Date: Tue, 22 Sep 92 05:04:18 From: Space Digest maintainer Reply-To: Space-request@isu.isunet.edu Subject: Space Digest V15 #229 To: Space Digest Readers Precedence: bulk Space Digest Tue, 22 Sep 92 Volume 15 : Issue 229 Today's Topics: Commercial Space News New lunar spacecraft (& old data formats) Population Space Platforms (political, not physical :-) Welcome to the Space Digest!! Please send your messages to "space@isu.isunet.edu", and (un)subscription requests of the form "Subscribe Space " to one of these addresses: listserv@uga (BITNET), rice::boyle (SPAN/NSInet), utadnx::utspan::rice::boyle (THENET), or space-REQUEST@isu.isunet.edu (Internet). ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: 20 Sep 92 21:26:52 From: Wales.Larrison@ofa123.fidonet.org Subject: Commercial Space News Newsgroups: sci.space COMMERCIAL SPACE NEWS 16 This is number sixteen in an irregular series on developments in commercial space activities. The commentaries included are my thoughts on these developments. Commercial space data has been piling up faster than I can process it into these columns, so I finally just threw out everything older than about a month, and cut this down to a more manageable size. Even so, there's still more than one column's worth of interesting developments... sigh... Contents - 1- NASDA DELAYS H-II PROGRAM; RSC'S COMMERCIAL ENTRY SLIPS 2- FIRST ROUND OF US/RUSSIAN SPACE LAUNCH TRADE TALKS BEGIN 3- INMARSAT CREATES CONTROVERSY WITH LAUNCH SERVICES RE-BID 4- ATLAS/CENTAUR FAILURE CHALLENGES GD'S LAUNCH BUSINESS 5- "WHITE KNIGHT" FOR CAPE YORK? ONE MORE (LAST?) ATTEMPT ... 6- SKYPIX IN BANKRUPTCY COURT; HUGHES DIRECT TV MOVES FORWARD 7- JOINT VENTURE TO PRODUCE ELECTRIC SATELLITE PROPULSION UNITS 8- STATE OF ALASKA TO BACK COMMERCIAL SMALL LAUNCH COMPANY? 9- THREE FIRMS AWARDED INITIAL LEO COMMUNICATIONS ALLOCATIONS 10- LANDSAT COMMERCIALIZATION MAY BE REVOKED ARTICLES ---------------------------------------------------------------- 1- NASDA DELAYS H-II PROGRAM; RSC'S COMMERCIAL ENTRY SLIPS Japan's National Space Development Agency (NASDA) has slipped the first launch date for the new H-II booster by at least 1 year after a test failure with the LE-7 engine. The LE-7 cryogenic LOX/LH2 engine development program has been plagued with problems over the past several years. After an engine caught fire during a 18 June test, it was decided to redesign part of the engine, forcing a 1 year delay in the program. Since the LE-7 is used to power the first stage of the H-II vehicle, the first flight of the H-II also slips to early 1994. This delay in fielding the H-II also delays entree of the H-II into the commercial launch market through Rocket System Corp (RSC), a consortium of Japanese aerospace companies. RSC had begun to bid the H-II into launch competitions for launches in 1995 and later. [Commentary: NASDA had expected to spend about $1.9 B on the H- II development, but problems with the LE-7 engine have caused cost growth and schedule slippage. The delay of the H-II into the commercial launch market provides a little bit of breathing space for US and European launch providers, who had begun to sharpen their pencils to make sure they could competitively bid against RSC and its large financial resources. The H-II delay also possibly opens up a small launch market for Japanese-origin satellites which were planned to be launched on the H-II and which might now be shifted to Ariane or Atlas rather than accepting the 1 year delay. It is also interesting to note that RSC will be inheriting a $1.9 B investment in technology and facilities by NASDA when beginning to bid for commercial contracts. A similar argument has been leveled against Arianespace by General Dynamics, who has invested several hundreds of millions of corporate funds to compete against Ariane. This topic has been raised in the GATT negotiations between Europe and the US and will undoubtedly also become a topic in the trade talks between the US and Japan, when RSC begins to seriously offer the H-II on the commercial market.] 2- FIRST ROUND OF US/RUSSIAN SPACE LAUNCH TRADE TALKS BEGIN The first round of bilateral space launch trade talks between the US and Russian governments took place the week of 1 Sep with a 2-day exchange of data. This round was designed to set a common basis of knowledge of each side's systems and plans before more detailed negotiations would start. Russian negotiators, led by the head of the Russian Space Agency (Yuri Koptiev), presented data on the Russian launch industry and Russian government support given to the industry. In response, the US government presented an overview of the US space launch industry and how the US government supports its space launch industry. The next round of talks are planned for Moscow next month, although exact dates have not yet been released. [Commentary: These talks are planned to establish "rules of the road" between the US and Russian governments for Russian participation in the international space market. Similar talks have been taking place for some years between the US, Chinese, and European governments. Their purpose is to establish general guidelines under which future procurements can be offered and accepted, including the launch of US satellites on Russian boosters and vice versa. These bilateral talks