 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

          Syllabus

   EVANS v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
         the eleventh circuit
No. 90-6105.   Argued December 9, 1991"Decided May 26, 1992

As part of an investigation of allegations of public corruption in Geor-
gia, a Federal Bureau of Investigation agent posing as a real estate
developer initiated a number of conversations with petitioner Evans,
an elected member of the DeKalb County Board of Commissioners.
The agent sought Evans' assistance in an effort to rezone a tract of
land and gave him, inter alia, $7,000 in cash, which Evans failed to
report on his state campaign-financing disclosure form or his federal
income tax return.  Evans was convicted in the District Court of,
among other things, extortion under the Hobbs Act, which is ``the
obtaining of property from another, . . . induced by wrongful use of
actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official
right,'' 18 U.S.C. 1951(b)(2).  In affirming the conviction, the
Court of Appeals acknowledged that the trial court's jury instruction
did not require a finding that Evans had demanded or requested the
money, or that he had conditioned the performance of any official act
upon its receipt.  However, it held that ``passive acceptance of the
benefit'' was sufficient for a Hobbs Act violation if the public official
knew that he was being offered the payment in exchange for a
specific requested exercise of his official power.
Held:An affirmative act of inducement by a public official, such as a
demand, is not an element of the offense of extortion ``under color of
official right'' prohibited by the Hobbs Act.  Pp.417.
(a)Congress is presumed to have adopted the common-law defini-
tion of extortion"which does not require that a public official make
a demand or request"unless it has instructed otherwise.  See
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263.  While the Act
expanded the common-law definition to encompass conduct by a
private individual as well as a public official, the portion of the Act
referring to official misconduct continues to mirror the common-law
definition.  There is nothing in the sparse legislative history or the
statutory text that could fairly be described as a ``contrary direction,''
ibid., from Congress to narrow the offense's scope.  The inclusion of
the word ``induced'' in the definition does not require that the wrong-
ful use of official power begin with a public official.  That word is
part of the definition of extortion by a private individual but not by
a public official, and even if it did apply to a public official, it does
not necessarily indicate that a transaction must be initiated by the
bribe's recipient.  Pp.411.
(b)Evans' criticisms of the jury instruction"that it did not proper-
ly describe the quid pro quo requirement for conviction if the jury
found that the payment was a campaign contribution, and that it did
not require the jury to find duress"are rejected.  The instruction
satisfies the quid pro quo requirement of McCormick v. United
States, 500 U.S. ___, because the offense is completed when the
public official receives payment in return for his agreement to
perform specific official acts; fulfillment of the quid pro quo is not an
element of the offense.  Nor is an affirmative step on the official's
part an element of the offense on which an instruction need be given.
Pp.1213.
(c)The conclusion herein is buttressed by the facts that many
courts have interpreted the statute in the same way, and that
Congress, although aware of this prevailing view, has remained
silent.  Pp.1314.
910 F.2d 790, affirmed.

Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White,
Blackmun, and Souter, JJ., joined, in Parts I and II of which O'Con-
nor, J., joined, and in Part III of which Kennedy, J., joined.  O'Con-
nor, J., and Kennedy, J., filed opinions concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment.  Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia, J., joined.

  NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
         SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                       No. 90-6105
 
            JOHN H. EVANS, Jr., PETITIONER v.
                           UNITED STATES
        on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
                 appeals for the eleventh circuit
                          [May 26, 1992]

       Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.
       We granted certiorari, 500 U. S. " (1991), to resolve a
conflict in the Circuits over the question whether an
affirmative act of inducement by a public official, such as a
demand, is an element of the offense of extortion ``under
color of official right'' prohibited by the Hobbs Act, 18
U. S. C. 1951.  We agree with the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit that it is not, and therefore affirm the
judgment of the court below.
                                 I
       Petitioner was an elected member of the Board of
Commissioners of DeKalb County, Georgia.  During the
period between March 1985 and October 1986, as part of an
effort by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to
investigate allegations of public corruption in the Atlanta
area, particularly in the area of rezonings of property, an
FBI agent posing as a real estate developer talked on the
telephone and met with petitioner on a number of occa-
sions.  Virtually all, if not all, of those conversations were
initiated by the agent and most were recorded on tape or
video.  In those conversations, the agent sought petitioner's
assistance in an effort to rezone a 25-acre tract of land for
high-density residential use.  On July 25, 1986, the agent
handed petitioner cash totaling $7,000 and a check, payable
to petitioner's campaign, for $1,000.  Petitioner reported the
check, but not the cash, on his state campaign-financing
disclosure form; he also did not report the $7,000 on his
1986 federal income tax return.  Viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the Government, as we must in
light of the verdict, see Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S.
60, 80 (1942), we assume that the jury found that petitioner
accepted the cash knowing that it was intended to ensure
that he would vote in favor of the rezoning application and
that he would try to persuade his fellow commissioners to
do likewise.  Thus, although petitioner did not initiate the
transaction, his acceptance of the bribe constituted an
implicit promise to use his official position to serve the
interests of the bribe-giver.
       In a two-count indictment, petitioner was charged with
extortion in violation of 18 U. S. C. 1951 and with failure
to report income in violation of 26 U. S. C. 7206(1).  He
was convicted by a jury on both counts.  With respect to the
extortion count, the trial judge gave the following instruc-
tion:
          ``The defendant contends that the $8,000 he received
         from agent Cormany was a campaign contribution.  The
         solicitation of campaign contributions from any person
         is a necessary and permissible form of political activity
         on the part of persons who seek political office and
         persons who have been elected to political office.  Thus,
         the acceptance by an elected official of a campaign
         contribution does not, in itself, constitute a violation of
         the Hobbs Act even though the donor has business
         pending before the official.
         ``However, if a public official demands or accepts money
         in exchange for [a] specific requested exercise of his or
         her official power, such a demand or acceptance does
         constitute a violation of the Hobbs Act regardless of
         whether the payment is made in the form of a cam-
         paign contribution.''  App. 1617.

