Computer underground Digest    Sat Apr 25, 1992   Volume 4 : Issue 19

       Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET)
       Associate Editor: Etaion Shrdlu, Jr.
       Arcmeisters: Brendan Kehoe and Bob Kusumoto

CONTENTS, #4.19 (Apr 25, 1992)
File 1--Hacking, Then and Now
File 2--Text of Sun Devil ruling
File 3--Ralph Nader/Cable TV/Information Networks (corrected)
File 4--Battle over Landsat/Public Domain (fr: Corp. Crime Rept)
File 5--Internet Society News

Issues of CuD can be found in the Usenet alt.society.cu-digest news
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chsun1.spc.uchicago.edu, and ftp.ee.mu.oz.au.  To use the U. of
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quotes) to archive-server@chsun1.spc.uchicago.edu.
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----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: Fri, 24 Apr 92 19:01:13 CDT
From: Jim Thomas <tk0jut2@mvs.cso.niu.edu>
Subject: File 1--Hacking, Then and Now

In CuD 4.18, Jerry Leichter raises several points for discussion.
Each reveals the rapid changes that continue to occur both in computer
technology and computer culture. Jerry writes:

     	2.  "Information" and "computers" should be free, hackers are
     just 		trying to learn, there is nothing wrong with learning.

     Point 2 I don't want to get into; it's old, tired, and if you
     don't recognize it for its moral bankruptcy by this time, nothing
     I can say will change your mind.

I doubt that Jerry means to imply that the debates over the
accessibility of information are morally bankrupt or that the goal of
learning through "hacking" is improper.  Rather, the cynical use of
the rhetoric of freedom by many "wannabe cybernauts" to justify
intrusion or blatant predatory behavior distorts the original
meaning of the term used by the early hackers.  The original hackers
found the challenge of the new machine intriguing. Few resources were
available for exploring its limits other than hands-on
trial-and-error, and there were no ethical or legal models to guide
the initial exploration. Two decades ago, control over the new
technology appeared limited to a relatively small elite who, if
unchecked, would amass what some considered unacceptable power over
the dissemination and use of computer technology and use.  Things
change.  This raises Jerry's second point: Whatever one may think of
hacking activity, its meaning is not the same in 1992 as it was even
as recently as the late-1980s. Bob Bickford's definition of hacking as
"the joy of exceeding limitations" is no longer the current dominating
ethos of too many of those who have assumed the "hacker" mantle. The
label has become a romanticized activity for teenagers and others who
see password cracking, simple computer intrusion for its own sake,
numbers-running, and credit card fraud as ends in themselves.

Like the counter-culture of the sixties, the "hacker culture" emerged
quickly, shaped a new generation of youth exploring beyond the
confines of conventional culture, and then disintegrated under the
excesses of those who adopted the trappings while losing sight of the
core of the new cultural message.  Like the counter-culture, the ease
of access into "hacking, the romanticized media depictions, the focus of
newcomers on the fun to the exclusion of corresponding
responsibilities, and the critical mass of exploiters able to
manipulate for their own ends fed the darkside of the culture.

All meanings occur in a broader context, and the context of hacking
has changed.  Social changes in the past decade have led to changes in
the definition of "hacking" and in the corresponding ethos and
culture.  The increased learning curve required to master contemporary
computers, the proliferation of networks to share information, and the
ease of distribution of software have reduced much of the incentive
for many amateur hackers to invest the time and effort in moving
beyond all but the simplest of technological skill.  As a consequence,
there has emerged a fairly large core of newcomers who lack both the
skill and the ethos that guided earlier hackers, and who define the
enterprise simplistically.

