TELECOM Digest     Wed, 11 May 94 14:03:00 CDT    Volume 14 : Issue 211

Inside This Issue:                           Editor: Patrick A. Townson

    BT Announces Dialing Code Changes (Ted Dupont)
    What is the Mercury Button? (John Perkins)
    EFF Summary: May 3 1994 Clipper / Digital Telephony Hearings (M. Solomon)
    'NNX' Area Codes?  I Think 'NXX' is More Appropriate (Paul Robinson)
    Pager Schematics and POCSAG/GOLAY Protocols? (Joseph Jesson)
    Nationwide Name and Address Service (George Thurman)
    Information on Seminar Wanted (kchok@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu)
    Re: Cellular Phone Abuse (John Gilbert)
    Re: Cellular Phone Abuse (Bob Wilson)
    Re: Cellular Phone Abuse (Steven H. Lichter)

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----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: Wed, 11 May 94 14:28:04 EDT
From: usbma9ne@ibmmail.COM (Ted Dupont)
Subject: BT Announces Dialing Code Changes


The following announcement was distributed to U.S. and Canadian news
media on Apr. 28, 1994:


                        Contact:        Jim Barron
                                        BT Corporate Communications
                                        100 Park Ave.
                                        New York NY 10017
                                        USA
                                        212-297-2724


                                        Ted DuPont
                                        Burson-Marsteller
                                        230 Park Ave. South
                                        New York NY 10003
                                        USA
                                        212-614-4562

               Starting April, 1995, New Dialing Codes
                   For Calls To The United Kingdom

NEW YORK, Apr. 28 - Starting Apr. 16, 1995, the 100 million-plus phone
calls made annually from North America to the United Kingdom will be
affected by the biggest change in the U.K.'s telephone numbering
system in more than 25 years.  The changes will result in a tenfold
increase in the U.K.'s telephone numbering capacity and will meet
requirements for many years to come.

        U.S. businesses should begin planning now to accommodate these
dialing changes, according to BT (British Telecommunications plc).

Starting Apr. 16, 1995, callers to most numbers in the United Kingdom
(England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales) will need to insert an
additional "1" in the dialing code, directly after "44" (the U.K.
country code).

        For example, a North American caller to London will dial
"011-44-171" in front of the local number, instead of the current
"011-44-71." (In the U.S., 011 is the international access code; 44 is
the U. K. country code, and 71 is the London area code).  All city
codes, not just London, will have the number "1" added.

        In addition, also on Apr. 16, 1995, the following five British
cities facing especially acute number shortages will be given completely 
new area codes:

                Current Area Code/Local Number      Apr. 16, 1995
Leeds           532 XXXXXX                          113 2XX-XXXX
Sheffield       742 XXXXXX                          114 2XX-XXXX
Nottingham      602 XXXXXX                          115 9XX-XXXX
Leicester       533 XXXXXX                          116 2XX-XXXX
Bristol         272 XXXXXX                          117 9XX-XXXX

        Starting Aug. 1, callers to the U.K. will have the choice of
using the new dialing codes or the existing codes; that is, calls to
the U.K. will go through whether or not the caller dials 1 after the
U.K. country code (44).  This "permissive" dialing phase will be in
effect until Apr. 16, 1995, when all calls to the U.K. will require
the additional 1.

Callers in the U.S. can call 1-800-634-2485 for more information on
the dialing code changes.

Growing Need for New Numbers

        These dialing changes are needed to deal with a growing
shortage of area codes caused by such new technologies as fax
machines, computer data modems and the fact that there are now 150
licensed telephone operators in the U.K., said officials of BT, the
U.K.'s largest telephone operator.  The dialing changes will not
affect calling rates.

        "It is important that U.S. businesses begin planning for these
dialing code changes now," said James E. Graf, BT's vice president of
regulatory affairs.  "While these dialing changes may seem simple,
they will actually require significant efforts by many companies to
reconfigure automated dialing equipment, fax machines, telecommunica-
tions software systems and PBX's -- in addition to changing signage and 
stationery."

        It will be especially critical to change preset numbers stored
in phones or faxes, said Graf, because dialing of the old codes by
automated dialing systems will mean that calls won't be connected
after Apr. 16, 1995.

