		      Ken Deen's THE AGGRESSIVE TRADER(tm)
	       "Seeking double-digit gains in one to four months"

			       STATUS REPORT

                                                           1339 Virginia Rd.
Vol. 1, No. 81                                           Montecito, CA 93108
August 26, 1992                                               (805) 565-2039
                                                      CompuServe: 72020,2050

   This month, I present the new improved DESI Trading System(tm), as
promised in the last Status Report, Vol.1 #70.  The improvements, based on
research I conducted in June and July of this year, dramatically enhance the
System's historical performance.
   First, however, let us review my performance for the month of July and
take a look at current market conditions.


July 1992:  Overview

   July was an excellent month for The Aggressive Trader(tm).  The Model
Portfolio was up 3.9%, and the Stock+Options Account was up 7.0%.  However, I
am still down for the year, with the Model Portfolio showing a loss of 5.9%
since the first of the year, and the Stock+Options Account showing a loss of
11.2% since its inception at the end of March.  See Tables 3 and 5 for
details.
   By comparison, the NASDAQ Composite was up 3.1% in July and up 0.9% for the
year to date.  The S&P 500 was up 3.9% for July and up 1.7% for the year.  So
I have outperformed the market in July, but underperformed for the year.
   Comparing my results with mutual funds which follow strategies similar to
mine, my year-to-date results start to look much better.  Pacific Horizon
Aggressive Growth was down 16% year-to-date on July 31, and Twentieth Century
Ultra was down 13%.  I am outperforming both of these aggressive growth funds.
Both of these funds are rated A+ by Investor's Business Daily based on their
very impressive 3-year track record.


Market Commentary 

   I continue to be bullish on growth stocks intermediate-term, but I am now
cautious short-term.  I expect a strong rally later this year, beginning
sometime between now and late November, led by growth stocks.  The recent
August selloff was impressive, but not as impressive, volume-wise, as the
powerful two-day rally we had on July 28 and 29.
   Short-term, the market must deal with the crisis in the dollar and the
resultant backing up of long-term interest rates.  This, and uncertainty over
the election, may continue to weigh heavily on stocks in coming weeks.
However, many bullish factors remain in place; see Vol.1 #80 for details.
   On August 25, the NASDAQ Composite closed at 554.22.  This is very close
to the low for the year, set on June 26, of 547.84.  If this index were to set
a new low, especially if such a break were to come on high volume, then I
would have to re-think my bullish stance.


Introducing an Improved DESI Trading System(tm)

   In this issue, I will share with you some of the highlights of the
evolution of the DESI Trading System(tm).  This represents a progress report
on more than a year's worth of full-time investigation into trading systems
based on earnings surprises.  For those of you who are just interested in the
bottom line, I will repeat here some of the statistics I presented last month
in a "sneak preview".
   In historical back-testing from Nov. 16, 1990 through July 22, 1992, this
improved DESI Trading System(tm) has produced 22 completed trades on paper,
19 of which were winners.  All trades are 3 to 3.5 months in duration.  Of the
19 winners, the average gain was 24.3%, versus an average loss for the 3
losers of 7.2%.  The best gain was 108%, versus the worst loss of 14.8%.
Commissions are ignored in these statistics, but the bid/ask spread and
slippage are more than taken into account(1).
   In an effort to evaluate the trading system from an even more revealing
angle, I am currently writing a computer program to track a hypothetical
$25,000 investment using the DESI Trading System(tm) exclusively(2).  I will
report these results as they become available.
   I have utilized my 17-year expertise in software engineering to design,
execute, and test this System.


