airplane and 8 
persons on the ground were killed in the crash. Six houses were 
destroyed; five houses were damaged substantially. 

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable 
cause of the accident was the airplane's encounter during the liftoff and 
initial climb phase of flight with a microburst-induced wind shear which 
imposed a downdraft and a decreasing headwind, the effects of which the 
pilot would have had difficulty recognizing and reacting to in time for 
the airplaneUs descent to be arrested before its impact with trees.

Contributing to the accident was the limited capability of current 
ground-based low-level wind shear detection technology to provide 
definitive guidance for controllers and pilots for use in avoiding low-
level wind shear encounters.



Date: February 19, 1985
Type: Boeing 747-SP
Registration: N4522V
Operator: China Airlines
Where: San Francisco, California
Report No. NTSB-AAR-86-03
Report Date: March 29, 1986
Pages: 48

A Boeing 747 SP-O9, enroute to Los Angeles, California from Taipei, 
Taiwan, suffered an inflight upset. The flight from Taipei to about 300 
nmi northwest of San Francisco was uneventful and the airplane was flying 
at about 41,000 feet mean sea level when the No. 4 engine lost power. 
During the attempt to recover and restore normal power on the No. 4 
engine, the airplane rolled to the right, nosed over, and entered an 
uncontrollable descent.  The captain was unable to restore the airplane 
to stable flight until it had descended to 9,500 feet. After the captain 
stabilized the airplane, he elected to divert to San Francisco 
International Airport, where a safe landing was made. Although the 
airplane suffered major structural damage during the upset, descent, and 
subsequent recovery, only 2 persons among the 274 passengers and crew on 
board were injured seriously.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable 
cause of this accident was the captain's preoccupation with an inflight 
malfunction and his failure to monitor properly the airplane's flight 
instruments which resulted in his losing control of the airplane.

Contributing to the accident was the captain's over-reliance on the 
autopilot after the loss of thrust on the No. 4 engine.



Date: August 16, 1987
Type: McDonnell-Douglas DC-9-82
Registration: N312RC
Operator: Northwest Airlines, Inc.
Where: Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport, Romulus, Michigan
Report No. NTSB-AAR-88-05
Report Date: May 10, 1988 Pages: 138

Executive Summary:

About 2046 eastern daylight time on August 16, 1987, Northwest
Airlines, Inc., flight 255 crashed shortly after taking off from runway
3 center at the Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport, Romulus,
Michigan.  Flight 255, a McDonnell Douglas DC-9-82, U.S. Registry
N312RC, was a regularly scheduled passenger flight and was en route to
Phoenix, Arizona, with 149 passengers and 6 crewmembers.

According to witnesses, flight 255 began its takeoff rotation about
1,200 to 1,500 feet from the end of the runway and lifted off near the
end of the runway.  After liftoff, the wings of the airplane rolled to
the left and the right about 35 degrees in each direction.  The
airplane collided with obstacles northeast of the runway when the left
wing struck a light pole located 2,760 feet beyond the end of the
runway.  Thereafter the airplane struck other light poles, the roof of
a rental car facility, and then the ground.  It continued to slide
along a path aligned generally with the extended centerline of the
takeoff runway.  The airplane broke up as it slid across the ground and
postimpact fires erupted along the wreckage path.  Three occupied
vehicles on a road adjacent to the airport and numerous vacant vehicles
in a rental car parking lot along the airplane's path were destroyed by
impact forces and/or fire.

Of the persons on board flight 255, 148 passengers and 6 crewmembers
were killed; 1 passenger, a 4-year-old child, was injured seriously.
On the ground, two persons were killed, one person was injured
seriously, and four persons suffered minor injuries.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable
cause of the accident was the flightcrew's failure to use the taxi
checklist to ensure that the flaps and slats were extended for takeoff.
Contributing to the accident was the absence of electrical power to the
airplane takeoff warning system which thus did not warn the flightcrew
that the airplane was not configured properly for takeoff.  The reason
for the absence of electrical power could not be determined.



