NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

                 Syllabus

DAWSON v. DELAWARE
certiorari to the supreme court of delaware
No. 90-6704.   Argued November 12, 1991-Decided March 9, 1992

A Delaware jury convicted petitioner Dawson of first-degree murder
 and other crimes.  At the penalty hearing, the prosecution, inter alia,
 read a stipulation-``[t]he Aryan Brotherhood refers to a white racist
 prison gang that began . . . in California in response to other gangs
 of racial minorities.  Separate gangs calling themselves the Aryan
 Brotherhood now exist in many state prisons including Dela-
 ware''-despite Dawson's assertion that the admission of the stipu-
 lated facts violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and
 introduced evidence that he had the words ``Aryan Brotherhood''
 tattooed on his hand.  The jury found that the aggravating circum-
 stances-that the murder was committed by an escaped prisoner,
 during the commission of a burglary, and for pecuniary
 gain-outweighed Dawson's mitigating evidence-that he had shown
 kindness to family members and had earned good time credits in
 prison-and made a binding recommendation to the court that he be
 sentenced to death.  The State Supreme Court affirmed.
Held:
   1.Dawson's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated
 by the admission of the Aryan Brotherhood evidence in this case,
 because the evidence had no relevance to the issues being decided in
 the proceeding.  The Constitution does not erect a per se barrier to
 the admission of evidence concerning one's beliefs and associations at
 sentencing simply because those beliefs and associations are protected
 by the First Amendment.  See, e. g., Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S.
 939.  However, the narrowness of the stipulation admitted here left
 the evidence totally without relevance to the sentencing proceeding.
 The stipulation says nothing about the beliefs of the Delaware
 prison's chapter of the Aryan Brotherhood.  Any racist beliefs the
 group might hold were not tied in any way to the murder, because
 Dawson's victim was white, as is Dawson.  The evidence proved only
 the group's and Dawson's abstract beliefs, not that the group had
 committed or endorsed any unlawful or violent acts.  Thus, it was not
 relevant to help prove any aggravating circumstance.  Cf. Texas v.
 Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414.  Nor was the evidence relevant to rebut
 any mitigating evidence, since, while the State was entitled to
 introduce ``bad'' character evidence to rebut Dawson's ``good'' char-
 acter evidence, see Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. ___, ___, the Aryan
 Brotherhood evidence cannot be viewed as relevant ``bad'' character
 evidence in its own right.  Pp.4-9.
   2.The question whether the wrongful admission of the Aryan
 Brotherhood evidence was harmless error is left open for consider-
 ation by the State Supreme Court on remand.  P.9.
581 A.2d 1078, vacated and remanded.

 Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White,
Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.,
joined.  Blackmun, J., filed a concurring opinion.  Thomas, J., filed a
dissenting opinion.
-------------------------------


NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
--------
No. 90-6704
--------
DAVID DAWSON, PETITIONER v. DELAWARE
on writ of certiorari to the supreme court
of delaware
[March 9, 1992]

  The Chief Justice  delivered the opinion of the Court.
  The question presented in this case is whether the First
and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the introduction in a
capital sentencing proceeding of the fact that the defendant
was a member of an organization called the Aryan Brother-
hood, where the evidence has no relevance to the issues
being decided in the proceeding.  We hold that they do.
  Shortly after midnight on December 1, 1986, petitioner
David Dawson and three other inmates escaped from the
Delaware Correctional Center near Smyrna, Delaware.
Dawson stole a car and headed south, while the other three
inmates stole another car and drove north.  Early that
morning, Dawson burglarized a house near Kenton,
Delaware, stealing a motorcycle jacket, several pocket
watches, and containers of loose change.  He then proceeded
to the home of Richard and Madeline Kisner, located about
half a mile from the burglary site.  Mrs. Kisner was alone
in the house, preparing to leave for work.  Dawson brutally
murdered Mrs. Kisner, stole the Kisners' car and some
money, and fled further south.
  He reappeared later that evening at the Zoo Bar in
Milford, Delaware, wearing a motorcycle jacket that was too
big for him.  While at the bar, Dawson introduced himself
to Patty Dennis, and told her that his name was -Abaddon,-
which he said meant -one of Satan's disciples.-  App. 80-81.
