Slip opinion

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will
be released, as is being done in connection with this
case, at the time the opinion is issued.  The syllabus
constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has
been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the
convenience of the reader.  See United States v. Detroit
Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

          Syllabus

TAYLOR v. FREELAND & KRONZ et al.
certiorari to the united states court of
     appeals for the third circuit
No. 91-571.   Argued March 2, 1992"Decided April 21, 1992

On the schedule she filed pursuant to 522(l) of the Bankruptcy Code,
debtor Davis listed as exempt property the expected proceeds from
her pending employment discrimination suit.  Petitioner Taylor, the
trustee of Davis' bankruptcy estate, did not object to the claimed
exemption within the 30-day period allowed by Bankruptcy Rule
4003(b).  However, upon later learning that the discrimination suit
had been settled for a substantial sum, Taylor filed a complaint
in the Bankruptcy Court against respondents, Davis' attorneys in
that suit, demanding that they turn over settlement proceeds as
property of Davis' estate.  Concluding that Davis had no statutory
basis for claiming the proceeds as exempt, the court ordered
respondents to ``return'' to Taylor a sum sufficient to pay off all
of Davis' unpaid creditors, and the District Court affirmed.  The
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Bankruptcy Court had
erred because Davis had claimed the money in question as exempt,
and Taylor had failed to object to the claimed exemption in a
timely manner.
Held:A trustee may not contest the validity of a claimed exemption
after the Rule 4003(b) 30-day period has expired, even though the
debtor had no colorable basis for claiming the exemption.  Pp.3-8.
(a)Because the parties agree that Davis did not have a statutory
right to exempt more than a small portion of the lawsuit proceeds,
let alone the full amount, Taylor apparently could have made a
valid objection under 522(l)"which provides, inter alia, that
``property claimed as exempt . . . is exempt'' ``[u]nless a party
in interest objects,'' but does not specify the time for object-
ing"if he had acted promptly under Rule 4003(b)"which establishes
the 30-day objections period for trustees and creditors ``unless,
within such period, further time is granted by the court.''
Pp.3-4.
(b)However, Taylor's failure to promptly object precludes him
from challenging the validity of the exemption at this time,
regardless of whether or not Davis had a colorable statutory basis
for claiming it.  By negative implication, Rule 4003(b) indicates
that a trustee may not object after 30 days unless a further
extension of time is granted.  Because no such extension was
allowed by the Bankruptcy Court in this case, 522(l) has made the
settlement proceeds exempt.  This Court rejects Taylor's argument
that, in order to discourage debtors from claiming meritless
exemptions merely in hopes that no one will object, a court may
invalidate an exemption after expiration of the 30-day period where
the debtor did not have a good-faith or reasonably disputable basis
for claiming it.  To the extent that the various Code and Rules
provisions aimed at penalizing debtors and their attorneys for
improper conduct fail to limit bad-faith exemption claims, Congress,
rather than this Court, may rewrite 522(l) to include a good-faith
requirement.  Pp.4-6.
(c)Taylor's assertion that 105(a) of the Code permits courts
to disallow exemptions not claimed in good faith despite the
absence of timely objections to such exemptions will not be consid-
ered by this Court, since that argument was first raised in Taylor-
's opening brief on the merits and was neither raised nor resolved
in the lower courts.  Pp.6-7.
938 F.2d 420, affirmed.

Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and White, Blackmun, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter,
JJ., joined.  Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

Opinion

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
before publication in the preliminary print of the
United States Reports.  Readers are requested to notify
the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United
States, Wash-ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or
other formal errors, in order that corrections may be
made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES--------
         No. 91-571
          --------
ROBERT J. TAYLOR, TRUSTEE, PETITIONER v.
     FREELAND & KRONZ, WENDELL G.
         FREELAND and RICHARD
               F. KRONZ
  on writ of certiorari to the united
 states court of appeals for the third
                circuit
                                  [April 21, 1992]

Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of
the Court.
Section 522(l) of the Bankruptcy Code
requires a debtor to file a list of the
property that the debtor claims as statuto-
rily exempt from distribution to creditors.
Bankruptcy Rule 4003 affords creditors and
the bankruptcy trustee 30 days to object to
claimed exemptions.  We must decide in this
case whether the trustee may contest the
validity of an exemption after the 30-day
period if the debtor had no colorable basis
for claiming the exemption.