The attraction of original phreaking and hacking and its attendant
lifestyle appear to center on three fundamental characteristics: The
quest for knowledge, the belief in a higher ideological purpose of
opposition to potentially dangerous technological control, and the
enjoyment of risk-taking.  In a sense, CU participants consciously
created dissonance as a means of creating social meaning in what is
perceived as an increasingly meaningless world.  In some ways, the
original CU represents a reaction against contemporary culture by
offering an ironic response to the primacy of a master technocratic
language, the incursion of computers into realms once considered
private, the politics of techno-society, and the sanctity of
established civil and state authority.  But, the abuses of this ethos
have changed the culture dramatically.  Consider two fairly typical
posts from two defunct self-styled "hacker" boards in the early 1990s:

     Well, instead of leaving codes, could you leave us
     "uninformed" people with a few 800 dialups and formats?  I
     don't need codes, I just want dialups!  Is that so much to
     ask?  I would be willing to trade CC's {credit cards} for
     dialups.  Lemme know..

     or:

     Tell ya what.  I will exchange any amount of credit cards
     for a code or two.  You name the credit limit you want on
     the credit card and I will get it for you.  I do this cause
     I to janitorial work at night INSIDE the bank when no one is
     there..... heheheheheh

Unfortunately, this is the "hacking" that the public and LE officials
dramatize, but it is simply an infantile form of social predation.
There is no adventure, no passion for learning, and no innocence
reflected in today's CU culture.  Jerry is, therefore correct: Times
have changed. If Altamont symbolized the death the counter-culture,
Cliff Stoll's _The Cuckoo's Egg_ symbolizes the end of the "golden age
of hacking." culture and those who participate in it have lost their
innocence.

Baudrillard observed that our private sphere now ceases to be the
stage where the drama of subjects at odds with their objects and with
their image is played out, and we no longer exist as playwrites or
actors, but as terminals of multiple networks.  The public space of
the social arena is reduced to the private space of the computer desk,
which in turn creates a new semi-public, but restricted, public realm
to which dissonance seekers retreat.  To participate in the computer
underground once was to engage in what Baudrillard describes as
"private telematics," in which individuals, to extend Baudrillard's
fantasy metaphor, are transported from their mundane computer system
to the controls of a hypothetical machine, isolated in a position of
perfect sovereignty, at an infinite distance from the original
universe.  There, identity is created through symbolic strategies and
collective beliefs.  Sadly, this generally is no longer the case for
most young computerists.  Times have changed.  Very few who currently
attempt to justify the "right to hack" as a form of social rebellion
recognize--let alone engage in--the tedious struggles of others (such
as EFF or CPSR) that would civilize the Electronic Frontier.  In the
battle to expand civil liberties to cyberspace, contemporary "hackers"
have not only *not* been part of the solution, they have become part
of the problem.

------------------------------

Date: Fri, 24 Apr 1992 17:22:24 EDT
From: David Sobel <dsobel@WASHOFC.CPSR.ORG>
Subject: File 2--Text of Sun Devil ruling

                       Text of Sun Devil ruling

     On March 12, 1992, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia issued its ruling in the Freedom of Information Act case
brought by Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR)
seeking disclosure of the Operation Sun Devil search warrant materials.
The Court ruled that the Secret Service may withhold the material from
public disclosure on the ground that release of the information would
impede the government's ongoing investigation.  On April 22,  CPSR filed
an appeal of that ruling.

     The Court's oral ruling, which was delivered from the bench, has now
been transcribed and is set forth below.

David Sobel
Legal Counsel
CPSR Washington Office


            *          *          *          *          *

   THE COURT:   The Court's going to issue its ruling, bench ruling
at this time, which will be its opinion in this case in the
summary judgment motions.  The defendants moved for summary
judgment in this FOIA case, and the plaintiffs originally sought
discovery under 56(f) to obtain information concerning sealing
orders covering certain of the documents at issue in this action.

           January 16 of this year, I denied the plaintiff's
motion that defendants were not relying upon the sealing orders
and that the Morgan case was inapposite, although it had been
discussed originally at some other status calls before this
Court.

             In this FOIA case, the Computer Professionals for
Social Responsibility seek these agency records regarding what's
called Operation Sun Devil from the Secret Service, which is
concededly a criminal investigation that is still ongoing
involving information compiled for law enforcement purposes that
was, involved alleged computer fraud which began back in May of
1990.

            The Secret Service has refused to release the search
warrants and the applications for the search warrants, the
executed warrants, as well as the applications for the inventory
lists except as to one Bruce Esquibel, known as Dr. Ripco, who
had agreed to have his information released.  But as to the
remaining 25 -- there were 26 search warrants -- the government
has refused to release them, relying upon FOIA exemptions 7(A),
(C), and (D) under the statute.