Dawson was subsequently asked to leave the bar.  Later
that evening, a Delaware state police officer responded to a
call to investigate a one-car accident.  The car involved in
the accident had been stolen from a location near the Zoo
Bar and had been driven into a ditch, but the driver had
left the scene.  The police began a house-to-house search for
Dawson, and found him at 5:25 the next morning, on the
floor of a Cadillac parked about three-tenths of a mile from
the accident site.
  A jury convicted Dawson of first-degree murder, posses-
sion of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony,
and various other crimes.  The trial court then conducted a
penalty hearing before the jury to determine whether
Dawson should be sentenced to death for the first-degree
murder conviction.  See Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11,  4209
(1987).  The prosecution gave notice that it intended to
introduce (1) expert testimony regarding the origin and
nature of the Aryan Brotherhood, as well as the fact that
Dawson had the words -Aryan Brotherhood- tattooed on the
back of his right hand, (2) testimony that Dawson referred
to himself as -Abaddon- and had the name -Abaddon-
tattooed in red letters across his stomach, and (3) photo-
graphs of multiple swastika tattoos on Dawson's back and
a picture of a swastika he had painted on the wall of his
prison cell.  Dawson argued that this evidence was inflam-
matory and irrelevant, and that its admission would violate
his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
  Before the penalty phase began, the parties agreed to a
stipulation regarding the Aryan Brotherhood evidence.  The
stipulation provided that
-[t]he Aryan Brotherhood refers to a white racist prison
gang that began in the 1960's in California in response
to other gangs of racial minorities.  Separate gangs
calling themselves the Aryan Brotherhood now exist in
many state prisons including Delaware.-  App. 132.
 In return for Dawson's agreement to the stipulation, the
prosecution agreed not to call any expert witnesses to
testify about the Aryan Brotherhood.  Although Dawson
agreed to the stipulation in order to avoid presentation of
this expert testimony, it is apparent from the record and
from the opinion of the Supreme Court of Delaware that he
continued to assert that the admission of the stipulated
facts into evidence violated the Constitution.  581 A. 2d
1078 (1990).  At the penalty hearing, the prosecution read
the stipulation to the jury and introduced evidence that
Dawson had tattooed the words -Aryan Brotherhood- on his
hand.  The trial judge permitted the prosecution to present
the evidence related to the name -Abaddon- as well, but
excluded all of the swastika evidence.  In addition, the
prosecution submitted proof of Dawson's lengthy criminal
record.  Dawson, in turn, presented mitigating evidence
based on the testimony of two family members and on the
fact that he had earned good time credits in prison for
enrolling in various drug and alcohol programs.  The jury
found three statutory aggravating circumstances, each
making Dawson eligible for the death penalty under
Delaware law; it determined (1) that the murder was
committed by an escaped prisoner, (2) that the murder was
committed during the commission of a burglary, and (3)
that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain.  See id.,
at 1102, and n. 27.  The jury further concluded that the
aggravating evidence outweighed the mitigating evidence,
and recommended that Dawson be sentenced to death.  The
trial court, bound by that recommendation, imposed the
death penalty.
  The Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the convictions
and the death sentence.  The court rejected Dawson's claim
that the evidence concerning the Aryan Brotherhood and
his use of the name -Abaddon- should have been excluded
from the penalty hearing.  It observed that having found at
least one statutory aggravating factor, the jury was -re-
quired to make an individualized determination of whether
Dawson should be executed or incarcerated for life, based
upon Dawson's character, his record and the circumstances
of the crime,- and that it was desirable for the jury to have
as much information before it as possible when making that
decision.  Id., at 1102-1103 (emphasis in original).  The
court acknowledged that the Constitution would prohibit
the consideration of certain irrelevant factors during the
sentencing process, but stated that - `[p]unishing a person
for expressing his views or for associating with certain
people is substantially different from allowing . . . evidence
of [the defendant's] character [to be considered] where that
character is a relevant inquiry.' -  Id., at 1103.  Because the
evidence relating to the Aryan Brotherhood and the name
-Abaddon- properly focused the jury's attention on Dawson's
character, and did not appeal to the jury's prejudices
concerning race, religion or political affiliation, the court
upheld its introduction during the penalty phase.  We
granted certiorari, 499 U. S. ___ (1991), to consider whether
the admission of this evidence was constitutional error.  We
hold that its admission in this case was error, and so
reverse.
