 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

          Syllabus

NORDLINGER v. HAHN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS TAX
ASSESSOR FOR LOS ANGELES COUNTY, et al.
certiorari to the court of appeal of california,
       second appellate district
No. 90-1912.   Argued February 25, 1992"Decided June 18, 1992

In response to rapidly rising real property taxes, California voters
approved a statewide ballot initiative, Proposition 13, which added
Article XIIIA to the State Constitution.  Among other things, Article
XIIIA embodies an ``acquisition value'' system of taxation, whereby
property is reassessed up to current appraised value upon new
construction or a change in ownership.  Exemptions from this reas-
sessment provision exist for two types of transfers:  exchanges of
principal residences by persons over the age of 55 and transfers
between parents and children.  Over time, the acquisition-value
system has created dramatic disparities in the taxes paid by persons
owning similar pieces of property.  Longer-term owners pay lower
taxes reflecting historic property values, while newer owners pay
higher taxes reflecting more recent values.  Faced with such a
disparity, petitioner, a former Los Angeles apartment renter who had
recently purchased a house in Los Angeles County, filed suit against
respondents, the county and its tax assessor, claiming that Article
XIIIA's reassessment scheme violates the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.  The County Superior Court dismissed
the complaint without leave to amend, and the State Court of Appeal
affirmed.
Held:Article XIIIA's acquisition-value assessment scheme does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause.  Pp.7-15.
(a)Unless a state-imposed classification warrants some form of
heightened review because it jeopardizes exercise of a fundamental
right or categorizes on the basis of an inherently suspect characteris-
tic, the Equal Protection Clause requires only that the classification
rationally further a legitimate state interest.  Pp.7-8.
(b)Petitioner may not assert the constitutional right to travel as
a basis for heightened review of Article XIIIA.  Her complaint does
not allege that she herself has been impeded from traveling or from
settling in California because, before purchasing her home, she
already lived in Los Angeles.  Prudential standing principles prohibit-
ing a litigant's raising another person's legal rights may not be
overlooked in this case, since petitioner has not identified any
obstacle preventing others who wish to travel or settle in California
from asserting claims on their own, nor shown any special relation-
ship with those whose rights she seeks to assert.  P.8.
(c)In permitting longer-term owners to pay less in taxes than
newer owners of comparable property, Article XIIIA's assessment
scheme rationally furthers at least two legitimate state interests.
First, because the State has a legitimate interest in local neighbor-
hood preservation, continuity, and stability, it legitimately can decide
to structure its tax system to discourage rapid turnover in ownership
of homes and businesses.  Second, the State legitimately can conclude
that a new owner, at the point of purchasing his property, does not
have the same reliance interest warranting protection against higher
taxes as does an existing owner, who is already saddled with his
purchase and does not have the option of deciding not to buy his
home if taxes become prohibitively high.  Pp.8-12.
(d)Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Webster, 488 U.S. 336, is not
controlling here, since the facts of that case precluded any plausible
inference that the purpose of the tax assessment practice there
invalidated was to achieve the benefits of an acquisition-value tax
scheme.  Pp.12-14.
(e)Article XIIIA's two reassessment exemptions rationally further
legitimate purposes.  The people of California reasonably could have
concluded that older persons in general should not be discouraged
from exchanging their residences for ones more suitable to their
changing family sizes or incomes, and that the interests of family and
neighborhood continuity and stability are furthered by and warrant
an exemption for transfers between parents and children.  Pp.14-15.
(f)Because Article XIIIA is not palpably arbitrary, this Court must
decline petitioner's request to invalidate it, even if it may appear to
be improvident and unwise yet unlikely ever to be reconsidered or
repealed by ordinary democratic processes.  P.15.
225 Cal. App. 3d 1259, 275 Cal. Rptr. 684, affirmed.
Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehn-
quist, C. J., and White, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter,
JJ., joined, and in which Thomas, J., joined as to Part II-A.  Thomas,
J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion.


NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
           SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES--------
                       No. 90-1912
                        --------
           STEPHANIE NORDLINGER, PETITIONER v.
               KENNETH HAHN, in his capacity as TAX
              ASSESSOR FOR LOS ANGELES COUNTY, et al.
          on writ of certiorari to the court of appeal of
               california, second appellate district
                          [June 18, 1992]

       Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court.