            The Court's going to grant the summary judgment for
the defendant for the following reasons:  There's no, as I said,
dispute as to whether or not this information has been compiled
for law enforcement purposes, which covers -- is covered by
exemption 7.  7 says, however, "only to the extent that the
production of such law enforcement records or information (A)
could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement
proceedings" and then "(C) could reasonably be expected to
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, [or] (D)
could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a
confidential source," et cetera.

          From the Court's view, (A) is the crucial issue in the
case and whether or not this would be unwarranted interference
with an ongoing investigation by ordering the Secret Service to
produce all the records regarding the 25 search warrants.  The
Secret Service represented as of today, apparently, one
individual has pled guilty by way of information, but there have
been no indictments, but that Operation Sun Devil continues,
obviously, then as an ongoing investigation.

            The deputy director of the Secret Service by
affidavit has stated the evidence in these materials consists of
facts that have been gathered against various individuals,
information provided by confidential sources, and affidavits
establishing probable cause for search of the individual
residences or businesses.

            He argues that any release of this overall
information  in one package, as opposed to someone finding out an
individual search warrant from the individual court, would give
this access to the evidence and strategy as being used by the
government in this law enforcement proceeding, that this would
show the focus, overall focus and the approach and the limits of
the government's case, it could have a chilling effect on the
witnesses and constitute potential interference with those
witnesses by revealing them, and it would give the ability to
those who are under investigation, who may not know the scope and
the nature of the overall approach of the government, to
construct defenses and interfere, obviously, with the ongoing
proceedings that they may have, that is, their ongoing
investigation.

             The issue really is whether the government has shown
that by the affidavit of Caputo and the other facts in the
record.  Obviously, the Caputo affidavit is tailored to meet the
law, NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber is one of them, 437 U.S. 214,
241, where Congress intended to prevent such interference with
law enforcement proceedings as giving a person greater access to
the government's case than it ordinarily would have, or Hatcher
v. U.S. Postal Service, which is an F. Supp. case here,  566 F.
Supp. 331, 333, where it's not necessary to show under exemption
7 the interference with law enforcement proceedings is likely to
occur if the documents are disclosed.  It's enough that there's a
generic showing that disclosure of particular kinds of records
would generally interfere with enforcement proceedings.

             The defendant -- excuse me, the plaintiff has
asserted first, that because they're routinely available around
the country and rarely filed under seal, and secondly, because
some are filed under seal, that they should be producible by the
federal government, using a dual argument.  One is that if
they're already public, then they can't claim there can be any
harm done by producing them now, and secondly, if they're under
seal, they have to go through a Morgan process before they can
rely upon them as being under seal and not producing them under
the law of this circuit.

            The plaintiffs have basically argued that it's a
circuitous argument advanced by the defendants that these
documents, but for the seals, would be produced, and that they
really, that's what they're relying upon.  The Court does not see
the government's, or defendants' argument in that light or the
affidavits that have been filed in this case.

          First, it seems to me that because some of the
information may be available after diligent research around the
country and some others may be under seal that could be made
public by petition or by the government going through the Morgan
exercise doesn't seem to the Court therefore the government has
no justification for saying that they can't produce these records
because they could interfere with ongoing criminal proceedings,
and that is because this would be the only place you could get
probably a total overall picture of the government's concerted
effort in this investigation.

          The government obviously has a concerted effort.
Whether it's a conspiracy or not and they're related, the
government executed these warrants all basically at the same time
and place in an overall organized plan in May of 1990.  They
executed 26 search warrants.  It was a concentrated, obviously
carefully orchestrated effort to move on several fronts at one
time all across the country and not separate, distinct,
individual cases coming over a period of years against various
individuals.  It was obviously an approach the government had
designed and planned as part of their criminal investigation,
which is still ongoing and has now resulted apparently in at
least one guilty plea.