The Theory Behind the DESI Trading System(tm)

   It is well-known that positive earnings surprises can provide excellent
trading opportunities.  Most traders attempt to anticipate these surprises by
buying the stock ahead of the earnings news.  This results in a runup in the
stock price a week or two prior to the announcement.  In such a situation,
when the earnings are actually announced, there may be little reaction;
indeed, there may actually be a drop in the stock price, as traders "buy on
the rumor and sell on the news".  When this happens, the business press may
refer to the earnings report as an "earnings surprise", meaning that the
numbers are better than the expectations of analysts; but it is not a surprise
to traders, since they were buying ahead of the news.
   On the other hand, when the earnings news is a genuine surprise -- to
traders as well as to analysts -- it can spark a rally that can last for weeks
or months.  These are the surprises which the DESI Trading System(tm) detects.
Factors such as the long-term growth record of the company are evaluated by
the DESI Trading System(tm), but the most important factors are the strength
of the earnings report and the strength of the market reaction to that report.
   Services do exist (I/B/E/S and Zacks) to track the expectations of analysts
regarding upcoming corporate earnings, but no service exists to track the
expectations of money managers, institutional investors, and traders -- the
people who actually buy and sell large blocks of stock.  In the absence of
such a service, the market action of the stock itself provides some strong
clues.  Using these clues, the DESI Trading System(tm) infers which earnings
reports came as the biggest surprise to these key market players.
   When one of these true earnings surprises hits the news wires, some very
fast traders will buy the stock on the day of the news.  This results in a
strong up day on strong volume.  Many times, some profit-taking takes place
the following day and the stock may give back part of its gain.  However,
within a few days of the surprise, a second wave of buyers will come in,
buyers who needed time to evaluate the earnings report and to research the
company, and also buyers who waited for this profit-taking to run its course.
This second wave of buying often receives additional stimulus from analysts
who upgrade their rating on the stock and raise their estimates of future
earnings.  Value-oriented investors may also be among the early buyers,
because after a very strong earnings report, trailing earnings jump up,
causing the P/E to drop.  Within a couple of weeks, the stock has risen in
price sufficiently to attract the attention of momentum players -- those
investors who look for stocks with the best relative strength.  As an upward
trend in the stock price becomes clear to the army of chart watchers and
technical analysts, more and more momentum players jump in.  This can create
a snowball effect, as the stock has by now established a clear upward trend.
   One of the great beauties of this System is that it identifies stocks which
attract investors of various stripes.  Fundamental analysts are attracted to
the stock because of the excellent earnings growth and improved outlook for
future earnings; technical analysts like it because of the pickup in price,
volume, and relative strength; and value-oriented investors like the drop in
P/E.


The Problem with Trading Systems

   When evaluating a trading system, it is very important to find out what
historical data was available to the system's author during the system's
development and fine-tuning.  I recommend ignoring the performance of the
system over time periods that were known when the system was designed or
revised.  Yes, that's right, I suggest ignoring the "19 winners and 3 losers"
and other statistics I have cited in order to attract your attention.  I will
show you below how I arrived at these stunning statistics, but, in the final
analysis, these statistics don't count.
   Anyone can design a trading system which looks great on known historical
data.  What counts is how the system performs over time periods which were
unknown to its author.  Obviously, the most important test of a trading system
is how well it performs in actual practice, in real-time, under live market
conditions.  In my opinion, it is equally valid to test the system under
historical market conditions, over time periods which were not available to
the author.  I will use the phrase "data that count" to refer to performance
data over time periods before and/or after those used in the system's design.
   The DESI Trading System(tm) in its current form was designed using buy
candidates from Nov. 16, 1990 through July 22, 1992.  This is not a long
period of time, but it does include a spectrum of market conditions, from a
roaring bull market to a severe correction of bear market proportions.
   There are many other trading systems which have been written about in
books, magazine articles, newspapers, and advertisements, and they all sport
impressive track records.  However, I have yet to see any which make this
important distinction between historical data that were used in the design of
the system versus "data that count".  I think it is fair to assume that most
if not all of these trading systems suffer from the flaw that their excellent
historical results are based on data that were used to design and tune the
system.  At this time, of course, my system is no different in this regard.
The difference is that in the coming months I will be reporting in these pages
"data that count" as they come in.  The first "data that count" trades will
be reported in next month's Status Report.
   In addition to collecting "data that count" under today's market conditions
as they come in, I am also engaged in collecting historical "data that
count" -- data prior to Nov. 16, 1990.  It may take months to collect this
data, as data must be keyed into my computer from each issue of Investor's
Daily.  I am hopeful that I will be able to acquire data at least back to
1987.  As this historical data comes in, I will report the results in these
pages.
   Will I re-design the DESI Trading System(tm) if it does not work well over
time periods other than those used in its design?  Perhaps, but if I do, I
will have to start over in terms of collecting "data that count".


