NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

                 Syllabus

RUFO, SHERIFF OF SUFFOLK COUNTY, et al. v.
INMATES OF SUFFOLK COUNTY JAIL et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the first circuit
No. 90-954.   Argued October 9, 1991-Decided January 15, 1992

Years after the District Court held that conditions at the Suffolk
 County, Massachusetts, jail were constitutionally deficient, petitioner
 officials and respondent inmates entered into a consent decree
 providing for construction of a new jail that, among other things,
 would provide single occupancy cells for pretrial detainees.  Work on
 the jail was delayed and, in the interim, the inmate population
 outpaced projections.  While construction was still underway, petition-
 er sheriff moved to modify the decree to allow double bunking in a
 certain number of cells, thereby raising the jail's capacity.  Relying
 on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)-which provides, inter alia,
 that ``upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party . . .
 from a . . . judgment . . . for the following reasons:  . . . (5) . . . it is
 no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
 operation''-the sheriff argued that modification was required by a
 change in law, this Court's postdecree decision in Bell v. Wolfish, 441
 U.S. 520, and a change in fact, the increase in pretrial detainees.
 The District Court denied relief, holding that Rule 60(b)(5) codified
 the standard of United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106,
 119-``Nothing less than a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by
 a new and unforeseen conditions should lead . . . to [a] change [in]
 what was decreed after years of litigation with the consent of all
 concerned''-and that a case for modification under this standard had
 not been made.  The court also rejected the argument that Bell
 required modification of the decree; found that the increased pretrial
 detainee population was ``neither new nor unforeseen''; declared that
 relief would be inappropriate even under a more flexible modification
 standard because separate cells for detainees were ``perhaps the most
 important'' element of the relief sought; and held that, even if the
 sheriff's double celling proposal met constitutional standards, allowing
 modification on that basis would undermine and discourage settle-
 ment of institutional cases.  The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held:
   1.The Swift ``grievous wrong'' standard does not apply to requests
 to modify consent decrees stemming from institutional reform litiga-
 tion.  That standard was formulated in the context of facts demon-
 strating that no genuine changes had occurred requiring modification
 of the decree in question, see id., at 115-116, and the Swift Court
 recognized that decrees involving the supervision of changing conduct
 or conditions may be revised if necessary to adapt to future events,
 id., at 114-115.  Moreover, subsequent decisions have emphasized the
 need for flexibility to modify a decree if the circumstances, whether
 of law or fact, have changed or new ones have arisen.  Thus, it
 cannot be concluded that Rule 60(b)(5) misread Swift and intended
 that decree modifications were in all cases to be governed by the
 ``grievous wrong'' standard.  A less stringent standard is made all the
 more important by the recent upsurge in institutional reform litiga-
 tion, where the extended life of decrees increases the likelihood that
 significant changes will occur.  Furthermore, the experience of federal
 courts in implementing and modifying such decrees demonstrates that
 a flexible approach is often essential to achieving the goals of reform
 litigation, particularly the public's interest in the sound and efficient
 operations of its institutions.  The contention that any rule other
 than the Swift standard would deter parties to such litigation from
 negotiating settlements and hence destroy the utility of consent
 decrees is unpersuasive.  Obviously that would not be the case with
 respect to government officials.  Moreover, plaintiffs will still wish to
 settle such cases, since, even if they litigate to conclusion and win,
 the resulting judgment may give them less than they hoped for,
 whereas settlement will avoid further litigation, will perhaps obtain
 more than would have been ordered without the local government's
 consent, and will eliminate the possibility of losing; and since the
 prospective effect of a judgment obtained after litigation will still be
 open to modification where deemed equitable under Rule 60(b).
 Pp.7-13.
   2.Under the flexible standard adopted today, a party seeking
 modification of an institutional reform consent decree bears the
 burden of establishing that a significant change in facts or law
 warrants revision of the decree and that the proposed modification is
 suitably tailored to the changed circumstances.  Pp.13-22.
    (a)Modification may be warranted when changed factual condi-
 tions make compliance with the decree substantially more onerous,
 when the decree proves to be unworkable because of unforeseen
 obstacles, or when enforcement of the decree without modification
 would be detrimental to the public interest.  Where a party relies
 upon events that actually were anticipated at the time it entered into
 a decree, modification should be granted only if the party satisfies
 the heavy burden of convincing the court that it agreed to the decree
 in good faith, made a reasonable effort to comply, and should be
 relieved of the undertaking under Rule 60(b).  Accordingly, on
 remand the District Court should consider whether the upsurge in
 inmate population was foreseen by petitioners.  Despite that court's
 statement that it was, the decree itself and aspects of the record
 indicate that the increase may have been unanticipated.  To relieve
 petitioners from the promise to provide single cells for pretrial
 detainees based on the increased jail population does not necessarily
 violate the decree's basic purpose of providing a remedy for what had
 been found-based on a variety of factors, including double
 celling-to be unconstitutional conditions in the old jail.  The rule
 cannot be that modifications of one of a decree's terms defeats its
 purpose, since modification would then be all but impossible.  Thus,
 the District Court erred in holding that, even under a standard more
 flexible than Swift's, modification of the single cell requirement was
 necessarily forbidden.  Pp.13-17.
    (b)A decree must be modified if one or more of the obligations
 placed upon the parties later becomes impermissible under federal
 law, and may be modified when the statutory or decisional law has
 changed to make legal what the decree was designed to prevent.  The
 Bell holding, which made clear that double celling is not in all cases
 unconstitutional, was not, in and of itself, a change in law requiring
 modification of the decree at issue.  Since that holding did not cast
 doubt on the legality of single celling, the possibility that such a
 holding would be issued must be viewed as having been immaterial
 to petitioners when they signed the decree; i. e., they preferred even
 in the event of such a holding to agree to a decree which called for
 providing single cells in the new jail.  To hold that a clarification in
 the law automatically opens the door for relitigation of the merits of
 every affected decree would undermine the finality of such agree-
 ments and could serve as a disincentive to settle institutional reform
 litigation.  Nevertheless, a decision that merely clarifies the law could
 constitute a change supporting modification if the parties had based
 their agreement on a misunderstanding of the governing law.  The
 decree at issue declares that it ``sets forth a program which is both
 constitutionally adequate and constitutionally required'' (emphasis
 added), and if petitioners can establish on remand that the parties
 believed that single celling was constitutionally mandated, this
 misunderstanding could form a basis for modification. Pp.17-20.
    (c)Once a moving party has established a change in fact or in
 law warranting modification of a consent decree, the district court
 should determine whether a proposed modification is suitably tailored
 to the changed circumstances.  A modification must not perpetuate
 or create a constitutional violation.  Thus, if respondents are correct
 that Bell is factually distinguishable and that double celling at the
 new jail would violate pretrial detainees' constitutional rights,
 modification should not be granted.  Because a consent decree is a
 final judgment that may be reopened only to the extent that equity
 requires, a proposed modification should not strive to rewrite the
 decree so that it conforms to the constitutional floor, but should
 merely resolve the problems created by the change.  Within these
 constraints, the public interest and considerations of comity require
 that the district court defer to local government administrators to
 resolve the intricacies of implementing a modification.  Although
 financial constraints may not be used to justify constitutional viola-
 tions, they are a legitimate concern of government defendants in
 institutional reform litigation and therefore are appropriately consid-
 ered in tailoring a modification.  Pp.20-22.
915 F.2d 1557, vacated and remanded.