          So I don't think the availability merely on the case-
by-case basis, potentially available, meets the same as having
the compilation of all the information the Secret Service can
provide in toto in a package which could allow one to see the
limits and the scope and the nature of their investigation
overall and give them a much better picture.  It's the old saw of
the seeing a tree or seeing the whole forest basically and having
perspective.

          The second really part of the argument by the plaintiff
is that if the Esquibel search can be released without harm to
the ongoing investigation, it could release the other
investigation without great damage to its work.  Again, however,
it seems to me the warrant in the Esquibel case was released upon
his agreement and request and waiver of his rights, that that is
an individual, one individual out of 26, and it seems to me very
different from exposing the entire investigative plan that may
well be exposed by providing all of the documents that relate to
the 25 other searches.

            The Secret Service has in its affidavits set forth
fairly clearly that they have gone through the three-fold process
to provide appropriate exemption under 7(A).  Under Bevis v.
Department of State, 801 F.2d 1386, the court ruled that it must,
the government, first define its categories functionally; second,
it must conduct a document-by-document review in order to assign
documents to the proper category; and finally, it must explain to
the court how the release of each category would interfere with
enforcement proceedings.

          And under our Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms, 789 F.2d 64, this circuit held that the agency must
provide this court with enough information to allow it to trace
any rational link between the nature of the documents and the
alleged likely interference.

            The Secret Service herein has set forth the
following: Information is in three general categories:  gathered
against particular individuals, provided by confidential sources,
and the information for the probable cause of the search of the
individual residences, referring to Caputo declaration.  This
information could be used to avoid prosecution by those who are
targets by giving, one, advanced knowledge of the information
would enable a suspect to inhibit additional investigation, to
destroy undiscovered evidence, to mold defenses to meet the
contours of the government's case.  Additionally, the release of
the information concerning confidential informants and evidence
in the possession of the government could lead to attempts at
intimidation, fabrication of evidence, and perhaps alibis
tailored to rebut the specifics of the government's cases.

          It seems to the Court that there is a rational link
between the nature of the documents that have been discussed and
the alleged likely interference.  I don't have to say that it's
beyond a reasonable doubt that this interference could occur, but
it is likely that it could occur.

          The overall release of these records, in the Court's
view the government has established, meets the exemption of 7(A),
that it would show an interference with enforcement proceedings
is likely to occur if the documents are disclosed, again giving
them the entire total package of the government's approach in
this case, which is still an ongoing criminal investigation and
apparently is still active, it is not dormant, and nothing has
happened in two years.  It is, rather, apparently, according to
the government's most recent evidence, has resulted in at least
one guilty plea.

          Additional exemptions relied upon by the government,
7(C) and 7(D), it's not necessary for the Court to address, but I
would just note for the record in case of further review of this,
the exemption for disclosure under 7(C) as to unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy, it seems to the Court that there's
obviously a cognizable interest in the privacy of anyone's
involvement in a law enforcement investigation.  No one wants to
be publicized that they may be the subject of some investigation.
They want their participation to remain secret.

          And the plaintiffs have not, do not seek the
identification of these individuals.  The interest really at
stake is their privacy interest, where they could be exposed by
the publication of these affidavits, with their names redacted,
and whether or not any other information contained in there would
also have to be redacted.

          If we look at the Esquibel affidavit that came in
supporting the search of his home and business, you'll see there
are numerous other computer hackers and, presumably, legitimate
computer users referred to, and that would be presumably the same
in the other affidavits for the other search warrants.
Therefore, there would have to be much redacting, if anything
could be produced in the other affidavits and the other search
warrants for the publication of these individuals who are named,
none of who have been indicted apparently, and obviously their
interest in, privacy interest should be protected.  What
information could be redacted and what could be released remains
to be seen, but I'll just note for the record it seems to the
Court that there would be little that can be produced based upon
the Esquibel affidavit at least, but that is a concern to the
Court, although I don't think it's a total bar to the production
under exemption 7(C).

          I think 7(D) is under the same formula, that is, could
reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential
sources by the publication of these records.  Again, obviously
there could be redaction.  Again, there would have to be some
type of review to see whether redaction can be meaningful or not
and anything could be produced.  The government's view is it
could not, but again, I don't think there's been any attempt yet
made to produce anything under that exemption, because the 7(A)
exemption is being relied primarily upon.  I would note again
there would have to be redactions, and whether anything of
substance could be produced would have to be seen at a later
hearing if this matter goes forward.