were agreed to during the 17 June Washington summit meeting of Presidents Bush and Yeltsin. The importance of establishing "rules of the road" for commercial firms is obvious - as they pave the way for real, routine commercial transactions between Russian and US commercial space entities. Over the past several months there have been a plethora of strange and disjointed claims about Russian launch and satellite systems being offered in the US, most of which have been found to be spurious. Part of blizzard of misinformation has caused by removal of centralized control over the representation and marketing of ex- Soviet systems and a desperate scramble of ex-Soviet design and manufacturing agencies for funds. I expect these "rules of the road" talks to define on what basis the Russian government will allow pricing of launch systems, and what level of direct and indirect government support to the offering entities will be acceptable. Rumors within the industry have indicated that some Russian bureaus have been pricing commercial offerings on the basis of their old "accounting rules" which only charged to the product the direct effort of the Russian bureau. Essentially, this treats all supplied parts and services as "free", and only the direct cost of assembling the system has been quoted to Western bidders. These accounting rules are changing, but before they can be eliminated for more realistic market-based rules, the Russian government must establish some type of acceptable transfer pricing mechanism (by "acceptable", I mean acceptable to the Russian government). Without this, the Russian government will continue to be used to subsidize industrial supply and prices without regard of the long-term viability of an industrial organization. This is one of the most thorny problems of reforming the Russian economy, and may be a tough issue to resolve. The announced agreement to allow the Russian government to bid for the launch of an Inmarsat satellite on a Proton launch vehicle should not be affected. The Russian bid should be accepted if it doesn't bid an absolutely absurd price -- and the rumors are they are bidding about 30% less than US or European competitor rather than the 95% less price rumored elsewhere. Indeed, the Inmarsat deal is being seen in some sectors as an experiment to gather data on Russian market mechanisms.] 3- INMARSAT CREATES CONTROVERSY WITH LAUNCH SERVICES RE-BID Inmarsat, the International Maritime Satellite Organization, has stirred up a furor with a recent action on bid for launch services. From information released in the trade press, Inmarsat had requested bids for launch of four Inmarsat 3 series satellites. Bids were received from several parties, with General Dynamics winning a contract for launch of the first two satellites. The third satellite is expected to be launched on the Proton. However, the round of bidding for the last satellite has become wrapped in controversy. Apparently, General Dynamics bid $61 M for launch and Arianespace bid $72 M. The bid was listed in the procurement RFP as being based upon best price. But rather than awarding the contract to GD, Olof Lundberg, director general of Inmarsat, recommended the fourth satellite launch contract should be given to Arianespace -- if a price could be negotiated to within 4% of GD's price. [Commentary: I'm going to make the rest of this commentary as at this point the facts get sparse and there's a lot of politics and flame going around about this. Inmarsat claims that they allowing Arianespace to rebid to maintain a second source of launchers other than GD. GD claims this violates the terms of the RFP and since both firms have already submitted a Best and Final Offer (BAFO) the award should be based only upon the submitted BAFOs and not on any yet-to-be-negotiated price. Furthermore, GD states if the price is to be re-bid by Arianespace, GD would also like an opportunity to re-bid as well. The US government, with Comsat Corp acting as its representative, is a member of Inmarsat and has protested this action within Inmarsat. In a letter of 30 June, the US representative to Inmarsat said the action by Lundberg "violated the very heart of the Inmarsat procurement process and undermines the critical principle of true competitive bidding". GD has been very active on the political/regulatory front as well, having taken this dispute to the regulating agencies in the US government - and I have seen data the US State, Commerce, and Transportation departments are all looking at it. It is expected the National Space Council will chair an interagency group to coordinate responses from the US government on this. In all, Inmarsat has stirred up a real hornet's nest. In my opinion GD has some very valid arguments about this competition. While Inmarsat also has valid concerns about maintaining a second source of supply, it is highly unlikely that Arianespace will go out of business if they don't get this one launch contract -- and from what data I can gather, it appears Inmarsat is violating the letter of the RFP on the basis for the award of the contract. If Inmarsat had wanted to maintain Ariane as the second supplier at the start of the contractual competition, they could have placed language in the contract such that Inmarsat reserved the option to place