  We have held that the First Amendment protects an
individual's right to join groups and associate with others
holding similar beliefs.  See Aptheker v. Secretary of State,
378 U. S. 500, 507 (1964); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 460 (1958).  Because his right to
associate with the Aryan Brotherhood is constitutionally
protected, Dawson argues, admission of evidence related to
that association at his penalty hearing violated his constitu-
tional rights.  Relying on our statement in Zant v. Stephens,
462 U. S. 862 (1983), that an aggravating circumstance is
invalid if -it authorizes a jury to draw adverse inferences
from conduct that is constitutionally protected,- he contends
that the Constitution forbids the consideration in sentenc-
ing of any evidence concerning beliefs or activities that are
protected under the First Amendment.  Id. at 885.
  We think this submission is, in the light of our decided
cases, too broad.  These cases emphasize that -the sentenc-
ing authority has always been free to consider a wide range
of relevant material.- Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. ___, ___
(1991) (slip op., at 10); United States v. Tucker, 404 U. S.
443, 446 (1972) (-[A] judge may appropriately conduct an
inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the
kind of information he may consider, or the source from
which it may come-); Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241
(1949).  We have previously upheld the consideration, in a
capital sentencing proceeding, of evidence of racial intoler-
ance and subversive advocacy where such evidence was
relevant to the issues involved.  In Barclay v. Florida, 463
U. S. 939 (1983), for example, we held that a sentencing
judge in a capital case might properly take into consid-
eration ``the elements of racial hatred'' in Barclay's crime as
well as ``Barclay's desire to start a race war.''  See id., at
949 (plurality opinion); id., at 970, and n. 18 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgment).
     One year later, in United States v. Abel, 469 U. S. 45
(1984), we held that the Government could impeachfense witness
by showing that both the defendant and the
witness were members of the Aryan Brotherhood, and that
members were sworn to lie on behalf of each other.  We
held the evidence admissible to show bias, even assuming
that membership in the organization was among the
associational freedoms protected by the First Amendment.
Though Abel did not involve a capital sentencing proceed-
ing, its logic is perfectly applicable to such a proceeding.
We therefore conclude that the Constitution does not erect
a per se barrier to the admission of evidence concerning
one's beliefs and associations at sentencing simply because
those beliefs and associations are protected by the First
Amendment.
   Although we cannot accept Dawson's broad submission,
we nevertheless agree with him that, in this case, the
receipt into evidence of the stipulation regarding his
membership in the Aryan Brotherhood was constitutional
error.  Before the penalty hearing, the prosecution claimed
that its expert witness would show that the Aryan Brother-
hood is a white racist prison gang that is associated with
drugs and violent escape attempts at prisons, and that
advocates the murder of fellow inmates.  If credible and
otherwise admissible evidence to that effect had been
presented, we would have a much different case.  But, after
reaching an agreement with Dawson, the prosecution
limited its proof regarding the Aryan Brotherhood to the
stipulation.  The brief stipulation proved only that an
Aryan Brotherhood prison gang originated in California in
the 1960's, that it entertains white racist beliefs, and that
a separate gang in the Delaware prison system calls itself
the Aryan Brotherhood.  We conclude that the narrowness
of the stipulation left the Aryan Brotherhood evidence
totally without relevance to Dawson's sentencing proceed-
ing.
  As an initial matter, the second sentence of the stipula-
tion, when carefully parsed, says nothing about the beliefs
of the Aryan Brotherhood -chapter- in the Delaware
prisons.  Prior to trial, the prosecution acknowledged that
there are differences among the various offshoots of the
Aryan Brotherhood, stating that -there are cells or specific
off-shoots within various local jurisdictions that don't see
eye to eye or share a union, if you will.-  App. 33.  But the
juxtaposition of the second sentence with the first sentence,
which describes the Aryan Brotherhood in California
prisons as a -white racist prison gang,- invited the jury to
infer that the beliefs of the Delaware chapter are identical
to those of the California chapter.
  Even if the Delaware group to which Dawson allegedly
belongs is racist, those beliefs, so far as we can determine,
had no relevance to the sentencing proceeding in this case.
For example, the Aryan Brotherhood evidence was not tied
in any way to the murder of Dawson's victim.  In Barclay,
on the contrary, the evidence showed that the defendant's
membership in the Black Liberation Army, and his conse-
quent desire to start a -racial war,- were related to the
murder of a white hitchhiker.  See 463 U. S., at 942-944
(plurality opinion).  We concluded that it was most proper
for the sentencing judge to -tak[e] into account the elements
of racial hatred in this murder.-  Id., at 949.  In the present
case, however, the murder victim was white, as is Dawson;
elements of racial hatred were therefore not involved in the
killing.
