                        CIVIL DISORDER 
                    PREPARING FOR THE WORST
 
                             By 

                     Maj. Dean De Jong, M.S. 
                    Support Services Section
                    Miami Police Department


     During an April 1991 conference on future trends in policing
held at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia, speakers made an 
especially disturbing prediction. Citing a number of factors, 
these experts raised the specter of increased numbers of civil 
disturbances worldwide during the 1990s. One year after the 
conference, violent rioting in several American cities in the 
wake of the Rodney King verdict seemed to confirm this predic-
tion.
 
     While the media quickly drew parallels between the riots of
1992 and those of the late 1960s, these comparisons are of limited 
value from a tactical perspective. In fact, reaction to the King 
verdict in the epicenter of the riots-South Central Los 
Angeles-followed a pattern much closer to the civil disturbance 
that erupted in Miami, Florida, in May 1980, following the 
acquittal of five Dade County police officers accused of beating 
a black motorcyclist.  Unlike the gradual escalation of violence 
in the riots of the 1960s, acts of murder during the Miami riot 
occurred within minutes of the first signs of disturbance.(1) This 
pattern of rapid and violent escalation was reaffirmed during the 
disorder in Los Angeles.
 
     In response to what appears to be the dual threat of more 
frequent and more violent civil disturbances, it is imperative 
that law enforcement agencies develop effective plans to meet 
this challenge. By preparing for the worst, public safety 
agencies can take steps to help prevent it from occurring. 

CHARACTERISTICS OF CIVIL DISORDER 

     Studies of the violent riots in Los Angeles and Miami, as
well as a series of disturbances that took place in the Miami area 
throughout the 1980s, reveal a clear pattern in modern civil 
unrest. The seven elements of this pattern include: 

    An incident or community event that is perceived negatively 
    by a segment of the community serves as the catalyst
 
    Small-but very violent-groups of people take advantage of the
    situation and begin engaging in seemingly random acts of vio-
    lence, such as throwing rocks and bottles, attacking innocent
    bystanders, and shooting at the police. (In fact, these at-
    tacks are generally planned and directed at specific types
    of victims.)
 
    This same small group initiates isolated acts of looting and
    arson
 
    As more citizens become involved, there is a gradual but 
    steady increase in incidents of looting and arson
 
    Widespread acts of civil disruption-attacks on innocent 
    people, looting, arson, sniper attacks-overwhelm law enforce-
    ment's ability to maintain control 

    Many segments of the community join in, creating a  "carnival-
    like" atmosphere 

    After several days, activities gradually cease due to a large
    influx of police resources and a lack of interest on the part
    of citizens in the affected areas.   

    When a disturbance finally calms, it leaves behind a multitude
of questions, along with smoldering fires and ravaged storefronts.
By searching for answers to these questions, law enforcement 
agencies and communities can be better prepared to respond-or pre-
ferably, to prevent-future incidents.

CRITICAL ELEMENTS 

     By analyzing its experiences with civil disorder during the 
past decade, the Miami Police Department identified seven key 
elements critical to the diffusion of unrest.

    1) Time-Once a disturbance begins, time is the enemy of law
    enforcement. Therefore, it becomes vitally important that the
    police department gather resources and suppress disruptive
    activities before violence spreads and large numbers of the
    affected community join the initial rioters

    2) Resources-While the department must respond as quickly as
    possible, it must do so with sufficient resources to handle
    multiple incidents that occur during an outbreak of civil
    disorder

    3) Goals-Before an incident occurs, the department should
    formulate an organizational philosophy and develop a prior-
    itized set of goals regarding the management of civil dis-
    order

    4) Specialized Tactics-The department must develop specialized
    tactics to deal with the unique policing conditions required 
    during periods of civil unrest

    5) Plan of Action-The police department should develop a de-
    tailed, written plan of action, addressing resources, per-
    sonnel, and command requirements

    6) Training-On a continual basis, the department should con-
    duct riot training, reinforcing the plans and tactics that
    have been developed

    7) Critique and Update-The police department must continually
    critique and update its planning and training so that its
    personnel are at a constant state of readiness.