Date: November 15, 1987
Type: DC-9-14
Registration: N626TX
Operator: Continental Airlines, Inc.
Where: Stapleton International Airport, Denver, Colorado
Report No. NTSB-AAR-88-09
Report September 27, 1988 Pages: 90

Executive Summary:

On November 15, 1987, Continental Airlines, Inc., flight 1713, a
McDonnell Douglas DC-9-14, N626TX, was operating as a regularly
scheduled, passenger-carrying flight between Denver, Colorado, and
Boise, Idaho.  The airplane was cleared to take off following a delay
of approximately 27 minutes after deicing.  The takeoff roll was
uneventful, but following a rapid rotation, the airplane crashed off
the right side of runway 35 left.  Both pilots, 1 flight attendant, and
25 passengers sustained fatal injuries.  Two flight attendants and 52
passengers survived.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable
cause of this accident was the captain's failure to have the airplane
deiced a second time after a delay before takeoff that led to upper wing
surface contamination and a loss of control during rapid takeoff
rotation by the first officer.  Contributing to the accident were the
absence of regulatory or management controls governing operations by
newly qualified flightcrew members and the confusion that existed
between the flightcrew and air traffic controllers that led to the
delay in departure.

The safety issues discussed in the report include:

    o  pilot training;

    o  aircraft deicing procedures; and

    o  wingtip vortex generation and lifespan.

Recommendations concerning these issues were addressed to the Federal
Aviation Administration, the National Fire Protection Association, the
American Association of Airport Executives, the Airport Operators
Council International, and Continental Airlines, Inc.



Date: July 19, 1989 
Type: McDonnell-Douglas DC-10-10 
Registration: N1819U 
Operator: United Airlines 
Where: Sioux Gateway Airport, Iowa
Report No. NTSB-AAR-90-06 
Report Date: November 1, 1990 Pages: 126

Executive Summary:

On July 19, 1989, at 1516, a DC-10-10, N1819U, operated by United
Airlines as flight 232, experienced a catastrophic failure of the #2
tail-mounted engine during cruise flight.  The separation,
fragmentation, and forceful discharge of stage 1 fan rotor assembly
parts from the #2 engine led to the loss of the three hydraulic systems
that powered the airplane's flight controls.  The flightcrew
experienced severe difficulties controlling the airplane, which
subsequently crashed during an attempted landing at Sioux Gateway
Airport, Iowa.  There were 285 passengers and 11 crewmembers onboard.
One flight attendant and 110 passengers were fatally wounded.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable
cause of this accident was the inadequate consideration given to human
factors limitations in the inspection and quality control procedures
used by United Airlines' engine overhaul facility, which resulted in
the failure to detect a fatigue crack originating from a previously
undetected metallurgical defect located in a critical area of the stage
1 fan disk that was manufactured by General Electric Aircraft Engines.
The subsequent catastrophic disintegration of the disk resulted in the
liberation of debris in a pattern of distribution and with energy
levels that exceeded the level of protection provided by design
features of the hydraulic systems that operate the DC-10's flight
controls.

The safety issues raised in this report include:

1.  General Electric Aircraft Engines' (GEAE) CF6-6 fan rotor assembly
design, certification, manufacturing, and inspection.

2.  United Airlines' maintenance and inspection of CF6-6 engine fan
rotor assemblies.

3.  DC-10 hydraulic flight control system design, certification and
protection from uncontained engine debris.

4.  Cabin safety, including infant restraint systems, and airport
rescue and firefighting facilities.

Recommendations concerning these issues were addressed to the Federal
Aviation Administration, the Secretary of the Air Force, the Air
Transport Association and the Aerospace Industries Association.



Date: September 8, 1989
Type: Boeing 737-200
Registration: N283AU
Operator: US Air
Where: Kansas City International Airport, Missouri
Report No. NTSB-AAR-90-04
Report Date: ?
Pages: ?

Abstract: missing. 



Date: February 24, 1989
Type: 747-122
Registration: N4713U
Operator: United Airlines
Where: Honolulu, Hawaii
Report No. NTSB-AAR-90-01
Report Date: April 16, 1990 Pages: 68

Executive Summary:

On February 24, 1989, United Airlines (UAL), flight 811, a Boeing
747-122 (B-747), N4713U, was being operated as a regularly scheduled
flight from Los Angeles, California (LAX) to Sydney, Australia (SYD)
with intermediate stops in Honolulu, Hawaii (HNL) and Aukland, New
Zealand (AKL).  There were 3 flightcrew, 15 flight attendants, and 337
passengers aboard the airplane.