        Planning for these changes should begin now:

Telecommunications equipment
    * Computer systems containing international phone codes
    * Phone numbers stored in any telephone or fax
    * Personnel records
    * Databases
    * Switchboard and PBX systems
    * Fax ID numbers

Stationery and Signs
    * Business stationery, letterheads, invoices, business cards,
      address labels, etc.
    * Advertisements, sales literature, brochures, direct-mail pieces,
      new product information

Phase-In of New Codes
        To provide ample time to make the transition, BT will be
phasing in the new dialing codes according to this timetable:

    --  Until August, 1994:  Current area code only (do not dial 1
after U.K. country code of 44).
    --  Aug. 1, 1994 through Apr. 15, 1995:  Old or new code (users
can make calls with or without 1 after U.K. country code).
    --  Apr. 16, 1995:  New code only (1 must be dialed after U.K.
country code).  Calls dialed without  the extra 1 will get a
pre-recorded message informing callers of the change.

        The code changes will not affect cellular phone numbers or
toll-free phone numbers; only geographic area codes will change.  BT
officials further noted that, on an international level, all European
countries are moving towards a single international access code.  In
accordance with this change, the international access code from the
U.K. will change from 010 to 00 -- like the other changes, on Apr. 16,
1995.

        BT is one of the leading global providers of telecommunications 
services.  BT's main products and services are local and long-distance
telephone services in the U.K., provision of telephone exchange lines
to homes and businesses, international voice and data services to and
from the U.K. and supplying telecommunications equipment to customer
premises.  BT's range of additional services includes private circuits, 
mobile communications and network outsourcing.

------------------------------

From: johnper@bunsen.rosemount.com (John Perkins)
Subject: What is the Mercury Button?
Organization: Rosemount, Inc.
Date: Wed, 11 May 1994 15:47:23 GMT


My parents in London (Chessington, actually) have just recently signed
up with Mercury and have been persuaded (by Mercury, presumably) to
have a Mercury phone set installed.  This phone has a "Mercury button"
on it to access the Mercury network.

Will someone please tell me what the Mercury button is?  I suspect
that it simply sends out a hard-coded sequence of DTMF digits which
accesses the Mercury network, and one could probably do this manually
with any phone that generates DTMF if one knew what the sequence was.

Am I right about this?   And does anyone know what the access sequence
for Mercury is?

They have a perfectly good BT "Tribune" phone set that has some
special attachments for the hearing impaired, but are under the
impression that they can't use it if they want to use Mercury. (I have
a feeling that they don't really need the Mercury phone set at all.)


John Perkins

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 11 May 1994 10:09:21 -0400
From: Monty Solomon <monty@roscom.COM>
Subject: EFF Summary: May 3 1994 Clipper / Digital Telephony Hearings


Forwarded FYI to the Digest:

Begin forwarded message:

  From: mech@eff.org (Stanton McCandlish)
  Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.news,talk.politics.misc
  Subject: EFF Summary of May 3 1994 Clipper and Digital Telephony Hearings
  Date: 4 May 1994 23:19:49 -0500
  Organization: UTexas Mail-to-News Gateway

EFF SUMMARIES
=============

May 4, 1994

Contents:
* Senate Subcommittee on Technology and the Law holds Clipper Hearing
* House Subcommittee on Technology, Environment and Aviation holds       

 hearing on Clipper and Digital Telephony proposals; EFF's      

      Executive Director Jerry Berman and Board Member David Farber       

      testify


SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE HOLDS CLIPPER HEARING

The Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology and the Law held a
hearing on Tuesday (5/3) to examine the Administration's "Clipper
Chip" Key Escrow Encryption proposal.  Witnesses included Asst. Atty.
Gen. Jo Ann Harris (Criminal Justice Division), NIST Deputy Director
Raymond Kammer, Whitfield Diffie (of Sun Microsystems), Stephen Walker
(President, Trusted Information Systems), and NSA director Vice Adm.
J.  M. McConnell.

The discussion touched on a number of key issues, including the
necessity of the Clipper proposal for law enforcement; the privacy
interests of network users; the costs associated with implementing the
Clipper scheme; export controls; and whether those intending to use
communications networks to break the law would actually use Clipper as
opposed to other encryption schemes.  Although a variety of views were
offered, few new developments emerged in this controversial debate.