                   I
The debtor in this case, Emily Davis,
declared bankruptcy while she was pursuing
an employment discrimination claim in the
state courts.  The relevant proceedings
began in 1978 when Davis filed a complaint
with the Pittsburgh Commission on Human
Relations.  Davis alleged that her employ-
er, Trans World Airlines (TWA), had denied
her promotions on the basis of her race and
sex.  The Commission held for Davis as to
liability but did not calculate the damages
owed by TWA.  The Pennsylvania Court of
Common Pleas reversed the Commission, but
the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court re-
versed that court and reinstated the Commi-
ssion's determination of liability.  TWA
next appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court.
In October 1984, while that appeal was
pending, Davis filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy
petition.  Petitioner, Robert J. Taylor,
became the trustee of Davis' bankruptcy
estate.  Respondents, Wendell G. Freeland,
Richard F. Kronz, and their law firm,
represented Davis in the discrimination
suit.  On a schedule filed with the Bank-
ruptcy Court, Davis claimed as exempt
property the money that she expected to win
in her discrimination suit against TWA.
She described this property as ``Proceeds
from lawsuit " [Davis] v. TWA'' and ``Claim
for lost wages'' and listed its value as
``unknown.''  App. 18.
Performing his duty as a trustee, Taylor
held the required initial meeting of credi-
tors in January 1985.  See 11 U.S.C. 341;
Bkrtcy. Rule 2003(a).  At this meeting,
respondents told Taylor that they estimated
that Davis might win $90,000 in her suit
against TWA.  Several days after the meet-
ing, Taylor wrote a letter to respondents
telling them that he considered the poten-
tial proceeds of the lawsuit to be property
of Davis' bankruptcy estate.  He also asked
respondents for more details about the
suit.  Respondents described the procedural
posture of the case and expressed optimism
that they might settle with TWA for $110,0-
00.
Taylor decided not to object to the
claimed exemption.  The record reveals that
Taylor doubted that the lawsuit had any
value.  Taylor at one point explained:  ``I
have had past experience in examining
debtors . . . . [M]any of them . . . indi-
cate they have potential lawsuits. . . .
[M]any of them do not turn out to be advan-
tageous and . . . many of them might wind
up settling far within the exemption limi-
tation.''  App. 52.  Taylor also said that
he thought Davis' discrimination claim
against TWA might be a ``nullity.''  Id.,
at 58.
                       Taylor proved mistaken.  In October 1986,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the
Commonwealth Court's determination that TWA
had discriminated against Davis.  In a
subsequent settlement of the issue of
damages, TWA agreed to pay Davis a total of
$110,000.  TWA paid part of this amount by
issuing a check made to both Davis and
respondents for $71,000.  Davis apparently
signed this check over to respondents in
payment of their fees.  TWA paid the re-
mainder of the $110,000 by other means.
Upon learning of the settlement, Taylor
filed a complaint against respondents in
the Bankruptcy Court.  He demanded that
respondents turn over the money that they
had received from Davis because he consid-
ered it property of Davis' bankruptcy
estate.  Respondents argued that they could
keep the fees because Davis had claimed the
proceeds of the lawsuit as exempt.
The Bankruptcy Court sided with Taylor.
It concluded that Davis had ``no statutory
basis'' for claiming the proceeds of the
lawsuit as exempt and ordered respondents
to ``return'' approximately $23,000 to
Taylor, a sum sufficient to pay off all of
Davis' unpaid creditors.  In re Davis, 105
B. R. 288 (WD Pa. 1989).  The District
Court affirmed, In re Davis, 118 B. R. 272
(WD Pa. 1990), but the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit reversed, 938 F. 2d 420
(1991).  The Court of Appeals held that the
Bankruptcy Court could not require respon-
dents to turn over the money because Davis
had claimed it as exempt, and Taylor had
failed to object to the claimed exemption
in a timely manner.  We granted certiorari,
502 U. S. "" (1991), and now affirm.
                                         II
When a debtor files a bankruptcy peti-
tion, all of his property becomes property
of a bankruptcy estate.  See 11 U. S. C.
541.  The Code, however, allows the debtor
to prevent the distribution of certain
property by claiming it as exempt.  Section
522(b) allowed Davis to choose the exemp-
tions afforded by state law or the federal
exemptions listed in 522(d).  Section
522(l) states the procedure for claiming
exemptions and objecting to claimed exemp-
tions as follows:
 ``The debtor shall file a list of prop-
erty that the debtor claims as exempt
 under subsection (b) of this section. .-
 . . Unless a party in interest objects,
 the property claimed as exempt on such
 list is exempt.''
Although 522(l) itself does not specify
the time for objecting to a claimed exemp-