The flightcrew reported the airplane's operation to be normal during
the takeoff from Honolulu, and during the initial and intermediate
segments of the climb.  The flightcrew observed en route thunderstorms
both visually and on the airplane's weather radar, so they requested
and received clearance for a deviation to the left of course from the
HNL Combined Center Radar Approach Control (CERAP).  The captain
elected to leave the passenger seat belt sign "on."

The flightcrew stated that the first indication of a problem occurred
while the airplane was climbing between 22,000 and 23,000 feet at an
indicated airspeed (IAS) of 300 knots.  They heard a sound, described
as a "thump," which shook the airplane.  They said that this sound was
followed immediately by a "tremendous explosion."  The airplane had
experienced an explosive decompression.  They said that they donned
their respective oxygen masks but found no oxygen available.  Engines
No. 3 and 4 were shutdown because of damage from foreign object
ingestion.

The airplane made a successful emergency landing at HNL and the
occupants evacuated the airplane.  Examination of the airplane revealed
that the forward lower lobe cargo door had separated in flight and had
caused extensive damage to the fuselage and cabin structure adjacent to
the door.  Nine of the passengers had been ejected from the airplane
and lost at sea.

The issues in this investigation centered around the design and
certification of the B-747 cargo doors, and the operation and
maintenance to assure the continuing airworthiness of the doors.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable
cause of this accident was the sudden opening of the improperly latched
forward lower lobe cargo door in flight and the subsequent explosive
decompression.  Contributing to the cause of the accident was a
deficiency in the design of the cargo door locking mechanisms, which
made them susceptible to inservice damage, and which allowed the door
to be unlatched, yet to show a properly latched and locked position.
Also contributing to the accident was the lack of proper maintenance
and inspection of the cargo door by United Airlines, and a lack of
timely corrective actions by Boeing and the FAA following the 1987
cargo door opening incident on a Pan Am B-747.

The Safety Board issued three safety recommendations as a result of
this investigation that addressed measures to improve the airworthiness
of the B-747 cargo doors and other non-plug doors on pressurized
transport category airplanes.  It also issued recommendations affecting
cabin safety.



Date: September 27, 1989
Type: De Havilland Twin Otter, DHC-6-300
Registration: N75PV
Operator: Grand Canyon Airlines
Where: Grand Canyon National Park Airport, Tusayan, Arizona
Report No. NTSB/AAR-91/01
Report Date: January 8, 1991
Pages: 34

[This is the Executive Summary, not the Abstract.  New format.]

On September 27, 1989, Grand Canyon Airlines Flight "Canyon 5," a de
Havilland DHC-6-300, Twin Otter, N75GC, was operating as a sightseeing
flight under 14 CFR 135 from Grand Canyon National Park Airport,
Tusayan, Arizona.  The flight was to last about 50 minutes.  The
airplane crashed during its initial landing attempt and was destroyed.
The two pilots and eight passengers received fatal injuries, none
passengers received serious injuries, and two passengers received
minor injuries.

Canyon 5's first sightseeing flight on the morning of the accident was
uneventful, and it departed on the second tour about 0900.  A video
tape taken by one of the passengers on the accident flight indicated
that the takeoff, tour, and approach to the airport were normal.

Witnesses described the airplane's approach as normal;  however, the
airplane travelled about 1,000 feet down the runway, which was 8,99
feet long, at an altitude of about 5 feet prior to touchdown.  The
airplane reportedly dropped to the runway, bounced back into the air,
continued another 1,000 fleet and dropped back onto the runway near the
intersection of taxiway "C."  Witnesses then saw the airplane veer off
to the right of the runway.  When it neared the runway edge, observers
saw it begin to climb in a nose-high attitude.  The airplane continued
to climb as it passes the control tower and reached an altitude of
150 to 200 feet above the runway.  At this point, the aircraft rolled
toward the left and crashed into trees on a hill about 1,200 feet to
the left of the runway.  The controllers reported that all
communications with Canyon 5 had been normal.  There were no reports
of winds or gusts at the time of the accident.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable
cause of the accident was improper pilot techniques and crew
coordination during the landing attempt, bounce, and attempted
go-around.