Assistant Attorney General Harris and NIST's Ray Kammer both stated
that the Clipper Scheme and Key Escrow system would not provide law
enforcement with any new surveillance abilities.  Rather, Harris
argued, Clipper is analogous to a translator.  Harris stated, "All
Clipper does is, after a court has authorized interceptions of
communications, is that we get the ability to understand the content
of legitimately intercepted communications".  The Administration
continues to maintain that the market would accept the Clipper
standard based on the assumption that it is the strongest encryption
scheme, regardless of who holds the keys.  When pressed by Sen. Leahy
on this issue, as well as on the question of whether criminals or
terrorist organizations would be willing to use the Clipper standards,
neither witness offered any assurances, and admitted that this is
still an open question.  Senator Leahy expressed skepticism: "I have
serious questions about whether any sophisticated criminal or
terrorist organization is going to use the one code endorsed by the
U.S. Government and for which U.S. Government agents hold the decoding
keys.  There are a multitude of alternative encryption methods
commercially available.  If Clipper Chip does become the standard
encryption method used by Americans, criminals may be forced to use
Clipper to communicate with legitimate outsiders.  But this is a big
'IF' ".

In what may prove to be a significant development, NIST's Kammer
conceded that additional fiscal authorization may be needed to fund
the implementation of the Clipper proposal.  If this is the case,
Congress would be required to consider legislation to authorize
funding, and at this point passage of such legislation is at best
uncertain.  EFF will continue to closely monitor this development, and
will pass along information as it develops.

Sun Microsystems Diffie urged a slow and careful approach to the
Clipper issue, cautioning that a rush to implement Clipper may create
a bureaucracy that would be difficult to dislodge at a later time.
Diffie stressed the need for international for information security,
and cautioned against attempts to use the power of technology to
increase the power of government.  Diffie added, "Integrity of
political speech is the root of legitimate laws in a democratic
society.  We are in a position where if we do not make it a national
priority to make privacy available", this integrity may be
compromised.

Steve Walker, of Trusted Information Systems, stressed the need for
the removal of export control restrictions.  He also countered the
Administration's contention that very few foreign encryption
alternatives exist; noting that his company had found over 340.
Walker displayed several of these applications, and noted that because
of export controls U.S. manufactures of encryption technology face a
significant disadvantage on the world market.

Although the Senate Hearing did not produce many new developments, it
is significant to note that no members of the Subcommittee expressed
outright support for the Clipper Chip proposal.  Chairman Leahy, the
most vocal panel member at Tuesday's hearing, was also the most
skeptical, and as such the fate Clipper proposal is still very much in
doubt.


HOUSE PANEL CONSIDERS CLIPPER AND DIGITAL TELEPHONY PROPOSALS

Tuesday proved to be a busy day for Clipper on the Hill, as the House
Science, Space and Technology Subcommittee on Technology, Environment
and Aviation also considered the Clipper and Digital Telephony
proposals.  Witnesses on the panel included James Kallstrom of the
FBI, NSA's Clinton Brooks, NIST Deputy Director Ray Kammer, Dr.
Dorothy Denning, Dr. David Faber, EFF Executive Director Jerry Berman
(on behalf of DPSWG), and Chmn. Willis Ware of the Congress/NIST
System Security and Privacy Advisory Board. The discussion centered
mainly on the Clipper issue.

Unlike the Senate panel, there seemed to be some support for the
Clipper proposal on the House Subcommittee.  Rep. Dan Glickman (D-KS),
Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, declared his "cautious
support", for the proposal, and stressed law enforcement's need for
strong surveillance abilities.  Subcommittee Chairman Valentine
(D-NC), as well as Reps. Morella (R-MD) and Rohrabacher (R-CA) all
expressed reservations.

James Kallstrom urged full support of both the Clipper and Digital
Telephony proposals on behalf of all law enforcement, citing the need
to counter the increasing sophistication of digital communications
technologies.  Kallstrom painted a picture of a network populated by
criminals, terrorists, and drug dealers which would pose a great
danger to public safety, unless law enforcement is given the ability
to intercept illegal communications.  EFF's Jerry Berman countered
this assertion by arguing that Clipper would only solve law
enforcement's problems if criminals use it.  The only way to do this,
Berman added, would be to mandate the Clipper standard, something
which the Administration does not claim to want to do.  The only
solution is for Congress to deny appropriation for Clipper and send
the Administration back to the drawing board, Berman argued.

Dr. Farber, appearing as an expert witness, stated that solutions to
the Clipper issue will not come easily and will not come in one big
step.  Rather, a carefully considered and open approach is required.