    The lessons learned by the Miami Police Department are re-
levant to any urban law enforcement agency that may confront civil
unrest. Using these seven critical areas as a basis, departments
can organize a response strategy. 

PREVENTION THROUGH PREPARATION 

     Having identified stages in the evolution of modern urban
riots and having learned lessons from past incidents of civil 
disorder, the department then addressed another important issue.
How can police departments best deal with major civil crises?
 
     The answer lies in preparation-one area where the police
maintain complete control. Preparation is the single most impor-
tant step law enforcement agencies can take to ensure that small 
disturbances do not grow into major incidents. Effective prepara-
tion is, in fact, the best form of prevention.
 
     Administrators should focus on the following issues when 
developing response strategies-organizational philosophy, pre-
planning, mobile tactical field force concept, written civil dis-
order plan, and effective training. Each of these components must
be addressed in some way for an agency to be adequately prepared
for civil disorder. 

Organizational Philosophy

    A police agency must determine its philosophy concerning the    
management of civil disorder well in advance of the outbreak of 
unrest. In the wake of several disturbances during the past 
decade, the Miami Police Department developed such a philosophy, 
based on containment, communication, coordination, and control. 

Containment 

    The first priority after an outbreak of civil disorder is to 
identify the affected geographical areas and to seal them off as 
quickly as possible. This containment is essential for two 
reasons. First, law enforcement must ensure that innocent people 
do not enter areas where hostile crowds are present. Second, it 
is important to isolate lawbreakers and to limit others from 
coming into the affected areas to join in disruptive and violent 
activities.
 
Communication 

    Communication, the second element, must begin at the onset        
of disorder and continue through-out the incident. Realistically, 
the process of communication flows in multiple directions-most 
importantly from field units to the emergency operations center 
(EOC)-where information concerning the type and size of the 
crowd, the level of violence, and the needed resources and 
equipment will be relayed. The EOC must then report response 
estimates, criminal intelligence, and specific strategies back to 
field units.
 
    However, communication should not be limited to internal 
information exchanged among police components. It is crucial that 
commanders in the EOC maintain constant contact with other 
government, civic, and community organizations. These contacts 
should include, but are not limited to, fire, sanitation, public 
works, and correctional agencies, as well as prosecutors' 
offices. If possible, representatives from certain major elements 
of emergency response, such as the fire and public works 
departments, should maintain a presence in the EOC to expedite 
response activities. 

Coordination 

    Once effective communication has been established, the third 
element-coordination-is critical. At this stage, field requests 
for additional personnel and equipment become operational 
realities. Operational units must be directed to the most 
critically affected areas in order to address the most pressing 
problems.
 
    To a large degree, successful coordination depends on main-
taining good communication. Commanders must also understand that,
as with communication, effective coordination of response efforts
is an ongoing undertaking as needs, available resources, and 
problem areas continually change during a crisis. 

Control 

    In the final stage-control-law enforcement moves in and 
establishes control of the situation with mobile field forces, 
arrest squads, and special weapons and tactics (SWAT) teams. To 
be most effective and safe, the three prior elements of con-
tainment, communication, and coordination must be successfully 
implemented before the control phase becomes operational. 

Preplanning

    After developing an organizational philosophy, agencies face
a variety of planning issues. Preplanning allows administrators
to address issues in a calm and nonstressful environment. This 
saves time during the first critical hours of an actual disturb-
ance. Specific areas of concern include civil disorder demo-
graphics, procedures, command and control, and personnel. 

Civil disorder demographics 

    In a broad sense, demographics is the study of societies and 
trends. Similarly, civil disorder demographics analyzes trends 
and other factors common to civil disorder. 

    Such issues as the types of weapon used by rioters in past 
incidents are important when equipping field forces and deter-
mining appropriate countermeasures. The layout of the streets
and alleys of potentially affected areas becomes critical in 
establishing perimeters and ensuring that mobile field forces 
cannot be ambushed. 

    Response units should be able to quickly identify and protect 
probable targets of looting, such as liquor stores, gas stations, 
and gun shops. Also, as part of civil disorder demographics, law 
enforcement must make an effort to understand the type of people 
involved and the alleged cause of their protest. 