  Because the prosecution did not prove that the Aryan
Brotherhood had committed any unlawful or violent acts, or
had even endorsed such acts, the Aryan Brotherhood
evidence was also not relevant to help prove any aggravat-
ing circumstance.  In many cases, for example, associational
evidence might serve a legitimate purpose in showing that
a defendant represents a future danger to society.  A
defendant's membership in an organization that endorses
the killing of any identifiable group, for example, might be
relevant to a jury's inquiry into whether the defendant will
be dangerous in the future.  Other evidence concerning a
defendant's associations might be relevant in proving other
aggravating circumstances.  But the inference which the
jury was invited to draw in this case tended to prove
nothing more than the abstract beliefs of the Delaware
chapter.  Delaware counters that even these abstract beliefs
constitute a portion of Dawson's -character,- and thus are
admissible in their own right under Delaware law.  Del.
Code Ann., Tit. 11,  4209(d) (1987).  Whatever label is
given to the evidence presented, however, we conclude that
Dawson's First Amendment rights were violated by the
admission of the Aryan Brotherhood evidence in this case,
because the evidence proved nothing more than Dawson's
abstract beliefs.  Cf. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S. 397, 414
(1989) (-[T]he government may not prohibit the expression
of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself
offensive or disagreeable-).  Delaware might have avoided
this problem if it had presented evidence showing more
than mere abstract beliefs on Dawson's part, but on the
present record one is left with the feeling that the Aryan
Brotherhood evidence was employed simply because the
jury would find these beliefs morally reprehensible.
Because Delaware failed to do more, we cannot find the
evidence was properly admitted as relevant character
evidence.
  Nor was the Aryan Brotherhood evidence relevant to
rebut any mitigating evidence offered by Dawson.  We have
held that a capital defendant is entitled to introduce any
relevant mitigating evidence that he proffers in support of
a sentence less than death.  Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455
U. S. 104, 114 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978)
(plurality opinion).  But just as the defendant has the right
to introduce any sort of relevant mitigating evidence, the
State is entitled to rebut that evidence with proof of its
own.  See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at
15) (-The State has a legitimate interest in counteracting
the mitigating evidence which the defendant is entitled to
put in-) (quotation omitted); id., at ___ (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).  In this case, Dawson's mitigating evidence
consisted of testimony about his kindness to family mem-
bers, as well as evidence regarding good time credits he
earned in prison for enrolling in various drug and alcohol
programs.  Delaware argues that because Dawson's evi-
dence consisted of -good- character evidence, it was entitled
to introduce any -bad- character evidence in rebuttal,
including that concerning the Aryan Brotherhood.  The
principle of broad rebuttal asserted by Delaware is correct,
but the argument misses the mark because, as stated
above, the Aryan Brotherhood evidence presented in this
case cannot be viewed as relevant -bad- character evidence
in its own right.
  The dissent takes us to task for failing to recognize the
broader implications of membership in a prison gang, and
for extending the protection of the First Amendment to
evidence introduced at a sentencing hearing.  The material
adduced by the dissent as to the nature of prison gangs -
similar to the evidence which the prosecution in this case
at one time considered adducing by expert testimony, supra,
at 5-6 - would, if it had been presented to the jury, have
made this a different case.  But we do not have the same
confidence as the dissent does that jurors would be familiar
with the court decisions and studies upon which it relies.
Regarding the reach of the First Amendment, the dissent
correctly points out that it prevents the State from crimi-
nalizing certain conduct in the first instance.  But it goes
further than that.  It prohibits a State from denying
admission to the bar on the grounds of previous member-
ship in the Communist Party, when there is no connection
between that membership and the ``good moral character''
required by the State to practice law.  Schware v. Board of
Bar Examiners of N.M., 353 U.S. 232 (1957).  It prohibits
the State from requiring information from an organization
that would impinge on First Amendment associational
rights if there is no connection between the information
sought and the State's interest.  Bates v. Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357
U.S. 449 (1958).  We think that it similarly prevents
Delaware here from employing evidence of a defendant's
abstract beliefs at a sentencing hearing when those beliefs
have no bearing on the issue being tried.
  The question of whether the wrongful admission of the
Aryan Brotherhood evidence at sentencing was harmless
error is not before us at this time, and we therefore leave it
open for consideration by the Supreme Court of Delaware
on remand.  See Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U. S. 738
(1990).
  For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the judgment of the
Supreme Court of Delaware, and remand for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

                            It is so ordered.