 White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined.  O'Connor, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.  Stevens, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun, J., joined.  Thomas, J., took
no part in the consideration or decision of the cases.
-------------------------------


NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
--------
Nos. 90-954 and 90-1004
--------
ROBERT C. RUFO, SHERIFF OF SUFFOLK COUNTY,
et al., PETITIONERS
90-954              v.
 INMATES OF THE SUFFOLK COUNTY JAIL et al.

THOMAS C. RAPONE, COMMISSIONER OF CORREC-
TION OF MASSACHUSETTS, PETITIONER
90-1004             v.
INMATES OF THE SUFFOLK COUNTY JAIL et al.
on writs of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the first circuit
[January 15, 1992]

  Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court.
  In these cases, the District Court denied a motion of the
Sheriff of Suffolk County, Massachusetts, to modify a
consent decree entered to correct unconstitutional condi-
tions at the Suffolk County Jail.  The Court of Appeals
affirmed.  The issue before us is whether the courts below
applied the correct standard in denying the motion.  We
hold that they did not and remand the case for further
proceedings.
                     I
  This litigation began in 1971 when inmates sued the
Suffolk County Sheriff, the Commissioner of Correction for
the State of Massachusetts, the Mayor of Boston, and nine
city councilors, claiming that inmates not yet convicted of
the crimes charged against them were being held under
unconstitutional conditions at what was then the Suffolk
County Jail.  The facility, known as the Charles Street Jail,
had been constructed in 1848 with large tiers of barred
cells.  The numerous deficiencies of the jail, which had been
treated with what a state court described as -malignant
neglect,- Attorney General v. Sheriff of Suffolk County, 394
Mass. 624, 625, 477 N. E. 2d 361, 362 (1985), arement-
ed in the decision of the District Court.  See Inmates of
Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676,
679-684 (Mass. 1973).  The court held that conditions at
the jail were constitutionally deficient:
     -As a facility for the pretrial detention of presump-
   tively innocent citizens, Charles Street Jail unnecessar-
   ily and unreasonably infringes upon their most basic
   liberties, among them the rights to reasonable freedom
   of motion, personal cleanliness, and personal privacy.
   The court finds and rules that the quality of incarcera-
   tion at Charles Street is `punishment' of such a nature
   and degree that it cannot be justified by the state's
   interest in holding defendants for trial; and therefore
   it violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth
   Amendment.-  Id., at 686.
The Court permanently enjoined the government defen-
dants:  -(a) from housing at the Charles Street Jail after
November 30, 1973 in a cell with another inmate, any
inmate who is awaiting trial and (b) from housing at the
Charles Street Jail after June 30, 1976 any inmate who is
awaiting trial.-  Id., at 691.  The defendants did not appeal.
  In 1977, with the problems of the Charles Street Jail still
unresolved, the District Court ordered defendants, including
the Boston City Council, to take such steps and expend the
funds reasonably necessary to renovate another existing
facility as a substitute detention center.  Inmates of Suffolk
County Jail v. Kearney, Civ. Action No. 71-162-G (Mass.,
June 30, 1977), App. 22.  The Court of Appeals agreed that
immediate action was required:
     -It is now just short of five years since the district
   court's opinion was issued.  For all that time the
   plaintiff class has been confined under the conditions
   repugnant to the constitution.  For all of that time
   defendants have been aware of that fact.
       .      .     .      .      .
     -Given the present state of the record and the
   unconscionable delay that plaintiffs have already
   endured in securing their constitutional rights, we have
   no alternative but to affirm the district court's order to
   prohibit the incarceration of pretrial detainees at the
   Charles St. Jail.-  Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v.
   Kearney, 573 F. 2d 98, 99-100 (CA1 1978).
The Court of Appeals ordered that the Charles Street Jail
be closed on October 2, 1978, unless a plan was presented
to create a constitutionally adequate facility for pretrial de-
tainees in Suffolk County.
  Four days before the deadline, the plan that formed the
basis for the consent decree now before this Court was
submitted to the District Court.  Although plans for the
new jail were not complete, the District Court observed that
-the critical features of confinement, such as single cells of
80 sq. ft. for inmates, are fixed and safety, security,
medical, recreational, kitchen, laundry, educational, reli-
gious and visiting provisions, are included.  There are
unequivocal commitments to conditions of confinement
which will meet constitutional standards.-  Inmates of
Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, Civ. Action No. 71-162-G
(Mass., Oct. 2, 1978), App. 51, 55.  The Court therefore
allowed Suffolk County to continue housing its pretrial
detainees at the Charles Street Jail.
  Seven months later, the Court entered a formal consent
decree in which the government defendants expressed their
``desire. . . to provide, maintain and operate as applicable a
suitable and constitutional jail for Suffolk County pretrial
detainees.''  Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, Civ.
Action No. 71-162-G (Mass., May 7, 1979), App. to Pet. for
Cert. 15a.  The decree specifically incorporated the provi-
sions of the Suffolk County Detention Center, Charles
Street Facility, Architectural Program, which-in the words
of the consent decree-``sets forth a program which is both
constitutionally adequate and constitutionally required.''
Id., at 16a.
  Under the terms of the Architectural Program, the new
jail was designed to include a total of 309 -[s]ingle occupan-
cy rooms- of 70 square feet, App. 73, 76, arranged in
modular units that included a kitchenette and recreation
area, inmate laundry room, education units, and indoor and
outdoor exercise areas.  See, e. g., id., at 249.  The size of
the jail was based on a projected decline in inmate popula-
tion, from 245 male prisoners in 1979 to 226 at present.
Id., at 69.
  Although the Architectural Program projected that con-
struction of the new jail would be completed by 1983, ibid.,
work on the new facility had not been started by 1984.
During the intervening years, the inmate population
outpaced population projections.  Litigation in the state
courts ensued, and defendants were ordered to build a
larger jail.  Attorney General v. Sheriff of Suffolk County,
394 Mass. 624, 477 N. E. 2d 361 (1985).  Thereupon,
plaintiff prisoners, with the support of the sheriff, moved
the District Court to modify the decree to provide a facility
with 435 cells.  Citing -the unanticipated increase in jail
population and the delay in completing the jail,- the
District Court modified the decree to permit the capacity of
the new jail to be increased in any amount, provided that:
     ``(a)single-cell occupancy is maintained under the
   design for the facility;
     ``(b)under the standards and specifications of the
   Architectural Program, as modified, the relative pro-
   portion of cell space to support services will remain the
   same as it was in the Architectural Program;
     ``(c)any modifications are incorporated into new
   architectural plans;
     ``(d)defendants act without delay and take all steps
   reasonably necessary to carry out the provisions of the
   Consent Decree according to the authorized schedule.''
   Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, Civ. Action
   No. 71-162-G (Mass., April 11, 1985), App. 110, 111.
The number of cells was later increased to 453.  Construc-
tion started in 1987.
  In July 1989, while the new jail was still under construc-
tion, the sheriff moved to modify the consent decree to allow
the double bunking of male detainees in 197 cells, thereby
raising the capacity of the new jail to 610 male detainees.
The sheriff argued that changes in law and in fact required
the modification.  The asserted change in law was this
Court's 1979 decision in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520
(1979), handed down one week after the consent decree was
approved by the District Court.  The asserted change in fact
was the increase in the population of pretrial detainees.
  The District Court refused to grant the requested
modification, holding that the sheriff had failed to meet the
standard of United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U. S. 106, 119
(1932):