The DESI Trading System(tm) in Three Steps

   In the next several sections, I present the new improved DESI Trading
System(tm) in three steps:  First, a discussion of how buy candidates are
identified; second, a discussion of a new market timing system which is used
to avoid buying when market conditions are unfavorable; and third, a
discussion of the System's new sell strategy.


Step 1: Identifying Buy Candidates

   This is the piece of the puzzle that has been in place for the longest
time.  Many months ago I invented a computerized selection process for
identifying the hottest earnings surprises.
   Each day I key in data from Investor's Business Daily, and my computer
program processes this data to produce a report of all DESI(tm) buy
candidates.  Most days, there are none.  Occassionally there is one, and,
rarely, there may be two or more on the same day.  The program looks for
the strongest market reactions to the strongest earnings reports; beyond that,
the details are proprietary.
   Below is a complete table of all DESI(tm) buy candidates which were
available to me when I revised the System in June and early July.  The buy
date is one day AFTER the earnings report is published in the newspaper --
this is typically two days after the company issues its press release.  Many
times, the stock will sell off a bit the day after a very strong up day, so
this delay typically results in a lower buy price.  This one-day delay is one
of the recent improvements to the System.
   To give you some idea of how these buys performed, I have shown each
stock's price 3 months later and the resulting gain or loss.

STEP 1.  DESI(tm) BUY CANDIDATES, NOV. 16, 1990 THROUGH JULY 22, 1992

         Buy     Buy   3 mos.Later              Buy    Buy    3 mos.Later
Ticker  Date    Price  Price   G/L     Ticker  Date    Price  Price   G/L

BORL   1/18/91  39.00  57.25 +46.8%    COLC  10/18/91  23.62  27.12 +14.8%
IBM    1/22/91 119.62 107.88  -9.8%    MRV   10/22/91  22.31  24.31  +9.0%
TAVI   1/22/91  10.33  18.67 +80.6%    RVAC  10/25/91  32.25  45.25 +40.3%
ILCT   1/29/91   9.25  12.25 +32.4%    EQIC  11/07/91  17.75  19.75 +11.3%
DGII   1/31/91  15.25  19.25 +26.2%    CSCO  11/11/91  26.75  40.62 +51.9%
CSCO   2/12/91  14.81  15.25  +3.0%    ECILF 11/11/91  23.25  28.75 +23.7%
USHC   2/14/91  26.83  29.00  +8.1%    FNIN  11/20/91  42.00  63.00 +50.0%
ECILF  2/20/91   9.75  14.00 +43.6%    RCDC  12/19/91  12.62  24.00 +90.1%
TW     2/25/91  18.00  20.00 +11.1%    SLR   12/24/91  17.25  21.75 +26.1%
HON    2/26/91  57.50  56.75  -1.3%    WHO   12/30/91  18.50  26.88 +45.3%
UFCS   2/28/91  43.00  45.50  +5.8%    CBEX   1/08/92  20.25  14.50 -28.4%
FWC    3/01/91  32.75  27.75 -15.3%    HELE   1/10/92  20.75  19.00  -8.4%
LDDSA  3/07/91  20.50  18.00 -12.2%    LINZ   1/14/92  33.75  33.50  -0.7%
FULL   3/28/91  44.50  41.00  -7.9%    MFC    1/20/92  22.12  21.00  -5.1%
DREAF  4/10/91  16.50  10.00 -39.4%    STCP   2/04/92  21.83  25.25 +15.7%
CS     4/19/91  43.00  43.25  +0.6%    PHSYA  2/06/92  27.00  28.12  +4.2%
VAR    4/26/91  49.25  38.38 -22.1%    DTM    2/14/92  11.50  15.62 +35.9%
BPILF  5/30/91  38.75  26.75 -31.0%    MRV    2/18/92  30.00  23.62 -21.2%
SMLS   7/01/91  70.50  50.25 -28.7%    OAR    2/25/92  47.50  59.50 +25.3%
WAMU   7/19/91  27.75  33.50 +20.7%    NWLIA  3/06/92  39.75  28.75 -27.7%
USHC   8/05/91  31.50  31.25  -0.8%    WHO    3/27/92  27.50  16.38 -40.5%
STW    8/12/91  25.88  25.00  -3.4%    MDB    4/09/92  13.75  12.88  -6.4%
CAW    8/23/91  29.12  30.62  +5.2%    FRCC   4/20/92  15.00  18.00 +20.0%
TECD   8/23/91  23.00  25.50 +10.9%    SUP    4/20/92  57.50  49.25 -14.3%
BSBL   9/23/91  16.17  27.25 +68.6%    XRIT   4/20/92  34.00  35.75  +5.1%
SOME  10/09/91  15.25  19.25 +26.2%    JSTN   4/21/92  20.67  27.50 +33.1%
APS   10/15/91  41.00  39.88  -2.7%    PMI    4/21/92  49.75  34.00 -31.7%
MER   10/17/91  51.12  63.25 +23.7%    IRWN   4/22/92  51.00  53.25  +4.4%
MFC   10/17/91  21.50  21.50   0.0%*

