



FEDERALIST No. 21

Other Defects of the Present Confederation
For the Independent Journal.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:
HAVING in the three last numbers taken a summary review of the
 principal circumstances and events which have depicted the genius
 and fate of other confederate governments, I shall now proceed in
 the enumeration of the most important of those defects which have
 hitherto disappointed our hopes from the system established among
 ourselves. To form a safe and satisfactory judgment of the proper
 remedy, it is absolutely necessary that we should be well acquainted
 with the extent and malignity of the disease.
The next most palpable defect of the subsisting Confederation,
 is the total want of a SANCTION to its laws. The United States, as
 now composed, have no powers to exact obedience, or punish
 disobedience to their resolutions, either by pecuniary mulcts, by a
 suspension or divestiture of privileges, or by any other
 constitutional mode. There is no express delegation of authority to
 them to use force against delinquent members; and if such a right
 should be ascribed to the federal head, as resulting from the nature
 of the social compact between the States, it must be by inference
 and construction, in the face of that part of the second article, by
 which it is declared, ``that each State shall retain every power,
 jurisdiction, and right, not EXPRESSLY delegated to the United
 States in Congress assembled.'' There is, doubtless, a striking
 absurdity in supposing that a right of this kind does not exist, but
 we are reduced to the dilemma either of embracing that supposition,
 preposterous as it may seem, or of contravening or explaining away a
 provision, which has been of late a repeated theme of the eulogies
 of those who oppose the new Constitution; and the want of which, in
 that plan, has been the subject of much plausible animadversion, and
 severe criticism. If we are unwilling to impair the force of this
 applauded provision, we shall be obliged to conclude, that the
 United States afford the extraordinary spectacle of a government
 destitute even of the shadow of constitutional power to enforce the
 execution of its own laws. It will appear, from the specimens which
 have been cited, that the American Confederacy, in this particular,
 stands discriminated from every other institution of a similar kind,
 and exhibits a new and unexampled phenomenon in the political world.
The want of a mutual guaranty of the State governments is
 another capital imperfection in the federal plan. There is nothing
 of this kind declared in the articles that compose it; and to imply
 a tacit guaranty from considerations of utility, would be a still
 more flagrant departure from the clause which has been mentioned,
 than to imply a tacit power of coercion from the like considerations
. The want of a guaranty, though it might in its consequences
 endanger the Union, does not so immediately attack its existence as
 the want of a constitutional sanction to its laws.
Without a guaranty the assistance to be derived from the Union
 in repelling those domestic dangers which may sometimes threaten the
 existence of the State constitutions, must be renounced. Usurpation
 may rear its crest in each State, and trample upon the liberties of
 the people, while the national government could legally do nothing
 more than behold its encroachments with indignation and regret. A
 successful faction may erect a tyranny on the ruins of order and
 law, while no succor could constitutionally be afforded by the Union
 to the friends and supporters of the government. The tempestuous
 situation from which Massachusetts has scarcely emerged, evinces
 that dangers of this kind are not merely speculative. Who can
 determine what might have been the issue of her late convulsions, if
 the malcontents had been headed by a Caesar or by a Cromwell? Who
 can predict what effect a despotism, established in Massachusetts,
 would have upon the liberties of New Hampshire or Rhode Island, of
 Connecticut or New York?
The inordinate pride of State importance has suggested to some
 minds an objection to the principle of a guaranty in the federal
 government, as involving an officious interference in the domestic
 concerns of the members. A scruple of this kind would deprive us of
 one of the principal advantages to be expected from union, and can
 only flow from a misapprehension of the nature of the provision
 itself. It could be no impediment to reforms of the State
 constitution by a majority of the people in a legal and peaceable
 mode. This right would remain undiminished. The guaranty could
 only operate against changes to be effected by violence. Towards
 the preventions of calamities of this kind, too many checks cannot
 be provided. The peace of society and the stability of government
 depend absolutely on the efficacy of the precautions adopted on this
 head. Where the whole power of the government is in the hands of
 the people, there is the less pretense for the use of violent
 remedies in partial or occasional distempers of the State. The
 natural cure for an ill-administration, in a popular or
 representative constitution, is a change of men. A guaranty by the
 national authority would be as much levelled against the usurpations
 of rulers as against the ferments and outrages of faction and
 sedition in the community.
The principle of regulating the contributions of the States to
 the common treasury by QUOTAS is another fundamental error in the
 Confederation. Its repugnancy to an adequate supply of the national
 exigencies has been already pointed out, and has sufficiently
 appeared from the trial which has been made of it. I speak of it
 now solely with a view to equality among the States. Those who have
 been accustomed to contemplate the circumstances which produce and
 constitute national wealth, must be satisfied that there is no
 common standard or barometer by which the degrees of it can be
 ascertained. Neither the value of lands, nor the numbers of the
 people, which have been successively proposed as the rule of State
 contributions, has any pretension to being a just representative.