       In affirming petitioner's conviction, the Court of Appeals
noted that the instruction did not require the jury to find
that petitioner had demanded or requested the money, or
that he had conditioned the performance of any official act
upon its receipt.  910 F. 2d 790, 796 (CA11 1990).  The
Court of Appeals held, however, that ``passive acceptance of
a benefit by a public official is sufficient to form the basis
of a Hobbs Act violation if the official knows that he is
being offered the payment in exchange for a specific
requested exercise of his official power.  The official need
not take any specific action to induce the offering of the
benefit.''  Ibid. (emphasis in original).
       This statement of the law by the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit is consistent with holdings in eight other
Circuits.  Two Circuits, however, have held that an
affirmative act of inducement by the public official is
required to support a conviction of extortion under color of
official right.  United States v. O'Grady, 742 F. 2d 682, 687
(CA2 1984) (en banc) (``Although receipt of benefits by a
public official is a necessary element of the crime, there
must also be proof that the public official did something,
under color of his public office, to cause the giving of
benefits''); United States v. Aguon, 851 F. 2d 1158, 1166
(CA9 1988) (en banc) (``We find ourselves in accord with the
Second Circuit's conclusion that inducement is an element
required for conviction under the Hobbs Act'').  Because the
majority view is consistent with the common-law definition
of extortion, which we believe Congress intended to adopt,
we endorse that position.
                                II
       It is a familiar ``maxim that a statutory term is generally
presumed to have its common-law meaning.''  Taylor v.
United States, 495 U. S. 575, 592 (1990).  As we have
explained, ``where Congress borrows terms of art in which
are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centu-
ries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster
of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the
body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning
its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise
instructed.  In such case, absence of contrary direction may
be taken as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions,
not as a departure from them.''  Morissette v. United States,
342 U. S. 246, 263 (1952).
       At common law, extortion was an offense committed by a
public official who took ``by colour of his office'' money that
was not due to him for the performance of his official
duties.  A demand, or request, by the public official was
not an element of the offense.  Extortion by the public
official was the rough equivalent of what we would now
describe as ``taking a bribe.''  It is clear that petitioner
committed that offense.  The question is whether the
federal statute, insofar as it applies to official extortion, has
narrowed the common-law definition.
       Congress has unquestionably expanded the common-law
definition of extortion to include acts by private individuals
pursuant to which property is obtained by means of force,
fear, or threats.  It did so by implication in the Travel Act,
18 U. S. C. 1952, see United States v. Nardello, 393 U. S.
286, 289296 (1969), and expressly in the Hobbs Act.  The
portion of the Hobbs Act that is relevant to our decision
today provides:
           ``(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays,
         or affects commerce or the movement of any article or
         commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or
         attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens
         physical violence to any person or property in further-
ance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of
         this section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
         imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
                  ``(b) As used in this section"
              .        .        .       .        .
             ``(2) The term `extortion' means the obtaining of prop-
erty from another, with his consent, induced by wrong-
ful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear,
         or under color of official right.''  18 U. S. C. 1951.
       The present form of the statute is a codification of a 1946
enactment, the Hobbs Act, which amended the federal
Anti-Racketeering Act.  In crafting the 1934 Act, Congress
was careful not to interfere with legitimate activities
between employers and employees.  See H. R. Rep. No.
1833, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1934).  The 1946 Amendment
was intended to encompass the conduct held to be beyond
the reach of the 1934 Act by our decision in United States
v. Teamsters, 315 U. S. 521 (1942).  The Amendment did
not make any significant change in the section referring to
obtaining property ``under color of official right'' that had
been prohibited by the 1934 Act.  Rather, Congress intend-
ed to broaden the scope of the Anti-Racketeering Act and
was concerned primarily with distinguishing between
``legitimate'' labor activity and labor ``racketeering,'' so as to
prohibit the latter while permitting the former.  See 91
Cong. Rec. 1189911922 (1945).
       Many of those who supported the Amendment argued
that its purpose was to end the robbery and extortion that
some union members had engaged in, to the detriment of
all labor and the American citizenry.  They urged that the
Amendment was not, as their opponents charged, an anti-
labor measure, but rather, it was a necessary measure in
the wake of this Court's decision in United States v.
Teamsters.  In their view, the Supreme Court had mis-
takenly exempted labor from laws prohibiting robbery and
extortion, whereas Congress had intended to extend such
laws to all American citizens.  See, e.g., 91 Cong. Rec.
11910 (1945) (remarks of Rep. Springer) (``To my mind this
is a bill that protects the honest laboring people in our
country.  There is nothing contained in this bill that relates
to labor.  This measure, if passed, will relate to every
American citizen''); id., at 11912 (remarks of Rep. Jennings)
(``The bill is one to protect the right of citizens of this
country to market their products without any interference
from lawless bandits'').