       In 1978, California voters staged what has been described
as a property tax revolt by approving a statewide ballot
initiative known as Proposition 13.  The adoption of
Proposition 13 served to amend the California Constitution
to impose strict limits on the rate at which real property is
taxed and on the rate at which real property assessments
are increased from year to year.  In this litigation, we
consider a challenge under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the manner in which real
property now is assessed under the California Constitution.
                                 I
                                 A
       Proposition 13 followed many years of rapidly rising real
property taxes in California.  From fiscal years 1967-1968
to 1971-1972, revenues from these taxes increased on an
average of 11.5 percent per year.  See Report of the Senate
Commission on Property Tax Equity and Revenue to the
California State Senate 23 (1991).  In response, the Califor-
nia Legislature enacted several property tax relief mea-
sures, including a cap on tax rates in 1972.  Id., at 23-24.
The boom in the State's real estate market persevered,
however, and the median price of an existing home doubled
from $31,530 in 1973 to $62,430 in 1977.  As a result, tax
levies continued to rise because of sharply increasing
assessment values.  Id., at 23.  Some homeowners saw their
tax bills double or triple during this period, well outpacing
any growth in their income and ability to pay.  Id., at 25.
See also Oakland, Proposition 13"Genesis and Conse-
quences, 32 Nat. Tax J. 387, 392 (Supp. June 1979).
       By 1978, property tax relief had emerged as a major
political issue in California.  In only one month's time, tax
relief advocates collected over 1.2 million signatures to
qualify Proposition 13 for the June 1978 ballot.  See Lefcoe
& Allison, The Legal Aspects of Proposition 13: The Amador
Valley Case, 53 S. Cal. L. Rev. 173, 174 (1978).  On election
day, Proposition 13 received a favorable vote of 64.8 percent
and carried 55 of the State's 58 counties.  California
Secretary of State, Statement of Vote and Supplement,
Primary Election, June 6, 1978, p. 39.  California thus had
a novel constitutional amendment that led to a property tax
cut of approximately $7 billion in the first year.  Senate
Commission Report, at 28.  A California homeowner with a
$50,000 home enjoyed an immediate reduction of about
$750 per year in property taxes.  Id., at 26.
       As enacted by Proposition 13, Article XIIIA of the
California Constitution caps real property taxes at 1% of a
property's  full cash value.  1(a).   Full cash value is
defined as the assessed valuation as of the 1975-1976 tax
year or,  thereafter, the appraised value of real property
when purchased, newly constructed, or a change in owner-
ship has occurred after the 1975 assessment.  2(a).  The
assessment  may reflect from year to year the inflationary
rate not to exceed 2 percent for any given year.  2(b).
       Article XIIIA also contains several exemptions from this
reassessment provision.  One exemption authorizes the
legislature to allow homeowners over the age of 55 who sell
their principal residences to carry their previous base-year
assessments with them to replacement residences of equal
or lesser value.  2(a).  A second exemption applies to
transfers of a principal residence (and up to $1 million of
other real property) between parents and children.  2(h).
       In short, Article XIIIA combines a 1% ceiling on the
property tax rate with a 2% cap on annual increases in
assessed valuations.  The assessment limitation, however,
is subject to the exception that new construction or a
change of ownership triggers a reassessment up to current
appraised value.  Thus, the assessment provisions of Article
XIIIA essentially embody an  acquisition value system of
taxation rather than the more commonplace  current value
taxation.  Real property is assessed at values related to the
value of the property at the time it is acquired by the
taxpayer rather than to the value it has in the current real
estate market.
       Over time, this acquisition-value system has created
dramatic disparities in the taxes paid by persons owning
similar pieces of property.  Property values in California
have inflated far in excess of the allowed 2% cap on
increases in assessments for property that is not newly
constructed or that has not changed hands.  See Senate
Commission Report, at 31-32.  As a result, longer-term
property owners pay lower property taxes reflecting historic
property values, while newer owners pay higher property
taxes reflecting more recent values.  For that reason,
Proposition 13 has been labeled by some as a  welcome
stranger system"the newcomer to an established commu-
nity is  welcome in anticipation that he will contribute a
larger percentage of support for local government than his
settled neighbor who owns a comparable home.  Indeed, in
dollar terms, the differences in tax burdens are staggering.
By 1989, the 44% of California home owners who have
owned their homes since enactment of Proposition 13 in
1978 shouldered only 25% of the more than $4 billion in
residential property taxes paid by homeowners statewide.