* Trades with a 0% gain are tallied as losses.
Prices are split-adjusted where appropriate.

   Here are some statistics on these results, again assuming a holding period
of 3 months:

                        Step 1:
                         Buy
                      Candidates
	                ------
Number of winners . . .   34
Number of losers. . . .   23
Percentage of winners .   60%
Best trade. . . . . . . +90.1%
Average winning trade . +27.0%
Worst trade . . . . . . -40.5%
Average losing trade. . -15.6%
Average trade overall .  +9.8%


Step 2: Market Timing

   These statistics from Step 1 are very good, but the period of time covered
was primarily a bull market.  What about bear markets?  The period of mid-
February through mid-June of 1992 was a bear market for growth stocks, as
the NASDAQ Composite fell 15% between Feb. 12 and June 26, with growth stocks
falling even more than that.  The DESI(tm) buy candidate stocks did not escape
the pounding.  5 out of 9 DESI(tm) buy candidates in March and April turned
out to be losers 3 months later, as can be seen from the data above.  The
market timing portion of the DESI Trading System(tm) attempts to avoid at
least some of these losing trades by not buying when market conditions are
unfavorable.
   A few months ago, in Vol.1 #50, I introduced a market timing system.  The
idea was to create an index of DESI(tm) buy candidates, and from the trend of
that index decide whether it is safe to buy or not.  This worked well, but I
have since improved upon this idea with the DESI-3(tm) timing system.
   The DESI-3(tm) timing system constructs and tracks an index of only the
three most recent DESI(tm) buy candidates.  If this index is behaving well,
the timing system gives a green light; otherwise, a red light is signalled.
Each trading day will either be a green-light day or a red-light day.  A red
light does NOT mean "sell", only "do not buy".  The exact details of how the
green light/red light decision is made are proprietary.  In order to buy a
stock, the System insists that a green light be in effect for two days
running: both on the buy date and on the previous trading day.  My research
indicates that this DESI-3(tm) timing system yields better results than the
original DESI(tm) index.
   Applying this DESI-3(tm) timing system to the 57 buy candidates above
results in throwing out 35 trades -- 17 losers and 18 winners -- due to a red
light.  This may not sound like a great idea, throwing out 18 winners and 17
losers, but it is!  Look at what we are left with:  16 winners and 6 losers!
Thus, the timing system has improved our winners-to-losers ratio from a hair
under 3-to-2 (34-to-23) to a hair better than 5-to-2 (16-to-6).  Stated
another way, the timing system has improved the percentage of winners from
60% to 73%.
   I find it particularly significant and gratifying that, during the bearish
months of March and April 1992, ALL NINE DESI(tm) buy candidates were rejected.
   The 22 trades which remain (after throwing out 35) are given below, with
the resulting statistics.

