                   2. BEHAVIORISTIC APPROACHES TO MOTIVATION.
        
             In the late nineteenth century psychology merged both
        philosophy and physiology together in an effort to explain
        motivational processes in human beings.  Three factors caused a
        revolution in motivational thought.  First, there was the
        explosive growth in theory and methodology of the natural
        sciences during the previous two centuries.  Second, There was
        the shattering influence of Darwin's theory of evolution.  These
        two influences affected the course of Hull's 1943 formulation
        (Korman, 1974).
        
             One psychologist profoundly influenced by these three was
        Watson (1913) who called for psychology to be objective in
        nature.  He called for researchers to study the hard, physical
        matter of behavior that one could touch, feel, and experiment
        with in the same way that one could in physiology and physics. 
        Watson believed that in this way psychology could stand beside
        the other sciences as a legitimate pursuit in the study of man. 
        He declared psychology could operate from the same philosophical
        framework as these others sciences.  The general approach would
        be to search for the "basic elements" of behavior, physically
        defined and understood.  This basic unit of behavior was called,
        conditioned-response.  
        
             Watson was able to recondition the child not to fear the
        rabbit by presenting it in a context where there was no strong
        fear-inducing stimulus.  The child's conditioned fear response
        was eliminated the same way that it had originally been
        developed.  Watson believed that he had developed a meaningful
        way of understanding the antecedents to behavioral choice and
        direction and that he could do it without resorting to what was,
        for him, the mysticism of conscious experience.
        
             Watson's theories were oversimplified explanations, as he
        and his followers (Kuo, 1921) thought they would be.  The
        conditioned response (CR) to the conditioned stimulus (CS) is
        rarely, if ever, the same as the unconditioned response (UR) to
        the unconditioned stimulus (US).  Hence, stimulus substitution
        cannot account for the change in the direction of behavior, one
        of the primary concerns of the psychology of motivation.  They
        concluded that something else must be involved.  Responses are
        not infinitely transferable.  
        
             Brown (1961) made this same conclusion.  He contended that
        this type of approach would hold that variables such as hunger
        and thirst, variables which are often called motivational because
        they arouse and direct behavior, are really just sets of stimuli
        and act like any other stimuli that become linked to responses
        through classical conditioning.  He described Freud's theory of
        motivation as follows:
             1.   Basic instinctual drives serve as determinants of
                  behavioral arousal;
             2.   Increase in internal stimulation results from cyclic
                  patterns in instinctual drives (id);
             3.   Nature of instinctual drive that is salient at the time
                  like hunger, thirst, sex, etc., results in motivation
                  to satisfy needs;
             4.   Societal constraints and values as to appropriate means
                  of instinctual drive reduction (super ego);
             5.   Strength of ego in being able to balance demand of id
                  and superego results in need fulfillment;
             6.   Contemporary environmental expectancies as to manner in
                  which currently salient instinctual drives may be
                  reduced are developed;
             6.   Learned habits as to appropriate means of instinctual
                  drive reduction result in the satisfaction of needs.  
             7.   Current developmental stages that the person is in
                  (oral, anal, phallic, latency, or genital), reveal
                  preferred habits of drive reduction remaining from
                  earlier stages, frustrations from earlier stages that
                  the individual wishes to overcome;
             8.   All this results in the direction of behavior or choice
                  (pp. 112-113).
        
             Freud's theory of motivation was largely untested due to its
        hypothetical rather than scientific foundation.  In avoiding
        unconscious motivational dynamics, Brown and others moved toward
        a more scientific and observable treatment of motivation in human
        beings.  
        
             Hull (1943) is remembered today as the author of a
        sophisticated attempt at constructing a rigorous, locally tight,
        mathematically oriented theory of motivation.  He rejected
        mentalistic, subjective notions, such as the will, in favor of
        physically defined variables in dealing with the phenomena he
        called motivational processes.  His work is described as having
        involved two major stages, with the first evolving into his 1943
        system (Hull, 1943) and the second into his 1952 theory (Hull,
        1952).  
        