          So I'm going to rule primarily basically on the 7(A)
exemption that the production of these documents overall, without
relying on the sealing or not and without accepting the
circuitous argument that the plaintiff asserts the defendant is
engaged in, I think the defendant has not and has elected to
stand and fall on exemption 7(A) as applying because of the
entire documentation being produced at one time and one place
could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted,
constitute an interference with the enforcement proceedings that
are ongoing.

          So for those reasons, I'll grant the motion for summary
judgment of the defendant, and I'll issue an order incorporating
by reference this bench opinion.

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 23 Apr 92 16:52 GMT
From: "Essential Information, Inc." <0002633455@MCIMAIL.COM>
Subject: File 3--Ralph Nader/Cable TV/Information Networks (corrected)

             "Ralph Nader/Cable TV/Information Networks"

From: Ralph Nader, Washington, DC
Date: April 16, 1992

Summary:  Your help is needed to secure an amendment to pending
          cable television legislation.  The amendment would
          create a mechanism to organize local Cable Consumer
          Action Groups (CCAGs) to represent the interests of
          consumers directly before regulatory and legislative
          bodies.  This proposal is an innovative way to create
          countervailing power to some of the large corporate
          interests that control our information infrastructure,
          and it is a model that is highly relevant for users of
          voice and data network services.  Readers are asked to
          sign a letter to Congress supporting this amendment.
          Action is needed very soon.  Respond to Jim Donahue,
          Teledemocracy Project  (Internet:
          0002633455@mcimail.com)


Dear citizen:

As you may know, congress is currently considering cable
television legislation.  Every television consumer should be
concerned about the outcome of this legislation, and particularly
citizens who are concerned about the future of information
technologies.  The current fiasco with the cable industry is an
important example of the management of information technologies
for the benefit of a few corporate monopolists at the expense of
the many.  Today nearly all americans are confronted with a
monopoly provider of cable video signals, who not only has total
control over what you can receive, but also what you pay.

Over the next 15 years we will see a rapid convergence of
information technologies.  Soon it will be possible to transmit
voice, data, and video signals over the same fiber optic
telecommunications infrastructure.  The fight over who will
control the content of information that flows over that
infrastructure, and how it will be priced, will define who can
send and who can receive information in digital form.  As the use
of modern technologies increasingly makes it easier to meter the
consumption of information products and services, the gaps
between the information rich and information poor will continue
to grow.

The current battle over the regulation of the cable television
industry is an important step in a more general battle over the
control of our information infrastructure.  This is a battle over
power and wealth, and also over democratic values, competition,
and enlightenment.  Will we harness our great new information
technologies to promote a diversity of sources of information, or
will these technologies be used primarily as vehicles for
narrowly focused commercial interests, exercising monopoly power?

     CABLE CONSUMER ACTION GROUPS (CCAG) AS COUNTERVAILING POWER

A number of consumer groups have asked Congress to adopt an
innovative proposal to help cable television subscribers organize
to represent their interests.  Notices describing local Cable
Consumer Action Groups (CCAGs), which would be independent and
democratically controlled local organizations, would be placed in
the cable companies billings.  The notices describe the purposes
and goals of the group and solicit funds for membership. The CCAG
would be required to reimburse the cable company for the
incremental costs of inserting the notice in the bill, so the
cost would not be a burden to the cable company or its
subscribers.  These local subscriber consumer groups would then
monitor the policies and practices of the cable company, and
represent consumer interests in regulatory and legislative
proceedings and with the cable companies directly.

The cable industry is extremely active politically, contributing
millions of dollars to candidates for political office and
spending millions more in lobbying activities before legislative
and regulatory bodies.  In the absence of something like the
CCAG, important public policy issues are debated in an extremely
unbalanced way.  The CCAG is a modest but important step in
addressing a very corrupt system that regularly tramples on the
rights and interests of consumers.