STEP 2.  DESI(tm) BUY CANDIDATES WITH GREEN LIGHTS

         Buy     Buy   3 mos.Later              Buy    Buy    3 mos.Later
Ticker  Date    Price  Price   G/L     Ticker  Date   Price   Price   G/L

IBM   01/22/91 119.62 107.88  -9.8%    CAW   08/23/91  29.12  30.62  +5.2%
TAVI  01/22/91  10.33  18.67 +80.6%    TECD  08/23/91  23.00  25.50 +10.9%
ILCT  01/29/91   9.25  12.25 +32.4%    MER   10/17/91  51.12  63.25 +23.7%
DGII  01/31/91  15.25  19.25 +26.2%    MFC   10/17/91  21.50  21.50   0.0%
USHC  02/14/91  26.83  29.00  +8.1%    COLC  10/18/91  23.62  27.12 +14.8%
ECILF 02/20/91   9.75  14.00 +43.6%    CSCO  11/11/91  26.75  40.62 +51.9%
TW    02/25/91  18.00  20.00 +11.1%    ECILF 11/11/91  23.25  28.75 +23.7%
HON   02/26/91  57.50  56.75  -1.3%    WHO   12/30/91  18.50  26.88 +45.3%
FWC   03/01/91  32.75  27.75 -15.3%    HELE  01/10/92  20.75  19.00  -8.4%
FULL  03/28/91  44.50  41.00  -7.9%    PHSYA 02/06/92  27.00  28.12  +4.2%
WAMU  07/19/91  27.75  33.50 +20.7%    DTM   02/14/92  11.50  15.62 +35.9%

Prices are split-adjusted where appropriate.

                        Step 1:   Step 2:
                         Buy     DESI-3(tm)
                      Candidates  Timing
	                ------    ------
Number of winners . . .   34        16
Number of losers. . . .   23         6
Percentage of winners .   60%       73%
Best trade. . . . . . . +90.1%    +80.6%
Average winning trade . +27.0%    +27.4%
Worst trade . . . . . . -40.5%    -15.3%
Average losing trade. . -15.6%     -7.1%
Average trade overall .  +9.8%    +18.0%


Step 3: When to Sell

   The statistics from Step 2 are very good indeed, but are based on the
simplistic assumption that a stock is sold exactly 3 months after it is bought.
Surely a more sophisticated sell strategy would improve the results even
further.
   For the purpose of evaluating sell strategies, I used all DESI(tm) buy
candidates, regardless of the green light/red light timing.  This allowed
me to run various sell strategies over many more trades, including many more
losing trades.
   My previous sell strategy -- the one I presented in Vol. 1 #50 -- turns
out to be worse than the simple-minded "hold exactly 3 months then sell" idea.
This previous sell strategy misses out on many big gains by taking profits too
soon.
   I tried various sell strategies, but, surprisingly, I found very few which
improved upon the simple 3-month holding period.  For example, adding a stop
loss feature increases the number of losers and decreases the number of
winners, resulting in a lower overall average gain.  I tried other constant
holding periods -- 2 months, 4 months, 6 months, etc. -- and found that 3
months was near ideal.  I also tried a number of other ideas, but most failed
to improve upon the simple 3-month approach.
   The sell strategy I finally chose is only a slight variation on "hold
exactly 3 months".  The basic idea is to hold the stock for 3 months, then
wait for evidence of a short-term peak.  The details of how a short-term peak
is detected are proprietary, but the maximum holding period is three and a
half months.  So the sell always comes 3 to 3.5 months after the buy.  This is
the best strategy I have found so far.
   Here, then, are the results of applying this sell strategy to the stocks
bought in Step 2.  This is the complete DESI Trading System(tm).

STEP 3.  SELL STRATEGY -- THE COMPLETE DESI TRADING SYSTEM(tm)

        Buy     Buy   Sell   Sell  Gain/           Buy  Buy   Sell Sell   Gain/
Ticker Date    Price  Date  Price  Loss   Ticker  Date Price  Date Price  Loss