             Hull's theory included the physically oriented behaviorism
        of Watson and the notions of instinctual behavior stemming from
        Darwin's theory of evolution.  Following Darwin, Hull believed
        that the problem of arousal of behavior, or why man originally
        behaved at all, stemmed clearly from evolutionary considerations. 
        Whenever an organism was in a threatening situation, behavior was
        aroused and engaged in to eliminate the treat.  An organism
        behaved when its survival was threatened, and the direction it
        took stemmed either from innate behavioral characteristics that
        had survival value or from learned behaviors that had been
        associated with survival in the past.  Hull believed most forms
        of behavior could eventually be achieved.  
        
             Hull (1943) attempted to provide some clear answers to the
        "why" of behavior or the reasons certain behaviors were engaged
        in more than others.  He attempted to spell out in precise detail
        how these mechanisms worked, how they combined, and so on.  He
        proposed that the newborn organism possessed a set of receptors
        capable of being stimulated by such sources as external stimuli
        and internal stimuli of the type associated with biological
        states of a threatening nature.  Examples are stomach
        contractions (hunger), dryness of the mouth (thirst), and tissue
        injury (pain).  These external and internal stimuli give rise to
        an internal state marked by two major characteristics.  The first
        of these is a general drive state (called D by Hull), that acts
        as a general stimulant to the arousal of behavior in that it
        stimulates activation of whatever behavior tendencies exist in
        the organism at the time.  The second characteristic is that
        these biological states have associated sets of physical
        stimulation unique to each state.  Thus, hunger involves stomach
        contractions, thirst, a dry mouth, and so on, Hull thought, and
        it is these physical stimuli that determine the direction of
        behavior.  The first type of behavior sequence that might be
        activated is the unlearned sequence, one innate to the organism
        possibly bred into him by evolutionary adaptation because of its
        survival value.  The second type of behavior sequence that might
        be activated is that in which the organism responds to the
        stimuli using a learned behavior rather than an innately bred
        mechanism.  This learned stimulus-response link Hull called H,
        for habit, and it is on the basis of biological survival value
        that these stimulus-response links develop, or are learned, or so
        Hull proposed.  
        
             Thus, for Hull, D, drive, and H, habit, are conceptual,
        theoretical variables, rather than observable, physical stimuli. 
        They occur and vary as a function of physically defined responses
        as a function of their values.  At least four of the basic
        instinctual forces of behavior are the desires to reduce (1)
        hunger, (2) thirst, (3) pain from tissue injury, and (4) sexual
        stimulation.  The 1943 Hullian system postulated a number of
        determinants and procedures for measuring these determinants. 
        First, H, a habit, develops because the responses involved have
        biological utility in that they have led to the reduction of
        drive stimuli.  The speed and development of H is a function of
        the following variables:
             1.   The closeness in time of the stimulus-response coupling
                  to the actual stimulus reduction;
             2.   The number of reinforced trials;
             3.   The magnitude of reinforcement during training (p. 32)
        
             These procedures determine how D and H are measured.  How do
        they combine in predicting behavior?  Hull, basing his statements
        on the results of experiments of Perrin (1942) and Williams
        (1938), suggested that the strength of the impetus to respond is
        a multiplicative function of habit and drive, assuming the form:
        
             Behavior = f(D) X f(H)
        
             Most forms of complex human behavior cannot be viewed simply
        as the attempt to satisfy survival needs.  These are the forms of
        motivated behavior that the Hullian tradition tended to report. 
        Human behavior is symbolic, conceptual, and not easily
        controllable by what seems to be the physical type of external
        stimulation found in animal experiments.  
        
             Hull's proposal was simple but illusory.  He proposed that
        stimuli associated with the primary drive states elicit behaviors
        similar to those that the primary drive states do.  Thus, it was
        by using the conditioned stimulus-conditioned reinforcers
        framework developed on the basis of contiguity that Hull proposed
        to account for complex behavior in his 1943 theory.
        