   -Nothing less than a clear showing of grievous wrong
   evoked by new and unforeseen conditions should lead
   us to change what was decreed after years of litigation
   with the consent of all concerned.-
The court rejected the argument that Bell required modifi-
cation of the decree because the decision -did not directly
overrule any legal interpretation on which the 1979 consent
decree was based, and in these circumstances it is inappro-
priate to invoke Rule 60(b)(5) to modify a consent decree.-
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, 734 F. Supp.
561, 564 (Mass. 1990).  The court refused to order modifica-
tion because of the increased pretrial detainee population,
finding that the problem was -neither new nor unforeseen.-
Ibid.
  The District Court briefly stated that, even under the
flexible modification standard adopted by other Courts of
Appeals, the sheriff would not be entitled to relief because
-[a] separate cell for each detainee has always been an
important element of the relief sought in this litiga-
tion-perhaps even the most important element.-  Id., at
565.  Finally, the court rejected the argument that the
decree should be modified because the proposal complied
with constitutional standards, reasoning that such a rule
-would undermine and discourage settlement efforts in
institutional cases.-  Ibid.  The District Court never decided
whether the sheriff's proposal for double celling at the new
jail would be constitutionally permissible.
  The new Suffolk County Jail opened shortly thereafter.
  The Court of Appeals affirmed, stating -[w]e are in
agreement with the well-reasoned opinion of the district
court and see no reason to elaborate further.-  Inmates of
Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, No.90-1440 (CA1, Sept. 20,
1990), judgt. order reported at 915 F. 2d 1557, App. to Pet.
for Cert. 2a.  We granted certiorari.  498 U. S. - (1991).
                    II
   In moving for modification of the decree, the sheriff
relied on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which in
relevant part provides:
   ``On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court
   may relieve a party or a party's legal representative
   from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
   following reasons: . . . (5) the judgment has been
   satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment
   upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise
   vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment
   should have prospective application; or (6) any other
   reason justifying relief from the operation of the
   judgment. . . .''
  There is no suggestion in these cases that a consent
decree is not subject to Rule 60(b).  A consent decree no
doubt embodies an agreement of the parties and thus in
some respects is contractual in nature.  But it is an
agreement that the parties desire and expect will be
reflected in and be enforceable as a judicial decree that is
subject to the rules generally applicable to other judgments
and decrees.  Railway Employes v. Wright, 364 U. S. 642,
650-651 (1961).  The District Court recognized as much but
held that Rule 60(b)(5) codified the -grievous wrong-
standard of United States v. Swift & Co., supra, that a case
for modification under this standard had not been made,
and that resort to Rule 60(b)(6) was also unavailing.  This
construction of Rule 60(b) was error.
  Swift was the product of a prolonged antitrust battle between the
Government and the meat-packing industry. In 1920, the defendants agreed to a
consent decree that enjoined them from manipulating the meat-packing industry
and banned them from engaging in the manufac- ture, sale, or transportation
of other foodstuffs.  286 U. S., at 111.  In 1930, several meat-packers
petitioned for modification of the decree, arguing that conditions in the
meat-packing and grocery industries had changed.  Id., at 113.  The Court
rejected their claim, finding that the meat- packers were positioned to
manipulate transportation costs and fix grocery prices in 1930, just as they
had been in 1920.  Id., at 115-116.  It was in this context that Justice
Cardozo, for the Court, set forth the much-quoted Swift standard, requiring
-[n]othing less than a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and
unforeseen conditions-as a predicate to modification of the meat-packers'
consent decree.  Id., at 119.
  Read out of context, this language suggests a -hardening-
of the traditional flexible standard for modification of
consent decrees.  New York State Assn. for Retarded
Children, Inc. v. Carey, 706 F. 2d 956, 968 (CA2), cert.
denied, 464 U. S. 915 (1983).  But that conclusion does not
follow when the standard is read in context.  See United
States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 391 U. S. 244, 248
(1968).  The Swift opinion pointedly distinguished the facts
of that case from one in which genuine changes required
modification of a consent decree, stating that:
   -The distinction is between restraints that give protec-
   tion to rights fully accrued upon facts so nearly perma-
   nent as to be substantially impervious to change, and
   those that involve the supervision of changing conduct
   or conditions and are thus provisional and tentat-
   ive. . . .  The consent is to be read as directed toward
   events as they then were.  It was not an abandonment
   of the right to exact revision in the future, if revision
   should become necessary in adaptation to events to be.-
   286 U. S., at 114-115.
  Our decisions since Swift reinforce the conclusion that the
-grievous wrong- language of Swift was not intended to
take on a talismanic quality, warding off virtually all efforts
to modify consent decrees.  Railway Employes emphasized
the need for flexibility in administering consent decrees,
stating: -There is . . . no dispute but that a sound judicial
discretion may call for the modification of the terms of an
injunctive decree if the circumstances, whether of law or
fact, obtaining at the time of its issuance have changed, or
new ones have since arisen.-  364 U. S., at 647-648.
  The same theme was repeated in our decision last term in Board of Education
of Oklahoma City Public Schools v.  Dowell, 498 U. S. ___, ___ (1991), in
which we rejected therigid use of the Swift -grievous wrong- language as a
barrier to a motion to dissolve a desegregation decree.
  There is thus little basis for concluding that Rule 60(b)
misread the Swift opinion and intended that modifications
of consent decrees in all cases were to be governed by the
standard actually applied in Swift.  That Rule, in providing
that, on such terms as are just, a party may be relieved
from a final judgement or decree where it is no longer
equitable that the judgment have prospective application,
permits a less stringent, more flexible standard.
  The upsurge in institutional reform litigation since Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), has made the
ability of a district court to modify a decree in response to
changed circumstances all the more important.  Because
such decrees often remain in place for extended periods of
time, the likelihood of significant changes occurring during
the life of the decree is increased.  See, e. g., Philadelphia
Welfare Rights Organization v. Shapp, 602 F. 2d 1114,
1119-1121 (CA3 1979), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 1026 (1980),
in which modification of a conscree was allowed in
light of changes in circumstances that were beyond the
defendants' control and were not contemplated by the court
or the parties when the decree was entered.
  The experience of the district and circuit courts in
implementing and modifying such decrees has demonstrat-
ed that a flexible approach is often essential to achieving
the goals of reform litigation.  See, e. g., New York State
Assn. for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, supra.  The
Courts of Appeals have also observed that the public
interest is a particularly significant reason for applying
a flexible modification standard in institutional reform
litigation because such decrees -reach beyond the parties
involved directly in the suit and impact on the public's right
to the sound and efficient operation of its institutions.-
Heath v. De Courcy, 888 F. 2d 1105, 1109 (CA6 1989).
Accord, New York State Assn. for Retarded Children, Inc. v.
Carey, supra, at 969.
   The government petitioners urge that these factors are
present in the cases before us and support modification of
the decree.  They assert that modification would actually
improve conditions for some pretrial detainees, who now
cannot be housed in the Suffolk County Jail and therefore
are transferred to other facilities, farther from family
members and legal counsel.  In these transfer facilities, the
petitioners assert that detainees may be double celled under