-------------------------------


SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
--------
No. 90-6704
--------
DAVID DAWSON, PETITIONER v. DELAWARE
on writ of certiorari to the supreme court
of delaware
[March 9, 1992]

  Justice Blackmun, concurring.
  I join the Court's opinion, but write separately to note my
understanding that the Court, by the penultimate para-
graph of its opinion, ante, at 9, does not require application
of harmless-error review on remand.
  This Court previously has declined to apply harmless-
error analysis to certain categories of constitutional error.
See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986) (racial
discrimination in the selection of a petit jury); Vasquez v.
Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 261-262 (1986) (racial discrimination
in the selection of a grand jury); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S.
39, 49-50, and n. 9 (1984) (right to a public trial); Tumey v.
Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927) (trial before an impartial
judge).  Because of the potential chilling effect that consid-
eration of First Amendment activity at sentencing might
have, there is a substantial argument that harmless-error
analysis is not appropriate for the type of error before us
today.  See Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 587 (1986)
(Stevens, J., opinion concurring in the judgment) (``[V]iola-
tions of certain constitutional rights are not, and should not
be, subject to harmless-error analysis because those rights
protect important values that are unrelated to the truth-
seeking function of the trial'').  The parties did not address
this issue, and it is better left for the Supreme Court of
Delaware on remand.
-------------------------------


SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
--------
No. 90-6704
--------
DAVID DAWSON, PETITIONER v. DELAWARE
on writ of certiorari to the supreme court
of delaware
[March 9, 1992]

  Justice Thomas, dissenting.
  To rebut mitigating character evidence introduced by
petitioner Dawson at his capital sentencing hearing, the
State of Delaware proved that Dawson belonged to the
Aryan Brotherhood prison gang.  The Court holds that the
gang membership evidence ``ha[d] no relevance to the issues
being decided in the proceeding'' and that admission of the
evidence violated the First Amendment.  Ante, at 1.  I
respectfully dissent.
                     I
  Dawson's membership in the Aryan Brotherhood prison
gang had relevance at sentencing.  Under Delaware law,
after a jury finds a statutory aggravating factor, it may
consider -all relevant evidence in aggravation or mitigation-
relating to either the crime or the -character and propensi-
ties- of the defendant.  Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11,  4209(d)(1)
(1987).  Under this provision, Dawson's character became
an issue in determining whether he should receive the
death penalty.
  To prove his good character, as the Court observes,
Dawson introduced evidence that he had acted kindly
toward his family and that he had earned good time credits
while in prison.  Ante, at 3.  Dawson also introduced
evidence of his membership and participation in various
respectable organizations, including the Green Tree
Program (described only as a -drug and alcohol program-),
Alcoholics Anonymous (not described at all), and certain
therapy and counseling groups (also not described at all).
App. 79.  Dawson did not call any expert witnesses to
clarify the nature of these organizations or their activities.
  The State attempted to rebut Dawson's mitigating charac-
ter evidence in part by showing that Dawson also belonged
to a prison gang called the Aryan Brotherhood.  A stipula-
tion read to the jury explained:
-The Aryan Brotherhood refers to a white racist prison
gang that began in the 1960's in California in response
to other gangs of racial minorities.  Separate gangs
calling themselves the Aryan Brotherhood now exist in
many state prisons including Delaware.-  Id., at 132.
I do not consider the evidence of Dawson's gang member-
ship irrelevant to his character.
                     A
  The Court asserts that the gang membership evidence
had no relevance because it did nothing more than indi-
cate Dawson's ``abstract'' racist ``beliefs.''  Ante, at 7.  The
Court suggests that Dawson's membership in a prison gang
would be relevant if the gang had endorsed or committed
``unlawful or violent acts'' such as drug use, escape, or the
murder of other inmates.  Ante, at 5-6, 7.  Yet, because the
State failed to prove the Aryan Brotherhood's activities, the
Court reasons, the jury could do no more than infer that
Dawson shared the gang's racist beliefs.  Ibid.  I disagree.
In my judgment, a jury reasonably could conclude from
Dawson's membership in a prison gang that he had engaged
in some sort of forbidden activities while in prison.  The
evidence also tended to establish future dangerousness and
to rebut Dawson's attempt to show that he was kind to
others.