Id., at 33.  If property values continue to rise more than the
annual 2% inflationary cap, this disparity will continue to
grow.
                                 B
       According to her amended complaint, petitioner Stephanie
Nordlinger in November 1988 purchased a house in the
Baldwin Hills neighborhood of Los Angeles County for
$170,000.  App. 5.  The prior owners bought the home just
two years before for $121,500.  Id., at 6.  Before her
purchase, petitioner had lived in a rented apartment in Los
Angeles and had not owned any real property in California.
Id., at 5; Tr. of Oral Arg. 12.
       In early 1989, petitioner received a notice from the Los
Angeles County Tax Assessor, who is a respondent here,
informing her that her home had been reassessed upward
to $170,100 on account of its change in ownership.  App. 7.
She learned that the reassessment resulted in a property
tax increase of $453.60, up 36% to $1,701, for the
1988-1989 fiscal year.  Ibid.
       Petitioner later discovered she was paying about five
times more in taxes than some of her neighbors who owned
comparable homes since 1975 within the same residential
development.  For example, one block away, a house of
identical size on a lot slightly larger than petitioner's was
subject to a general tax levy of only $358.20 (based on an
assessed valuation of $35,820, which reflected the home's
value in 1975 plus the up-to-2% per year inflation factor).
Id., at 9-10.  According to petitioner, her total property
taxes over the first 10 years in her home will approach
$19,000, while any neighbor who bought a comparable
home in 1975 stands to pay just $4,100.  Brief for Petitioner
3.  The general tax levied against her modest home is only
a few dollars short of that paid by a pre-1976 owner of a
$2.1 million Malibu beachfront home.  App. 24.
       After exhausting administrative remedies, petitioner
brought suit against respondents in Los Angeles County
Superior Court.  She sought a tax refund and a declaration
that her tax was unconstitutional.  In her amended
complaint, she alleged:  Article XIIIA has created an
arbitrary system which assigns disparate real property tax
burdens on owners of generally comparable and similarly
situated properties without regard to the use of the real
property taxed, the burden the property places on govern-
ment, the actual value of the property or the financial
capability of the property owner.  Id., at 12.  Respondents
demurred.  Id., at 14.  By minute order, the Superior Court
sustained the demurrer and dismissed the complaint
without leave to amend.  App. to Pet. for Cert. D2.
       The California Court of Appeal affirmed.  Nordlinger v.
Lynch, 225 Cal.App.3d 1259, 275 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1990).  It
noted that the Supreme Court of California already had
rejected a constitutional challenge to the disparities in
taxation resulting from Article XIIIA. See Amador Valley
Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization,
22 Cal.3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281 (1978).  Characterizing Article
XIIIA as an  acquisition value system, the Court of Appeal
found it survived equal protection review, because it was
supported by at least two rational bases: first, it prevented
property taxes from reflecting unduly inflated and unfore-
seen current values, and, second, it allowed property owners
to estimate future liability with substantial certainty.  225
Cal.App.3d, at 1273, 275 Cal. Rptr., at 691-692 (citing
Amador, 22 Cal.3d, at 235, 583 P.2d, at 1293).
       The Court of Appeal also concluded that this Court's more
recent decision in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Webster
County, 488 U. S. 336 (1989), did not warrant a different
result.  At issue in Allegheny Pittsburgh was the practice of
a West Virginia county tax assessor of assessing recently
purchased property on the basis of its purchase price, while
making only minor modifications in the assessments of
property that had not recently been sold.  Properties that
had been sold recently were reassessed and taxed at values
between 8 and 35 times that of properties that had not been
sold.  Id., at 341.  This Court determined that the unequal
assessment practice violated the Equal Protection Clause.
       The Court of Appeal distinguished Allegheny Pittsburgh
on grounds that  California has opted for an assessment
method based on each individual owner's acquisition cost,
while,  [i]n marked contrast, the West Virginia Constitution
requires property to be taxed at a uniform rate statewide
according to its estimated current market value (emphasis
in original).  225 Cal.App.3d, at 1277-1278, 275 Cal. Rptr.,
at 695.  Thus, the Court of Appeal found:  Allegheny does
not prohibit the states from adopting an acquisition value
assessment method.  That decision merely prohibits the
arbitrary enforcement of a current value assessment
method (emphasis omitted).  Id., at 1265, 275 Cal. Rptr.,
at 686.
