Return-path: X-Andrew-Authenticated-as: 7997;andrew.cmu.edu;Ted Anderson Received: from beak.andrew.cmu.edu via trymail for +dist+/afs/andrew.cmu.edu/usr11/tm2b/space/space.dl@andrew.cmu.edu (->+dist+/afs/andrew.cmu.edu/usr11/tm2b/space/space.dl) (->ota+space.digests) ID ; Sun, 18 Nov 1990 02:52:05 -0500 (EST) Message-ID: Precedence: junk Reply-To: space+@Andrew.CMU.EDU From: space-request+@Andrew.CMU.EDU To: space+@Andrew.CMU.EDU Date: Sun, 18 Nov 1990 02:51:32 -0500 (EST) Subject: SPACE Digest V12 #572 SPACE Digest Volume 12 : Issue 572 Today's Topics: Re: Save our Shuttle data? USA 38 Payload Observed Summary of responses to "the Ariane V36 failure" (long - sorry) Re: LNLL Inflatable Stations Re: Reliability and Insurance (3 of 3) NASA Prediction Bulletins: Space Shuttle Administrivia: Submissions to the SPACE Digest/sci.space should be mailed to space+@andrew.cmu.edu. Other mail, esp. [un]subscription notices, should be sent to space-request+@andrew.cmu.edu, or, if urgent, to tm2b+@andrew.cmu.edu ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: 17 Nov 90 02:11:30 GMT From: usc!wuarchive!emory!wa4mei!ke4zv!gary@apple.com (Gary Coffman) Subject: Re: Save our Shuttle data? In article <0093FC0D.95D057E0@KING.ENG.UMD.EDU> sysmgr@KING.ENG.UMD.EDU (Doug Mohney) writes: >What steps could be (are?) taken to preserve the specs and construction >techniques for the Space Shuttle, especially in the area of the main engines? > >There's been a lot of speculation on what it would take to (re) build a 1990 >Apollo command module or a Saturn V, and the typical answer seems to be "You >can't; they burned/lost/destroyed/buried the plans." > >I could see us sitting around 15 years from now going "Gosh, the Shuttle SSME, >with a few minor differences, would be a perfect application." Are the plans >and specs to SSMEs proprietary? Or are they the property of the U.S. >government? > >We've "lost" one set of technological plans (Apollo/Saturn) already. Some will >argue we should be glad to lose the Shuttle whenever it is finally retired, but >I'd rather see all the data stashed away somewhere gathering dust than >"lost." > >Maybe we need Leonard Nimoy to do a "In Search of" the Saturn V specifications. >Are all the engineers who worked on building and designing the F-1 engines >dead? We still have the design specs of the F-1 engines. Heck, we even have real live examples lying around. So what's the problem? The problem is that many of the parts required special job shop techniques to machine the materials to the right tolerances and special heat treatments were required for some of the materials. Machining special alloys to precise tolerances requires special techniques that are often specfic to the particular machine tool used. Sometimes to the very tool and not just any production model of the tool. The machine operator plays a very major part in this operation. It's his skill, experience, and most particularly, his "feel" for his machine that determines the results. Unlike a production line, job shop machining almost always uses hand controlled machines. Most of the work for Saturn was done by small job shops under subcontract. Many of these are out of business. Many of the machine tools used have been consigned to the scrap heap as worn out or have changed hands at bankruptcy auctions. Most of the experienced machinists who developed the often undocumented tricks that made the machining work have long since retired or died. Some of the specialty metals suppliers who supplied the job shops with exotic alloys are either out of business or don't make those alloys anymore. It's not so much that the plans have been lost or destroyed, it's that the infrastructures needed to execute the plans have been lost. This is true in many areas of technology. A friend of mine who runs a job shop remarked that he had almost never seen a set of specs and procedures come down from the contractor that would actually work. He said every job requires special tricks devised on the shop floor to actually produce an item that meets engineering specs. These tricks are almost always only documented in the individual machine operator's head and hands. Often the operator can't say exactly what it is that he is doing that makes a process work. It's programmed at the reflex level. This is the major reason we can't make Saturns anymore without a major new development program where a whole new generation of job shops relearn the tricks their machines and their batches of special alloys require to produce the parts. Gary ------------------------------ Date: 17 Nov 90 04:21:37 GMT From: van-bc!ubc-cs!