IBM   1/22/91 119.62  5/07 101.88 -14.8%   CAW    8/23 29.12 12/06 29.75  +2.2%
TAVI  1/22/91  10.33  4/26  21.50+108.1%   TECD   8/23 23.00 11/29 27.25 +18.5%
ILCT  1/29/91   9.25  5/07  13.75 +48.7%   MER   10/17 51.12  1/27 60.62 +18.6%
DGII  1/31/91  15.25  5/06  18.25 +19.7%   MFC   10/17 21.50  1/30 23.88 +11.1%
USHC  2/14/91  26.83  5/28  35.25 +31.4%   COLC  10/18 23.62  1/22 25.50  +7.9%
ECILF 2/20/91   9.75  5/29  14.62 +50.0%   CSCO  11/11 26.75  2/18 41.12 +53.7%
TW    2/25/91  18.00  6/03  20.38 +13.2%   ECILF 11/11 23.25  2/14 29.75 +28.0%
HON   2/26/91  57.50  6/05  62.50  +8.7%   WHO   12/30 18.50  4/09 19.12  +3.4%
FWC   3/01/91  32.75  6/05  30.50  -6.9%   HELE   1/10 20.75  4/24 22.25  +7.2%
FULL  3/28/91  44.50  7/05  44.50   0.0%   PHSYA  2/06 27.00  5/22 27.06  +0.2%
WAMU  7/19/91  27.75 10/31  29.50  +6.3%   DTM    2/14 11.50  5/26 14.38 +25.0%

Prices are split-adjusted where appropriate.

                        Step 1:   Step 2:   Step 3:
                         Buy     DESI-3(tm)  Sell
                      Candidates  Timing   Strategy
	                ------    ------    ------
Number of winners . . .   34        16        19
Number of losers. . . .   23         6         3
Percentage of winners .   60%       73%       86%
Best trade. . . . . . . +90.1%    +80.6%   +108.1%
Average winning trade . +27.0%    +27.4%    +24.3%
Worst trade . . . . . . -40.5%    -15.3%    -14.8%
Average losing trade. . -15.6%     -7.1%     -7.2%
Average trade overall .  +9.8%    +18.0%    +20.0%

   Notice in particular that this sell strategy improves the winners-to-losers
ratio significantly, from 73% (16-to-6) to 86% (19-to-3).  In other words,
three losers turned into winners by virtue of waiting a little longer for a
short-term rally.  Also, TAVI, the +80.6% best winner of step 2 becomes a
double, with a gain of 108.1%.


How Do I Plan to Use the DESI Trading System(tm)?

   My intention is to follow the DESI Trading System(tm) with my own money,
primarily in the Model Portfolio.  I have already begun to do this.  As of
July 31, the DESI Trading System(tm) had issued two buys since the design
changes I made in June and early July.  I purchased both stocks on the very
day dictated by the System.
   There may be times when I purchase DESI(tm) stocks in the Stock+Options
Account, and there may be times when I override the System.  For example, I
might sell on a disappointing earnings report.  In such a case, I would issue
two sell alerts: one on the day I actually sell, and a second on the day the
DESI Trading System(tm) issues a sell.  In most cases, however, I expect to
follow the System.
   I will continue to engage in other trading outside of the System; however,
I plan to limit such other trading to the Stock+Options Account.  Also, I
will continue the new feature inaugurated in Vol.1 #77 of alerting you to
other trading ideas -- ideas which do not fall into my usual categories.


Performance Review: The Details

   Table 1 shows the status of all "data that count" DESI Trading System(tm)
trades.  There are no completed trades as of July 31, so this is not very
significant.  Next month's Status Report will include the first "data that
count" trades.
   Tables 2 and 3 review the status of the Model Portfolio as of June 30
(Table 3 gives performance numbers).  Tables 4 and 5 do the same for the
Stock+Options Account.
   Past Status Reports have given two additional tables, one listing all
completed stock trades so far this year, and the other listing all completed
option trades.  Due to the length of these tables, I am no longer including
them.  I will send this data by US mail upon request; please enclose a self-
addressed stamped envelope.
   All tables reflect the state of trading as of July 31, 1992.