As a result of the investigation of this accident, seven
recommendations were issued to the FAA concerning the POI's inspection
of operator procedures, the adequacy of the certification inspection
of the Grand Canyon National Park Airport, and the inspection of
passenger seats.  Four recommendations were issued to the Arizona
Department of Transportation to improve electrical and communications
equipment and aircraft rescue and fire fighting capability at the
airport.



Date: October 28, 1989
Type: De Havilland Twin Otter, DHC-6-300
Registration: N707PV
Operator: Aloha IslandAir, Inc.
Where: Halawa Point, Molokai, Hawaii
Report No. NTSB/AAR-90/05
Report Date: September 25, 1990
Pages: 40

[This is the Executive Summary, not the Abstract.  New format.]

On October 28, 1989, Aloha IslandAir, flight 1712, a de Havilland
DHC-6-300, Twin Otter, N707PV, collided with terrain near Halawa Bay,
Molokai, Hawaii, while en route on a scheduled passenger flight from
the Kahalui Airport, Maui, Hawaii, to Kaunakakai Airport, Molokai,
Hawaii.  The flight was conducted under visual flight rules (VFR) and
under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 135.  The aircraft was destroyed;
the two pilots and all 18 passengers received fatal injuries.

Official sunset had occurred about32 minutes before the flight
departed Kahalui, Maui, and low clouds and precipitation existed over
the mountains near Halawa Bay.  Radar data revealed that the flight
descended from its intended cruising altitude of 1,000 ft msl to an
altitude of 500 feet as it approached Halawa Bay.  The airplane was in
a wings-level attitude on a heading of 260 deg when it struck the
rising terrain.  This final heading was determined to have been the
normal heading routinely used by other Aloha IslandAir flights as the
travelled over water parallel to the north shore of Molokai en route
to the Kaunakakai Airport.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable
cause of this accident was the decision of the captain to continue
flight under visual flight rules at night into instrument
meteorological conditions (IMC), which obscured rising mountainous
terrain.

Contribution to the accident was the inadequate supervision of
personnel, training, and operations by Aloha IslandAir management.
Also contribution to the accident was insufficient oversight by the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) of Aloha IslandAir during a
period of rapid operational expansion and corporate growth.

As a result of this investigation, the Safety Board made six
recommendations to the FAA pertaining to surveillance of 14 CFR Part
135 operators, 12 CFR Part 135 operating procedures, and flight
following in the Hawaiian Islands.  It also made one recommendation to
the National Weather Service to include the possibility of orographic
clouds in weather reports.  Three recommendations were made to Aloha
IslandAir regarding crew training.  In addition, the Safety Board made
one recommendation to the Regional Airlines Association and the
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association to inform their members of
the circumstances of this accident.



Date: December 26, 1989
Type: British Aerospace BA-3101 Jetstream
Registration: N410UE
Operator: NPA, Inc. dba United Express
Where: Tri-Cities Airport, Pasco, Washington
Report No. NTSB/AAR-91/06
Report Date: November 4, 1991
Pages: 62

[This is the Executive Summary, not the Abstract.  New format.]

On December 26, 1989, United Express, flight 2415 (Sundance 415), a
British Aerospace BA-3101 Jetstream, N410UE, crashed approximately 400
feet short of runway 21R at Tri-Cities Airport, Pasco, Washington.
The airplane crashed while executing an instrument landing system
approach to the runway at approximately 2230 pacific standard time.
Visual meteorological conditions prevailed beneath the cloud bases,
which were approximately 1,000 feet above ground level at the time of
the accident.  The airplane was destroyed and the two pilots and all
four passengers received fatal injuries.

Recorded air traffic radar data revealed that the flight did not
intercept the final approach course until it was about 1.5 miles
inside the outer marker, at an altitude about 1,000 feet above the
glideslope, on the instrument landing system approach to runway 21R.
Further examination of the radar data and weather information indicated
that the airplane was in the clouds in icing conditions for almost 9
and 1/2 minutes.  As the approach was initiated, the flightcrew called
the Seattle Air Route Traffic Control Center for a missed approached
because of "a couple of flags on our instruments" but then elected to
continue the approach.