tion, Bankruptcy Rule 4003(b) provides in
part:
    ``The trustee or any creditor may file
 objections to the list of property
 claimed as exempt within 30 days after
 the conclusion of the meeting of credi-
tors held pursuant to Rule 2003(a) . . .
 unless, within such period, further time
 is granted by the court.''
In this case, as noted, Davis claimed the
proceeds from her employment discrimination
lawsuit as exempt by listing them in the
schedule that she filed under 522(l).  The
parties agree that Davis did not have a
right to exempt more than a small portion
of these proceeds either under state law or
under the federal exemptions specified in
522(d).  Davis in fact claimed the full
amount as exempt.  Taylor, as a result,
apparently could have made a valid objec-
tion under 522(l) and Rule 4003 if he had
acted promptly.  We hold, however, that his
failure to do so prevents him from chal-
lenging the validity of the exemption now.
                   A
Taylor acknowledges that Rule 4003(b)
establishes a 30-day period for objecting
to exemptions and that 522(l) states that
``[u]nless a party in interest objects, the
property claimed as exempt . . . is ex-
empt.''  He argues, nonetheless, that his
failure to object does not preclude him
from challenging the exemption at this
time.  In Taylor's view, 522(l) and Rule
4003(b) serve only to narrow judicial
inquiry into the validity of an exemption
after 30 days, not to preclude judicial
inquiry altogether.  In particular, he
maintains that courts may invalidate a
claimed exemption after expiration of the
30-day period if the debtor did not have a
good-faith or reasonably disputable basis
for claiming it.  In this case, Taylor
asserts, Davis did not have a colorable
basis for claiming all of the lawsuit
proceeds as exempt and thus lacked good
faith.
Taylor justifies his interpretation of
522(l) by arguing that requiring debtors
to file claims in good faith will discour-
age them from claiming meritless exemptions
merely in hopes that no one will object.
Taylor does not stand alone in this reading
of 522(b).  Several Courts of Appeals have
adopted the same position upon similar
reasoning.  See In re Peterson, 920 F. 2d
1389, 1393-1394 (CA8 1990); In re Dembs,
757 F. 2d 777, 780 (CA6 1985); In re Sherk,
918 F. 2d 1170, 1174 (CA5 1990).
We reject Taylor's argument.  Davis
claimed the lawsuit proceeds as exempt on
a list filed with the Bankruptcy Court.
Section 522(l), to repeat, says that ``[u]-
nless a party in interest objects, the
property claimed as exempt on such list is
exempt.''  Rule 4003(b) gives the trustee
and creditors 30 days from the initial
creditors' meeting to object.  By negative
implication, the Rule indicates that credi-
tors may not object after 30 days ``unless,
within such period, further time is granted
by the court.''  The Bankruptcy Court did
not extend the 30-day period.  Section
522(l) therefore has made the property
exempt.  Taylor cannot contest the exemp-
tion at this time whether or not Davis had
a colorable statutory basis for claiming it.
Deadlines may lead to unwelcome results,
but they prompt parties to act and they
produce finality.  In this case, despite
what respondents repeatedly told him,
Taylor did not object to the claimed exemp-
tion.  If Taylor did not know the value of
the potential proceeds of the lawsuit, he
could have sought a hearing on the issue,
see Rule 4003(c), or he could have asked
the Bankruptcy Court for an extension of
time to object, see Rule 4003(b).  Having
done neither, Taylor cannot now seek to
deprive Davis and respondents of the exemption.
Taylor suggests that our holding will
create improper incentives.  He asserts
that it will lead debtors to claim property
exempt on the chance that the trustee and
creditors, for whatever reason, will fail
to object to the claimed exemption on time.
He asserts that only a requirement of good
faith can prevent what the Eighth Circuit
has termed ``exemption by declaration.''
Peterson, 920 F. 2d, at 1393.  This con-
cern, however, does not cause us to alter
our interpretation of 522(l).
Debtors and their attorneys face penal-
ties under various provisions for engaging
in improper conduct in bankruptcy proceed-
ings.  See, e.g., 11 U. S. C. 727(a)(4)(-
B) (authorizing denial of discharge for
presenting fraudulent claims); Rule 1008
(requiring filings to ``be verified or
contain an unsworn declaration'' of truth-
fulness under penalty of perjury); Rule
9011 (authorizing sanctions for signing
certain documents not ``well grounded in
fact and . . . warranted by existing law or
a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing
law''); 18 U. S. C. 152 (imposing criminal
penalties for fraud in bankruptcy cases).
These provisions may limit bad-faith claims
of exemptions by debtors.  To the extent
that they do not, Congress may enact compa-
rable provisions to address the difficul-
ties that Taylor predicts will follow our
decision.  We have no authority to limit
the application of 522(l) to exemptions
claimed in good faith.