       The Court of Appeal also rejected petitioner's argument
that the effect of Article XIIIA on the constitutional right to
travel warranted heightened equal protection review.  The
court determined that the right to travel was not infringed,
because Article XIIIA  bases each property owner's assess-
ment on acquisition value, irrespective of the owner's status
as a California resident or the owner's length of residence
in the state.  Id., at 1281, 275 Cal. Rptr., at 697.  Any
benefit to longtime California residents was deemed
 incidental to an acquisition-value approach.  Finally, the
Court of Appeal found its conclusion was unchanged by the
exemptions in Article XIIIA.  Ibid., 275 Cal. Rptr., at 697.
       The Supreme Court of California denied review.  App. to
Pet. for Cert. B1.  We granted certiorari.  ___ U. S. ___
(1991).
                                II
       The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 1, commands that no State shall  deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.  Of course, most laws differentiate in some fashion
between classes of persons.  The Equal Protection Clause
does not forbid classifications.  It simply keeps governmen-
tal decisionmakers from treating differently persons who
are in all relevant respects alike.  F.S. Royster Guano Co.
v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415 (1920).
       As a general rule,  legislatures are presumed to have
acted within their constitutional power despite the fact
that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 425-426 (1961).
Accordingly, this Court's cases are clear that, unless a
classification warrants some form of heightened review
because it jeopardizes exercise of a fundamental right or
categorizes on the basis of an inherently suspect character-
istic, the Equal Protection Clause requires only that the
classification rationally further a legitimate state interest.
See, e.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U. S.
432, 439-441 (1985); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U. S. 297,
303 (1976).
                                 A
       At the outset, petitioner suggests that her challenge to
Article XIIIA qualifies for heightened scrutiny because it
infringes upon the constitutional right to travel.  See, e.g.,
Zobel v. Williams, 457 U. S. 55, 60, n. 6 (1982); Memorial
Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250, 254-256
(1976).  In particular, petitioner alleges that the exemptions
to reassessment for transfers by owners over 55 and for
transfers between parents and children run afoul of the
right to travel, because they classify directly on the basis of
California residency.  But the complaint does not allege
that petitioner herself has been impeded from traveling or
from settling in California because, as has been noted, prior
to purchasing her home, petitioner lived in an apartment in
Los Angeles.  This Court's prudential standing principles
impose a  general prohibition on a litigant's raising another
person's legal rights.  Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 751
(1984).  See also Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. S.
163, 166 (1972).  Petitioner has not identified any obstacle
preventing others who wish to travel or settle in California
from asserting claims on their own behalf, nor has she
shown any special relationship with those whose rights she
seeks to assert, such that we might overlook this prudential
limitation.  Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S.
617, 623, n. 3 (1989).  Accordingly, petitioner may not
assert the constitutional right to travel as a basis for
heightened review.
                                 B
       The appropriate standard of review is whether the
difference in treatment between newer and older owners
rationally furthers a legitimate state interest.  In general,
the Equal Protection Clause is satisfied so long as there is
a plausible policy reason for the classification, see United
States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 166, 174,
179 (1980), the legislative facts on which the classification
is apparently based rationally may have been considered to
be true by the governmental decisionmaker, see Minnesota
v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U. S. 456, 464 (1981), and
the relationship of the classification to its goal is not so
attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irratio-
nal, see Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U. S.,
at 446.  This standard is especially deferential in the
context of classifications made by complex tax laws.   [I]n
structuring internal taxation schemes `the States have large
leeway in making classifications and drawing lines which
in their judgment produce reasonable systems of taxation.'
Williams v. Vermont, 472 U. S. 14, 22 (1985), quoting
Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U. S. 356,
359 (1973).  See also Regan v. Taxation with Representation
of Washington, 461 U. S. 540, 547 (1983) ( Legislatures
have especially broad latitude in creating classifications and
distinctions in tax statutes).
       As between newer and older owners, Article XIIIA does
not discriminate with respect to either the tax rate or the
annual rate of adjustment in assessments.  Newer and older
owners alike benefit in both the short and long run from
the protections of a 1% tax rate ceiling and no more than a
2% increase in assessment value per year.  New owners and
old owners are treated differently with respect to one factor
only"the basis on which their property is initially assessed.
Petitioner's true complaint is that the State has denied
her"a new owner"the benefit of the same assessment
value that her neighbors"older owners"enjoy.