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!utgpu!molczan@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU (Ted Molczan) Subject: USA 38 Payload Observed I have received reports of STS 38 payload sightings tonight by two observers, working independently on consecutive shuttle passes over the southern U.S.A.. The first sighting, by a Tampa Florida area observer who prefers to remain anonymous, was at about 18:46 EST (16 Nov 23:46 UTC). The shuttle was preceded by 24.1 seconds by a reddish/yellow, magnitude zero satellite. The observer reported a rapid variation in brightness, from reddish to golden to yellow-white. This could be an indication of a rapid spin. The spacecraft passed at a 76 deg elevation to the north. The second sighting was by Mike McCants, of Austin Texas, at 19:15 CST (17 Nov 01:15 UTC). Mike was observing under very poor sky conditions, but did see the spacecraft for about 10 seconds through a hole in the clouds. When the first object came by, he thought it was the shuttle, though somewhat faint. Then, the shuttle came by, he realized that the first object had been the payload. The brightness and colour of the payload are reminiscent of the Lacrosse radar imaging sat, deployed from Atlantis on STS 27, however it is too soon to make even a tentative identification. Further observations are required. So far, the AV WEEK story on this mission has been very accurate. -- Ted Molczan@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca ------------------------------ Date: 17 Nov 90 17:37:09 GMT From: eagle!news@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU (Ronald E. Graham) Subject: Summary of responses to "the Ariane V36 failure" (long - sorry) This is a summary of responses to the thread entitled "the Ariane V36 failure." I am grateful to all of the participants in the discussion. Contributors were: Peter Budgell peter@engrg.uwo.ca Henry Spencer henry@zoo.toronto.edu Bruce Dunn a752@mindlink.UUCP Michael Mraz mikemr@microsoft.UUCP Jean-Yves Herve' herve@urdr.umd.edu George William Herbert gwh@monsoon.Berkeley.EDU The original article read: [regarding the failure of the Ariane V36...] > I hope someone can offer insight on the following questions: > > (1) the failure was due to a piece of cloth. How could this have been > isolated after the failure? > (2) what is the mechanism by which a piece of cloth was able to cause the > failure? By that I mean > - was the cloth of sufficient size/porosity to totally restrict water > flow? or did it have to be? > - how is a piece of cloth able to be in the water line anyway? > - what is the sequence of events leading to the failure, given the > presence of the cloth? > (3) how can Arianespace ensure no repeat of this mechanism/sequence of > events? Per Mr. Spencer and Mr. Dunn, a summary of the sequence of events leading to the failure would be: o the water line to one of the main engines is blocked; o chamber pressure drops to that engine; o the engine loses thrust; o remaining engines gimbal to correct for thrust imbalance; o remaining engines go hard-over, but vehicle goes off course anyway; o vehicle skids into yaw motion; o vehicle breaks up due to aerodynamic loads. Now, Mr. Spencer, Mr. Dunn, and Mr. Mraz all asked the same question: "what was a water line doing in the propulsion system anyway?" Mr. Herbert said he thought it was for cooling engine parts, but Mr. Spencer disagreed. I have contacted a couple of folks in my area who are Atlas wizards, and they did not recognize any comparable water-lines as part of an Atlas. I am still looking into it, however, and will report as soon as I learn something. Atlas uses different engines than the Ariane series, but there's more to it than that, I'm sure. One similarity between the V36 and the average Atlas: an Atlas can only hard-over its engines about 4 degrees, and can only handle yaw motion up to that point. The Ariane series is in the same situation. Mr. Dunn references the journal Spaceflight, regarding the determination of the cause of the failure: [The article goes on to talk about how debris from the exploded launcher fell at the shoreline and just off-shore of the launch site.] "In particular, this search located external tubing of engine D as well as water tank elements. The first stage propulsion bay along with the four Viking motors was found. Despite extremely difficult conditions, the suspect elements of the water circuit were recovered shortly before this issue of Spaceflight went to press..." "The rag was probably left in the pipe when the tubing was dismantled and readjusted during first stage integration before transfer to French Guiana. Arianespace Chairman Frederic d'Allest said the cause of the failure was 'not only shocking but hard to accept.'" Mr. Herve' points out that the cloth was found "clean," indicating that it had probably not been used for cleaning and forgotten. So how did it get there, then? Anybody care to comment? Regarding quality control, and ensuring against a repeat failure: Mr. Dunn again references Spaceflight, "From flight V37, the water line and the N2O4 feed line of each engine will be examined. The inspection will take place at Kourou (launch site in Fr. Guiana), using a fibroscope type video camera with integrated light source. Additional leak checks were made on the first stage and strap-on fuel lines to ensure that there was no repeat of the fire on the previous mission. Also, new thermal protection inside the propulsion bays of the first stage will protect