       Although the present statutory text is much broader
than the common-law definition of extortion because it
encompasses conduct by a private individual as well as
conduct by a public official, the portion of the statute
that refers to official misconduct continues to mirror the
common-law definition.  There is nothing in either the
statutory text or the legislative history that could fairly be
described as a ``contrary direction,'' Morissette v. United
States, 342 U. S., at 263, from Congress to narrow the scope
of the offense.
       The legislative history is sparse and unilluminating with
respect to the offense of extortion.  There is a reference to
the fact that the terms ``robbery and extortion'' had been
construed many times by the courts and to the fact that the
definitions of those terms were ``based on the New York
law.''  89 Cong. Rec. 3227 (1943) (statement of Rep. Hobbs);
see 91 Cong. Rec. 11906 (1945) (statement of Rep. Robsion).
In view of the fact that the New York statute applied to a
public officer ``who asks, or receives, or agrees to receive''
unauthorized compensation, N. Y. Penal Code 557 (1881),
the reference to New York law is consistent with an intent
to apply the common-law definition.  The language of the
New York statute quoted above makes clear that extortion
could be committed by one who merely received an unautho-
rized payment.  This was the statute that was in force in
New York when the Hobbs Act was enacted.
       The two courts that have disagreed with the decision to
apply the common-law definition have interpreted the word
``induced'' as requiring a wrongful use of official power that
``begins with the public official, not with the gratuitous
actions of another.''  United States v. O'Grady, 742 F. 2d, at
691; see United States v. Aguon, 851 F. 2d, at 1166 (```in-
ducement' can be in the overt form of a `demand,' or in a
more subtle form such as `custom' or `expectation''').  If we
had no common-law history to guide our interpretation of
the statutory text, that reading would be plausible.  For two
reasons, however, we are convinced that it is incorrect.
       First, we think the word ``induced'' is a part of the
definition of the offense by the private individual, but not
the offense by the public official.  In the case of the private
individual, the victim's consent must be ``induced by
wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence or fear.''
In the case of the public official, however, there is no such
requirement.  The statute merely requires of the public
official that he obtain ``property from another, with his
consent, . . . under color of official right.''  The use of the
word ``or'' before ``under color of official right'' supports this
reading.
       Second, even if the statute were parsed so that the word
``induced'' applied to the public officeholder, we do not
believe the word ``induced'' necessarily indicates that the
transaction must be initiated by the recipient of the bribe.
Many of the cases applying the majority rule have conclud-
ed that the wrongful acceptance of a bribe establishes all
the inducement that the statute requires.  They conclude
that the coercive element is provided by the public office
itself.  And even the two courts that have adopted an
inducement requirement for extortion under color of official
right do not require proof that the inducement took the
form of a threat or demand.  See United States v. O'Grady,
742 F. 2d, at 687; United States v. Aguon, 851 F. 2d, at
1166.
    Petitioner argues that the jury charge with respect to
extortion, see supra, at 23, allowed the jury to convict him
on the basis of the ``passive acceptance of a contribution.''
Brief for Petitioner 24.  He contends that the instruction
did not require the jury to find ``an element of duress such
as a demand,'' Brief for Petitioner 22, and it did not
properly describe the quid pro quo requirement for convic-
tion if the jury found that the payment was a campaign
contribution.
       We reject petitioner's criticism of the instruction, and
conclude that it satisfies the quid pro quo requirement of
McCormick v. United States, 500 U. S. " (1991), because
the offense is completed at the time when the public official
receives a payment in return for his agreement to perform
specific official acts; fulfillment of the quid pro quo is not an
element of the offense.  We also reject petitioner's conten-
tion that an affirmative step is an element of the offense of
extortion ``under color of official right'' and need be included
in the instruction.  As we explained above, our construc-
tion of the statute is informed by the common-law tradition
from which the term of art was drawn and understood.  We
hold today that the Government need only show that a
public official has obtained a payment to which he was not
entitled, knowing that the payment was made in return for
official acts.
       Our conclusion is buttressed by the fact that so many
other courts that have considered the issue over the last 20
years have interpreted the statute in the same way.
Moreover, given the number of appellate court decisions,
together with the fact that many of them have involved
prosecutions of important officials well known in the
political community, it is obvious that Congress is aware
of the prevailing view that common-law extortion is
proscribed by the Hobbs Act.  The silence of the body that
is empowered to give us a ``contrary direction'' if it does not
want the common-law rule to survive is consistent with an
application of the normal presumption identified in Taylor
and Morissette, supra.
                                III
       An argument not raised by petitioner is now advanced by
the dissent.  It contends that common-law extortion was
limited to wrongful takings under a false pretense of official
right.  Post, at 23; see post, at 4 (offense of extortion  was
understood ... [as] a wrongful taking under a false pretense
of official right) (emphasis in original); post, at 5.  It is
perfectly clear, however, that although extortion accom-
plished by fraud was a well-recognized type of extortion,
there were other types as well.  As the court explained in
Commonwealth v. Wilson, 30 Pa. Super. 26 (1906), an
extortion case involving a payment by a would-be brothel
owner to a police captain to ensure the opening of her
house:

          The form of extortion most commonly dealt with in the
         decisions is the corrupt taking by a person in office of
         a fee for services which should be rendered gratuitous-
ly; or when compensation is permissible, of a larger fee
         than the law justifies, or a fee not yet due; but this is
         not a complete definition of the offense, by which I
         mean that it does not include every form of common-
law extortion.  Id., at 30.

See also Commonwealth v. Brown, 23 Pa. Super. 470,
488489 (1903) (defendants charged with and convicted of
conspiracy to extort because they accepted pay for obtaining
and procuring the election of certain persons to the position
of school-teachers); State v. Sweeney, 180 Minn. 450, 456,
231 N.W. 225, 228 (1930) (alderman's acceptance of money
for the erection of a barn, the running of a gambling house,
and the opening of a filling station would constitute
extortion) (dicta); State v. Barts, 132 N.J.L. 74, 76, 83, 38
A.2d 838, 841, 844 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (police officer, who
received $1,000 for not arresting someone who had stolen
money, was properly convicted of extortion because  generi-
cally extortion is an abuse of public justice and a misuse by
oppression of the power with which the law clothes a public
officer); White v. State, 56 Ga. 385, 389 (1876) (If a
ministerial officer used his position  for the purpose of
awing or seducing a person to pay him a bribe that would
be extortion).
       The dissent's theory notwithstanding, not one of the cases
it cites, see post, at 45, and n. 3, holds that the public
official is innocent unless he has deceived the payor by
representing that the payment was proper.  Indeed, none
makes any reference to the state of mind of the payor, and
none states that a  false pretense is an element of the
offense.  Instead, those cases merely support the proposition
that the services for which the fee is paid must be official
and that the official must not be entitled to the fee that he
collected"both elements of the offense that are clearly
satisfied in this case.  The complete absence of support for
the dissent's thesis presumably explains why it was not
advanced by petitioner in the District Court or the Court of
Appeals, is not recognized by any Court of Appeals, and is
not advanced in any scholarly commentary.
                              The judgment is affirmed.
                                                  It is so ordered.



             SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                       No. 90-6105
 
            JOHN H. EVANS, Jr., PETITIONER v.
                           UNITED STATES
        on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
                 appeals for the eleventh circuit
                          [May 26, 1992]

       Justice O'Connor, concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment.
       I join Parts I and II of the Court's opinion, because in my
view they correctly answer the question on which the Court
granted certiorari"whether or not an act of inducement is
an element of the offense of extortion under color of official
right.  See Pet. for Cert. i.  The issue raised by the dissent
and discussed in Part III of the Court's opinion is not fairly
included in this question, see our Rule 14.1(a), and sound
prudential reasons suggest that the Court should not
address it.  Cf. Yee v. City of Escondido, ___ U. S. ___, ___-
___ (slip op. at 1317) (1992).  Neither party in this case
has briefed or argued the question.  A proper resolution of
the issue requires a detailed examination of common law
extortion cases, which in turn requires intensive historical
research.  As there appear to be substantial arguments on
either side, we would be far more assured of arriving at the
correct result were we to await a case in which the issue
had been addressed by the parties.  It is unfair to the
respondent to decide a case on a ground not raised by the
petitioner and which the respondent has had no opportunity
to address.  For these reasons, I join neither the dissent nor
Part III of the Court's opinion, and I express no view as to
which is correct.



             SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                       No. 90-6105
 
            JOHN H. EVANS, Jr., PETITIONER v.
                           UNITED STATES
        on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
                 appeals for the eleventh circuit
                          [May 26, 1992]