Among the groups that have endorsed this proposal are:

     Center for Media Education
     Consumer Federation of America
     New York City Commissioner of Consumer Affairs
     Public Citizen
     Teledemocracy Project
     U.S. Public Interest Research Group

HAS IT BEEN TRIED BEFORE?

This proposal is based on the highly successful Citizen Utility
Board (CUB) model, which has represented ratepayers in several
states.  The most successful CUB, in Illinois,  has 170,000
members; its advocacy has saved consumers some $2 billion over
the past several years.  Other CUBs exist in Wisconsin, Oregon
and San Diego.  We want to see this innovation used nation wide
in the cable television industry.  (Of course, it may well be a
model that has applications to other telecommunications issues.)

WHAT YOU CAN DO



The CCAG proposal was included in H.R. 4850, but was deleted by a
voice vote (in contrast to a recorded vote) in the House
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance.  The bill is now
in the full Energy and Commerce Committee, where committee
supporters will seek to restore the provision through an
amendment.  We are asking you to send us an email message giving
permission to use your name in a letter to Congress supporting
this amendment. If you are willing to do so send the following
information to the Teledemocracy Project (internet:
0002633455@mcimail.com, or fax 202-234-5176).

     Name:
     Title: (optional)
     Affiliation:  (optional)
     Address:
     City and State:  (important, for obvious reasons)
     telephone:  (for verification)
     email address:  optional


Thank you very much for your help on this.

Sincerely,

Ralph Nader

A copy of the letter follows:

-------------------------------------------------------------


LETTER

Chairman Edward Markey
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance
Committee on Energy and Commerce
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Chairman Markey:

We are writing to support your "consumer representation"
amendment to H.R. 4850, the cable re-regulation bill. It is
imperative that new cable legislation provide a mechanism that
gives consumers a stronger voice in regulatory and legislative
debates.  This amendment is ideal because it brings citizens into
the regulatory process at no cost to the government or the cable
industry.

Who in Congress can deny the unfairness of a system where the
owners of cable monopolies can use subscriber revenues for
lobbying purposes while consumers are left powerless and
unrepresented?  This is only a small step toward curbing the
monopolistic power of the cable television industry. We urge the
House Energy and Commerce Committee to include your consumer
representation amendment in the cable bill.

Sincerely,


------------------------



For more information, contact:

Jim Donahue
Teledemocracy Project
voice:  202/387-8030
fax:  202/234-5176
Internet: 0002633455@mcimail.com

For a an email copy of the amendment contact Jim Donahue
(internet:  0002633455@mcimail.com).

------------------------------

Date:         Mon, 20 Apr 1992 10:36:58 CDT
From:         James P Love <LOVE@PUCC.BITNET>
Subject: File 4--Battle over Landsat/Public Domain (fr: Corp. Crime Rept)

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++Original message++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Reprinted with permission from Corporate Crime Reporter.

[Corporate Crime Reporter is published by American Communications and
Publishing Co., Inc. 48 times a year. ISSN Number: 0897-4101.
Principal Editorial Offices: 1322 18th St, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.
Telephone: (202) 429-6928. Editor: Russell Mokhiber.]

Vol 6, No. 15, April 13, 1992.

    STATES, ENVIRONMENTALISTS LAUNCH CAMPAIGN TO RETURN LANDSAT TO
              PUBLIC DOMAIN. "A NASTY FIGHT IS BREWING"

A loose coalition of state officials and environmentalists has formed
to challenge the 1984 decision by the federal government to privatize
Landsat, the first satellite dedicated to the environment.

In a letter last month to Congressman James Scheuer (D-New York),
Chairman of the Subcommittee on the Environment of the House Science,
Space and Technology Committee, a number of environmental groups,
including Greenpeace, Sierra Club and the Environmental Defense Fund,
called for a "clean break with the patently unsuccessful `experiment
in commercialization'."

Landsat was first launched in 1972. Until 1984, the satellite was in
the public domain. State governments, environmental groups, and
universities used the data for a range of purposes, including
environmental management and enforcement of environmental laws.

In 1984, the Reagan Administration "commercialized" the satellite,
taking it out of the public's hands, and giving the data rights to a
private company owned by General Electric and Hughes, to sell on the
commercial market.