             Mowrer (1960) proposed a theory of behavior explicitly
        designed to use much of the Hullian approach and terminology in
        accounting for complex behavior.  His approach dealt with
        conditioned reinforcers and their implications for controlling
        behavior.  According to Mowrer, various stimuli become associated
        with various kinds of outcomes and thus assume symbolic
        significance to the organism.  These stimuli assume reinforcing
        properties and are influences on later behavior.  Mowrer
        distinguished at least four separate cases:
             1.   Stimuli that become associated with outcomes of
                  behavior that are negative in nature; these become
                  stimuli that are called "fear" stimuli.
             2.   Stimuli that become associated with outcomes of
                  behavior that are positive.
             3.   Stimuli that become associated with outcomes of
                  behavior that involve the disappearance of signals that
                  meant the reduction of drives; these become
                  "disappointment" stimuli.
             4.   Stimuli that become associated with outcomes of
                  behavior that involve the termination of danger
                  stimuli; these become "relief" stimuli.
        
             It was Mowrer's basic prediction that "hope" and "relief"
        stimuli become positive reinforcers of behavior and can be
        utilized to build habits since organisms are motivated to achieve
        them.  "Fear" and "Disappointment" are negative outcomes that,
        Mowrer argued, organisms try to avoid and that will not build up
        into habits.
        
             Miller (1948) studied how a conditioned response could be
        predicted.  In an experiment with rats, he found that when they
        were placed in a situation where they would receive shocks while
        attempting to escape from a maze that they would (a) attempt to
        escape even before the shock was administered, and (b) learn new
        habits that would enable escape from the box when earlier learned
        escapes were unavailable.  The implications of this research
        finding were that fear could be considered a secondary or
        acquired drive because it acted like a drive even though it was
        not innate, but was learned, and conditions for its acquisition
        could be demonstrated experimentally.  The fact that the behavior
        is learned and does not need to have any biological significance
        attached to it is very crucial.  This research was one of the
        reasons why the adequacy of Hull's theoretical system was
        eventually challenged by many psychologists.  
        
             The significance of anxiety for understanding neurotic
        behavior had been pointed out by Freud (1933), among others, and
        psychologists such as Mowrer (1960) spent significant portions of
        their careers studying the anxiety phenomenon by using
        experimental techniques inspired by Hullian theory.  Miller
        suggested this in a 1948 article.
             The mechanism of acquired drives allows behavior to be more
             adaptable in complex variable situations.  It also allows
             behavior to appear more baffling and apparently lawless to
             any investigator who has not had the opportunity to observe
             the conditions under which the acquired drive was
             established.  One hypothesis is that neurotic systems, such
             as compulsions, are habits which are motivated by fear and
             are reinforced by a reduction in fear (pp. 100-101).
        
             One implication from this successful experimental
        development of an acquired drive was that it led to a proposed
        mechanism for integrating within a relatively theoretical
        framework the diverse multiplicity of human goals.  Instead of
        going through the process of postulating separate motives for
        such things as money, status, prestige, a new car, a big house,
        and the like.  Brown (1952) suggested:
             The important motivating component of many of the supposed
             acquired drives for specific goal objects is actually a
             learned tendency to be discontented or anxious in the
             absence of these goal objects.  On this view, stimulus cues
             signifying a lack of affection, a lack of prestige,
             insufficient money, etc. would be said to acquire, through
             learning, the capacity to arouse an anxiety reaction having
             drive properties.  This learned anxiety would then function
             to energize whatever behavior is directed toward goal
             objects by stimuli, and its reduction, following the
             achievement of these goals, would be powerfully reinforcing
             (pp. 1-21).
        