less desirable conditions than those that would exist if
double celling were allowed at the new Suffolk County Jail.
The government petitioners also contend that the public
interest is implicated here because crowding at the new
facility has necessitated the release of some pretrial
detainees and the transfer of others to halfway houses, from
which many escape.  For the District Court, these points were insufficient
reason to modify under Rule 60(b)(5) because its -authority
[was] limited by the established legal requirements for
modification . . . .-  734 F. Supp., at 566.  The District
Court, as noted above, also held that the suggested modifi-
cation would not be proper even under the more flexible
standard that is followed in some other Circuits.  None of
the changed circumstances warranted modification because
it would violate one of the primary purposes of the decree
which was to provide for -[a] separate cell for each detainee
[which] has always been an important element of the relief
sought in this litigation-perhaps even the most important
element.-  Id., at 565.  For reasons appearing later in this
opinion, this was not an adequate basis for denying the
requested modification.  The District Court also held that
Rule 60(b)(6) provided no more basis for relief.  The District
Court, and the Court of Appeals as well, failed to recognize
that such rigidity is neither required by Swift nor appropri-
ate in the context of institutional reform litigation.
  It is urged that any rule other than the Swift -grievous
wrong- standard would deter parties to litigation such as
this from negotiating settlements and hence destroy the
utility of consent decrees.  Obviously that would not be the
case insofar as the state or local government officials are
concerned.  As for the plaintiffs in such cases, they know
that if they litigate to conclusion and win, the resulting
judgment or decree will give them what is constitutionally
adequate at that time but perhaps less than they hoped for.
They also know that the prospective effect of such a
judgment or decree will be open to modification where
deemed equitable under Rule 60(b).  Whether or not they
bargain for more than what they might get after trial, they
will be in no worse position if they settle and have the
consent decree entered.  At least they will avoid further
litigation and perhaps will negotiate a decree providing
more than what would have been ordered without the localgovernment's consent.  And, of course, if they litigate, they
may lose.
                    III
  Although we hold that a district court should exercise
flexibility in considering requests for modification of an
institutional reform consent decree, it does not follow that
a modification will be warranted in all circumstances.  Rule
60(b)(5) provides that a party may obtain relief from a court
order when -it is no longer equitable that the judgment
should have prospective application,- not when it is no
longer convenient to live with the terms of a consent decree.
Accordingly, a party seeking modification of a consent
decree bears the burden of establishing that a significant
change in circumstances warrants revision of the decree.  If
the moving party meets this standard, the court should
consider whether the proposed modification is suitably
tailored to the changed circumstance.
                     A
  A party seeking modification of a consent decree may
meet its initial burden by showing either a significant
change in factual conditions or in law.
                     1
  Modification of a consent decree may be warranted when
changed factual conditions make compliance with the decree
substantially more onerous.  Such a modification was
approved by the District Court in this litigation in 1985
when it became apparent that plans for the new jail did not
provide sufficient cell space.  Inmates of Suffolk County Jail
v. Kearney, Civ. Action No. 71-162-G (Mass., Apr. 11, 1985),
App. 110.  Modification is also appropriate when a decree
proves to be unworkable because of unforeseen obstacles,
New York State Assn. for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey,
706 F. 2d, at 969 (modification allowed where State could
not find appropriate housing facilities for transfer patients);
Philadelphia Welfare Rights Organization v. Shapp, 602 F.
2d, at 1120-1121 (modification allowed where State could
not find sufficient clients to meet decree targets); or when
enforcement of the decree without modification would be
detrimental to the public interest, Duran v. Elrod, 760 F.
2d 756, 759-761 (CA7 1985) (modification allowed to avoid
pretrial release of accused violent felons).
  Respondents urge that modification should be allowed
only when a change in facts is both -unforeseen and
unforeseeable.-  Brief for Respondents at 35.  Such a
standard would provide even less flexibility than the
exacting Swift test; we decline to adopt it.  Litigants are not
required to anticipate every exigency that could conceivably
arise during the life of a consent decree.
  Ordinarily, however, modification should not be granted
where a party relies upon events that actually were
anticipated at the time it entered into a decree.  See Twelve
John Does v. District of Columbia, 274 U.S. App. D.C. 62,
65-66, 861 F. 2d 295, 298-299 (1988); Ruiz v. Lynaugh, 811
F. 2d 856, 862-863 (CA5 1987).  If it is clear that a party
anticipated changing conditions that would make perfor-
mance of the decree more onerous but nevertheless agreed
to the decree, that party would have to satisfy a heavy
burden to convince a court that it agreed to the decree in
good faith, made a reasonable effort to comply with the
decree, and should be relieved of the undertaking under
Rule 60(b).
  Accordingly, on remand the District Court should con-
sider whether the upsurge in the Suffolk County inmate
population was foreseen by the petitioners.  The District
Court touched on this issue in April, 1990, when, in the
course of denying the modification requested in this
litigation, the court stated that -the overcrowding problem
faced by the Sheriff is neither new nor unforeseen.  It has
been an ongoing problem during the course of this litiga-
tion, before and after entry of the consent decree.-  734 F.
Supp., at 564.  However, the Architectural Program
incorporated in the decree in 1979 specifically set forth
projections that the jail population would decrease in
subsequent years.  Significantly, when the District Court
modified the consent decree in 1985, the Court found that
the -modifications are necessary to meet the unanticipated
increase in jail population and the delay in completing the
jail.-  Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, Civ. Action
No. 71-162-G (Mass., Apr. 11, 1985), App. 110 (emphasis
added).  Petitioners assert that it was only in July, 1988, 10
months after construction began, that the number of
pretrial detainees exceeded 400 and began to approach the
number of cells in the new jail.  Brief for Petitioner in
No.90-954, p.9.
   It strikes us as somewhat strange, if a rapidly increasing
jail population had been contemplated, that respondents
would have settled for a new jail that would not have been
adequate to house pretrial detainees.  There is no doubt
that the original and modified decree called for a facility
with single cells.  Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Kear-
ney, Civ. Action No.71-162-G (Mass., Apr. 11, 1985), App.
110.  It is apparent, however, that the decree itself no-
where expressly orders or reflects an agreement by petition-
ers to provide jail facilities having single cells sufficient to
accommodate all future pretrial detainees, however large
the number of such detainees might be.  Petitioners'
agreement and the decree appear to have bound them only
to provide the specified number of single cells.  If petition-
ers were to build a second new facility providing double
cells that would meet constitutional standards, it is doubt-
ful that they would have violated the consent decree.
  Even if the decree is construed as an undertaking by
petitioners to provide single cells for pretrial detainees, to
relieve petitioners from that promise based on changed
conditions does not necessarily violate the basic purpose of
the decree.  That purpose was to provide a remedy for what
had been found, based on a variety of factors, including
double celling, to be unconstitutional conditions obtaining
in the Charles Street Jail.  If modification of one term of a
consent decree defeats the purpose of the decree, obviously
modification would be all but impossible.  That cannot be
the rule.  The District Court was thus in error in holding
that even under a more flexible standard than its version
of Swift required, modification of the single cell require-
ment was necessarily forbidden.
                     2