the contract on other than a lowest price basis - but they didn't. Similarly, they could have maintained Ariane as a second source by directing a procurement to them, and not making it a competitive bid, but this would have changed the Inmarsat launch services procurement method. (Inmarsat would have had to write the equivalent of the "single source procurement justification" and have it approved by the Inmarsat government council - which would have been done, in my opinion). Or, Inmarsat could have awarded the contract to GD, and paralleled it with a small Ariane contract for analysis and interface hardware to maintain Ariane readiness as a second source. This contentious issue, coming at a time when competitive trade issues in space launch are very highly visible, has caused major waves in the international trade community. The US government is even reported to be considering denying the export license for the US-built Inmarsat 3 satellite concerned if this issue isn't resolved. There will be another meeting later this year of the Inmarsat governing council, and this is expected to be a major issue until then.] 4- ATLAS/CENTAUR FAILURE CHALLENGES GD'S LAUNCH BUSINESS After one of two Centaur second-stage engines failed to ignite on 22 August, range safety destroyed an Atlas launch vehicle, racking up a $160 M failure for GD's commercial launch business. This was the second failure in 16 months for Atlas. While the reason for this failure is not known, it was similar to the previous Atlas failure on 18 April 1991, when another Centaur engine didn't ignite. That failure was traced to debris in a fuel line. General Dynamics and the Air Force has formed an independent failure review oversight board chaired by Forrest McCartney, former director of KSC. This board oversees a 30-member GD team studying the latest launch failure. The two biggest customers for upcoming Atlas launches, AT&T and Hughes, also are represented. [Commentary: This can only be seen as a major impact on General Dynamics' commercial launch business. It is not uncommon for customers participate on failure investigation boards, but Hughes has lost two of their satellites on Atlas (the Japan DBS satellite lost on the last failure was also built by Hughes) and has another dozen Hughes-built or Hughes-owned satellites scheduled for launch. While AT&T is not a satellite manufacturer, it has booked its entire next generation satellite network on Atlas and is reportedly concerned about the safety of its $1 B+ investment. Since GD is currently competing for new Intelsat and Inmarsat launch contracts and bidding head-to-head with Arianespace, this is going to hurt them in the competition. Similarly, they are trying to line up customers for their new Atlas II series of launchers, and these failures on the "tried and proven" Atlas I series may make customers more leery of using the Atlas II until they have more flight experience. It should also be noted this loss valued at $159.5 M (satellite and launch) wipes out 70% of all space insurance premiums paid so far this year. While premium payments may total of $440 M by the end of the year, that number assumes the launch of all 6 scheduled Arianes and the 2 remaining scheduled Atlases. Since the next Ariane (with Hippasat and Satcom) is carrying $300M in insurance, it is very quickly calculated the insurance industry can very quickly show a major loss. Current launch insurance rates of 15-20% can possibly grow -- particularly for Atlas, which the insurance industry ranks as a reliability of 75% over the past 20 launches, and 80% over the past 25. [Note: since I wrote this, Hippasat and Satcom were successfully launched on Ariane.] The only note of inadvertent humor out of all this was that Charles Lloyd, VP and managing director of General Dynamics Commercial Launch Services, was quoted as saying it was "particularly disappointing that we failed to provide Hughes Communications Inc. a good launch - as they are one of our largest customers." To which the obvious response is - "And if they weren't one of your largest customers, you wouldn't be disappointed?" 5- "WHITE KNIGHT" FOR CAPE YORK? ONE MORE (LAST?) ATTEMPT ... The latest in a procession of firms who have tried to develop a commercial space port on Australia's Cape York Peninsula has appeared. According to press reports, the Cape York International Spacelaunch Ltd (CYISL), has started to raise a projected $1 B (US) to fund the project. CYISL is headed by Robert Cooksey of Australia and Ian Whitehead of England, and is reportedly supported by six major companies. The identities of these companies has not been released by Cooksey or Whitehead on the grounds of confidentiality, but supposedly the firms have expertise in aerospace systems, launch site design and construction, infrastructure development, range systems, systems integration and launch program management, and facilities management and logistics support. But if CYISL is to develop the project, it must move quickly. A recent Australian review of their national space program recommended government support for the Cape York effort be terminated if private funds to proceed are not found by the end of the year. [Commentary: Another round in the saga of Cape York. I hope CYISL can pull off finding financing, but it is not a