             Motivation can be a function of frustration.  It is an
        emotion that causes many people to make life adjustments to meet
        desired needs.  Frustration, according to Brown (1961) and Lawson
        (1965), is a conflict between two opposing tendencies.  One
        response tendency is the one originally evoked by the situation
        (presumably some kind of goal response), and the other being some
        alternative response aroused by the frustrating interfering
        conditions themselves.  This conflict between opposing tendencies
        leads to whatever could be said to be the unique behavioral
        consequences of frustration.  Because frustration is defined in
        terms of the relationship between two hypothetical constructs -
        the opposing response "tendencies" - frustration is a higher
        order construct.  It is defined in terms of first order
        constructs.  One effect is an increase in drive.  Frustration
        adds to the total motivation of the organism, and thus
        strengthens if the goal directed response is far stronger than
        any other behavior in the situation.  The second effect is to
        produce unique internal stimuli.  These stimuli may be related to
        other responses not previously present in the situation. 
        
             Although there were studies to support Hull's prediction
        (Wolfe, 1936; Cowles, 1937), the hypothesis always had problems. 
        For example, there was evidence that secondary reinforcers may
        quickly lose their effect over time if they are not associated
        often enough with the primary reinforcer (Isaacson, Hutt, and
        Blum, 1965; Wike, 1969).  Other experiments showed secondary
        reinforcing effects over long periods of time.  Zimmerman (1957)
        predicted that a secondary reinforcer can have long-lasting
        effects if it has been periodically associated with the primary
        reinforcer to begin with, rather than a constant association with
        it.  Siegal and Milty (1969) found little experimental support
        for the proposal that stimuli signal the termination of electric
        shock take on secondary properties in the manner that Hull and
        Mowrer predicted.  
        
             In his emphasis on Darwinian evolutionary theory as a logic
        for behavior and on a stimulus-reduction model as a basic
        explanatory system, Hull (1943) was quite similar to Freud.  In
        other respects he was different.  Hull was a physically oriented
        behaviorist who attempted to deal with motivational processes by
        postulating physiologically based stimuli of evolutionary
        significance as leading to the arousal and motivation of
        behaviors.  Once behavior was aroused and drive (D) was
        operative, Hull suggested that direction was due to the linkage
        of physiologically based stimuli and responses.  Despite his
        objective goals, logical and empirical problems appeared when
        Hull applied his theories to complex human processes.
        
             Hull's work became what he hoped it would, a stimulation for
        continued research by opponents and proponents.  Fifty years
        later, his research can still be cited as the acme of what a
        theory should be: a thought-generating system that proved to be
        an immeasurable aid in the understanding of what motivates
        behavior.  
        
             There were a number of problems with Hull's 1943 system. 
        While stimuli associated with shock do assume fear or anxiety-
        arousing properties and do function as drives in the Hullian
        sense, stimuli associated with hunger and thirst deprivation
        states do not become conditioned stimuli and do not assume drive
        characteristics (Cravens and Renner, 1970).  
        
             Another set of findings that did not support Hull's work was
        the evidence that obese individuals do not use biological
        deprivation cues for how and when they should eat.  Their eating
        behavior seems to be a function of variables of having little or
        nothing to do with the degree of their physiological deprivation
        at the time (Nisbett, 1968; Schacter, Goldman, and Gordon, 1968).
        
             As a continuing demonstration of the difficulty of
        coordinating D, as conceptualized by Hull, to biological-need
        states and the various stimuli conditioned to them, Zajonc's
        program supported the theoretical assumption that the presence of
        other people may as a drive state in the Hullian sense.  This
        added to the confusion as to what D is (Zajonc, 1965).  
        
             There was considerable additional evidence that biologically
        linked need states as hunger, thirst, pain, and sex area function
        of many other variables besides physiological determinants. 
        Vernon (1969) pointed out that (a) food preferences are very much
        culturally determined and some individuals will and do starve
        rather than eat forbidden foods; (b) sexual behavior is under
        hormonal influence for organisms low in the evolutionary
        hierarchy, but such behaviors are very much a function of
        learning experience for humans and higher animals; (c) there is
        some basis for biologically linked instinctual maternal behaviors
        in lower animals but such behavior is culturally determined in
        humans; and (d) fear and anxiety are very much culturally
        learned, with great differences between individuals and groups in
        the degree to which they will admit such reactions and base their
        behavior on them.  
        