Table 1:  DESI Trading System(tm) Stocks -- "Data That Count"**

                               DESI-buy*   DESI-sell*  Jul31  Gain/
Symbol    Company Name         Date High   Date Low    Close  Loss

OAR    Ohio Art Co.            4/28 50.00              56.00 +12.0% ***
LANTF  Lannet Data Comm. Ltd.  5/08 28.25              29.50  +4.4% ***
BJICA  Ben & Jerry's Homemade  5/11 22.50              28.25 +25.6% ***
PHSYA  PacifiCare Health Sys.  7/31 35.50                           ***
UWSI   United Wisconsin Svcs.  7/31 39.50                           ***

Statistics on Completed Trades:  No completed trades as of July 31.

*   Stocks are assumed to be bought at the day's high and sold at the day's low.
**  "Data That Count" means that these trades were not used in the design of
    the DESI Trading System(tm).
*** These stocks are currently held by the System.


Table 2.  Model Portfolio Transaction Log                                 
                                                                          
      Sym-                       B/   #                   Pro-     Cash   
Date  bol  Company Name          S  Shrs Price  Cost**   ceeds**  Balance 
                                                                          
           From previous month . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  $16,361 
7/15 CFFS  Columbia First Bank   B  350 14.75*  $5,188            $11,172 
7/20 WHO   Waterhouse Inv Svcs   S  150 16.00*           $2,388   $13,560 
7/29 LCSI  LCS Industries        S  500  7.25*           $3,607   $17,167 
7/31 PHSYA PacifiCare Health Sys B  140 35.00*  $4,925            $12,243 
7/31 UWSI  United Wisconsin Svcs B  190 36.75*  $7,017             $5,225 

End-of-month cash balance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   $5,225 
                                                                          
* In cases where I actually bought or sold a model portfolio stock, I 
  have shown my transaction price and marked the price with an
  asterisk.  In cases where I did not trade the stock, the day's 
  closing price is shown.  This applies to Tables 2 and 3.
** Includes transaction cost of 0.5%


Table 3.  Model Portfolio Status
                                                                              
Sym-                     Purch  # Purch    Orig   Jul31  Jul31    Gain/Loss
bol   Company Name       Date ShrsPrice   Cost**  Price  Value    $$      %

CS    Cabletron Systems   4/2 165 54.00*  $8,955 54.50  $8,993     $38  +0.4%
IFMX  Informix           5/11 200 34.00*  $6,834 37.75  $7,550    $716 +10.5%
CLCDF Clearly Canadian   5/12 500 18.00*  $9,045 15.63  $7,813 ($1,233)-13.6%
CFFS  Columbia 1st Bank  7/15 350 14.75*  $5,188 14.75  $5,163    ($26) -0.5%
PHSYA PacifiCare Health  7/31 140 35.00*  $4,925 35.50  $4,970     $46  +0.9%
UWSI  United Wisconsin   7/31 190 36.75*  $7,017 38.50  $7,315    $298  +4.2%

Total value of stocks held . . . . . . . $41,964       $41,803   ($161) -0.4%
End-of-month cash balance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  $5,225
One-month portfolio gain . . . . . . . . $45,264       $47,028  $1,763  +3.9%
Year-to-date portfolio gain. . . . . . . $50,000       $47,028 ($2,972) -5.9%

*  See footnote, Table 2.
** Includes transaction cost of 0.5%


Table 4.  Stock+Option Account(*) Transaction Log

      Sym-                        B/   #                  Pro-      Cash
 Date bol  Company Name           S  Shrs Price  Cost**  ceeds**  Balance

Long Transactions and Covered Shorts
Cash balance from last month (excl. cash from open shorts) . . .   $2,963
 7/6 CCR   Countrywide Credit     B  100  38.88  $3,916             ($952)
6/25 XOMA  Xoma Corp.(short)      S  800  13.00          $10,359   $9,407
7/17 XOMA  Xoma Corp.(cover)      B  800  14.00 $11,241           ($1,834)
7/17 ARW   Arrow Electronics      B  300  21.50  $6,484           ($8,318)
7/20 WHO   Waterhouse Inv Svcs    S  400  16.00           $6,363  ($1,955)
7/29 FTXTD FreeptMcMoran Aug20put S   10   1.00             $965    ($990)
7/29 RUS   Russ Berrie & Co.      B  150  28.50  $4,305           ($5,295)
7/29 C     Chrysler Corp.         B  200  22.00  $4,431           ($9,726)

End-of-month cash balance (excl. cash from open shorts). . . . .  ($9,726)

Short sells:
7/17 USS   US Surgical            S  100  98.00           $9,772   $9,772

* This is an actual, personal account of the editor.