good sign when an organization says "I've got a billion dollars - just trust me". There are some unanswered questions about Cape York's viability that need to be resolved, and in my opinion, I think this may be one of the last gasps of its entrepreneurial viability. I've talked with representatives from the Australian Space Office about this venture, and it looks good in a spreadsheet, given several key factors. The most important was the availability of cheap Soviet/Russian boosters taken from a concurrent major Soviet/ Russian production run. Recently the Russian launch rate has plummeted and while cheap boosters are still being marketed, the sustainability of having cheap boosters from a humming production line is somewhat questionable. The availability of raw materials and components within the CIS has also become questionable as some of the CIS supplier firms have gone out of business due to lack of funds and raw materials, and this is looking like another problem for cheap Russian boosters available for Cape York. Secondly, the financial numbers for Cape York were highly dependent upon capturing a significant number of annual launches. The numbers presented represented about a 50% market share of the commercial launch market. Obviously, this would be strongly contested by Arianespace, US launch firms, and the Chinese. Highly competitive and speculative market positioning was also one of the achilles heels of the Cape York proposals. Lastly, the investment needed in Cape York is significant; estimates range from a few hundreds of millions up to a billion dollars or more. This large amount of funds for a very speculative investment was difficult for investors to swallow as a lump, and was made more speculative by the unwillingness of the Australian national government to guarantee or otherwise support such a large investment sum -- while the Australian government kept control the regulatory powers over Cape York's operations. While the state government and the ASO was very supportive of the effort to develop a Cape York launch site, it has been very difficult to put together the needed financial consortium given the speculative supply and market factors given above, and unresolved political issues. Perhaps this is the last gasp in the Cape York saga? Unless something drastic changes, the probability of a commercial spaceport at Cape York seems to be fading away. Unless a miracle of financial legerdemain happens, I believe the venture might only gasp on for another year or two before disappearing.] 6- SKYPIX IN BANKRUPTCY COURT; HUGHES DIRECT TV MOVES FORWARD SkyPix Corp., which was planning to introduce a satellite broadcasting service offering 80 channels of direct-to-home video programming, is not in bankruptcy court in Seattle. Creditors of the corporation are arguing that SkyPix should be forced into chapter 11 and operation of the firm be taken over by a court- appointed trustee. In return, SkyPix has fired off a barrage of lawsuits against the other parties involved in the venture. SkyPix is seeking damages of more than $44 M from Compression Labs claiming that the first of 350 decoder units ordered from them were defective and did not function to specification. In return, Compression Labs claims SkyPix contractually agreed the devices performed satisfactorily and to pay $1M owed by SkyPix to Compression Labs. SkyPix is also seeking $ 53 M in actual and punitive damages from the Home Shopping Network, Inc., alleging it failed to negotiate in good faith after signing a joint-venture agreement and promising to contribute $15.5 M in cash and a similar amount in services. SkyPix is claiming a $6.2 M promissory note signed to Home Shopping was done at the insistence of Home Shopping as Home Shopping insisted SkyPix guarantee that amount to reserve broadcasting slots on Hughes Communications satellites. Home Shopping called SkyPix's suit "an obvious attempt to dodge the debt." SkyPix is also suing two past presidents of the corporation. In other news, DirecTv Inc., a subsidiary of Hughes Communications Inc., has officially broken ground for a new facility dedicated to distributing satellite television for Hughes' 150- channel direct-to-home programming services. The new 40,000 sq ft facility in Castle Rock, CO is expected to cost between $7 and $8 M, and to be completed by June 1993. DirecTv services are planned to begin in 1994. As described by Hughes, the service will allow viewer to receive the programming through a "low-cost home receiving system consisting of an 18-inch satellite antenna and a set-top decoder box." [Commentary: I ran across these two peripherally related news items in my files and thought they made an interesting comparison. The Direct Broadcasting Satellite (DBS) market has historically been a dynamic market with lots of ups and downs, and these two ventures show that range of circumstances. SkyPix had raised several tens of millions of dollars from a variety of sources including a substantial number of private investors, but has had problems meeting its scheduled developments and in lining up the next round of investors. The suits and counter-suits indicate some of the investors are getting very leery about getting their money back and have lost confidence in the management and direction of SkyPix. The two