       We have no difficulty in ascertaining at least two rational
or reasonable considerations of difference or policy that
justify denying petitioner the benefits of her neighbors'
lower assessments.  First, the State has a legitimate
interest in local neighborhood preservation, continuity, and
stability.  Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926).
The State therefore legitimately can decide to structure its
tax system to discourage rapid turnover in ownership of
homes and businesses, for example, in order to inhibit
displacement of lower income families by the forces of
gentrification or of established,  mom-and-pop businesses
by newer chain operations.  By permitting older owners to
pay progressively less in taxes than new owners of compa-
rable property, the Article XIIIA assessment scheme
rationally furthers this interest.
       Second, the State legitimately can conclude that a new
owner at the time of acquiring his property does not have
the same reliance interest warranting protection against
higher taxes as does an existing owner.  The State may
deny a new owner at the point of purchase the right to  lock
in to the same assessed value as is enjoyed by an existing
owner of comparable property, because an existing owner
rationally may be thought to have vested expectations in
his property or home that are more deserving of protection
than the anticipatory expectations of a new owner at the
point of purchase.  A new owner has full information about
the scope of future tax liability before acquiring the
property, and if he thinks the future tax burden is too
demanding, he can decide not to complete the purchase at
all.  By contrast, the existing owner, already saddled with
his purchase, does not have the option of deciding not to
buy his home if taxes become prohibitively high.  To meet
his tax obligations, he might be forced to sell his home or to
divert his income away from the purchase of food, clothing,
and other necessities.  In short, the State may decide that
it is worse to have owned and lost, than never to have
owned at all.
       This Court previously has acknowledged that classifica-
tions serving to protect legitimate expectation and reliance
interests do not deny equal protection of the laws.   The
protection of reasonable reliance interests is not only a
legitimate governmental objective: it provides an exceeding-
ly persuasive justification. . . . (internal quotations omit-
ted).  Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U. S. 728, 746 (1984).  For
example, in Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U. S.
450 (1988), the Court determined that a prohibition on user
fees for bus service in  reorganized school districts but not
in  nonreorganized school districts does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause, because  the legislature could
conceivably have believed that such a policy would serve
the legitimate purpose of fulfilling the reasonable expecta-
tions of those residing in districts with free busing arrange-
ments imposed by reorganization plans.  Id., at 465.
Similarly, in United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz,
supra, the Court determined that a denial of dual  windfall
retirement benefits to some railroad workers but not others
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, because
 Congress could properly conclude that persons who had
actually acquired statutory entitlement to windfall benefits
while still employed in the railroad industry had a greater
equitable claim to those benefits than the members of
appellee's class who were no longer in railroad employment
when they became eligible for dual benefits.  449 U. S., at
178.  Finally, in New Orleans v. Dukes, supra, the Court
determined that an ordinance banning certain street-vendor
operations, but grandfathering existing vendors who had
been in operation for more than eight years, did not violate
the Equal Protection Clause because the  city could reason-
ably decide that newer businesses were less likely to have
built up substantial reliance interests in continued opera-
tion.  427 U. S., at 305.
       Petitioner argues that Article XIIIA cannot be distin-
guished from the tax assessment practice found to violate
the Equal Protection Clause in Allegheny Pittsburgh.  Like
Article XIIIA, the practice at issue in Allegheny Pittsburgh
resulted in dramatic disparities in taxation of properties of
comparable value.  But an obvious and critical factual
difference between this case and Allegheny Pittsburgh is the
absence of any indication in Allegheny Pittsburgh that the
policies underlying an acquisition-value taxation scheme
could conceivably have been the purpose for the Webster
County tax assessor's unequal assessment scheme.  In the
first place, Webster County argued that  its assessment
scheme is rationally related to its purpose of assessing
properties at true current value (emphasis added).  Id., at
488 U. S., at 343.  Moreover, the West Virginia  Constitu-
tion and laws provide that all property of the kind held by
petitioners shall be taxed at a rate uniform throughout the
State according to its estimated market value, and the
Court found  no suggestion that  the State may have
adopted a different system in practice from that specified by
statute.  Id., at 345.
       To be sure, the Equal Protection Clause does not demand
for purposes of rational-basis review that a legislature or
governing decisionmaker actually articulate at any time the
purpose or rationale supporting its classification.  United
States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U. S., at 179.