             The question is, does the learning of stimulus-response
        connections (habit) depend on primary and/or conditioned-stimulus
        (need) reduction?
             
             In a real sense, the logic of Hull's entire approach rested
        on the answer to this question.  He based his system on the
        principle of the biological utility of behavior and its
        derivatives.  While habits can be learned on the basis of primary
        or conditioned need reduction, it is not necessary that such
        reduction occur for learning to take place.  The evidence for
        this statement comes from a variety of research sources, some of
        which follow:
             1.   Non-nutritive saccharin (a substance that passes
                  through the body without providing any food value) can
                  reinforce the learning of an instrumental response
                  (Sheffield and Roby, 1950).
             2.   Infant monkeys can obtain satisfaction from ersatz
                  mothers who have not provided milk (Sheffield, Wulf,
                  and Backe, 1951).
             3.   Rats can be reinforced by copulating responses without
                  being given the opportunity to ejaculate (Harlow and
                  Zimmerman, 1959).
             4.   Habits can be learned when the outcome of the behavior
                  involved is not the reduction of some primary or
                  conditioned need, but rather the opportunity to explore
                  some primary or conditioned need and to explore some
                  "new" stimulus field (Harlow, 1953; Montgomery, 1953;
                  Glanzer, 1953).  By a "new" stimulus field is meant one
                  that is different from the one in which the organism is
                  currently behaving and one not previously associated
                  with primary-need reduction.
        
             Blodgett's (1929) famous latent-learning experiments showed
        quite conclusively that drive reduction, which defines
        reinforcement in the Hullian sense, seemed to influence engaging
        in behavior patterns already known, but may not be necessary for
        learning them.  He showed that in three groups of rats learning
        to run a maze.  One of the groups was provided food at the end of
        the maze whereas the other two were not.  At first glance, this
        seemed to support Hullian theory.  However, after closer scrutiny
        of the data, a different conclusion presented itself.  He
        inferred that both Groups II and III almost immediately attained
        the level of proficiency of Group I, suggesting that they knew
        how to run the maze all the time, but that there was no reason to
        do so.  Once they learned that there was food available, then
        there was some reason to show the learned behavior patterns.  The
        latent learning experiments were crucial for at least two
        reasons.  First, by showing that need reduction is not necessary
        for learning, but that the opportunity for need gratification
        could generate quick, significant changes in behavior,
        considerable doubt was cast on the 1943 Hull theory.  Second,
        these results suggested that a complete theory of motivation
        would have to include some consideration of how changes in the
        environment affect behavior, and among these effects might be the
        availability of the types of incentives used by Blodgett.  Thus,
        it was this research that led Hull and his co-workers to develop
        K, a type of environmental incentive, as part of the later 1952
        postulates and Spence's 1956 theory.    
        
             The theoretically crucial question for Freud, Hull, and
        other researchers to ask is behavior just a desire to reduce
        stimulation?  Is this where behavior arousal comes from, or is
        there some other motivating factor present?
        
             Miller and Dollard (1941) suggested a drive is a strong
        stimulus which impels action.  Any stimulus can become a drive if
        it is made strong enough.  The stronger stimulus, the more drive
        function it possesses.
        
             Their logic eventually led Hull to adopt their argument in
        1952.  There was considerable evidence to support Hull's,
        Miller's, Dollard's, and Freud's work.  Behavior is sometimes
        more than just a reduction of stimulation and may lead to less
        behavior rather than more.  The following studies support these
        notions.
        
             Olds and Milner (1954) found that direct electrical
        stimulation of certain parts of the brain can reinforce behavior
        in the same manner as food, thirst, and pain reduction.  They
        found that here was a case where reinforcement can come from more
        stimulation, rather than less.  
        