  A consent decree must of course be modified if, as it later
turns out, one or more of the obligations placed upon the
parties has become impermissible under federal law.  But
modification of a consent decree may be warranted when
the statutory or decisional law has changed to make legal
what the decree was designed to prevent.
  This was the case in Railway Employes v. Wright, 364
U. S. 642 (1961).  A railroad and its unions were sued for
violating the Railway Labor Act, 45 U. S. C. 151 et seq.,
which banned discrimination against nonunion employees,
and the parties entered a consent decree that prohibited
such discrimination.  Later, the Railway Labor Act was
amended to allow union shops, and the union sought a
modification of the decree.  Although the amendment did
not require but purposely permitted union shops, this Court
held that the union was entitled to the modification because
the parties had recognized correctly that what the consent
decree prohibited was illegal under the Railway Act as it
then read and because a -court must be free to continue to
further the objectives of th[e] Act when its provisions are
amended.-  Railway Employes, supra, at 650, 651.  See also
Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 576, and n.9, 583, n.17
(1984).
   Petitioner Rapone urges that, without more, our 1979
decision in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), was a
change in law requiring modification of the decree govern-
ing construction of the Suffolk County Jail.  We disagree.
Bell made clear what the Court had not before announced:
that double celling is not in all cases unconstitutional.  But
it surely did not cast doubt on the legality of single celling,
and petitioners were undoubtedly aware that Bell was
pending when they signed the decree.  Thus, the case must
be judged on the basis that it was immaterial to petitioners
that double celling might be ruled constitutional, i.e., they
preferred even in that event to agree to a decree which
called for providing only single cells in the jail to be built.
  Neither Bell nor the Federal Constitution forbade this
course of conduct.  Federal courts may not order States or
local governments, over their objection, to undertake a
course of conduct not tailored to curing a constitutional
violation that has been adjudicated.  See Milliken v.
Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U. S. 267, 281 (1977).  But we
have no doubt that, to -save themselves the time, expense,
and inevitable risk of litigation,- United States v. Armour
& Co., 402 U. S. 673, 681 (1971), petitioners could settle the
dispute over the proper remedy for the constitutional
violations that had been found by undertaking to do more
than the Constitution itself requires (almost any affirmative
decree beyond a directive to obey the Constitution necessar-
ily does that), but also more than what a court would have
ordered absent the settlement.  Accordingly, the District
Court did not abuse its discretion in entering the agreed-
upon decree, which clearly was related to the conditions
found to offend the Constitution.  Milliken v. Bradley
(Milliken I), 418 U. S. 717, 738 (1974).  See also Dowell, 498
U.S., at ___.  Cf. Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U. S. 501,
525 (1986).
   To hold that a clarification in the law automatically
opens the door for relitigation of the merits of every affected
consent decree would undermine the finality of such
agreements and could serve as a disincentive to negotiation
of settlements in institutional reform litigation.  The
position urged by  petitioners
   ``would necessarily imply that the only legally enforce-
   able obligation assumed by the state under the consent
   decree was that of ultimately achieving minimal
   constitutional prison standards. . . .  Substantively, this
   would do violence to the obvious intention of the
   parties that the decretal obligations assumed by the
   state were not confo meeting minimal constitu-
   tional requirements.  Procedurally, it would make
   necessary, as this case illustrates, a constitutional
   decision every time an effort was made either to
   enforce or modify the decree by judicial action.''  Plyler
   v. Evatt, 924 F. 2d 1321, 1327 (CA4 1991).
  While a decision that clarifies the law will not, in and of
itself, provide a basis for modifying a decree, it could consti-
tute a change in circumstances that would support modifi-
cation if the parties had based their agreement on a
misunderstanding of the governing law.  For instance, in
Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S.
424, 437-438 (1976), we held that a modification should
have been ordered when the parties had interpreted an
ambiguous equitable decree in a manner contrary to the
District Court's ultimate interpretation and the District
Court's interpretation was contrary to intervening decision-
al law.  And in Nelson v. Collins, 659 F. 2d 420, 428-429
(CA4 1981) (en banc), the Fourth Circuit vacated an
equitable order that was based on the assumption that
double bunking of prisoners was per se unconstitutional.
  Thus, if the Sheriff and Commissioner could establish on
remand that the parties to the consent decree believed that
single celling of pretrial detainees was mandated by the
Constitution, this misunderstanding of the law could form
a basis for modification.  In this connection, we note again,
see supra, at 4, that the decree itself recited that it -sets
forth a program which is both constitutionally adequate and
constitutionally required.-  (Emphasis added).
                     B
  Once a moving party has met its burden of establishing
either a change in fact or in law warranting modification of
a consent decree, the District Court should determine
whether the proposed modification is suitably tailored to
the changed circumstance.  In evaluating a proposed
modification, three matters should be clear.
  Of course, a modification must not create or perpetuate
a constitutional violation.  Petitioners contend that double
celling inmates at the Suffolk County Jail would be consti-
tutional under Bell.  Respondents counter that Bell is
factually distinguishable and that double celling at the new
jail would violate the constitutional rights of pretrial
detainees.  If this is the case-the District Court did not
decide this issue, 734 F. Supp., at 565-566-modification
should not be granted.
  A proposed modification should not strive to rewrite a
consent decree so that it conforms to the constitutional
floor.  Once a court has determined that changed circum-
stances warrant a modification in a consent decree, the
focus should be on whether the proposed modification is
tailored to resolve the problems created by the change in
circumstances.  A court should do no more, for a consent
decree is a final judgment that may be reopened only to the
extent that equity requires.  The court should not -turn
aside to inquire whether some of [the provisions of the
decree] upon separate as distinguished from joint action
could have been opposed with success if the defendants had
offered opposition.-  Swift, 286 U.S., at 116-117.
  Within these constraints, the public interest and -[c]on-
siderations based on the allocation of powers within our
federal system,- Dowell, 498 U.S., at ____, require that the
district court defer to local government administrators, who
have the -primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing,
and solving- the problems of institutional reform, to resolve
the intricacies of implementing a decree modification.
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S., at 299.  See also
Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, ___ (1990); Milliken II,
433 U.S., at 281.  Although state and local officers in
charge of institutional litigation may agree to do more than
that which is minimally required by the Constitution to
settle a case and avoid further litigation, a court should
surely keep the public interest in mind in ruling on a
request to modify based on a change in conditions making
it substantially more onerous to abide by the decree.  To
refuse modification of a decree is to bind all future officers
of the State, regardless of their view of the necessity of
relief from one or more provisions of a decree that might
not have been entered had the matter been litigated to its
conclusion.  The District Court seemed to be of the view
that the problems of the fiscal officers of the State were
only marginally relevant to the request for modification in
this case.  734 F. Supp., at 566.  Financial constraints may
not be used to justify the creation or perpetuation of
constitutional violations, but they are a legitimate concern
of government defendants in institutional reform litigation
and therefore are appropriately considered in tailoring a
consent decree modification.