Procedures 

    Ensuring that commanders and officers understand accepted 
procedures is another important element of the preplanning 
process. Put succinctly, procedures cover who does what and how 
they do it. 

    Planners must determine if existing procedures conflict with
one another and if they are consistent with the agency's
philosophy. Also, officers need to know what equipment to secure
and where to obtain it. It is paramount that agencies answer
these procedural questions before any outbreak of unrest. 

Command and control
 
     Arguments between senior officers regarding matters of
command or individual responsibilities at a time of crisis can 
needlessly delay response times of field units. Within the Miami 
Police Department, lines of authority are clearly established and 
approved by the chief. Likewise, specific responsibilities for 
strategic and tactical decisionmaking are prearranged and ready 
for implementation should unrest erupt. 

    During an incident, the EOC commander makes all strategic 
decisions, such as identifying the resources that will be 
allocated to specific problems, while the field commander 
oversees tactical decisions regarding how objectives established 
by the EOC are going to be met. However, preplanning helps to 
eliminate unnecessary conflicts and allows the agency to focus 
its efforts on the real problems. 

Personnel 

    Personnel represents the greatest resource and the single 
largest problem in the effective management of civil disorders. 
Allocation of personnel will ultimately be the key to success or 
failure.
 
    With regard to personnel, agencies must first address the 
issue of supply and demand. To determine supply, agencies should    
conduct a detailed survey of all officers and support employees 
to determine their assignments and work hours. 

    After completing this survey, administrators must review the    
established civil disorder plans to determine personnel 
requirements-or demand-in case of civil unrest. Areas of concern 
should include the number of individuals needed to fill perimeter 
posts, special details, and field force assignments to handle 
routine calls for service, protect vulnerable businesses, ensure 
station security, and continue staffing essential units, such as 
investigations and media relations. 

    These projections will present planners with two sets of 
figures-one for supply and one for demand. In a perfect world, 
these two sets of numbers would be approximately equal. More 
likely, however, planners will be required to reevaluate human 
resource needs carefully and reconcile them with available 
personnel. 

    Still, under no circumstances should administrators plan 
down to the last officer. Reality dictates that when emergency 
mobilization begins, commanders may only be able to contact 60 
to 70 percent of the agency's personnel. Therefore, a plan that 
depends on all officers reporting for duty is almost certainly 
doomed to failure. 

    Planners should pay close attention to the work shifts and 
the number of hours personnel will be asked to work. In the Miami 
Police Department, all officers and certain critical civilian 
personnel, such as radio dispatchers, switch to 12-hour shifts 
during emergency mobilization. All vacations and leave-with the 
exception of sick leave-are canceled. 

    The department employs an "Alpha/Bravo" configuration, with 
the Alpha shift working from 4 a.m. to 4 p.m. and the Bravo shift 
working from 4 p.m. to 4 a.m. Officer assignments to the two 
groups have been predetermined in the organizational plan. For 
the most part, officers who normally work daytime shifts are 
assigned to the Alpha group, while personnel who ordinarily work 
afternoon and night shifts make up the Bravo group. Any balancing 
of the work force should be accomplished on a unit, not an 
individual, basis. Usually, this balancing involves moving 
additional daytime personnel to the night shift when rioters are 
more active. 

    After allocating personnel and assigning them to shifts, 
planners may think that the most difficult personnel-related 
tasks have been completed. Nothing could be further from the 
truth. During an actual mobilization, the real problems begin 
when an entire shift-perhaps as many as 600 officers-arrives at 
once and need to be given specific assignments. 

    During emergency mobilization in the Miami Police Department,
all incoming officers report to a personnel allocation desk at 
the entrance of the headquarters building. After receiving their 
specific assignments, officers wear color-coded wristbands that 
identify their particular area of assignment. This enables 
supervisors to determine at a glance which officers have been 
assigned to what areas. In the first chaotic hours of a major 
civil disturbance, a system of this type might make the 
difference between fielding officers in time to contain the 
situation or responding after control of the streets has already 
been lost. 