             Harlow (1953), Montgomery (1953), and Glanzer (1953) all
        showed that the opportunity to explore and see "newness" and
        "differences" can be a great incentive to behavior; "newness" and
        "difference" can be assumed to be increases in stimulation.
        
             Brown and Jacobs (1949) found that increased amounts of
        drive do not always result in increased physical activity and
        might actually result in less.  As an example, they cited their
        own research finding that some anxious rats "freeze," rather than
        increase their motor behavior.  This is one of those situations
        where it is possible to argue that "freezing" is a form of
        behavior that reduces the drive for the subjects.
        
             Research with different forms of drug addiction and drug-
        taking behavior indicated both support and difficulties for the
        Hullian drive concept.  On the one hand, the taking of opiates
        and barbiturates provides support since in these cases the result
        is some kind of stimulation-reducing process.  On the other hand,
        the taking of hallucinogenic drugs like hashish, marijuana, and
        LSD, and those termed, analeptic (cocaine and amphetamines),
        would be considered negative evidence since the outcome is
        generally increased excitement and stimulation (Cohen, 1965). 
        The sum total of these findings suggest that behavior can clearly
        be shown to be more than a reduction of stimulation.  Under some
        conditions, organisms may act in order to increase stimulation.
        
             Berlyne's (1960) theoretical hypothesis suggested that the
        stimulation organisms try to reduce is not environmental but
        rather in the reticular activating system (RAS) of the brain. 
        Berlyne argued that it is a curvilinear function of physical
        environmental stimulus complexity, so that RAS arousal is
        greatest when environmental stimulation is either very great or
        very small.  According to this system, the following behavioral
        predictions are made as a function of the given physical
        environmental stimulus condition.  The crucial question here is
        the degree of support for the major innovation of the theory,
        namely, that low levels environmental stimulation lead to high
        RAS arousal.  While there is some indication that boredom leads
        to high RAS arousal, the evidence to support this is still scant
        (deCharms, 1968, p. 101).  
        
             The implication of this paradigm is that the previous
        history of the organism determines its degree of responsiveness
        to later positive and negative outcomes and how significant these
        possible or expected outcomes may be in affecting its behavior. 
        The poorer the previous history, the less likely it is that
        "good" outcomes will be necessary in order to solidify or
        reinforce approach behavior.  The following research studies
        indicate that the more an organism is punished for its behavior,
        the less likely it will engage in behavior to achieve rewards and
        avoid punishments in the future.  Conversely, the less it is
        punished, the more it will be oriented to achieving "good
        outcomes," such as engaging in behavior to achieve positive
        outcomes and avoid those that are negative.  There is a vast body
        of research that points to the fact that organisms  have not been
        continuously positively reinforced for engaging in certain
        behaviors when no reinforcement is available than those who have
        a history of continuous positive reinforcement.  
        