The local controller at the Pasco air traffic control tower observed
the airplane at an altitude higher than normal descending with its
wings level.  He stated that the rate of descent was faster than other
airplanes he had observed.  He said that he later saw the airplane
nose over and crash short of runway 21R.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable
cause of this accident was the flightcrew's decision to continue an
unstabilized instrument landing system approach that lead to a stall,
most likely of the horizontal stabilizer, and lost of control at low
altitude.  Contributing to the accident was the air traffic
controller's improper vectors that positioned the airplane inside the
outer marker while it was still well above the glideslope.
Contributing to the stall and loss of control was the accumulation of
airframe ice that degraded the aerodynamic performance of the
airplane.

As a result of this investigations, the Safety Board issued two
recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration.  One pertains
to the immediate termination of the practice at air route traffic
control centers of providing radar vectors for flights to the final
approach course when using a radar display set to an expanded range.
The other recommendation pertains to the terminations of such services
when the approach gate is not depicted on the video map that is used.
As a result of the findings of this accident and other accidents
involving operations in icing conditions, remedial measures were
required by the Civil Aviation Administration of the United Kingdom
and the Federal Aviation Administration for operators of the BA-3101
in icing conditions.  The report includes five additional
recommendations to the FAA that address aircraft certification and
operations in icing conditions.



Date: January 18, 1990
Types: Boeing 727-225A and Beechcraft King Air A100
Registrations: N8867E and N44UE
Operators: Eastern Airlines and Epps Air Service
Where: Atlanta Hartsfield International Airport, Atlanta, Georgia
Report No. NTSB/AAR-91/03
Report Date: May 29, 1991
Pages: 95

[This is the Executive Summary, not the Abstract.  New format.]

On January 18, 1990, about 1904, and Eastern Airlines Boeing 727,
flight 111, while landing on the runway in night visual conditions,
collided with an Epps Air Service Beechcraft King Air A100, N44UE, at
the William B. Hartsfield International Airport, Atlanta, Georgia.
The King Air had been cleared to land on runway 26 right.  The B-727
sustained substantial damage, but none of the 149 passengers or 8
crewmemebers onboard were injured.  The King Air was destroyed as a
result of the collision.  The pilot of the King Air sustained fatal
injuries, and the pilot, the only other occupant, sustained severe
injuries.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable
causes of this accident were (1) the failure of the Federal Aviation
Administration to provide air traffic control procedures that
adequately take into consideration human performance factors such as
those which resulted in the failure of the north local controller to
detect the developing conflict between N44UE and EA 111, and (2) the
failure of the north local controller to ensure the separation of
arriving aircraft which were using the same runway.

Contributing to the accident was the failure of the north local
controller to follow the prescribed procedure of issuing appropriate
traffic information to EA 111, and failure of the north final
controller and the radar monitor controller to issue timely speed
reductions to maintain adequate separations between aircraft on final
approach.

The safety issues raised in this report include:

        Air traffic controller procedures and compliance with
        requirements for final approach separation and clearance to
        land.

        Conspicuity of airplane lighting

        Limitations of the "see and avoid" principle in the night
        landing, final approach environment.

        Effectiveness of airport surface detection equipment (ASDE)
        the Airport Movement Area Safety System (AMASS) and Airport
        Surface Traffic Automation (ASTA) to preclude similar runway
        incursion accidents.

As a result of this investigation, the Safety Board made five
recommendations to the FAA intended to prevent runway incursion
accidents.



Date: January 25, 1990
Type: Boeing 707-321B
Registration: HK 2016
Operator: Avianca, the Airline of Columbia
Where: Cove Neck, New York
Report No. NTSB/AAR-91/04
Report Date: April 30, 1991
Pages: 285

[This is the Executive Summary, not the Abstract.  New format.]

On January 25. 1990, at approximately 2134 eastern standard time,
Avianca Airlines flight 052, a Boeing 707-321B with Colombian
registration HK 2016, crashed in a wooded residential area in Cove
Neck, Long Island, New York.  AVA052 was a scheduled international
passenger flight from Bogota, Colombia, to John F. Kennedy
International airport, New York, with an intermediate stop at Jose
Maria Cordova Airport, near Medellin, Colombia.  Of the 158 persons
aboard, 73 were fatally injured.