While stressing the need for encryption standards on communications
networks, Dr. Farber cautioned against "smoke-filled-room standards"
of encryption which are, in his view, likely to bead mistrust.  Dr.
Farber also argued for the removal of export controls on encryption
technology.

NSA's Clinton Brooks expressed support for Congressional Consideration
of the Clipper issue.  He argued that Clipper is a sound technological
solution to a legitimate law enforcement and National Security
dilemma, and that a public debate on its merits would eventually
remove the misinformation and mistrust of government, and would prove
Clipper to be in the public interest.  Dr. Farber offered a strong
caution to this, expressing the concern that a future administration
may find it necessary to mandate the Clipper standard.  Dr. Farber
suggested that at the very least Congress weld into law a guarantee
that Clipper remain voluntary, that the Judiciary be an escrow holder.
He cautioned, in the words of Benjamin Franklin, "They that can give
up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve
neither liberty nor safety"

                      ***************

Written testimony & documents from the hearings are available as:

ftp.eff.org, /pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/Clipper/[filename]
gopher.eff.org, 1/EFF/Policy/Crypto/Clipper, [filename]
gopher://gopher.eff.org/11/EFF/Policy/Crypto/Clipper, [filename]
http://www.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/Clipper/[filename]

where [filename] is:

berman_eff_clip-dt.testimony    - House testimony of Jerry Berman (EFF)
brooks_nsa_clip-dt.testimony    - House testimony of Clint Brooks (NSA)
denning_clip-dt.testimony       - House testimony of Dorothy Denning
farber_clip-dt.testimony        - House testimony of David Farber
kallstrom_fbi_clip-dt.testimony - House testimony of James Kallstrom (FBI)
kammer_nist_clip-dt.testimony   - House testimony of Ray Kammer (NIST)
ware_csspab_clip-dt.testimony   - House testimony of Willis Ware (CSSPAB)
clip-dt_hearings.docs           - charter, witness list, diagrams.

* Senate testimony and spoken testimony from both hearings will be
  made available from in the same directory when obtained.

This material will also be available from the EFF BBS within a day or so,
at +1 202 638 6120.


Stanton McCandlish * mech@eff.org * Electronic Frontier Found. OnlineActivist

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 11 May 1994 05:39:19 EDT
From: Paul Robinson <PAUL@TDR.COM>
Reply-To: Paul Robinson <PAUL@TDR.COM>
Subject: 'NNX' Area Codes?  I Think 'NXX' is More Appropriate
Organization: Tansin A. Darcos & Company, Silver Spring, MD USA


In some prior articles, the term 'NNX' has been used to refer to the
new format for area codes debuting in International Dialing Zone 1 on
January 15, 1995.

While this is the format that is being added to the current area code
system is technically correct with respect to the additions, I think
that this term is wrong and misleading.

In area codes and prefixes, the term 'N' is used to refer to a digit
space that permits any number from 2 through 9.  'X' is used to refer
to an 'any digit' field which allows 0 and 1.  Area codes currently
permit 0 and 1 (and ONLY 0 AND 1) as the second digit.  As of the
above date, they will allow any digit for the last two digits of the
area code.  The first digit of an area code will remain required to be
2 through 9.

Based on this, references to the new area codes should say 'NXX' area
codes, and not 'NNX' area codes, as it might indicate that the old
area codes with 0 and 1 as the middle digit are being replaced by the
new area codes, which is not the case.

------------------------------

From: joe@netcom.com (Joseph Jesson)
Subject: Pager Schematics and POCSAG/GOLAY Protocols?
Organization: NETCOM On-line Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest)
Date: Wed, 11 May 1994 13:58:27 GMT


  At a Dayton flea market, I picked up several NEC and Motorola pagers
in various non-working condition.  I was impressed when you consider
the sensitivity and selectivity is such a small space (the antenna
loops are approx -20db when compared to a diople antenna). It has
potential for a single channel 152 (approximately) or 932 Mhz
receiver.

Any idea where I can get a schematic for the Motorola Bravo, Sensar,
or NEC pager?  Also, has anyone built a capcode programmer or fully
decoded all pager codes (Pocsag / Golay / Flex - 512/1200/2400/6400
rates)?

Universal Shortwave, in Ohio, sells a M400 which only decodes POCSAG or
GOLAY at 512 bps ...