suits against Compression Labs and Home Shopping also indicate key suppliers and customers may also have lost confidence in the venture. In comparison, the Hughes venture seems to be proceeding relatively smoothly. Hughes has a good track record in operating satellite TV distribution systems and in providing services to most of the major broadcasters and cable services - including major players in the international and foreign markets. From my current files on DirecTV, it seems Hughes has taken a significantly different path than SkyPix -- focusing on providing broadcast services to other firms who provide the programming, rather than trying to enter the more competitive video programming arena themselves. However, DirecTv has not yet shown financial or market viability, and it will be some time before we can assess the profit/ loss of this approach for DBS services. As a last note, these systems offer 80 or 150 channels of "entertainment". While I'm as much of a video junkie as anyone else, I still have to wonder -- are there really enough good movies and shows and events such that a firm can profitably fill up the DBS transmission?. And if there are 2 or 3 competing services, then there would have to be 160-450 simultaneous channels?. I believe programming is the achilles heel of DBS. There are only so many channels of "Wheel of Fortune", "Home Shopping Network" minor league baseball, and reruns of "Gilligan's Island" that can be shown profitably.] 7- JOINT VENTURE TO PRODUCE ELECTRIC SATELLITE PROPULSION UNITS A few months ago, it was agreed that Russian "Hall Effect" thrusters would be sold to Loral Space Systems. In recent news, Space Systems/Loral, the Fakel Experimental Design Bureau of Kaliningrad and the Research Institute of Applied Mechanics and Electrodynamics in Moscow have formed a joint venture called International Space Technology Inc. to sell and produce satellite stationkeeping propulsion systems. The system would use these Russian thrusters and US electronics to compete with existing liquid propellant satellite stationkeeping systems. According to Loral, an integrated system using Russian stationary plasma thrusters could cut the weight of stationkeeping systems on geosynchronous satellites by as much as 20%. This technology will be marketed to other satellite manufacturers and to US government customers. [Commentary: This is just a quick mention of the first real joint business venture I've noted for space hardware. While there are several similar ventures in the aviation field (as an example, the recent debut of Rolls Royce engines and Rockwell avionics on Russian manufactured jetliners), I've not noticed joint US/Russian space business ventures bringing joint hardware to the market - up to now. The past few months have seen several significant activities between US, Japanese, and European firms to really catalog and explore Russian technology and systems for commercially viable products. I believe the next year or so will see additional joint business ventures with the Russians to bring specific subsystems and elements into the international commercial market.] 8- STATE OF ALASKA TO BACK COMMERCIAL SMALL LAUNCH COMPANY? The Alaska Industrial Development and Export Authority (AIDEA), a state-funded development agency, is considering providing financial backing to International MicroSpace Inc. (IMI). IMI is proposing to build a small launch vehicle based upon in-production solid rocket motors and other off-the-shelf components. IMI has been discussing use of the Poker Flats launch range located north of Fairbanks with the Alaskan Aerospace Development Corp.. The AADC was founded by the Alaskan state legislature to expand the small aerospace industry base in Alaska and in particular, to expand the use of the Poker Flat range. This activity is strongly supported by the Alaskan congressional delegation and the state's governor. According to news reports, IMI approached AIDEA just before submitting a bid for the recent SDIO small ELV launch contract (see past issues of "Commercial Space News"). As part of the bid, IMI had to show financial viability, and AIDEA agreed to help provide backing for IMI. At AIDEA, several funding options were examined -- including funding IMI through the states's venture capital fund (the Polaris Fund) which has already invested $700,000 in IMI, for AIDEA to buy launch facilities and "lease" then back to IMI, and for transference to funds from AIDEA to the AADC which would in turn, provide $3M as a loan to IMI. Current reports are the loan from AADC to IMI will be offered, contingent upon a set of conditions which IMI must meet. These conditions include the Herndon, VA-based company moving its headquarters to Alaska and changing its charter to an Alaskan corporation. [Commentary: I've been following the effort to develop a launch industry in Alaska for some time. The Alaskan state government has been looking for means of diversifying the state's economy. Space activities of even $10-$50 M per year could have a major impact, considering Alaska has only 500,000 or so citizens. Complicating this is IMI just won that SDIO contract, worth about $12.6 M for the launch of the MISTI-4 payload from SDIO (with options for another potential 9 launches). At the same time, AADC is hiring Pat Ladner