Because of poor weather conditions in the northeastern part of the
United States, the flightcrew was place in holding three times by air
traffic control for a total of about 1 hour and 17 minutes.  During
the third period of holding, the flightcrew reported that the airplane
could not hold longer than 5 minutes, that it was running out of fuel,
and that it could not reach its alternate airport, Boston-Logan
International.  Subsequently, the flightcrew executed a missed approach
to John F. Kennedy International Airport.  While trying to return to
the airport, the airplane experienced a loss of power to all four
engines and crashed approximately 16 miles from the airport.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable
cause of this accident was the failure of the flightcrew to adequately
manage the airplane's fuel load, and their failure to communicate an
emergency fuel situation to air traffic control before fuel exhaustion
occurred.  Contribution to the accident was the flightcrew's failure
to use an airline operation control dispatch system to assist them
during the international flight into a high-density airport in poor
weather.  Also contributing to the accident was inadequate traffic
flow management by the Federal Aviation Administration and the lack of
standardized understandable terminology for pilots and controllers for
minimum and emergency fuel states.

The Safety board also determines that windshear, crew fatigue and
stress were factors that lead to the unsuccessful completion of the
first approach and thus contributed to the accident.

The safety issues raised in this report include:

        1.  Pilot responsibilities and dispatch responsibilities
        regarding planning. fuel requirements, and flight following
        during international flights.

        2.  Pilot to controller communications regarding the
        terminology to be used to convey fuel status and the need for
        special handling.

        3.  ATC flow control procedures and responsibilities to
        accommodate aircraft with low fuel states.

        4.  Flightcrew coordination and English language proficiency
        of foreign crews.

Recommendations concerning these issues were addressed to the Federal
Aviation Administration and the Director, Departmento Administrativo
de Aeronautico Civil (DAAC), Colombia.



Date: June 2, 1990
Type: Boeing 737-2X6C
Registration: N670MA
Operator: MarkAir, Inc.
Where: Unalakleet, Alaska
Report No. NTSB/AAR-91/02
Report Date: January 23, 1991
Pages: 85

[This is the Executive Summary, not the Abstract.  New format.]

On June 2, 1990, at 0937 Alaskan Daylight Time, MarkAir, Inc., Flight
3087, a Boeing 737-2X6C, registered in the US as N670MA, crashed about
7.5 miles short of runway 14, Unalakleet, Alaska, while executing a
localizer approach to that runway.  The flight originated at 0828 at
Anchorage International Airport, Anchorage, Alaska.  Instrument
meteorological conditions existed at the time, and the flight was on
an IFR flight plan.  The captain, the first officer, and a flight
attendant sustained minor injuries.  Another flight attendant
sustained serious injuries.  There were no passengers on board, and
the airplane was destroyed.  The flight was operated under FAR Part
121.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable
cause of this accident was deficiencies in flightcrew coordination,
their failure to adequately prepare for and properly execute the UNK
LOC Rwy 14 nonprecision approach and their subsequent premature
descent.

The safety issues discussed in this report include cockpit resource
management and approach chart symbology.  The Safety Board issued a
safety recommendation on approach chart standardization to the
Federal Aviation Administration.  Safety recommendations were also
issued to MarkAir, Inc., on the subjects of cockpit resource
management and checklist usage.



Date: November 25, 1990
Type: Fuel Farm Fire
Registration:
Operator: United Airlines and Continental Airlines
Where: Stapleton International Airport, Denver, Colorado
Report No. NTSB/AAR-91/07
Report Date: October 1, 1991
Pages: 71

[This is the Executive Summary, not the Abstract.  New format.]

About 0915 mountain standard time, on Sunday, November 25, 1990, a
fire erupted at a fuel storage and dispensing facility about 1.8 miles
from the main terminal of Stapleton International Airport at Denver,
Colorado.  The facility, referred to as a fuel farm, was operated by
United Airlines and Continental Airlines.  From the time firefighting
efforts were initiated immediately after the fire erupted until the
fire was extinguished, a total of 634 firefighters, 47 fire units, and
4 contract personnel expended 56 million gallons of water and 28,000
gallons of foam concentrate.  The fire burned for about 48 hours.  Of
the 5,185,000 gallons of fuel stored in tanks at the fire before
the fire, about 3 million gallons were wither consumed by the fire or
lost as a result of leakage from the tanks.  Total damage was
estimated by United Airlines to have been between $15 and $20
million.  No injuries or fatalities ocurred as a result of the fire.