See also McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs of Chica-
go, 394 U. S. 802, 809 (1969) (legitimate state purpose may
be ascertained even when the legislative or administrative
history is silent).  Nevertheless, this Court's review does
require that a purpose may conceivably or  may reasonably
have been the purpose and policy of the relevant govern-
mental decisionmaker.  Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v.
Bowers, 358 U. S. 522, 528-529 (1959).  See also Schweiker
v. Wilson, 450 U. S. 221, 235 (1981) (classificatory scheme
must  rationally advanc[e] a reasonable and identifiable
governmental objective (emphasis added)).  Allegheny
Pittsburgh was the rare case where the facts precluded any
plausible inference that the reason for the unequal assess-
ment practice was to achieve the benefits of an acquisition-
value tax scheme.  By contrast, Article XIIIA was enacted
precisely to achieve the benefits of an acquisition-value
system.  Allegheny Pittsburgh is not controlling here.
       Finally, petitioner contends that the unfairness of Article
XIIIA is made worse by its exemptions from reassessment
for two special classes of new owners: persons aged 55 and
older, who exchange principal residences, and children who
acquire property from their parents.  This Court previously
has declined to hold that narrow exemptions from a general
scheme of taxation necessarily render the overall scheme
invidiously discriminatory.  See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation
with Representation of Washington, 461 U. S. at 550-551
(denial of tax exemption to nonprofit lobbying organizations,
but with an exception for veterans' groups, does not violate
equal protection).  For purposes of rational-basis review, the
 latitude of discretion is notably wide in . . . the granting of
partial or total exemptions upon grounds of policy.  F.S.
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S., at 415.
       The two exemptions at issue here rationally further
legitimate purposes.  The people of California reasonably
could have concluded that older persons in general should
not be discouraged from moving to a residence more
suitable to their changing family size or income.  Similarly,
the people of California reasonably could have concluded
that the interests of family and neighborhood continuity
and stability are furthered by and warrant an exemption for
transfers between parents and children.  Petitioner has not
demonstrated that no rational bases lie for either of these
exemptions.
                                III
       Petitioner and amici argue with some appeal that Article
XIIIA frustrates the  American dream of home ownership
for many younger and poorer California families.  They
argue that Article XIIIA places start-up businesses that
depend on ownership of property at a severe disadvantage
in competing with established businesses.  They argue that
Article XIIIA dampens demand for and construction of new
housing and buildings.  And they argue that Article XIIIA
constricts local tax revenues at the expense of public
education and vital services.
       Time and again, however, this Court has made clear in
the rational-basis context that the  Constitution presumes
that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvi-
dent decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic
process and that judicial intervention is generally unwar-
ranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political
branch has acted (footnote omitted).  Vance v. Bradley, 440
U. S. 93, 97 (1979).  Certainly, California's grand experi-
ment appears to vest benefits in a broad, powerful, and
entrenched segment of society, and, as the Court of Appeal
surmised, ordinary democratic processes may be unlikely to
prompt its reconsideration or repeal.  See 225 Cal. App. 3d,
at 1282, n. 11, 275 Cal. Rptr., at 698, n. 11.  Yet many wise
and well-intentioned laws suffer from the same malady.
Article XIIIA is not palpably arbitrary, and we must decline
petitioner's request to upset the will of the people of
California.
       The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
It is so ordered.



            SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES--------
                       No. 90-1912
                        --------
           STEPHANIE NORDLINGER, PETITIONER v.
               KENNETH HAHN, in his capacity as TAX
              ASSESSOR FOR LOS ANGELES COUNTY, et al.
          on writ of certiorari to the court of appeal of
               california, second appellate district
                          [June 18, 1992]

       Justice Thomas, concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment.
       In Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission
of Webster County, 488 U. S. 336 (1989), this Court struck
down an assessment method used in Webster County, West
Virginia, that operated precisely the same way as the
California scheme being challenged today.  I agree with the
Court that Proposition 13 is constitutional.  But I also agree
with Justice Stevens that Allegheny Pittsburgh cannot be
distinguished, see post, at 5.  To me Allegheny Pittsburgh
represents a  needlessly intrusive judicial infringement on
the State's legislative powers, New Orleans v. Dukes, 427
U. S. 297, 306 (1976) (per curiam), and I write separately
because I see no benefit, and much risk, in refusing to
confront it directly.