from SDIO as its new executive director, and AADC will be funding IMI. Some of the other small launch firms have raised their eyebrows at this apparently incestuous relationship. However, from what I've been able to see, Ladner had removed himself from any procurement activities at SDIO some months ago; well before the MISTI/Small ELV procurements were even released. There is no evidence of any ties between him and any of these procurement offers and any influence on any pertinent procurement action. I hope Ladner and the AADC are successful at developing an orbital launch infrastructure in Alaska. Poker Flat is the only privately-owned and operated launch range in North America (it's owned by the University of Alaska corporation), and might offer an private competitor to the government owned and operated ranges farther south. IMI might also have some interesting spinoffs for the AADC as well - they are part of a joint venture with Defense Systems Inc (one of the leading smallsat manufacturers) and Pacific Communications Sciences Inc to build, launch, and operate a LEO smallsat communications constellation. That venture, called Constellation Communications Inc, was one of the firms given a preliminary license from the FCC to launch and test their system. (see below). IMI looks like a reasonable bet by the Alaskan Aerospace Development Corp to bring some business to Alaska.] 9- THREE FIRMS AWARDED INITIAL LEO COMMUNICATIONS ALLOCATIONS On 5 August, the FCC proposed opening the frequencies 1610-1626.5 Mhz and 2483.5-2500 MHz for mobile satellite communications services in accord with the International Telecommunication Union as established at the last World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC). This opened up the spectrum for US LEO communications satellite constellations. To give initial licenses for services in these bands, the FCC was planning to provide "pioneer's preference" to see if any firm which had filed for LEO satellite services should be given a head start on approval (see past issues of CSN for a description of the process and some of the maneuvering between competitors to get this "pioneer's preference"). However, the FCC found none of the applications submitted for LEO constellations have provided enough of a jump in technology or innovation over its competitors, and their proposed techniques weren't so much of a quantum leap as much as derived from previous techniques. This disappointed some of the firms, but as was explained by Tom Stanley, the FCC chief engineer, the FCC sets the threshold for a "pioneer's preference" extremely high, and to get the approved head start through the licensing process an applications has to almost be an enabling technology for dramatically new services. Three of the 5 "big" LEO applications were granted an experimental launch and operations license, including: Constellation Communications (a joint venture from Pacific Communications Sciences Inc, Defense Systems Inc, and International Microspace Inc,) to launch and operate 2 satellites, a ground control station, and up to 100 ground terminals. Ellipsat (TRW) to launch and operate 4 satellites, 1 ground station, and up to 1000 user terminals, Motorola/Iridium to launch and operate 5 satellites, 2 ground stations (each in a different frequency), up to 100 user terminals, and 2 aircraft. The FCC warned the applicants they spend funds on these satellites at their own risk since the service and frequency sharing rules for such systems are not in place. While each firm expects to use their experimental satellites as part of an eventual full, operational constellation, that may not be feasible. Initial experiments have to be performed and some sort of negotiated rule making made to determine how differing systems and services can best share the spectrum. On the "small" LEO side, most applicants for frequencies below 1 GHz have agreed on service rules and have completed a spectrum sharing plan. But while Orbcomm, Starsys, and VITA have jointly agreed, Leosat is still appealing its FCC application dismissal due to a late filing fee, and the Air Force is re-voicing a concern about availability of spectrum in that frequency range for on-going military operations. Orbcomm, Starsys, and VITA are hoping this will be quickly resolved and the FCC will rule on their applications by the end of the year. [Commentary: Round Two of the LEO communications satellite competition is now starting. I expect a flurry of near-term activity to line up financing, get satellite construction contracts moving, and to start lining up launch services and ground system contracts. However, this still Round 2, and each firm will have to accept a significant amount of financial and business risk, dependent upon the outcome of the systems and service tests. The biggest issue seems to be the FDMA/TDMA scheme proposed for use on the Motorola/Iridium satellites. Virtually all of the other bidders insist that if Motorola is given an allocation in the frequency spectrum, no other firm can also use that operating band. Motorola insists that the CDMA schemes proposed by the other applications also have the same problem. This was a sufficiently serious concern that when a rumor started circulating that Motorola was to get the coveted "pioneer's preference", TRW, one of the other "big" LEO applicants filed an emergency petition for a writ of prohibition with the US Court of Appeals in the District of Columbia to stop all "pioneer preferences". The next round's results will have to be judged through the FCC for technical merit and compatibility. I'd expect a minimum commitment to get through this round at about $100 M (2 sats at $25 M, 2 launches at $20 M, ground station at $5M, and 100 ground terminals at $10 K, plus $10 M in test, development, and documentation). Then we'll see real $$ invested if an operational system(s) is approved.] 