United Airlines' flight operations were disrupted because of the lack
of fuel to prepare aircraft for flight.  Airport facilities, other
than the fuel farm, were not affected by the fire.  The duration and
intensity of the fire, however, raised concerns about the ability of
airport and local firefighters to respond to a fuel fire of this
magnitude.  The origin of the fire also raised concerns about the
safety oversight and inspection of fuel farm pumping operations.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable
cause of the fire at the fuel storage facility at Denver's Stapleton
International Airport was the failure of AMR Combs to detect loose
motor bolts that permitted the motor of motor/pump unit 3 to become
misaligned, resulting in damage to the pump and subsequent leakage
and ignition of fuel.  Contributing to the accident was the failure of
AMR Combs to properly train its employees to inspect and maintain the
fuel pump equipment and the failure of the city and county of Denver
to carry out its certificate holder responsibility to oversee the fuel
storage facility in accordance with its airport certification manual.
Contributing to the severity and duration of the fire were the lack of
storage tank fail-safe control valves and internal fire valves and the
location of the control building were [sic] fuel leaks were likely to
occur.

The safety issues discussed in this accident report include:

        maintenance and inspection of fuel storage facilities on
        airport property;

        training of company personnel charged with maintaining and
        inspecting fuel storage pumping equipment;

        adequacy of safety features for fuel pumping equipment;

        the responsibility of the Federal Aviation Administration
        (FAA) for inspection of fuel storage facilities on
        FAA-certified airport property; and

        industry contingency plans for responding to fuel farm fires.

As a result of this accident, safety recommendations were issued to
the Federal Aviation Administration, AMR Combs--the company that was
under contract to operate and maintain United Airlines' portion of the
fuel farm, the National Fire Protection Association, the Airport
Operators Council International, Inc., and the American Association of
Airport Executives.



Date: December 3, 1990
Type: McDonnell Douglas DC-9 and Boeing 727 (B-727)
Registration: N3313L and N278US
Operator: Northwest Airlines, Inc.
Where: Detroit Metropolitan/Wayne County Airport, Romulus, Michigan
Report No. NTSB/AAR-91/05
Report Date: June 25, 1991
Pages: 169

[This is the Executive Summary, not the Abstract.  New format.]

On December 3, 1990, at 1345 eastern standard time, Northwest Airlines
flight 1482, a McDonnell Douglas DC-9, and Northwest Airlines flight
299, a Boeing 727, collided near the intersection of runways 09/27 and
03C/21C in dense fog at Detroit Metropolitan/Wayne County Airport,
Romulus, Michigan.  At the time of the collision, the B-727 was on its
takeoff roll, and the DC-9 had just taxied onto the active runway.
The B-727 was substantially damaged, and the DC-9 was destroyed.
Eight of the 39 passengers and 4 crewmembers aboard the DC-9 received
fatal injuries.  None of the 146 passengers and 10 crewmembers aboard
the B-727 were injured.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable
cause of this accident was a lack of proper crew coordination,
including a virtual reversal of roles by the DC-9 pilots, which lead
to their failure to stop taxiing their airplane and alert the ground
controller of their positional uncertainty in a timely manner before
and after intruding onto the active runway.

Contributing to the cause of the accident were (1) deficiencies in the
air traffic control services provided by the Detroit tower, including
failure of the ground controller to take timely action to alert the
local controller to the possible runway incursion, inadequate
visibility observations, failure to use progressive taxi instructions
in low-visibility conditions, and issuance of inappropriate and
confusing taxi instructions compounded by inadequate backup
supervision of the level of experience of the staff on duty; (2)
deficiencies in the surface markings, signage, and lighting at the
airport and the failure of the Federal Aviation Administration
surveillance to detect or correct any of these deficiencies; and (3)
failure of Northwest Airlines, Inc., to provide adequate cockpit
resource management training to their line aircrews.

Contributing to the fatalities in the accident was the inoperability
of the DC-9 internal tailcone release mechanism.  Contribution to the
number and severity of injuries was the failure of the crew of the
DC-9 to properly execute the passenger evacuation.

The safety issues raised in this report include:

        1.  Airport marking and lighting;

        2.  Cockpit resource management;

        3.  Air traffic control procedures in low-visibility
        conditions.

        4.  Flight attendant procedures during evacuations;

        5.  Design of the DC-9 tailcone emergency release system.

Recommendations concerning these issues were addressed to the Federal
Aviation Administration, the Detroit Metropolitan/Wayne County Airport,
and Northwest Airlines, Inc.