  Jurors do not leave their knowledge of the world behind
when they enter a courtroom and they do not need to have
the os spelled out in painstaking detail.  Just as
defense counsel may assume when introducing mitigating
evidence that a jury understands the nature of a church
choir, a softball team, or the Boy Scouts, so too may a
prosecutor assume when rebutting this evidence that a jury
knows the nature of a prison gang.  The concept of a prison
gang is not so mysterious that it requires an encyclopedic
definition or a greater explanation than any of the other
organizations to which Dawson belonged, such as Alcoholics
Anonymous or the Green Tree Program.  Cf. Jones v.
Hamelman, 869 F. 2d 1023, 1028 (CA7 1989) (testimony of
a purported expert unnecessary to explain a prison gang
once the record established its existence); United States
Dept. of Justice, Prison Gangs: Their Extent, Nature and
Impact on Prisons 10 (1985) (discussing the "extensive"
media coverage of prison gangs).
  In stating that Dawson belonged to a prison gang, the
stipulation implied much more than that he shared the
gang's abstract racist creed; it indicated that Dawson had
engaged in prison gang activities, and that he had the
character of a person who engages in these activities.
-One of the distinguishing characteristics of the prison
gang is the virtual absence of any non-criminal, non-
deviant activities.  Gang members engage in some
institutional pastimes, weight lifting being one of the
more notable, but in general their activities are crimi-
nal or deviant in nature.  The gang member is com-
pletely immersed in being a career prison gangster,
leaving little time and less inclination for other than
asocial behavior.-  U. S. Dept. of Justice, supra, at x-xi.
Denying that Dawson's gang membership told the jury
anything about his activities, tendencies, and traits-his
-character--ignores reality.  What Judge Easterbrook
remarked when others attempted to distinguish gang
membership from gang activities, someone reading the
Court's opinion might say today:
-Who do they think they are fooling?  What elements of
`membership'-as opposed to `activity'-take place [in
the prison]?  What are prison gangs for, except to
engage in forbidden `activity'?  Surely [they] do not
believe that prison gangs meet every month to discuss
The Critique of Pure Reason and debate how Stanley
Tigerman's buildings differ from those of the Bauhaus
school.  Gangs affiliate for mutual support, but not the
kind contemplated by the National Labor Relations
Act.-  David K. v. Lane, 839 F. 2d 1265, 1278 (CA7
1988) (concurring opinion).
In my view, the stipulation was relevant to Dawson's
character because it explained that the Aryan Brotherhood
was a prison gang and that Dawson was a member.  That
evidence, I submit, supports an inference that while in
prison, Dawson engaged in the kind of unlawful activity
mentioned by the Court.
  The description of the Aryan Brotherhood as a ``racist''
prison gang conveyed additional information about Daw-
son's character.  In Barclay v. Florida, 463 U. S. 939 (1983),
the plurality found it relevant that a black gang conspired
not merely to commit crimes, but to commit them against
white persons out of racial hatred.  See id., at 949.  Even if
Dawson's white racist prison gang does not advocate ``the
murder of fellow inmates,'' ante, at 6, a jury reasonably
could infer that its members in one way or another act upon
their racial prejudice.  The stipulation itself makes clear
that the Aryan Brotherhood does not exist merely to
facilitate formulation of abstract racist thoughts, but to
``respon[d]'' to gangs of racial minorities.  The evidence thus
tends to establish that Dawson has not been ``a well-
behaved and well-adjusted prisoner,'' Skipper v. South
Carolina, 476 U. S. 1, 4 (1986), which itself is an indication
of future dangerousness, see Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U. S.
164, 178 (1988) (plurality opinion); id., at 186 (O'Connor,
J., concurring in judgment).
  The stipulation also tends to rebut Dawson's evidence of
good character.  In capital cases, we have held that the
sentence imposed should reflect a ```reasoned moral re-
sponse''' not only to the crime, but also to the ```back-
ground''' and ```character''' of the defendant himself.  See
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302, 328 (1989) (quoting
California v. Brown, 479 U. S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor,
J., concurring).  In determining Dawson's ``personal culpa-
bility,'' Penry, supra, at 327, the jury surely would want to
know about the various activities, traits, and tendencies
that distinguish him as a ``uniquely individual human
bein[g],'' Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280, 304
(1976).  Dawson introduced mitigating character evidence
that he had acted kindly towards his family.  The stipula-
tion tended to undercut this showing by suggesting that
Dawson's kindness did not extend to members of other
racial groups.  Although we do not sit in judgment of the
morality of particular creeds, we cannot bend traditional
concepts of relevance to exempt the antisocial.