10- LANDSAT COMMERCIALIZATION MAY BE REVOKED [I've been not reporting or commenting on the current changes going on with Landsat, since there are a lot of differing proposals and competing options. However, this latest could have significant impacts on the Earth Resources space market segment.] Under a bill accepted on 11 August by the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee, the EOSAT corporation would be stripped of their exclusive rights to market Landsat data. The Senate "Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992" would apply to data produced by the Landsat 7 satellite, planned for launch in 1997 to replace the aging Landsat 6 satellite now in orbit. This bill was introduced by Sen. Larry Pressler (R-S.D.), and states "The cost of unenhanced Landsat data has impeded the use of such data for scientific purposes, such as for global environmental change research, as well as for other public sector applications." It also states "...Full commercialization of the Landsat program cannot be achieved within the foreseeable future, and thus should not serve as the near-term goal of national policy on land remote sensing." If passed, the bill orders negotiations with EOSAT Corp to ensure all Landsat data (including archived data from previous Landsats prior to Landsat 7) be made available to government agencies and government-sponsored researchers "at the cost of fulfilling user requests." Beginning with Landsat 7, management of the program would revert to the government, and all data would be made available at the cost of fulfilling a data order. In contrast, the House has proposed a Landsat bill with a 2- tiered fee schedule including a lower rate for non-commercial (governmental and academic) users. A memorandum of understanding (MOU) between EOSAT and NASA had been signed in late July that would have provided Landsat data to NASA global change researchers at a deep discount with EOSAT to use the proceeds from such sales to fund a grant program for research into new ways of using Landsat data. [Commentary: My believe this Senate bill is not in the best interest of commercial space activities. The Europeans have "commercialized" SPOT by developing new SPOT satellites under government/ESA funding and then turning the operational satellites over to SPOT Image to sell the data. The revenues generated from SPOT are not yet high enough to provide a basis for a commercial buy of new SPOT satellites, but the Europeans have been continuing to provide new generations of SPOT. Revenue streams are continuing to grow at about 20% annually for remote sensing data sales, but it will be at least another decade before this market segment will be large enough to support a fully commercial large satellite construction, launch and data collection venture. In contrast, the US government commercialized the Landsat program by turning over the operational Landsat to EOSAT, and never provided the funds for replacing Landsats or upgrading their technology. At the same time, the prices of acquiring Landsat data were allowed to rise to market rates, over the subsidized government prices before EOSAT. Now, some NASA and academic researchers are saying "What? We have to pay for data? At market rates?" and have been working behind the scenes to lobby for "at cost of reproduction" data to be provided to them. (In their defense, I should note the grants and budgets they are working on were never increased to reflect the cost of acquiring the data needed, and paying market prices for data has taken a big chunk out of their budgets.) But "uncommercializing" Landsat is NOT the way to promote commercialization of space. What should be done is to provide the funds for NASA and academic researchers to pay market rates for remote sensing data -- if the government is going to fund such research. Furthermore, my opinion is if the government is to promote the development of this area of the market, then they should also guarantee a market of size and quality sufficient for EOSAT to place a commercial procurement for a Landsat follow-on system (not necessarily for Landsat 7 as a clone of Landsat 6), and let EOSAT or an equivalent firm market its data to users. If the government is guaranteeing the market (which is not doing now) then it could provide the data so procured to government funded academic researchers and other government agencies (NASA, NOAA, and the DoD) sources at minimum cost. The government market guarantees should phase-out into a fully commercial system as the revenues grow to allow this. Uncommercializing the US Landsat system is only a step backwards for space commercialization. There are many more constructive steps that can be made rather than adding road blocks