                   B
Taylor also asserts that courts may
consider the validity of the exemption
under a different provision of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, 11 U. S. C. 105(a), despite
his failure to object in a timely manner.
That provision states:
 ``The court may issue any order, pro-
cess, or judgment that is necessary or
 appropriate to carry out the provisions
 of this title.  No provision of this
 title providing for the raising of an
 issue by a party in interest shall be
 construed to preclude the court from,
 sua sponte, taking any action or making
 any determination necessary or appropri-
ate to enforce or implement court orders
 or rules, or to prevent an abuse or
 process.''  105(a) (emphasis added).
Although Taylor stresses that he is not
asserting that courts in bankruptcy have
broad authorization to do equity in deroga-
tion of the code and rules, he maintains
that 105 permits courts to disallow exemp-
tions not claimed in good faith.  Several
courts have accepted this position.  See,
e. g., Ragsdale v. Genesco, Inc., 674 F. 2d
277, 278 (CA4 1982); In re Staniforth, 116
B. R. 127, 131 (WD Wis. 1990); In re Budin-
sky, No. 90-01099, 1991 WL 105640 (WD Pa.
June 10, 1991).
We decline to consider 105(a) in this
case because Taylor raised the argument for
the first time in his opening brief on the
merits.  Our Rule 14.1(a) makes clear that
``[o]nly the questions set forth in the
petition [for certiorari], or fairly in-
cluded therein, will be considered by the
Court,'' and our Rule 24.1(a) states that
a brief on the merits should not ``raise
additional questions or change the sub-
stance of the questions already presented''
in the petition.  See Yee v. Escondido, 503
U. S. "", "" (1992).  In addition, we have
said that ``[o]rdinarily, this Court does
not decide questions not raised or resolved
in the lower court[s].''  Youakim v. Mill-
er, 425 U. S. 231, 234 (1976) (per curiam).
These principles help to maintain the
integrity of the process of certiorari.
Cf. Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U. S. 808,
816 (1985).  The Court decides which ques-
tions to consider through well-established
procedures; allowing the able counsel who
argue before us to alter these questions or
to devise additional questions at the last
minute would thwart this system.  We see no
``unusual circumstances'' that warrant
addressing Taylor's 105(a) argument at
this time.  Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S.
420, 443, n. 38 (1984).