The Mobile Field Force Concept 

    The mobile field force concept now used by the Miami Police 
Department represents a radical departure from the line formation 
and crowd control techniques of the past. It was developed after 
the violent riots of 1980 to maximize the impact of resources 
available to the department. 

    The mobile field force is comprised of 54 officers divided 
into 6 squads, each supervised by a lieutenant. Individual squads 
consist of one sergeant and seven officers who ride in two patrol 
vehicles. An arrest wagon driven by two additional field force 
officers rounds out the force. 

    This highly mobile force provides commanders with a variety 
of response options. For example, commanders can deliver 54 
officers to a single problem area rapidly. The psychological 
effect of 14 police vehicles-all with sirens operating-can be 
overwhelming and often causes crowds to disperse upon approach. 

    Additionally, individual squads can be detached to handle 
specific problems or to hold objectives previously taken by the 
police. In fact, because of its mobility, flexibility, and 
ability to respond to any part of the city quickly, the mobile 
field force can be used in almost unlimited ways. This force 
gives departments the ability to deliver large numbers of people 
to a single problem area or groups of officers to several problem 
areas at the same time. In short, it gives the police a valuable 
tactical edge. 

Civil Disorder Plan 

    An old expression familiar to everyone in law enforcement 
holds that no job is complete until the paperwork is done. This 
is especially true with regard to preparing for civil disorder. 
After investing time and resources in developing preplanning 
procedures and forming a mobile field force, agencies should 
record the information in a written civil disorder plan.(2)
 
    The plan should address all the issues identified in the 
preplanning process. It should be sufficiently specific to 
include such information as unit assignments and wristband 
identification codes. The document should also include specific 
information on perimeter posts to be held, forms to be used, and 
specific responsibilities of the emergency operations command. To 
be of value, the plan must be straightforward and easily 
understood. 

    Finally, the civil disorder plan must be a "living" document. 
If it rests on a shelf after being written, it may no longer be 
viable when the need arises to implement it. Therefore, members 
of the command staff should review the plan at least once a year. 
A careful critique should follow any training scenarios or actual 
incidents in which the plan is used. Following a critique, 
administrators should make any adjustments necessary to enhance 
the effectiveness of the plan. 

Training 

    The final step in preparing for civil disorder involves train-
ing. Administrators should keep in mind that no matter how well 
developed the written plan may be, nothing teaches it as well as 
practical experience. 

    Twice a year, the Miami Police Department conducts civil 
disorder training for all sworn personnel. This training includes 
practical exercises in the field force concept, line formations, 
and tactics. 

    Ideally, training should be made as realistic as possible and 
should include physical confrontation and (if applicable) the use 
of chemical agents. Training exercises should be designed to 
place both mental and physical stress on participants to 
condition their reactions. 

    Additionally, in Miami, command and supervisory personnel re-
ceive further classroom instruction in command and control issues. 
They also review details of the written civil disorder plan. 

    Because it represents a huge commitment of personnel, the 
training component of civil disorder control can be costly to law 
enforcement agencies. However, the cost of not training can be 
far greater in terms of damage to the community and lives lost if 
officers do not respond effectively. 

CONCLUSION 

    Police agencies have a fundamental duty to protect lives and 
property in the communities they serve. A major incident of 
public disorder represents one of the most severe challenges to 
that obligation. 

    Although the likelihood of large-scale public disturbances 
may appear remote, a number of factors make such events a dis-
tinct possibility in communities across the Nation. By studying 
these factors on a national, as well as local, level and by 
analyzing the characteristics of urban disorder, public safety 
officials will be in a better position to manage and prepare for 
such incidents. Then, by developing effective response plans, 
agencies can reduce the likelihood of minor disturbances evolving 
into widespread violent assaults on civil order. 


ENDNOTES 

    (1)  Bruce Porter and Marvin Dunn, The Miami Riot of 
1980--Crossing the Bounds (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath 
and Company, 1984), 173.
 
    (2)  A copy of the Miami Police Department's civil disorder 
plan is available to law enforcement agencies upon request. Write 
to the Miami Police Department, Support Services Section, P.O. 
Box 016777, Miami, FL 33101. 
 
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