electrical systems in the event of a fire." Mr. Budgell notes a parallel between this situation and Nuclear power station startups: "all kinds of strange things are said to come out of the piping during commisioning - soft drink cans, welder's dams, 2 x 4's ..." "During commisioning (of a nuclear power station) they will put screens in strategic locations, let water into the piping, and test the pumps. The screens are to prevent debris from entering reactors, heat exchanger tubing, impellers, and so on. The screens will be checked after pump tests. Tool counts, like the QC procedures in operating rooms, attempt to prevent things being left behind." Mr. Spencer notes that no single organization was responsible for the entire water line. Management confusion can get in the way both of resolving present failures and of preventing new ones. Two final notes: o Mr. Dunn comments, "Spaceflight is an excellent journal received by members of the British Interplanetary Society." The address is 27/29 South Lambeth Road, London, SW8 1SZ, England o one other response flamed NASA for my attitude, presented in the way I asked for responses to these questions. While I wish I had a nickel for every time somebody flames NASA ;-), I learn a valuable lesson: the next time you want thoughtful comments only, ask for them: "thoughtful comments only, please." RG ------------------------------ Date: 15 Nov 90 00:26:39 GMT From: agate!dog.ee.lbl.gov!hellgate.utah.edu!caen!umich!sharkey!cfctech!teemc!fmeed1!cage@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU (Russ Cage) Subject: Re: LNLL Inflatable Stations In article <2732@polari.UUCP> crad@polari.UUCP (Charles Radley) writes: >That is not the point. Any material can carry any load, if it has big >enough cross section. It is a question of how heavy it has to be to get low >enough stress. Structure carrying centrifugal loads is heavier than >structure which does not. Charles, you could easily check this yourself. If the rotating mass is 80,000 lbs/half, and it averages 1/2 G, then the total tension is 40,000 lbs. If the diameter is 15 feet, then the internal 7.5 psi pressure exerts a tension of 190,000 lbs, nearly 5 times the load from centrifugal effects. What really appalls me is that you had similar numbers available to you from the net, and failed to find your incorrect assertion before posting. I hoped for better from you. > Why exactly do LLNL want to spin the thing anyway ? I cannot see any >advantage where crews are rotated every 90 days. And half the fun for the >astronauts is the zero-gee.... Blinders on again... Charles, this could easily be another of those cost-saving measures. Crews do not *have* to be rotated every 90 days, which reduces transport (and thus life-cycle) costs. You keep assuming the weaknesses of NASA's design when talking about LLNL's design. This is fallacious thinking. -- Russ Cage Ford Powertrain Engineering Development Department Work: itivax.iti.org!cfctech!fmeed1!cage (CHATTY MAIL NOT ANSWERED HERE) Home: russ@m-net.ann-arbor.mi.us (All non-business mail) Member: HASA, "S" division. ------------------------------ Date: Sat, 17 Nov 90 09:38:06 -0500 From: "Allen W. Sherzer" Subject: Re: Reliability and Insurance (3 of 3) Newsgroups: sci.space Cc: In article <1990Nov16.163309.18249@zoo.toronto.edu> Henry Spencer writes: >>I know Rockwell was considering a Commercial Shuttle a while back... >The big problem that has hit all attempts at commercializing the shuttle >is NASA, which does not want to lose control of the program.... True, but a good case for it could be made under Title II of the current NASA authorization bill. Of course, Rockwell would need to push for it in a very agressive manner but it could be done. The big problem is that none of the aerospace contractors want to piss off NASA. Allen -- +---------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Allen W. Sherzer| I had a guaranteed military sale with ED-209. Renovation | | aws@iti.org | programs, spare parts for 25 years. Who cares if it | | | works or not? - Dick Jones, VP OCP Security Concepts | ------------------------------ Date: 17 Nov 90 20:13:36 GMT From: ncis.tis.llnl.gov!blackbird!tkelso@lll-winken.llnl.gov (TS Kelso) Subject: NASA Prediction Bulletins: Space Shuttle The most current orbital elements from the NASA Prediction Bulletins are carried on the Celestial RCP/M, (513) 427-0674, and are updated several times weekly. Documentation and tracking software are also available on this system. As a service to the satellite user community, the most current elements for the current shuttle mission are provided below. The Celestial RCP/M may be accessed 24 hours/day at 300, 1200, or 2400 baud using 8 data bits, 1 stop bit, no parity. STS 38 1 20935U 90 97 A 90320.40850694 .00161290 68898-5 25599-3 0 47 2 20935 28.4646 240.6373 0006560 286.7334 43.3613 16.02355418 67 -- Dr TS Kelso Assistant Professor of Space Operations tkelso@blackbird.afit.af.mil Air Force Institute of Technology ------------------------------ End of SPACE Digest V12 #572 *******************