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
                               Affirmed.

Dissent

  SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES--------
         No. 91-571
          --------
ROBERT J. TAYLOR, TRUSTEE, PETITIONER v.
     FREELAND & KRONZ, WENDELL G.
         FREELAND and RICHARD
               F. KRONZ
  on writ of certiorari to the united
 states court of appeals for the third
                circuit
                                  [April 21, 1992]

Justice Stevens, dissenting.
The Court states that it has  no authori-
ty to limit the application of 522(l) to
exemptions claimed in good faith.  Ante,
at 6.  It does not deny, however, that it
has ample authority to hold that the doc-
trine of equitable tolling applies to the
30-day limitations period in Bankruptcy
Rule 4003(b).  In my view, such a result
is supported not only by strong equitable
considerations, but also by the common law,
the widespread practice of the bankruptcy
courts, and the text of 522(b).

                   I
Rule 4003, which is derived from 522(l)
of the Code and in part from former Bank-
ruptcy Rule 403, shifted theemphasis of the earlier rule, placing the
burden on the debtor to list her exemptions
and the burden on the parties in interest
to raise objections.  Rule 4003(b) in
particular fills a gap that remains in
522(l), which is silent as to the time in
which parties in interest must file their
objections.  Rule 4003(b) provides for a
30-day period for objections.  Although the
adoption of Rule 4003 has furthered the
interest in orderly administration, there
is no suggestion that it was put into
effect in order to avoid prejudice to the
debtor.  Thus, there is no identifiable
reason why ordinary tolling principles that
apply in other contexts should not also
apply in bankruptcy proceedings; indeed,
the generally equitable character of bank-
ruptcy makes it especially appropriate to
apply such rules in this context.
It is familiar learning that the harsh
consequences of federal statutes of limita-
tion have been avoided at times by relying
on either fraudulent concealment or undis-
covered fraud to toll the period of limita-
tion.  For example, in Bailey v. Glover, 21
Wall. 342, 349-350 (1875), the Court de-
scribed two situations in which the  strict
letter of general statutes of limitation
would not be followed.  Id., at 347.  The
first situation is  where the ignorance of
the fraud has been produced by affirmative
acts of the guilty party in concealing the
facts, and the second is  where the party
injured by the fraud remains in ignorance
of it without any fault or want of dili-
gence or care on his part.  Id., at 347-3-
48.  The former involves fraudulent con-
cealment; the latter defines undiscovered
fraud.  The Court concluded in Bailey that
fraudulent concealment, which was at issue
in that case, tolls the running of the
statute of limitation when the fraud  has
been concealed, or is of such character as
to conceal itself.  Id., at 349-350.  To
hold otherwise, reasoned the Court, would
 make the law which was designed to prevent
fraud the means by which it is made suc-
cessful and secure.  Id., at 349.  In
Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392, 397
(1946), the Court extended the reach of
this tolling doctrine when it observed that
it is to be  read into every federal stat-
ute of limitation.
In this case, even if there was no fraud,
and even if it is assumed that the trustee
failed to exercise due diligence, it re-
mains true that the parties injured by the
trustee's failure to object within the 30-
day period are innocent creditors.  More-
over, it is apparently undisputed that
there was no legitimate basis for the claim
of an exemption for the entire award.  See
ante, at 4.  Under these circumstances,
unless the debtor could establish some
prejudice caused by the trustee's failure
to object promptly, I would hold that the
filing of a frivolous claim for an exemp-
tion is tantamount to fraud for purposes of
deciding when the 30-day period begins to
run.
                  II
                       This, in essence, is also the position
adopted by numerous bankruptcy courts and
three Courts of Appeals.  Over a period of
years, they have held that the failure to
make a timely objection is not dispositive,
Rule 4003(b) notwithstanding.  For example,
in In re Hackett, 13 B.R. 755, 756 (Bkrptc-
y. Ct. ED Pa. 1981), the court explained
that  [e]quitable considerations dictate
that a debtor should not be allowed exemp-
tions to which she is obviously not enti-
tled.  This view was echoed in In re
Rollins, 63 B.R. 780, 783-784 (Bkrptcy. Ct.
ED Tenn. 1986):   [T]he debtor cannot make
property exempt simply by claiming it as
exempt when there is no apparent legal
basis for the exemption.  In that situa-
tion, the trustee's failure to object to
the claim of exemption within the time
limit of Rule 4003(b) does not create an