                    IV
  To conclude, we hold that the Swift -grievous wrong-
standard does not apply to requests to modify consent
decrees stemming from institutional reform litigation.
Under the flexible standard we adopt today, a party seeking
modification of a consent decree must establish that a
significant change in facts or law warrants revision of the
decree and that the proposed modification is suitably
tailored to the changed circumstance.  We vacate the dec-
ision below and remand for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion
                         It is so ordered.


  Justice Thomas took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
-------------------------------


SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
--------
Nos. 90-954 and 90-1004
--------
ROBERT C. RUFO, SHERIFF OF SUFFOLK COUNTY,
et al., PETITIONERS
90-954              v.
 INMATES OF THE SUFFOLK COUNTY JAIL et al.

THOMAS C. RAPONE, COMMISSIONER OF CORREC-
TION OF MASSACHUSETTS, PETITIONER
90-1004             v.
INMATES OF THE SUFFOLK COUNTY JAIL et al.
on writs of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the first circuit
[January 15, 1992]

  Justice O'Connor, concurring in the judgment.
  I agree that these cases should be remanded so that the
District Court may reconsider whether to modify the decree.
I write separately to emphasize the limited nature of our
review; to clarify why, despite our limited review, the cases
should be returned to the District Court; and to explain my
concerns with certain portions of the Court's opinion.
                     I
  A court may modify a final judgment, such as the judg-
ment embodied in the consent decree at issue, where the
court finds that ``it is no longer equitable that the judgment
should have prospective application.''  Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.
60(b)(5).  Determining what is ``equitable'' is necessarily a
task that entails substantial discretion, particularly in a
case like this one, where the District Court must make
complex decisions requiring the sensitive balancing of a
host of factors.  As a result, an appellate court should
examine primarily the method in which the District Court
exercises its discretion, not the substantive outcome the
District Court reaches.  If the District Court takes into
account the relevant considerations (all of which are not
likely to suggest the same result), and accommodates them
in a reasonable way, then the District Court's judgment will
not be an abuse of its discretion, regardless of whether an
appellate court would have reached the same outcome in
the first instance.  Cf. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192,
200 (1973) (``In shaping equity decrees, the trial court is
vested with broad discretionary power; appellate review is
correspondingly narrow'').
  Our deference to the District Court's exercise of its discre-
tion is heightened where, as in this litigation, the District
Court has effectively been overseeing a large public institu-
tion over a long period of time.  Judge Keeton has been
supervising the implementation of this decree since 1979;
he has developed an understanding of the difficulties
involved in constructing and managing a jail that an
appellate court, even with the best possible briefing, could
never hope to match.  In reviewing the District Court's
judgment, we accordingly owe substantial deference to ``the
trial judge's years of experience with the problem at hand.''
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 688 (1978).
  The Court devotes much of its attention to elaborating a
``standard'' for lower courts to apply in cases of this kind.
Ante, at 7-14.  I am not certain that the product of this
effort-``A party seeking modification of a consent decree
may meet its initial burden by showing either a significant
change in factual conditions or in law,'' ante, at
13-14-makes matters any clearer than the equally general
language of Rule 60(b)(5).  I think we would offer more
guidance to the District Court here, and to the many other
courts burdened with administering complex decrees like
this one, if we would simply review the District Court's
exercise of its discretion, and specify any shortcomings we
might find in the method by which the court reached its
conclusion.
                    II
  In my view, the District Court took too narrow a view of
its own discretion.  The court's reasoning, as expressed in
its opinion, was flawed by three different errors of law, each
of which excised a portion of the range of options available
to the court.  I believe the sum of these erroneously self-
imposed limits constituted an abuse of the court's discre-
tion.
  First, the court relied on United States v. Swift & Co.,
286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932), to determine that ``new and
unforeseen conditions'' were a prerequisite to any modifica-
tion.  Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, 734 F.
Supp. 561, 563 (Mass. 1990).  Because the court found that
the overcrowding at the jail was foreseen, id., at 564, the
court viewed Swift as barring modification.  As the Court
explains today, ante, at 8-10, the District Court erred in
this respect.  That overcrowding was foreseen should not
have been a dispositive factor in the court's decision.
Modification could conceivably still be ``equitable'' under
Rule 60(b)(5) even if the rise in inmate population had been
foreseen; the danger to the community from the pretrial
release of inmates, for example, might outweigh the
petitioners' failure to accommodate even a foreseen increase
in the inmate population.
  Second, the District Court concluded that it lacked the
authority to consider the petitioners' budget constraints in
determining whether modification would be equitable.  The
court held:  ``It is not a legally supportable basis for
modification of a consent decree that public officials having
fiscal authority have chosen not to provide adequate
resources for the Sheriff to comply with the terms of the
consent decree.''  734 F. Supp., at 566.  Here again, I think
the court took too narrow a view of its own authority.  State
and local governments are responsible for providing a wide
range of services.  Public officials often operate within
difficult fiscal constraints; every dollar spent for one
purpose is a dollar that cannot be spent for something else.
While the lack of resources can never excuse a failure to
obey constitutional requirements, it can provide a basis for
concluding that continued compliance with a decree
obligation is no longer ``equitable,'' if, for instance, the
obligation turns out to be significantly more expensive than
anyone anticipated.
  Third, although the District Court purported to apply the
``flexible standard'' proposed by the petitioners, the court
denied modification because ``[t]he type of modification
sought here would not comply with the overall purpose of
the consent decree; it would set aside the obligations of that
decree.''  Id., at 565.  Taken literally, this conclusion
deprives the ``flexible standard'' of any meaning; every
modification, by definition, will alter an obligation of a
decree.  The court may have meant no more than that the
plaintiff class would never have agreed to a decree without
single celling, but, taking the court at its word, it held the
petitioners to a standard that would never permit modifica-
tion of any decree.  This was another instance where the
District Court, in my view, erroneously found that it lacked
the authority to grant the relief requested by the petition-
ers.
  In these three respects, the District Court felt itself
bound by constraints that in fact did not exist.  We do not
know whether and to what extent the court would have
modified the decree had it not placed these limits on its
own authority.  I would accordingly remand these cases, so
that the District Court may exercise the full measure of its
discretion.
  In doing so, however, I would emphasize that we find
fault only with the method by which the District Court
reached its conclusion.  The District Court may well have
been justified, for the reasons suggested by Justice
Stevens, in refusing to modify the decree, and the court is
free, when fully exercising its discretion, to reach the same
result on remand.  This is a case with no satisfactory
outcome.  The new jail is simply too small.  Someone has to
suffer, and it is not likely to be the government officials
responsible for underestimating the inmate population and
delaying the construction of the jail.  Instead, it is likely to
be either the inmates of Suffolk County, who will be double
celled in an institution designed for single celling; the
inmates in counties not yet subject to court supervision,
who will be double celled with the inmates transferred from
Suffolk County; or members of the public, who may be the
victims of crimes committed by the inmates the county is
forced to release in order to comply with the consent decree.
The District Court has an extraordinarily difficult decision
to make.  We should not be inclined tod-guess the
court's sound judgment in deciding who will bear this
burden.
                    III
  The Court's opinion today removes what I see as the
three barriers the District Court erroneously placed in its
own path.  Ante, at 9 (distinguishing Swift); ante, at 16-17
(explaining that the court applied an impossibly strict
version of the petitioners' proposed ``flexible standard'');
ante, at 22 (permitting the court to consider the petitioners'
fiscal constraints).  But what the Court removes with one
hand, it replaces with the other.  Portions of the Court's
opinion might be read to place new constraints on the
District Court's discretion that are, in my view, just as
misplaced as the ones with which the District Court
fettered itself the first time.
  Most significantly, the Court observes that the District
Court recognized single celling as ```the most important
element''' of the decree.  Ante, at 12 (quoting 734 F. Supp.,
at 566).  But the Court decides that ``this was not an
adequate basis for denying the requested modification.''
Ante, at 12.  This conclusion is unsupported by any authori-
ty.  Instead, the Court offers its own reasoning:  ``If modifi-
cation of one term of a consent decree defeats the purpose
of the decree, obviously modification would be all but
impossible.  That cannot be the rule.''  Ante, at 17.
  This sweeping conclusion strikes me as both logically and
legally erroneous.  It may be that the modification of one
term of a decree does not always defeat the purpose of the
decree.  See supra, at 4.  But it hardly follows that the
modification of a single term can never defeat the decree's
purpose, especially if that term is ``the most important
element'' of the decree.  If, for instance, the District Court
finds that the respondents would never have consented to
the decree (and a decade of delay in obtaining relief)
without a guarantee of single celling, I should think that
the court would not abuse its discretion were it to conclude
that modification to permit double celling would be inequi-
table.  Similarly, were the court to find that the jail was
constructed with small cells on the assumption that each
cell would hold but one inmate, I doubt that the District
Court would exceed its authority under Rule 60(b)(5) by
concluding that it would be inequitable to double cell the
respondents.  To the extent the Court suggests otherwise,
it limits the District Court's discretion in what I think is an
unwarranted and ill-advised fashion.
  The same is true of the Court's statement that the
District Court should ``defer to local government administra-
tors . . . to resolve the intricacies of implementing a decree
modification.''  Ante, at 21.  To be sure, the courts should
defer to prison administrators in resolving the day-to-day
problems in managing a prison; these problems fall within
the expertise of prison officials.  See, e.g., Thornburgh v.
Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407-408 (1989).  But I disagree with
the notion that courts must defer to prison administrators
in resolving whether and how to modify a consent decree.
These questions may involve details of prison management,
but at bottom they require a determination of what is
``equitable'' to all concerned.  Deference to one of the parties
to a lawsuit is usually not the surest path to equity;
deference to these particular petitioners, who do not have
a model record of compliance with previous court orders in
this case, is particularly unlikely to lead to an equitable
result.  The inmates have as much claim as the prison offi-
cials to an understanding of the equities.  The District
Court should be free to take the views of both sides into
account, without being forced to grant more deference to
one side than to the other.
-------------------------------