 If we compare the wealth of the United Netherlands with that of
 Russia or Germany, or even of France, and if we at the same time
 compare the total value of the lands and the aggregate population of
 that contracted district with the total value of the lands and the
 aggregate population of the immense regions of either of the three
 last-mentioned countries, we shall at once discover that there is no
 comparison between the proportion of either of these two objects and
 that of the relative wealth of those nations. If the like parallel
 were to be run between several of the American States, it would
 furnish a like result. Let Virginia be contrasted with North
 Carolina, Pennsylvania with Connecticut, or Maryland with New
 Jersey, and we shall be convinced that the respective abilities of
 those States, in relation to revenue, bear little or no analogy to
 their comparative stock in lands or to their comparative population.
 The position may be equally illustrated by a similar process
 between the counties of the same State. No man who is acquainted
 with the State of New York will doubt that the active wealth of
 King's County bears a much greater proportion to that of Montgomery
 than it would appear to be if we should take either the total value
 of the lands or the total number of the people as a criterion!
The wealth of nations depends upon an infinite variety of causes.
 Situation, soil, climate, the nature of the productions, the
 nature of the government, the genius of the citizens, the degree of
 information they possess, the state of commerce, of arts, of
 industry,these circumstances and many more, too complex, minute, or
 adventitious to admit of a particular specification, occasion
 differences hardly conceivable in the relative opulence and riches
 of different countries. The consequence clearly is that there can
 be no common measure of national wealth, and, of course, no general
 or stationary rule by which the ability of a state to pay taxes can
 be determined. The attempt, therefore, to regulate the
 contributions of the members of a confederacy by any such rule,
 cannot fail to be productive of glaring inequality and extreme
 oppression.
This inequality would of itself be sufficient in America to work
 the eventual destruction of the Union, if any mode of enforcing a
 compliance with its requisitions could be devised. The suffering
 States would not long consent to remain associated upon a principle
 which distributes the public burdens with so unequal a hand, and
 which was calculated to impoverish and oppress the citizens of some
 States, while those of others would scarcely be conscious of the
 small proportion of the weight they were required to sustain. This,
 however, is an evil inseparable from the principle of quotas and
 requisitions.
There is no method of steering clear of this inconvenience, but
 by authorizing the national government to raise its own revenues in
 its own way. Imposts, excises, and, in general, all duties upon
 articles of consumption, may be compared to a fluid, which will, in
 time, find its level with the means of paying them. The amount to
 be contributed by each citizen will in a degree be at his own
 option, and can be regulated by an attention to his resources. The
 rich may be extravagant, the poor can be frugal; and private
 oppression may always be avoided by a judicious selection of objects
 proper for such impositions. If inequalities should arise in some
 States from duties on particular objects, these will, in all
 probability, be counterbalanced by proportional inequalities in
 other States, from the duties on other objects. In the course of
 time and things, an equilibrium, as far as it is attainable in so
 complicated a subject, will be established everywhere. Or, if
 inequalities should still exist, they would neither be so great in
 their degree, so uniform in their operation, nor so odious in their
 appearance, as those which would necessarily spring from quotas,
 upon any scale that can possibly be devised.
It is a signal advantage of taxes on articles of consumption,
 that they contain in their own nature a security against excess.
 They prescribe their own limit; which cannot be exceeded without
 defeating the end proposed, that is, an extension of the revenue.
 When applied to this object, the saying is as just as it is witty,
 that, ``in political arithmetic, two and two do not always make four
.'' If duties are too high, they lessen the consumption; the
 collection is eluded; and the product to the treasury is not so
 great as when they are confined within proper and moderate bounds.
 This forms a complete barrier against any material oppression of
 the citizens by taxes of this class, and is itself a natural
 limitation of the power of imposing them.
Impositions of this kind usually fall under the denomination of
 indirect taxes, and must for a long time constitute the chief part
 of the revenue raised in this country. Those of the direct kind,
 which principally relate to land and buildings, may admit of a rule
 of apportionment. Either the value of land, or the number of the
 people, may serve as a standard. The state of agriculture and the
 populousness of a country have been considered as nearly connected
 with each other. And, as a rule, for the purpose intended, numbers,
 in the view of simplicity and certainty, are entitled to a
 preference. In every country it is a herculean task to obtain a
 valuation of the land; in a country imperfectly settled and
 progressive in improvement, the difficulties are increased almost to
 impracticability. The expense of an accurate valuation is, in all
 situations, a formidable objection. In a branch of taxation where
 no limits to the discretion of the government are to be found in the
 nature of things, the establishment of a fixed rule, not
 incompatible with the end, may be attended with fewer inconveniences
 than to leave that discretion altogether at large.
PUBLIUS.
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