The coalition of users and environmental groups fighting to return
Landsat to the public domain argue that the "experiment in
commercialization" has been disastrous.  High prices have dramatically
reduced the availability of the data to researchers, academics, and
conservationists. Images that once cost under $100 have now soared to
$4,500 per scene.

"At a time when destruction of tropical forests is recognized as an
international calamity, the Landsat sensors are infrequently even
turned on over the most threatened regions," the environmentalists
argued. "Those who need remote sensing most, namely conservationists
and third world natural resource agencies, are able to afford it
least."

Congressman George Brown (D-California) has introduced legislation
(H.R. 3614) that would take back some public control over the data
base. But the environmental groups are not happy with H.R. 3614. They
charge that H.R. 3614 sets up "a complicated system of partial
commercialization."

"It seems to us much better to simply eliminate `commercialization' as
rapidly as possible under existing contracts," they write.

In the letter to Scheuer, the groups argue for a return to the policy
in effect before 1984, thus making data available "to all who request
it at marginal cost of copying and distribution."

Hill staffers close to the impending battle predicted a bitter fight.
"A nasty fight is brewing," said one. "There are some former NASA
scientists who are hell-bent on returning Landsat into the public
fold. They believe that there is something wrong with commercializing
publicly funded data about the environment at prices only industry can
afford. And on the other hand, the big aerospace firms know how to
play hardball. GE and Hughes are not going to roll over and play
dead."

------------------------------

Date: Tue, 21 Apr 92 19:34:20 EDT
From: "Ofer Inbar" <cos@CHAOS.CS.BRANDEIS.EDU>
Subject: File 5--Internet Society News

In Cu Digest 4.18, Michael Rosen wrote:

> "At negligible cost, in the span of a few weeks, an entirely virtual
> global publishing network involving nearly 150 correspondents has been
> assembled," Anthony M. Rutkowski, editor in chief of the _Internet
> Society News_, wrote in the first issue of the magazine, which was
> recently published.

> [No e-mail addresses were mentioned in the letter; do you have any
> knowledge of the addresses of anyone involved in this publication?]

>From the inside front cover of the Internet Society News Vol 1 No 1:

Editor-in-Chief:  Anthony-Michael Rutkowsky <amr@nri.reston.va.us>
               <amr@media-lab.media.mit.edu> <amr@cernvax.cern.ch>

Associate Editor:  Joyce K. Reynolds <jkrey@nri.reston.va.us>

Editorial Advisory Board:
	Brian Carpenter 	<brian@cernvax.cern.ch>
	Christian Huitema 	<huitema@mirsa.inria.fr>
	Ole Jacobson		<ole@csli.stanford.edu>
	Carl Malamud 		<carl@malamud.com>
	Joyce Reynolds 		<jkrey@nri.reston.va.us>
	Mike Roberts 		<roberts@educom.edu>
	Anthony Rutkowski 	<amr@nri.reston.va.us>
	Mike Schwartz 		<schwartz@latour.colorado.edu>
	Bernard Stockman 	<boss@sunet.se>

Internet Society Board of Trustees:
	Hideo Aiso 		<aiso@sfc.keio.ac.jp>
	Charles Brownstein 	<cbrownst@note.nsf.gov>
	Vint Cerf 		<vcerf@nri.reston.va.us>
	Lyman Chapin 		<lyman@bbn.com>
	Ira Fuchs 		<fuchs@pucc.princeton.edu>
	Frode Greisen 		<neufrode%neuvm1.bitnet@searn.sunet.se>
	Juergen Harms 		<harms@cui.unige.ch>
	Geoff Huston		<g.huston@aarnet.edu.au>
	Robert Kahn		<rkahn@nri.reston.va.us>
	Tomaz Kalin 		<kalin@ijs.ac.mail.yu>
	Kenneth King 		<kmk@educom.edu>
	Lawrence Landweber 	<lhl@cs.wisc.edu>
	Anthony Rutkowski 	<amr@nri.reston.va.us> [temporary]

------------------------------

End of Computer Underground Digest #4.19
************************************