                     B
  The Court's opinion suggests that the Constitution now
imposes a double standard for determining relevance:  a
standard easy for defendants to satisfy, but difficult for
prosecutors.  Under Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104
(1982), and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978) (plurality
opinion), a capital defendant has a right to introduce all
relevant mitigating evidence.  Capital defendants, as a
result, regularly introduce character evidence that allows
juries to consider their abstract beliefs and associational
rights.  Dawson, for example, introduced evidence that he
associated with Alcoholics Anonymous and other groups.
Other defendants have introduced comparable evidence
regarding their religious practice and fraternal organiza-
tions.  See, e. g., Jordan v. State, 518 So. 2d 1186, 1188
(Miss. 1987) (membership in a church); Sivak v. State, 112
Idaho 197, 236, 731 P. 2d 192, 231 (1986) (same); Deputy v.
State, 500 A. 2d 581, 598 (Del. 1985) (religious rebirth);
People v. Belmontes, 45 Cal. 3d 744, 797, 755 P. 2d 310, 340
(1988) (same); Evans v. McCotter, 790 F. 2d 1232, 1242, and
n. 10 (CA5 1986) (conversion to Christianity); State v.
Beuke, 38 Ohio St. 3d 29, 43, 526 N. E. 2d 274, 289 (1988)
(former membership in the Cub Scouts).  I see no way to
hold that this evidence has relevance, but that Dawson's
gang membership does not.
  A double standard for determining relevance may distort
the picture presented to the jury.  In this case, Dawson
himself chose to introduce evidence of certain good charac-
ter traits.  Unless the State had responded with evidence of
other, bad traits, the jury could not possibly have made a
fair and balanced determination.  Membership in Alcoholics
Anonymous might suggest a good character, but member-
ship in the Aryan Brotherhood just as surely suggests a bad
one.  The jury could not have assessed Dawson's overall
character without both.
  Just last term, in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. --
(1991), the Court condemned a similar distortion.  Overrul-
ing Booth v. Maryland, 482 U. S. 496 (1987), and South
Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U. S. 805 (1989), we held that the
Eighth Amendment does not generally prohibit the intro-
duction of victim impact evidence.  See Payne, supra, at
--.  We reasoned that allowing the jury to consider the
defendant, but not the victim, would create an unbalanced
picture.  Quoting a dissenting opinion in Booth, we stated:
-`[T]he State has a legitimate interest in counteracting the
mitigating evidence which the defendant is entitled to put
in, by reminding the sentencer that just as the murderer
should be considered as an individual, so too the victim is
an individual whose death represents a unique loss to
society and in particular to his family.'-  Payne, supra, at
-- (quoting Booth, 482 U. S., at 517 (White, J., dissent-
ing)); see also 482 U. S., at 520 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(-Many citizens have found one-sided and hence unjust the
criminal trial in which a parade of witnesses comes forth to
testify to the pressures beyond normal human experience
that drove the defendant to commit his crime . . . .  Perhaps
these sentiments do not sufficiently temper justice with
mercy, but that is a question to be decided through the
democratic processes of a free people, and not by the
decrees of this Court-).  Whatever distortion was produced
in requiring an exclusive focus on the defendant's character,
at least nothing in Booth prevented the jury-as does
today's decision-from fairly and fully assessing that
character.
                    II
  The Court acknowledges that Delaware could have
avoided any First Amendment problem simply by present-
ing evidence that proved something more than Dawson's
abstract beliefs.  Ante, at 7-8.  For the reasons that I have
stated, I believe that Delaware has made such a showing.
I therefore see no First Amendment violation under the
Court's analysis.  The Court, however, goes on to make
several further assertions about the First Amendment that
I find troubling and unnecessary in this case.
                     A
  Both Dawson and the State, as noted above, had a right
to develop the issue of ``character'' at the sentencing
proceeding.  See Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, 4209(d)(1) (1987);
Eddings, 455 U. S., at 113-114.  In applying the First
Amendment, however, the Court declines to decide whether
abstract beliefs may constitute a portion of character.
``[W]hatever label is given to the evidence,'' the Court
asserts, ``we conclude that Dawson's First Amendment
rights were violated . . . in this case . . . .''  Ante, at 7.  As
a consequence, to the extent that abstract beliefs make up
part of a person's character, the decision today limits the
aspects of character that sentencing authorities may
consider.