       Justice Kennedy, concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment.
       The Court gives a summary of its decision in these words:
 We hold today that the Government need only show that
a public official has obtained a payment to which he was
not entitled, knowing that the payment was made in return
for official acts.  Ante, at ___.  In my view the dissent is
correct to conclude that this language requires a quid pro
quo as an element of the Government's case in a prosecu-
tion under 18 U. S. C. 1951, see post, at ___, and the
Court's opinion can be interpreted in a way that is consis-
tent with this rule.  Although the Court appears to accept
the requirement of a quid pro quo as an alternative
rationale, in my view this element of the offense is essential
to a determination of those acts which are criminal and
those which are not in a case in which the official does not
pretend that he is entitled by law to the property in
question.  Here the prosecution did establish a quid pro quo
that embodied the necessary elements of a statutory
violation.  I join part III of the Court's opinion and concur
in the judgment affirming the conviction.  I write this
separate opinion to explain my analysis and understanding
of the statute.
       With regard to the question whether the word  induced
in the statutory definition of extortion applies to the phrase
under color of official right, 18 U. S. C. 1951(b)(2), I find
myself in substantial agreement with the dissent.  Scrutiny
of the placement of commas will not, in the final analysis,
yield a convincing answer, and we are left with two quite
plausible interpretations.  Under these circumstances, I
agree with the dissent that the rule of lenity requires that
we avoid the harsher one.  See post, at ___.  We must take
as our starting point the assumption that the portion of the
statute at issue here defines extortion as  the obtaining of
property from another, with his consent, induced . . . under
color of official right.
       I agree with the Court, on the other hand, that the word
 induced does not  necessarily indicat[e] that the transac-
tion must be initiated by the public official.  Ante, at ___
(emphasis in original).  Something beyond the mere
acceptance of property from another is required, however,
or else the word  induced would be superfluous.  That
something, I submit, is the quid pro quo.  The ability of the
official to use or refrain from using authority is the  color
of official right  which can be invoked in a corrupt way to
induce payment of money or to otherwise obtain property.
The inducement generates a quid pro quo, under color of
official right, that the statute prohibits.  The term  under
color of is used, as I think both the Court and the dissent
agree, to sweep within the statute those corrupt exercises
of authority that the law forbids but that nevertheless
cause damage because the exercise is by a governmental
official.  Cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 184 (1961)
( `Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and
made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with
the authority of state law, is action taken `under color of'
state law') (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299,
326 (1941)).
       The requirement of a quid pro quo means that without
pretense of any entitlement to the payment, a public official
violates 1951 if he intends the payor to believe that absent
payment the official is likely to abuse his office and his
trust to the detriment and injury of the prospective payor
or to give the prospective payor less favorable treatment if
the quid pro quo is not satisfied.  The official and the payor
need not state the quid pro quo in express terms, for
otherwise the law's effect could be frustrated by knowing
winks and nods.  The inducement from the official is
criminal if it is express or if it is implied from his words
and actions, so long as he intends it to be so and the payor
so interprets it.
The criminal law in the usual course concerns itself with
motives and consequences, not formalities.  And the trier of
fact is quite capable of deciding the intent with which words
were spoken or actions taken as well as the reasonable
construction given to them by the official and the payor.
See McCormick v. United States, 500 U. S. ___, ___ (1991)
( It goes without saying that matters of intent are for the
jury to consider).  In this respect a prosecution under the
statute has some similarities to a contract dispute, with the
added and vital element that motive is crucial.  For
example, a quid pro quo with the attendant corrupt motive
can be inferred from an ongoing course of conduct.  Cf.
United States v. O'Grady, 742 F. 2d 682, 694 (CA2 1984)
(Pierce, J., concurring).  In such instances, for a public
official to commit extortion under color of official right, his
course of dealings must establish a real understanding that
failure to make a payment will result in the victimization
of the prospective payor or the withholding of more favor-
able treatment, a victimization or withholding accomplished
by taking or refraining from taking official action, all in
breach of the official's trust.  See Lindgren, The Elusive
Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion: From the
Common Law to the Hobbs Act, 35 UCLA L. Rev. 815,
887888 (1988) (observing that the offense of official
extortion has always focused on public corruption).
Thus, I agree with the Court, that the quid pro quo
requirement is not simply made up, as the dissent asserts.
Post, at ___.  Instead, this essential element of the offense
is derived from the statutory requirement that the official
receive payment under color of official right, see ante, at
___, n. 20, as well as the inducement requirement.  And
there are additional principles of construction which justify
this interpretation.  First is the principle that statutes are