Date: February 1, 1991
Type: Boeing 737-300 and Fairchild Metroliner SA-227-AC
Registration: N388US and N683AV
Operator: USAir and Skywest
Where: Los Angeles International Airport, Los Angeles, California
Report No. NTSB/AAR-91/08
Report Date: October 22, 1991
Pages: 161

[This is the Executive Summary, not the Abstract.  New format.]

On February 1, 1991, at 1807 Pacific standard time, USAir flight 1493,
N388US, a Boeing 737-300, collided with Skywest flight 5569, N683AV, a
Fairchild Metroliner (SA-227-AC), while the USAir airplane was landing
on runway 24 left at Los Angeles International Airport, Los Angeles,
California.  The Skywest Metroliner was positioned on the same runway,
at intersection 45, awaiting clearance for takeoff.  As a result of
the collision, both airplanes were destroyed.  All 10 passengers and 2
crewmembers aboard the Metroliner and 20 passengers and 2 crewmembers
aboard the USAir airplane were fatally injured.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable
cause of the accident was the failure of the Los Angeles Air Traffic
Facility Management to implement procedures that provided redundancy
comparable to the requirements contained in the National Operational
Position Standards and the failure of the FAA Air Traffic Service to
provide adequate policy direction and oversight to its air traffic
control facility managers.  The failures created an environment in the
Los Angeles Air Traffic Control tower that ultimately led to the
failure of the local controller 2 (LC2) to maintain an awareness of
the traffic situation, culminating in the inappropriate clearances and
subsequent collision of the USAir and Skywest aircraft.  Contributing
to the cause of the accident was the failure of the FAA to provide
effective quality assurance of the ATC system.

The safety issues raised in this report include:

        Air traffic management and equipment at Los Angeles
        International Airport.

        Aircraft exterior lighting and conspicuity.

        Pilot situation awareness during takeoff and landing and
        operation on airport surfaces.

        Air traffic controller workload, performance, and supervision.

        Air transport accident survivability, evacuation standards and
        procedures, interior furnishing flammability standards, and
        survival devices.

Recommendations concerning these issues were addressed to the Federal
Aviation Administration.



Date: February 17, 1991
Type: Douglas DC-9-15
Registration: N565PC
Operator: Ryan International Airlines
Where: Cleveland-Hopkins International Airport, Cleveland, Ohio
Report No. NTSB/AAR-91/09
Report Date: November 16, 1991
Pages: 100

[This is the Executive Summary, not the Abstract.  New format.]

About 0019, Sunday, February, 1991, Ryan International Airlines flight
590 (Ryan 590), a DC-9 series 10 airplane, crashed while taking off
>From Cleveland-Hopkins International Airport.  The flightcrew consisted
of two pilots.  There were no other crewmembers or passengers on the
flight, which was contracted to carry mail for the U.S. Postal
Service.  Both pilots were fatally injured, and the airplane was
destroyed as a result of the accident.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable
cause of this accident was the failure of the flightcrew to detect and
remove ice contamination on the airplane's wings, which was largely a
result of a lack of appropriate response by the Federal Aviation
Administration, Douglas Aircraft Company, and Ryan International
Airlines to the known critical effect that a minute amount of
contamination has on the stall characteristics of the DC-9 series 10
airplane.  The ice contamination led to wing stall and loss of control
during the attempted takeoff.

The safety issues discussed in this report include the dissemination of
information regarding precautions to be taken when operating in
conditions conducive to airframe ice and the particular susceptibility
of DC-9 series 10 airplanes to control problems during take off with
a minute amount of ice is on the wing.                             



Date: April 4, 1991
Type: Piper Aerostar PA-60 and Bell 412SP
Registration: N3645D and N78S
Operator: Lycoming Air Services, Inc. and Sun Company Aviation Department
Where: Merion, Pennsylvania
Report No. NTSB/AAR-91/01/SUM
Report Date: September 17, 1991
Pages: 26

[This is a Summary Report]

This report explains the midair collision involving a Lycoming Air
Services Piper Aerostar PA-60 and a Sun Company Aviation Department
Bell 412.  The Safety issues discussed include pilot judgment, the
training and checking of flightcrews, the adequacy of the PA-60 flight
manual, and FAA surveillance of the carrier.