Joseph Jesson   joe@netcom.com  Day (312) 856-3645  Eve (708) 356-6817
21414 W. Honey Lane, Lake Villa, IL, 60046

------------------------------

From: gst@gagme.wwa.com (George Thurman)
Subject: Nationwide Name and Address Service
Date: 11 May 1994 00:48:34 -0500
Organization: WorldWide Access - Chicago Area Internet Services 312-282-8605


I had a 900 number that if you called it and gave them a telephone
number, they would give you the name and address of the person who had
that telephone number. (In most cases)

The 900 number, 1-900-884-1212 has been disconnected, and I think that
the company that provided the service has gone belly-up.  Does anyone
know of any other 900 numbers that provide this same kind of service?


GEORGE S. THURMAN   (312) 509-6308   gst@gagme.wwa.com   

------------------------------

From: KCHOK@KUHUB.CC.UKANS.EDU
Subject: Information on Seminar Wanted
Date: 11 May 94 10:26:01 CDT
Organization: University of Kansas Academic Computing Services


Hello out there,

I am an exchange student graduating in December. As a part of my
program I shall be paid to attend a seminar in the continental United
States. I want to attend a seminar on data trasmissions/telephone
networks sometime in the first week of August in New York City. If
anyone out there knows of any such seminars please write to me at
"ldorji@weber.ece.ukans.edu". 

Thanks for your time.

------------------------------

From: johng@ecs.comm.mot.com (John Gilbert)
Subject: Re: Cellular Phone Abuse
Organization: Motorola, LMPS
Date: Wed, 11 May 1994 11:04:06 -0500


In article <telecom14.201.2@eecs.nwu.edu>, jharan@cwa.com (Jeff Haran)
wrote:
 
> Maybe I'm missing something, but it seems like an obvious solution to
> an obvious problem. The thing that I can't understand is why this
> service abuse wasn't anticipated by the cellular telephone founders.
> Does anybody have any insights as to why it doesn't work this way
> today?

The VHF and UHF IMTS radiotelephones that were widely used prior to
the introduction of cellular were much less secure than what we have
today.  These were programmed by opening the radio up and using wire
jumpers to set the area code and last four digits of the phone number
(only 10,000 phones were allowed per area code -- no exchange code was
in the phone).  These phones didn't have any electronic serial number.
Signaling of phone addressing and calling numbers was by a ten
pulse-per-second tone; so slow you could easily decode it with a tape
recorder, if not by ear.

As far as I know, IMTS wasn't widely abused.  The planners would not
have anticipated that the much more secure AMPS system would not have
had adequate protection to deal with the threat which, at the time,
was probably considered minimal.  It is fairly clear that the
designers of AMPS underestimated the sophistication of their
adversaries, the availability of inexpensive test and programing
equipment, and the advantages to the criminal underground of using
altered phones.


John Gilbert         johng@ecs.comm.mot.com

------------------------------

From: bwilson@netcom.com (Bob Wilson)
Subject: Re: Cellular Phone Abuse
Organization: NETCOM On-line Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest)
Date: Wed, 11 May 1994 11:27:17 GMT


John R Levine (johnl@iecc.com) wrote:

>> Does anybody have any insights as to why it doesn't work this way
>> [with per-phone challenge-response passwords] today?

> The AMPS system in use in the U.S. was designed over a decade ago, and
> has become much more popular than even the most optimistic forecasts
> predicted.  There's a balance between cost and function, and ten years
> ago the cost of adding the security features would have been quite
> high, and the advantage, given the relatively modest popularity they
> expected, low.

Its my understanding that the reason better security measures were not
implemented was because they were deemed "too secure" and instead the
industry decided to wait until it would actually become a problem.
I'm not so sure that the cost/function rational really applied.

> On the other hand, if the next round of cell phones (CDMA or TDMA)
> don't include effective security features, that's just stupid.

Indeed.

------------------------------

From: co057@cleveland.Freenet.Edu (Steven H. Lichter)
Subject: Re: Cellular Phone Abuse
Date: 11 May 1994 08:51:22 GMT
Organization: Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio (USA)


Air ouch (PacTel Cellular) has been testing a system that looks at the
telephones finger like prints beside the EIN. That should slow things
down, but also it can cause a problem when you have a loaner phone
with your number since the way it operates will be different from you
regular phone. I have not heard anything about the tests in sometime
so maybe they are finished and being used or not.


Sysop: Apple Elite II -=- an Ogg-Net Hub BBS
(909) 359-5338 12/24/96/14.4 V32/V42bis

------------------------------

End of TELECOM Digest V14 #211
******************************