  We long have held that the Constitution permits courts
and juries to consider character evidence in sentencing
proceedings.  See Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241, 247
(1949).  Until today, we have never hinted that the First
Amendment limits the aspects of a defendant's character
that they may consider.  To the contrary, we have empha-
sized that the sentencing authority ``may appropriately
conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either
as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source
from which it may come.''  United States v. Tucker, 404
U. S. 443, 446 (1972).
  In Williams, for example, we upheld a New York law that
encouraged the sentencing judge to consider evidence about
the defendant's ``past life, health, habits, conduct, and
mental and moral propensities,'' 337 U. S., at 245, a phrase
easily broad enough to encompass a substantial amount of
First Amendment activity.  Writing for the Court, Justice
Black specifically identified religion and interests as
sentencing considerations that may ``give the sentencing
judge a composite picture of the defendant.''  Id., at 250,  n.
15.
  More recently, in Franklin v. Lynaugh, all five Members
of the Court who addressed the issue agreed that religious
activity may bear upon a defendant's character.  See 487
U. S., at 186 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment)
(-Evidence of . . . religious devotion might demonstrate
positive character traits-); id., at 190 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (-Evidence of . . . regular church attendance- is
relevant to character).  Although the opinions in Franklin
endorsed consideration of religious activity as a mitigating
factor, the endorsement necessarily disfavors abstention
from religious activity, which the First Amendment also
protects.
  The Court nowhere explains why courts and juries may
consider some First Amendment protected activities when
assessing character, but they cannot consider others.
Today's decision, moreover, does not define the boundaries
of permissible inquiry into character.  If the Court means
that no First Amendment protected activity ``ca[n] be
viewed as relevant `bad' character evidence in its own
right,'' ante, at 8, then today's decision represents a dramat-
ic shift in our sentencing jurisprudence.
                     B
  Once the Court concludes that the gang membership
evidence ``has no relevance to the issues being decided in
the [sentencing] proceeding,'' ante, at 1, I also have difficul-
ty seeing what the First Amendment adds to the analysis.
If the Court considers the evidence irrelevant, the problem
is not that Delaware law bases the sentencing decision on
impermissible issues, but rather that Dawson may not have
received a fair trial on the permissible issues in the
proceeding.  The Due Process Clause, not the First Amend-
ment, traditionally has regulated questions about the im-
proper admission of evidence.
  As we stated in Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227
(1940), the requirement of Due Process always has protect-
ed -the weak, or . . . helpless political, religious, or racial
minorities and those who differed- by ensuring that -no
man's life, liberty or property be forfeited as criminal
punishment for violation of [the] law until there ha[s] been
a charge fairly made and fairly tried in a public tribunal
free of prejudice, passion, excitement, and tyrannical
power.-  Id., at 236-237.  We have made clear, in particu-
lar, that when a state court admits evidence that is -so
unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally
unfair, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment provides a mechanism for relief.-  Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U. S., at --; see Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U. S. 168,
179-183 (1986).
  Our decision in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of
N.M., 353 U. S. 232 (1957), which the Court incorrectly
cites, illustrates the point.  In Schware, the New Mexico
Supreme Court denied an applicant admission to the bar on
grounds that he lacked good moral character.  Evidence
showed that the applicant had belonged to the Communist
Party 15 years earlier.  The Court erroneously states that
Schware held that admitting proof of the applicant's mem-
bership in the Communist Party violated the First Amend-
ment.  Ante, at 9.  Schware, in fact, did not decide that
admitting the Communist Party evidence abridged any
right of free political iation.  See 353 U. S., at 243, n.
13.  It held, instead, that the state court erred in admitting
the Communist Party evidence because it had no relevance
to the applicant's moral character after so many years.  See
id., at 246.  Due process, the Court concluded, prohibited
the state court to find the applicant morally unfit to
practice law without any relevant evidence.  See id., at 247.
  Applying familiar evidentiary standards in Dawson's case,
the trial judge recognized that the -real issue- in admitting
the gang membership evidence was whether its -probative
value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.-
App. 52.  The Delaware Supreme Court, likewise, examined
the record to determine whether the gang membership
evidence -improperly appeal[ed] to the juror's passions and
prejudices concerning race, religion, or political affiliation.-
581 A. 2d 1078, 1103 (1990).  The standards employed by
these courts went further than the fundamental unfairness
standard stated in Payne and therefore satisfied the
requirements of Due Process.  Dawson has presented no
convincing argument, based on the record as a whole, that
the courts misapplied these standards to the facts of his
case.  For these reasons, I would affirm.
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