             Baron (1966) found that individuals who have high social
        reinforcement standards are more likely to perform in a manner
        designed to achieve high rewards than those who have low social
        reinforcement standards.  Kaufman (1963) and Feather (1965)
        projected that self-perceived ability on a task based on previous
        task performance is positively related to later task performance. 
        Korman (1967a, 1967b) hypothesized that individuals of high
        esteem are more likely to choose occupations where they perceive
        themselves to have a degree of mobility than those of low self-
        esteem.  In a later study, Korman (1968) found that individuals
        who are told they are incompetent and cannot achieve specific
        goals on task, even though they have had no previous experience
        with the task, will perform worse than those who are told they
        are competent to achieve the task goals.  Zander et al (1969), in
        studying group behavior, found that if they failed previously set
        goals, they increase the probability of their failing again. 
        Shaw (1968) maintained that academic underachievers have a more
        negative self-concept than achievers.  Brookover and Thomas
        (1963-64) found that there is a significant positive relationship
        between self-concept of ability and grade-point average.  Maier's
        (1949) focused on individuals who had a long series of
        frustrations.  They engaged in behavior that was (a) persistent
        beyond degree of reward, (b) not alterable by punishments, (c)
        non-goal oriented, and (d) not affected by consequences or by the
        anticipation of the same.  Karsh (1962) and Miller (1960) found
        that human beings often over learned in response to becoming very
        competent at any task, and this increases as the effectiveness of
        punishment is meted out resulting in eventually suppressing
        responses.  Miller (1960) supported the notion that human beings
        adapt to punishment and in so doing decrease its effectiveness to
        cause change in the individual.  Holz and Azrin (1961) found that
        if a subject is habituated to receiving shock together with
        positive reinforcement during reward training, punishment during
        extinction can actually increase resistance to extinction. 
        Masserman's (1943) research indicated that punishment can lead to
        self-defeating behavior oriented toward no goal.  Finally,
        Miller, Butler, and Martin (1969) concluded that rewarding others
        has a greater influence on their behavior than punishing them. 
        Spence (1960) and Amsel (1958) theorized that organisms put on a
        partial-reinforcement schedule learn to link two types of stimuli
        with approach responses in a given goal-box situation.  They
        learn two habits, not one, under partial reinforcement.  The
        Spence-Amsel attempt to account for what might be termed self-
        defeating behavior within a physical system received considerable
        research attention, with some results being supportive (Haggard,
        1959; Goodrich, 1959) and others not so (Hill, 1968).  These
        researchers supported the conclusion that individuals will
        perform in a manner consistent with other reinforcement patterns. 
        
        
             From the previous discussion, it is clear that Hull's 1943
        theory had an imposing list of problems that had to be overcome
        if the approach was to remain a viable one in the study of
        motivational processes.  The decade of the 1950's saw revisions
        of the general framework by Hull, and his promising student,
        Kenneth Spence.  The dilemma for Hull and Spence was to account
        for the findings of the latent-learning experiments and others
        similar to it within the physical system.  There was evidence
        that organisms could and did change their behavior almost
        immediately when the levels of reward and/or incentive available
        in the environment changed.  This accounted for the fact that
        behavior was not only determined by previous learning (habit) and
        current condition (drive), but also by the contemporary
        characteristics of the environment.  
        
             Consider a rat running a maze to get to a "goal box" that
        has food in it.  Once he gets to the food, he begins eating, and
        the more food, the longer and more vigorously he eats, generally
        up to the saturation point.  Since this eating behavior becomes
        conditioned by stimulus-generalization processes to the various
        stimulus characteristics of the "goal box," the rat, when later
        reintroduced into the "goal box," immediately starts the eating
        behavior again, even before the food is present.  This
        anticipatory behavior is engaged in prior to actual eating
        behavior and might be engaged in other parts of the maze prior to
        actually entering the "goal box."  When the rat runs a maze, the
        physical stimuli affecting him are the stimuli of the maze and
        his anticipatory goal (or eating) responses at each of the maze
        prior to the goal (or food) box (Korman, 1974, p. 60).
        
             Spence (1960) described this condition mechanism as K, and
        he felt that K, as a general arousing agent acting in the same
        manner as D, should be placed in the same conceptual category.
        
            Behavior = D (drive) + K (conditioned mechanism) x Habit
        
             Hull (1952) proposed that D and K combine multiplicatively,
        whereas, Spence (1960) proposed that they combine additively, a
        difference illustrated by the above formula.  
        
             Hull gave up the simplistic notion that all behavior stemmed
        from biological-physical sources.  He changed his assumption that
        behavior or drive was aroused by biological-need deprivation by
        some stimulus conditioned to it.  Instead, he eventually
        supported Miller and Dollard's (1943) assumptions that any strong
        stimulus can become a drive, the reduction of which is
        reinforcing.  This change in focus presented several advantages. 
        It freed Hull from having to tie all secondary drives back to a
        biological base and it enabled him to show that, experimentally,
        learning and performance, and competence, could take place
        without biological-need reduction.  
        