exemption.  More recently, the court in In
re Ehr, 116 B.R. 665, 667 (Bkrptcy. Ct. ED
Wis. 1988), reaffirmed this approach, as
did the court in In re Staniforth, 116 B.R.
127, 130 (Bkrptcy. Ct. WD Wis. 1990).  As
one court explained:   Read strictly, Rule
4003 and Section 522(l) support appellants'
position concerning waiver.  But, most
courts have not followed appellants' inter-
pretation of these provisions.  Instead,
most courts hold that an exemption must
have an apparent legal basis for an exemp-
tion to overcome an untimely objection.
In re Stutterheim, 109 B.R. 1010, 1012
(Kan. 1989).
The equitable principles that motivated
these bankruptcy courts are best encapsu-
lated by the court in In re Bennett, 36
B.R. 893 (Bkrptcy. Ct. WD Ky. 1984).
There, the court explained that to apply
Rule 4003(b) rigidly would be to encourage
a debtor to claim that all of her property
was exempt, thus leaving it to the trustee
and creditors to sift through the myriad
claimed exemptions to assess their validi-
ty.  Such a policy would result in rever-
sion to  the law of the streets, with bare
possession constituting not nine, but ten,
parts of the law; orderly administration of
estates would be replaced by uncertainty
and constant litigation if not outright
anarchy.  Id., at 895.
Although several Courts of Appeals and
bankruptcy courts did not go as far as
these courts, preferring instead in the
case of an untimely objection to examine a
claimed exemption to determine if there was
a  good-faith statutory basis for the
exemption, they nevertheless eschewed the
literal reading of the statute and rule
adopted by the Court today.  They did so
because they believed it was important to
strike a proper balance between avoiding
the undesirable effect of  exemption by
declaration and yet not permitting a
trustee  another bite at the debtor's apple
where the debtor has claimed certain prop-
erty exempt in good faith.  In re Peter-
son, 920 F. 2d 1389, 1393-1394 (CA8 1990);
see In re Sherk, 918 F. 2d 1170, 1174 (CA5
1990); In re Dembs, 757 F. 2d 777, 780 (CA6
1985).
Here, the trustee would succeed under
either approach.  Whether the court is
always permitted to entertain an objection
to a claimed exemption (at least until the
case is closed) when the claimed exemption
is invalid or whether the court can do so
only if the claimed exemption lacks a good-
faith statutory basis, would mean that in
this case the court could review the debto-
r's claimed exemption.  Here, the parties
acknowledge that the debtor could not claim
a statutory basis for her claimed exemption
for the full award because neither backpay
nor tort recovery is exempt under 522(d)(-
5).
                  III
The practice of these lower courts has
been motivated not only by equitable con-
siderations, but also by the requirement
set forth in 522(b).  Section 522(l)
explicitly provides that  [t]he debtor
shall file a list of property that the
debtor claims as exempt under subsection
(b) of this section.  Subsection (b)
limits exemptions claimed by the debtor to
 any property that is exempt under federal
law . . . or State or local law that is
applicable on the date of the filing of the
petition.  11 U. S. C. 522(b)(2)(A).
When a debtor claims exemptions that do not
even arguably satisfy this condition,
there is good reason to hold that the
filing does not comply with 522 and there-
fore the 30-day objection period does not
begin to run.  As one court noted,  [i]f
Debtor may select in any manner her exemp-
tions, then no purpose is served by the
inclusion of the . . . terms.  In re
Kingsbury, 124 B.R. 146, 148, n. 9 (Bkrptc-
y. Ct. Maine 1991).  It declined to con-
clude that Congress added the requirements
that the property be exempted  under feder-
al law . . . or state law or local law but
 refused to grant them meaning.  Ibid.
(Emphasis omitted.)

                  IV
The Court's disposition of this case is
straightforward.  Because it regards the
meaning of the statute and rule as  plain,
that is the end of the case.  I have no
doubt, however, that if the debtor or the
trustee were guilty of fraud, the Court
would readily ignore what it now treats as
the insurmountable barrier of  plain mean-
ing.  The equities in this case are not as
strong as if fraud were implicated, but our
power to reach a just result despite the
 plain meaning barrier is exactly the same
as it was in Bailey v. Glover, 21 Wall. 342
(1875).  Here, as in Bailey, we should be
guided by the common-law principles that
have supported the tolling of other stat-
utes of limitation, and, in addition, by
the experience of bankruptcy courts that
have recognized the need for a similar rule
to achieve both equitable results and fair
administration in cases of this kind.  In
my view, it is a mistake to adopt a  strict
letter approach, id., at 347, when justice
requires a more searching inquiry.  Accord-
ingly, I respectfully dissent.
