Date: Mon, 23 Nov 1992 12:57:02 EDT >From: David Sobel Subject: File 3--NASA Statement on Ames Raid NASA Statement on Ames Raid THE CPSR Washington Office has been monitoring developments concerning the unannounced "security review" conducted at the Ames Research Center this past summer. During the course of the review, desks were searched, computers were opened, employees were locked out of their offices, and nine employees (5 civil servants and 4 contractors) were placed on administrative leave without explanations. CPSR has submitted a Freedom of Information Act request to seeking information on the purpose and results of the review. NASA announced on November 17 that certain matters growing out of the Ames raid have been referred to the FBI for further investigation. The agency's statement is reprinted below. David Sobel Legal Counsel CPSR Washington Office ******************************************************** RELEASE: 92-207 NASA RELEASES FINDINGS OF REVIEW TEAM ON SECURITY CONCERNS In July 1992, a Management Review Team (MRT) was established, after a classified briefing was presented to NASA Headquarters management by Ames Research Center (ARC) management located at Mountain View, Calif. The briefing identified potential national security problems. NASA Administrator Daniel S. Goldin determined that the situation at ARC warranted a special one-time review to determine whether the issues and problems existed and, if so, what type of corrective action should be taken. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Justice and the Department of Defense were consulted on the national security and foreign counterintelligence aspects of the problems identified. "Upon learning about the potential security problems, I immediately ordered a review of the situation," Goldin said. "Based on the review, information has been forwarded to proper authorities. The recommendations of the review are being taken very seriously and I intend to promptly implement them." Based upon the review and discussions with senior management, the MRT does not believe that the problems encountered at ARC are occuring at other NASA centers. Findings of Review ARC is considered "high risk" for hostile intelligence operations. ARC exacerbated a marginally effective security posture by not focusing appropriate management attention on the handling of sensitive technology. Structural and functional weaknesses existed in the way the ARC security office worked in relation to other center operations. In addition to security concerns, processes and practices in the areas of personnel, legal, procurement, and data and technology protection are contributing to the potential risk rather than serving as controls over the risk. The ARC culture and environment were found to be the underlying cause of NASA's vulnerability; the culture is strongly biased toward maintaining an academic reputation, rather than meeting U.S.industry and national needs. Generally accepted management controls, as well as security, legal, personnel, and procurement policies, are often viewed as impediments and are sometimes sidetracked or avoided. Lax procedures and attitudes were identified that set the stage for widespread dissemination of commercially valuable applied technology being developed by ARC personnel. ARC's credibility with the U.S. aerospace industry has been damaged as a result of these problems. Some of NASA's customers and partners are reluctant to share important data with NASA for fear it will be disseminated with little or no regard for its sensitivity. In order to regain credibility, specific processes for the identification and handling of sensitive and commercially valuable technologies at ARC must be developed and fully implemented by ARC employees. To resolve the conflict between NASA's desire to share technology internationally and the need to place U.S. interests first, an environment and culture must be developed at ARC and elsewhere at NASA, which focuses NASA's attention on the needs and expectations of U.S. industry and the taxpayer. Basic science efforts actively involve and will continue to involve the international community but applied technology, developed at U.S. taxpayer expense, must be protected for U.S. industry use in accordance with applicable laws and regulations. NASA must work internally, and externally with appropriate members of the Administration and Congress to address the problems and develop long-term solutions. Information Referred to OIG and FBI The MRT found a number of specific discrepancies in the areas of procurement, misuse of government equipment and apparent violations of the law and/or NASA policy. The MRT referred this information, as appropriate, to the NASA Office of Inspector General (OIG) and the FBI, which has jurisdiction over foreign counter intelligence issues resulting from the review. Cases were opened up by both the OIG and the FBI. It is anticipated that the OIG effort will be completed in December 1992. Review of the MRT Team Because the review was unexpected by the ARC workforce and employees of Asian-Pacific ancestry appeared to be disproportionately affected, there was a significant adverse reaction to the review among some of the ARC workforce. The NASA Administrator took immediate action to address employees' concerns. He met with representatives of the ARC Asian Pacific Island Advisory Group to discuss their concerns. The Administrator also appointed an Assessment Panel on Aug. 26, 1992, to assess the approach and process used by the MRT. The assessment panel was charged with examining the concerns that could have unnecessarily increased the levels of employee discomfort or organizational disruption flowing from the review. It was also tasked to make recommendations that would alleviate employee concern about the process, and minimize difficulties, should a similar review be required in the future. The Assessment Panel concluded that "the scope and objective of the management review were legal and that individuals were not selected for interview and search of their workplaces based upon their race or national origin." The Panel further concluded that there was a confluence of factors prior to, during and after the management review, some of which were avoidable and some not, which caused negative reactions within the workforce. ------------------------------ Downloaded From P-80 International Information Systems 304-744-2253