. SOME local (or other country) laws have been implemented. (typically
only for personal security in a vestuble, thought)

. the banking industry is CHEAP.
. they DO NOT put any more than they need.
. they are also unregulated, they can do anything they want with the 
cameras. there is no 'camera' police to decide if they are 'allowed'.

. fish eye adapters (not lenses, but screw on adapter glass for the 
existing lens, which is typically an auto-iris type) cost bucks, as much as 
the camera in some instances.

. pinhole lenses are even more expensive, the image sucks. they DO NOT use 
them in ATMs. period.

. the bank could care less if they could see your hands entering the pin, 
they want to see your face.

. their bigest loss is in fraud, and this is the ONLY reason for them 
putting cameras in. NOT your personal security. (if there is a vestibule, 
and cameras in it, THESE are for security)

. to get the best image of the user, the lense is picked and adjusted to 
make your face fill the screen when you use the ATM. this includes focal 
length/focus to around 20inches.  you can not be identified at 20ft.

. if there is a camera, you can see it. if it is too dark of plastic to 
see through for you, it is same for camera.

. one way mirror (like manager's office type) is too dark, so is not 
used, instead, they use a mylar film. you can see through is just as well 
as the camera, if there is not too much reflected light on your side.

. very few banks review their tapes, and those that do, just review them
for system operation (all cameras work? in focus? date/time correct? 
transaction data showing?) they do not watch the tape with any detail,
unless they are looking for something. 

. once they are looking for something. they search for that date/time on
the tape (using que/review or VITC search) ignoring all other activity on
the tape. 

. the vcrs run 24hours a day, only 1% of them are 'activated' by the card 
(there is too much time taken to get the tape upto speed after such an 
unloaded position, and if you stay in 'still' for ever, you trash the 
tape and heads).

. it is also easier for the bank to just put it on a weekly exchange of 
the tape, then they do not have the posibility of running out of tape 
unpredictably based on atm activity.

. they usually have 15 to 30 weeks rotation of the tapes, because it can 
take that long for them to find out that there is a problem with the 
account (three or more billing cycles)

. vcrs in use are beta, super-beta, ed-beta(nec), vhs and super vhs (nec,
sony, jvc, panasonic, and many re-manufactured consumer decks, and a few
8mm's thrown in from sony. 

. the beta decks run an odd fundemental speed (beta1.5hour) and have 
same-angle heads (you can not play your consumer beta).

. the early vhs decks also had same-angle heads, and could not play your 
consumer tapes.

. the newer vhs/s-vhs decks have consumer compatible 2- or 4-head, and 
can play your 2hr vhs tapes, but very few will play your 6hr tapes (again 
because of the odd fundemental speeds).

. typical speeds are 2hr 12h 24h(.18sec) 48h(.34sec) 72h(.5sec) 84h(.58sec) 
96h 120h(.82sec) 180h(1.22sec) 240h(1.62sec) 480h(3.22sec).

. all use L500/T120 tapes. the L750/T160 tapes get eaten by the machines.

. tapes are good for about 10 to 20 passes before they are scored from 
the drum.

. the drums are good for 12 to 18 months if good tape (double coated, not 
too many passes) is used.

. the decks cost the bank between us$1800 and us$2600. many are rs-232c 
remote controlled, for programming/searching the tapes.

. very few can record audio, even less are even used for audio. (it only 
works in 2h or some 12h/24h speeds on some vcrs.

. resolution in b&w is between 350 to 420 lines of resolution.

. they will record color, but resolution and identification is better if 
you dont waste it on trying to reproduce color.

. color cameras cost bucks too.

. most cameras installed now are ccd.

. easy hacks, walk up to camera with sun behind you. the auto iris lense 
usually can not adjust for the bad contrast. (but some cameras have image 
enhancers to fix such contrast problems, but they work only if the white 
to black area is about 3:1 or 3.5:1)

. walk up from side, if you can not see the glass of the lense, it can 
not see you.

. walk up to camera with a bright light glairing right into it, auto iris 
will try to shut it out.

. cover lense with celeophane. if it looks fuzzy and out of focus to you...
this has the added bennie of being unnoticed.

atm hacks: 

. yes, the data is encrypted, to an extent, but not 100% of the traffic, 
just a few fields.

. no, NO ONE uses/used dial-up lines. MYTH.

. no, you could not spoof the com line and make the atm spit money.
reason on the grand scale, is protocol (typically SDLC/SNA, BISYNC or async 
Poll/Select) exchanges message numbers with each packet, so you would 
need to 'become' the host after learning the sequences 'right now', get 
the atm to request from the host your withdraw, emulate the proper 
ENCRYPTED sequence, based on the ENCRYPRED request, sequentually in real 
time. 

. there is no way for the host to 'tell' the atm to spit money. the host 
just grants approval for the request. ("can I give this customer 3 $20's 
and a $10?" "...sure!"). your next problem would be the audit trail kept 
in the atm. 

. if you disconnect the line, the atm shuts down as if the service key 
was turned.  depending on the network, reconnection can be automatic or 
need to be enabled by the host.

. those that speek of accessing the atm when it is not communicating with
the host are correct, to an extent. all depends on the network and the
software loaded (local approval for bank-owned accounts only, typically)

. no, you can not easly get into the vault of the atm. I have seen them 
dragged off of walls with tow trucks(he ended up dragging it for about 2 
blocks), they have been blown up (enough force to pop them also toasts 
the cash). they have however been cracked just like any other safe.

. cash on hand is less than 70k fully loaded with us$20 in both bins, but 
usually they are mix of two denominations. 

. the cash bins look like tall ammunition cases, and are also locked, and
then locked into the machine (takes two keys even after the vault is
opened) the bins have the feed mech built in, so when locked, are sealed
from 'coathanger' prying. 

. if a card is captured, it is not "eaten, munched or trashed", it is 
just tossed into a tupperware bin.

. the deposit envelopes are only checked by humans for content, the
machine can not do this. 

. the deposit envelopes are printed with the audit trail as is is accepted 
into the machine.

. nuf said.

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