to this growing area of space commerce.] ------------------------------------------------------------------- Wales Larrison Space Technology Investor "Fortis cadere, P.O. Box 2452 cedere non potest" Seal Beach, CA 90740-1452 ------------------------------ Date: 21 Sep 92 15:22:37 GMT From: Pat Subject: New lunar spacecraft (& old data formats) Newsgroups: sci.space In article <2AB50B7F.17D1@deneva.sdd.trw.com> hangfore@spf.trw.com (John Stevenson) writes: > > >The reference goes on to note that the radionavigation data was acquired >from the NSDC on 7 track tapes, which no one any longer had the software ( >or even tape drives?) to read. The reference then goes on to discuss the >various boxes of punched cards which may or may not contain the required >data. So it appears that the information is not yet lost, but the will ( >or dollars) to recover it may be. > > Gee, sounds like no-one at NSSDC has ever done commercial data processing. When i lived in chicago, veitually every decent sized computer center had their own little museum of computer technology. old obscure hardware running some little job that no-one ever fixed up for modern times. at one site we had a tabulating punch vintage 1930's that we would dust off every year to run one old end of year job. no-one had the time to modernize it, and besides we liked the fun of that old beast. there were also shops that specialized in obscure stuff. want time on a cdc600 no problem. maybe nssdc should pay some money and they will find someone who can reprocess the data. ------------------------------ Date: 21 Sep 92 10:14:49 GMT From: nicho@VNET.IBM.COM Subject: Population Newsgroups: sci.space In <1992Sep21.064536.19465@ucsu.Colorado.EDU> David Knapp writes: >Do you think it is always appropriate to always give other species the >short end of the stick if it inconveniences man? How about the other way >around? I've never heard anybody favor either way. Talk to greenpeace then. They want to outlaw the way of life for many whaling communities. They _don't_ however, offer to compensate these people, they just implicitly assume that they are morally superior. >What kind of stuff are you reading? Mostly Usenet ... :-) >>Environmentalists tend to regard Man as >>seperate from nature, as if we were some alien interlopers, rather >>than an integral part. Even their choice of language shows this. >Hmm, I'm an environmentalist and that's not how I regard man. I'd say >you were wrong. Nope ... as you've pointed out. You worry about the changes we cause, as if they are somehow 'unnatural'. Your (implicit) assumption is that the changed wrought by Man shouldn't happen, yet if 'twere another species caught in the act, this would be alright .. yes ? The bottom line is that everything we do is natural, as we are an integral part of nature. You can debate the rights and wrong of our imposing our will on the planet in human ethical terms, however you cannot debate it as a 'crime against nature', for you cannot know what nature intends. If you are an ardent Gaia-ist, it is possible to make the premise that humans colonising other planets (reproducing Gaia) is worth almost any sacrifice (notice the space connection here ??). >> It can be overdone however. >Well that's true of *every* subject, isn't it. Yes, however how many environmentalists are prepared to accept this argument applying to their particular hobby horse ??? >> The environment is going to >>change no matter what. >Hmm, You and I might have a different idea of how the environment would change >with or without man. I'd say he's having a rather profound effect. And you regard this as 'unnatural' right ??? :-) Why are you seperating Man's changes from those caused by other species ?? >You're right. Species do come and go. Which species,so far, has been responsible >for the most species 'going'? As has been already pointed out, it was blue green algae. Man is a piker when compared to other causes. ----------------------------------------------------------------- ** Of course I don't speak for IBM ** Greg Nicholls ... nicho@vnet.ibm.com or nicho@cix.compulink.co.uk voice/fax: 44-794-516038 ------------------------------ Date: 21 Sep 92 16:08:59 GMT From: alan l wendt Subject: Space Platforms (political, not physical :-) Newsgroups: sci.space,talk.politics.space,alt.politics.marrou,alt.politics.libertarian In article <1992Sep16.054900.17022@techbook.com> szabo@techbook.com (Nick Szabo) writes: > >From memory, the Libertarian platform has two signficant statements on space: > >* Disband NASA, turning over science to the universities, R&D > operations to commerce, and anything the military needs to the > military. > In the back of their recent "Fallen Angels", Larry Niven & Co. argue that the cargo-carrying capacity of the shuttle could be achieved for about 1% of its current cost. More specifically, in terms of # of employees per aircraft: Commercial carriers: 135 R71B (Blackbird): 40 NASA Shuttle support ops: 5000 They further claim that the fuel cost of low-earth orbit is about the same as that of North America to Australia. 100 miles vertical instead of 2000 horizontal. Sounds reasonable to me but they've done more study than I. Alan Wendt ------------------------------ End of Space Digest Volume 15 : Issue 229 ------------------------------