Table 5.  Stock+Options Account(*) Status

Sym-                    Purch  #    Purch    Orig   Jul31   Jul31    Gain/Loss
bol   Company Name       Date Shrs  Price    Cost   Price   Value    $$      %

Long Positions:
CS    Cabletron Systems   4/2  55  54.00  $2,997  54.50   $2,998     $1   +0.0%
CS    Cabletron Systems   4/2  55  51.00  $2,807  54.50   $2,998   $191   +6.8%
MDB   Prof. Bancorp      4/14 200  15.00  $3,031  11.75   $2,350  ($681) -22.5%
CSFCB CSF Holdings Inc.   6/9 250  22.00  $5,529  34.00   $8,500 $2,971  +53.7%
MDB   Prof. Bancorp      6/11 200  12.50  $2,531  11.75   $2,350  ($181)  -7.2%
CCR   Countrywide Credit  7/6 150  25.92  $3,916  29.63   $4,444   $528  +13.5%
ARW   Arrow Electronics  7/17 300  21.50  $6,484  20.25   $6,075  ($409)  -6.3%
RUS   Russ Berrie & Co.  7/29 150  28.50  $4,305  28.50   $4,275   ($30)  -0.7%
C     Chrysler Corp.     7/29 200  22.00  $4,431  21.88   $4,375   ($56)  -1.3%

Total value of long positions held . . . . . . . . . . . $38,364
End-of-month cash balance, excl. cash from open shorts . ($9,726)
Portfolio value, long portion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . $28,638

Short Positions:
USS   US Surgical       7/17 -100  98.00 ($9,772) 91.00  ($9,100)  $672   +6.9%

Summary of short positions . . . . . . . ($9,772)        ($9,100)  $672   +6.9%

Account Summary:
Total portfolio value (long portion+net gain on shorts)  $29,310
One-month portfolio gain . . . . . . . . $27,400         $29,310 $1,910   +7.0%
Portfolio gain since inception (3/31/92) $33,001         $29,310($3,691) -11.2%

* This is an actual, personal account of the editor.

--------------
Footnotes

   (1) On the day that the System says "buy", that day's high is used as the
buy price.  Likewise, the day's low is used as the sell price when a "sell" is
given.  It is a bit of a handicap, since typically one can get a better price
than that.  On the other hand, the ignoring of commissions artificially boosts
the performance.  This handicap and this boost roughly cancel each other out.

   (2) The program I am writing to track a $25,000 investment using the DESI
Trading System(tm) will take commissions into account, using the commission
schedule of a deep discount broker.  It will also have built into it the same
handicap mentioned in footnote (1), in order to account for slippage and the
bid/ask spread.  Since this program has this handicap without the artificial
boost of ignoring commissions, the results reported will be a bit pessimistic.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
   The Aggressive Trader(tm) is edited and published at irregular intervals,
but at least monthly, by Kenneth L. Deen ("Ken Deen"), 1339 Virginia Road,
Montecito, California 93108, (805) 505-2039, and is distributed free of charge
to all interested parties.  Ken Deen reserves the right to begin charging a
subscription fee at any time.
   Ken Deen, is employees, affiliates, and/or clients may have positions in
securities recommended herein and may make additional purchases and/or sales
in these securities.  Ken Deen frequently reveals in this publication the
holdings, trading activity, and performance of certain of his personal
brokerage accounts.  However, he reserves the right to discontinue this
practice at any time without notice.
   Recommendations made in this publication involve risk and may result in
losses.  Readers should not assume that recommendations will be profitable or
will equal past performance.  Neither The Aggressive Trader(tm) nor Ken Deen
shall be liable in any manner for losses of any kind.  The information in this
publication is collected from sources believed to be reliable, but neither the
accuracy nor the completeness of this information can be guaranteed in any
way.  Reporduction in whole or in part without the express written consent of
Ken Deen is strictly prohibited.
   Copyright 1992 Kenneth L. Deen.
			      -END-