             Five decades after the 1943 model was first presented, there
        are a number of conclusions that can be waged.  First, the
        tradition is a strong one and remains highly viable as a source
        for continued resource.  Second, environmental as well as
        biological and sociological factors can and do effect
        motivational change and Hull and Spence included these factors in
        their later theories.  
        
             As an example of the pervasiveness of the Hullian scheme,
        Weiss (1968) adopted an approach to delimit the conditions under
        which attitude change was a function of persuasive communication. 
        He suggested that the likelihood of change as a result of
        persuasive communication is greater the more we have changed our
        attitudes in the past.  The more anxiety we feel about our
        current attitudes, and hence the greater the impetus toward
        change, the more reason we see for attitudinal change.  
        
             Zajonc (1965) hypothesized why the presence of others will
        sometimes facilitate performance and sometimes debilitate it.  He
        postulated that the presence of others is a source of drive, D. 
        While other people can be directional influences on behavior in
        the sense of producing specific cues and reinforcement, Zajonc
        argued that they are also a source of general arousal, energizing
        all responses likely to be emitted in the given situation. 
        Zajonc reported a number of studies that supported these
        predictions (Zajonc and Sales, 1966; Wheeler and Davis, 1967;
        Cottrell, Rittle, and Wack, 1967; Zajonc, Heingartner, and
        Herman, 1969).  In addition, this particular application was
        further solidified and related to the general Hullian tradition
        by the theorizing of Cottrell et al. (1968), Weiss and Miller
        (1971), and Paulus and Murdock (1971).  Evidence suggested by
        Bolles (1967) that these different sources of drive were not
        interchangeable in contributing to general arousal and were
        contrary to Hull's predictions.  
        
             Cofer and Appley (1964) created two incentive-like
        constructs, known as the sensitization-integration mechanism
        (SIM) and the anticipation-invigoration mechanism (AIM), as
        conceptual substitutes for the D construct.  Berger and Lambert
        (1968) described these mechanisms as follows:
             The first mechanism (SIM) is posited to explain the
             invigorating effects on action of selective sensitization to
             certain stimuli.  This effect is probably an innate one, but
             one that can be modified by learning.  For example, under
             controlled conditions, activity increments which one would
             expect as a result of deprivation may not occur.  These
             activity increments do occur when the relevant stimuli are
             introduced, in the sense that the deprived organism responds
             more vigorously than the non-deprived one.  In sex behavior,
             Beach (1956) suggested hormones are a necessary precondition
             for arousal of the male, but are not sufficient; usually a
             receptive female, plus physical or symbolic interaction, are
             also necessary for copulation to occur.  The parallel
             mechanism, AIM, carries the main weight of the Cofer and
             Appley analysis.  Here invigoration of behavior is enhanced
             by learned anticipations.  These may take several forms: the
             incentive cues (K) which "control" anticipation, working
             through such processes as the r mechanism; the energy
             released by the states of conflict between two or more
             anticipations; or the ee mechanisms, suggested by Sears
             (1951).  Where anticipation is possible the usual effects of
             deprivation does not appear to be operative, invigoration
             may occur through anticipation alone (p. 822).  
        
             One major problem with the expectancy system of Hull and
        Spence was what to predict for low-expectancy people.  Do they
        keep searching for the best alternative and pick that one?  Does
        that mean that before he reaches self-fulfillment drive and habit
        must be abrogated?  Does that mean he is less likely to behave
        like a high-expectancy person?  Many questions remained to be
        asked by researchers.  K as a concept did not work because it was
        logically possible to show that the same processes hypothesized
        to lead to K (behavior increase) would also lead to behavior
        reduction.  In addition to this problem, other logical and
        empirical problems developed with the Hullian system, suggesting
        that Hull's goal of achieving an objective, physically oriented,
        natural-science approach to motivation did not succeed.