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
--------
Nos. 90-954 and 90-1004
--------
ROBERT C. RUFO, SHERIFF OF SUFFOLK COUNTY,
et al., PETITIONERS
90-954              v.
 INMATES OF THE SUFFOLK COUNTY JAIL et al.

THOMAS C. RAPONE, COMMISSIONER OF CORREC-
TION OF MASSACHUSETTS, PETITIONER
90-1004             v.
INMATES OF THE SUFFOLK COUNTY JAIL et al.
on writs of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the first circuit
[January 15, 1992]

  Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Blackmun joins,
dissenting.
  Today the Court endorses the standard for modification
of consent decrees articulated by Judge Friendly in New
York State Association for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey,
706 F. 2d 956 (CA2), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 915 (1983).  I
agree with that endorsement, but under that standard I
believe the findings of the District Court in this action
require affirmance of its order refusing to modify this
consent decree.
                     I
  When a district court determines, after a contested trial,
that a state institution is guilty of a serious and persistent
violation of the Federal Constitution, it typically fashions a
remedy that is more intrusive than a simple order directing
the defendants to cease and desist from their illegal
conduct.  See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education, 402 U. S. 1 (1971).  A district court has a duty
to command a remedy that is effective, and it enjoys the
broad equitable authority necessary to fulfill this obligation.
See id., at 15-16; Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S.
294, 300 (1955); see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U. S. 33
(1990).
                    II
  In June 1973 after finding that petitioners' incarceration
of pretrial detainees in the Charles Street Jail violated
constitutional standards, the District Court appropriately
entered an injunction that went -beyond a simple proscrip-
tion against the precise conduct previously pursued.-
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States,
435 U. S. 679, 698 (1978).  It required petitioners to
discontinue (1) the practice of double celling pretrial
detainees after November 30, 1973, and (2) the use of the
Charles Street Jail for pretrial detention after June 30,
1976.  Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F.
Supp. 676, 691 (Mass. 1973).
  Petitioners did not appeal from that injunction.  When
they found it difficult to comply with the double-celling
prohibition, however, they asked the District Court to
postpone enforcement of that requirement.  The court
refused and ordered petitioners to transfer inmates to other
institutions.  The Court of Appeals affirmed.  Inmates of
Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 494 F. 2d 1196 (CA1),
cert. denied, 419 U. S. 977 (1974).  When petitioners found
that they could not comply with the second part of the 1973
injunction, the District Court postponed the closing of the
Charles Street Jail, but set another firm date for compli-
ance.  While petitioners' appeal from that order was
pending, the parties entered into the negotiations that
produced the 1979 consent decree.  After the Court of
Appeals affirmed the District Court's order and set yet
another firm date for the closing of the Charles Street Jail,
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, 573 F. 2d 98,
101 (CA1 1978), the parties reached agreement on a plan
that was entered by the District Court as a consent decree,
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, Civ. Action No.
71-162-G (Mass., May 7, 1979), App. to Pet. for Cert. 15a.
  The facility described in the 1979 decree was never
constructed.  Even before the plan was completed, petition-
ers recognized that a larger jail was required.  In June
1984, the sheriff filed a motion in the District Court for an
order permitting double celling in the Charles Street Jail.
The motion was denied.  The parties then negotiated an
agreement providing for a larger new jail and for a modifi-
cation of the 1979 decree.  After they reached agreement,
respondents presented a motion to modify, which the
District Court granted on April 11, 1985.  The Court found
that modifications were -necessary to meet the unanticipat-
ed increase in jail population and the delay in completing
the jail as originally contemplated.-  App. 110.  The District
Court then ordered that nothing in the 1979 decree should
prevent petitioners:
-from increasing the capacity of the new facility if the
following conditions are satisfied:

  -(a)single-cell occupancy is maintained under the
design for the facility;
  -(b)under the standards and specifications of the
Architectural Program, as modified, the relative
proportion of cell space to support services will remain
the same as it was in the Architectural Program . . . .-
Id., at 110-111.