to be construed so that they are constitutional.  See Edward
J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building &
Construction Trades Council, 485 U. S. 568, 575 (1988), and
cases cited therein.  As one Court of Appeals Judge who
agreed with the construction the Court today adopts noted,
 the phrase `under color of official right,' standing alone, is
vague almost to the point of unconstitutionality.  United
States v. O'Grady, , supra, at 695 (Van Graafeiland, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Village of
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455
U. S. 489, 498499 (1982)).  By placing upon a criminal
statute a narrow construction, we avoid the possibility of
imputing to Congress an enactment that lacks necessary
precision.
Moreover, the mechanism which controls and limits the
scope of official right extortion is a familiar one: a state of
mind requirement.  See Morissette v. United States, 342
U. S. 246 (1952) (refusing to impute to Congress the intent
to create a strict liability crime despite the absence of any
explicit mens rea requirement in the statute).  Hence, even
if the quid pro quo requirement did not have firm roots in
the statutory language, it would constitute no abuse of
judicial power for us to find it by implication.
Morissette legitimates the Court's decision in an addition-
al way.  As both the Court and the dissent agree, compare
ante, at ___ with post, at ___, n. 5, Congress' choice of the
phrase  under color of official right rather than  by colour
of his office does not reflect a substantive modification of
the common law.  Instead, both the Court and dissent
conclude that the language at issue here must be interpret-
ed in light of the familiar principle that absent any indica-
tion otherwise, Congress meant its words to be interpreted
in light of the common law.  Morissette, supra, at 263.  As
to the meaning of the common law, I agree with the Court's
analysis, and therefore join part III of the Court's opinion.
While the dissent may well be correct that prior to the
enactment of the Hobbs Act a large number of the reported
official extortion cases in the United States happened to
involve false pretenses, those cases do not so much as hint
that a false pretense of right was ever considered as an
essential element of the offense.  See, e.g., People v. Whaley,
6 Cow. 661, 663664 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827) ( Extortion
signifies, in an enlarged sense, any oppression under color
of right.  In a stricter sense, it signifies the taking of money
by any officer, by color of his office; either, where none at
all is due, or not so much due, or when it is not yet due);
Hanley v. State, 125 Wis. 396, 104 N.W. 57, 59 (1905) ( The
common-law offense of extortion is said `to be an abuse of
public justice, which consists in any officer's unlawfully
taking by color of his office, from any man, any money or
thing of value that is not due him, or more than is due him,
or before it is due) (quoting W. Blackstone, 4 Commentar-
ies 141).  Furthermore, as the Court demonstrates, see ante,
at ___, during the same period other American courts
affirmed convictions of public officials for extortion based
upon corrupt receipt of payment absent any claim of right.
Morissette is relevant in one final respect.  As I have
indicated, and as the jury instructions in this case made
clear, an official violates the statute only if he agrees to
receive a payment not due him in exchange for an official
act, knowing that he is not entitled to the payment.  See
App. 13 (requiring  wrongful use of otherwise valid official
power).  Modern courts familiar with the principle that
only a clear congressional statement can create a strict
liability offense, see Morissette, supra, understand this
fundamental limitation.  I point it out only because the
express terms of the common law definition of official
extortion do not state the requirement that the official's
intent be corrupt, see, e.g., Whaley, supra, at 663664;
Hanley, supra, at 401402, 104 N.W., at 59; Lindgren,
supra, at 870871 (setting forth six colonial-era definitions
of official extortion), and some courts in this country appear
to have taken the view that the common-law offense had no
mens rea requirement.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bagley,
7 Pick. 279, 281 (Mass. 1828) (affirming the conviction  of
an honest and meritorious public officer, who by misappre-
hension of his rights [had] demanded and received a lawful
fee for a service not yet performed).  On the other hand, in
other jurisdictions corrupt motive was thought to be an
element of the offense.  E.g., Whaley, supra, at 664 (re-
marking that the jury found that the defendant accepted
payment  with the corrupt intent charged in the indict-
ment).  In any event, even if the rule had been otherwise
at common law, our modern jurisprudence would require
that there be a mens rea requirement now.  In short, a
public official who labors under the good-faith but erroneous
belief that he is entitled to payment for an official act does
not violate the statute.  That circumstance is not, however,
presented here.
The requirement of a quid pro quo in a 1951 prosecution
such as the one before us, in which it is alleged that money
was given to the public official in the form of a campaign
contribution, was established by our decision last term in
McCormick v. United States, 500 U. S. ___ (1991).  Readers
of today's opinion should have little difficulty in under-
standing that the rationale underlying the Court's holding
applies not only in campaign contribution cases, but all
1951 prosecutions.  That is as it should be, for, given a
corrupt motive, the quid pro quo, as I have said, is the
essence of the offense.
Because I agree that the jury instruction in this case
complied with the quid pro quo requirement, I concur in the
judgment of the Court.