There was no appeal from that modification order.  Indeed,
although the Boston City Council objected to the modifica-
tion, it appears to have been the product of an agreement
between respondents and petitioners.
  In 1990, 19 years after respondents filed suit, the new jail
was completed in substantial compliance with the terms of
the consent decree, as modified in 1985.
                    III
  It is the terms of the 1979 consent decree, as modified
and reaffirmed in 1985, that petitioners now seek to modify.
The 1979 decree was negotiated against a background in
which certain important propositions had already been
settled.  First, the litigation had established the existence
of a serious constitutional violation.  Second, for a period of
almost five years after the entry of the 1973 injunc-
tion-which was unquestionably valid and which petitioners
had waived any right to challenge-the petitioners were
still violating the Constitution as well as the injunction.
See Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, 573 F. 2d, at
99.  Third, although respondents had already prevailed,
they were willing to agree to another postponement of the
closing of the Charles Street Jail if petitioners submitted,
and the court approved, an adequate plan for a new facility.
  Obviously any plan would have to satisfy constitutional
standards.  It was equally obvious that a number of
features of the plan, such as the site of the new facility or
its particular architectural design, would not be constitu-
tionally mandated.  In order to discharge their duty to
provide an adequate facility, and also to avoid the risk of
stern sanctions for years of noncompliance with an out-
standing court order, it would be entirely appropriate for
petitioners to propose a remedy that exceeded the bare
minimum mandated by the Constitution.  Indeed, terms
such as -minimum- or -floor- are not particularly helpful in
this context.  The remedy is constrained by the requirement
that it not perpetuate a constitutional violation, and in this
sense the Constitution does provide a -floor.-  Beyond that
constraint, however, the remedy's attempt to give expres-
sion to the underlying constitutional value does not lend
itself to quantitative evaluation.  In view of the complexity
of the institutions involved and the necessity of affording
effective relief, the remedial decree will often contain many,
highly detailed commands.  It might well be that the failure
to fulfill any one of these specific requirements would not
have constituted an independent constitutional violation,
nor would the absence of any one element render the decree
necessarily ineffective.  The duty of the District Court is not
to formulate the decree with the fewest provisions, but to
consider the various interests involved and, in the sound
exercise of its discretion, to fashion the remedy that it
believes to be best.  Similarly, a consent decree reflects
the parties' understanding of the best remedy, and, subject
to judicial approval, the parties consent decree enjoy at
least as broad discretion as the District Court in formulat-
ing the remedial decree.  Cf. Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478
U. S. 501, 525-526 (1986).
  From respondents' point of view, even though they had
won their case, they might reasonably be prepared to
surrender some of the relief to which they were unquestion-
ably entitled-such as enforcing the deadline on closing the
Charles Street Jail-in exchange for other benefits to be
included in an appropriate remedy, even if each such
benefit might not be constitutionally required.  For exam-
ple, an agreement on an exercise facility, a library, or an
adequate place for worship might be approved by the court
in a consent decree, even if each individual feature were not
essential to the termination of the constitutional violation.
In fact, in this action it is apparent that the two overriding
purposes that informed both the District Court's interim
remedy and the respondents' negotiations were the prohibi-
tion against double celling and the closing of the old jail.
The plan that was ultimately accepted, as well as the terms
of the consent decree entered in 1979, were designed to
serve these two purposes.
  The consent decree incorporated all the details of the
agreed upon architectural program.  A recital in the decree
refers to the program as -both constitutionally adequate
and constitutionally required.-  That recital, of course,
does not indicate that either the court or the parties
thought that every detail of the settlement-or, indeed, any
of its specific provisions-was -constitutionally required.-
An adequate remedy was constitutionally required, and the
parties and the court were satisfied that this program was
constitutionally adequate.  But that is not a basis for
assuming that the parties believed that any provision of the
decree, including the prohibition against double celling, was
constitutionally required.
                    IV
  The motion to modify that ultimately led to our grant of
certiorari was filed on July 17, 1989.  As I view these cases,
the proponents of that motion had the burden of demon-
strating that changed conditions between 1985 and 1989
justified a further modification of the consent decree.  The
changes that occurred between 1979 and 1985 were already
reflected in the 1985 modification.  Since petitioners
acquiesced in that modification, they cannot now be heard
to argue that pre-1985 developments-either in the law or
in the facts-provide a basis for modifying the 1985 order.
It is that order that defined petitioners' obligation to
construct and to operate an adequate facility.
  Petitioners' reliance on Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520
(1979), as constituting a relevant change in the law is
plainly misplaced.  That case was pending in this Court
when the consent decree was entered in 1979.  It was the
authority on which the sheriff relied when he sought
permission to double cell in 1984 and, of course, it was well-
known to all parties when the decree was modified in 1985.
It does not qualify as a changed circumstance.
  The increase in the average number of pretrial detainees
is, of course, a change of fact.  Because the size of that
increase had not been anticipated in 1979, it was appropri-
ate to modify the decree in 1985.  But in 1985, the steady
progression in the detainee population surely made it
foreseeable that this growth would continue.  The District
Court's finding that -the overcrowding problem faced by the
Sheriff is neither new nor unforeseen,- Inmates of Suffolk
County Jail v. Kearney, 734 F. Supp. 561, 564 (Mass. 1990),
is amply supported by the record.
  Even if the continuing increase in inmate population had
not actually been foreseen, it was reasonably foreseeable.
Mere foreseeability in the sense that it was an event that
``could conceivably arise'' during the life of the consent
decree, see ante, at 14, should not, of course, disqualify an
unanticipated development from justifying a modification.
But the parties should be charged with notice of those
events that reasonably prudent litigants would contemplate
when negotiating a settlement.  Given the realities of
today's society, it is not surprising that the District Court
found a continued growth in inmate population to be within
petitioners' contemplation.
  Other important concerns counsel against modification of
this consent decree.  Petitioners' history of noncompliance
after the 1973 injunction provides an added reason for
insisting that they honor their most recent commitments.
Petitioners' current claims of fiscal limitation are hardly
new.  These pleas reflect a continuation of petitioners'
previous reluctance to budget funds adequate to avoid the
initial constitutional violation or to avoid prolonged non-
compliance with the terms of the original decree.  The
continued claims of financial constraint should not provide
support for petitioners' modification requests.
  The strong public interest in protecting the finality of
court decrees always counsels against modifications.  Cf.
Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, 308-310 (1989) (plurality
opinion); Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 682-683
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and
dissenting in part).  In the context of a consent decree, this
interest is reinforced by the policy favoring the settlement
of protracted litigation.  To the extent that litigants are
allowed to avoid their solemn commitments, the motivation
for particular settlements will be compromised, and the
reliability of the entire process will suffer.
  It is particularly important to apply a strict standard
when considering modification requests that undermine the
central purpose of a consent decree.  In his opinion in New
York State Association for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey,
706 F. 2d 956 (CA2 1983), Judge Friendly analyzed the
requested modifications in the light of the central purpose
-of transferring the population of Willowbrook, whose
squalid living conditions this court has already recited, to
facilities of more human dimension as quickly as possible.''
706 F. 2d, at 967.  The changes that were approved were
found to be consistent with that central purpose.  In this
action, the entire history of the litigation demonstrates that
the prohibition against double celling was a central purpose
of the relief ordered by the District Court in 1973, of the
bargain negotiated in 1979 and embodied in the original
consent decree, and of the order entered in 1985 that
petitioners now seek to modify.  Moreover, as the District
Court found, during the history of the litigation petitioners
have been able to resort to various measures such as
-transfers to state prisons, bail reviews by the Superior
Court, and a pretrial controlled release program- to respond
to the overcrowding problem.  734 F. Supp., at 565.  The
fact that double celling affords petitioners the easiest and
least expensive method of responding to a reasonably
foreseeable problem is not an adequate justification for
compromising a central purpose of the decree.  In this
regard, the Court misses the point in its observation that
``[i]f modification of one term of a consent decree defeats the
purpose of the decree, obviously modification would be all
but impossible.''  Ante, at 16.  It is certainly true that
modification of a consent decree would be impossible if the
modification of any one term were deemed to defeat the
purpose of the decree.  However, to recognize that some
terms are so critical that their modification would thwart
the central purpose of the decree does not render the decree
immutable, but rather assures that a modification will
frustrate neither the legitimate expectations of the parties
nor the core remedial goals of the decree.
  After a judicial finding of constitutional violation,
petitioners were ordered in 1973 to place pretrial detainees
in single cells.  In return for certain benefits, petitioners
committed themselves in 1979 to continued compliance with
the single-celling requirement.  They reaffirmed this
promise in 1985.  It was clearly not an abuse of discretion
for the District Court to require petitioners to honor this
commitment.
  I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
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