                                 I
       Allegheny Pittsburgh involved a county assessment
scheme indistinguishable in relevant respects from Proposi-
tion 13.  As the Court explains, California taxes real
property at 1% of  full cash value, which means the
 assessed value as of 1975 (under the previous method)
and after 1975-1976 the  appraised value of real property
when purchased, newly constructed, or a change in value
has occurred after the 1975 assessment.  The assessed
value may be increased for inflation, but only at a maxi-
mum rate of 2% each year.  See California Const., Art.
XIIIA, 1(a), 2(a); ante, at 2.  The property tax system
worked much the same way in Webster County, West
Virginia.  The tax assessor assigned real property an
 appraised value, set the  assessed value at half of the
appraised value, then collected taxes by multiplying the
assessed value by the relevant tax rate.  For property that
had been sold recently, the assessor set the appraised value
at the most recent price of purchase.  For property that had
not been sold recently, she increased the appraised price by
10%, first in 1976, then again in 1981 and 1983.
       The assessor's methods resulted in  dramatic differences
in valuation between . . . recently transferred property and
otherwise comparable surrounding land.  488 U. S., at 341;
cf. Glennon, Taxation and Equal Protection, 58 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 261, 269-270 (1990) (discussing the effects of
Proposition 13); Cohen, State Law in Equality Clothing: A
Comment on Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Company v. County
Commission, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 87, 91, and n. 29 (1990);
Hellerstein & Peters, Recent Supreme Court Decisions
Have Far-Reaching Implications, 70 J. Taxation 306,
308-310 (1989).  Several coal companies that owned
property in Webster County sued the county assessor,
alleging violations of both the West Virginia and the United
States Constitutions.  The Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia upheld the assessment against the compa-
nies, but this Court reversed.
       The Allegheny Pittsburgh Court asserted that with
respect to taxation, the Equal Protection Clause constrains
the States as follows.  Although  [t]he use of a general
adjustment as a transitional substitute for an individual
reappraisal violates no constitutional command, the Clause
requires that  general adjustments [be] accurate enough
over a short period of time to equalize the differences in
proportion between the assessments of a class of property
holders.  488 U. S., at 343.   [T]he constitutional require-
ment is the seasonable attainment of a rough equality in
tax treatment of similarly situated property owners.  Ibid.
(citing Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522,
526-527 (1959)).  Moreover, the Court stated, the Constitu-
tion and laws of West Virginia  provide that all property of
the kind held by petitioners shall be taxed at a rate uniform
throughout the State according to its estimated market
value, and  [t]here [was] no suggestion . . . that the State
may have adopted a different system in practice from that
specified by statute.  488 U. S., at 345.   Indeed, [the
assessor's] practice seems contrary to that of the guide
published by the West Virginia Tax Commission as an aid
to local assessors in the assessment of real property.  Ibid.;
see also ibid. ( We are not advised of any West Virginia
statute or practice which authorizes individual counties of
the State to fashion their own substantive assessment
policies independently of state statute).  The Court refused
to decide  whether the Webster County assessment method
would stand on a different footing if it were the law of a
State, generally applied, instead of the aberrational
enforcement policy it appears to be.  Id., at 344, n. 4.
Finally, the Court declared,  `[I]ntentional systematic
undervaluation by state officials of other taxable property
in the same class contravenes the constitutional right of one
taxed upon the full value of his property.'  Id., at 345
(quoting Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U. S. 350,
352-353 (1918), and citing Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota
County, 260 U. S. 441 (1923), and Cumberland Coal Co. v.
Board of Revision of Tax Assessments in Green County, Pa.,
284 U. S. 23 (1931)).  The Court concluded that the assess-
ments for the coal companies' properties had failed these
requisites of the Equal Protection Clause.
                                II
       As the Court accurately states today,  this Court's cases
"Allegheny Pittsburgh aside" are clear that, unless a
classification warrants some form of heightened review
because it jeopardizes [the] exercise of a fundamental right
or categorizes on the basis of an inherently suspect charac-
teristic, the Equal Protection Clause requires only that the
classification rationally further a legitimate state interest.
Ante, at 7; see also Burlington N. R. Co. v. Ford, 504 U. S.
___, ___ (1992); Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co.,
410 U. S. 356, 359 (1973).  The California tax system, like
most, does not involve either suspect classes or fundamental
rights, and the Court properly reviews California's classifi-
cation for a rational basis.  Today's review, however, differs
from the review in Allegheny Pittsburgh.
       The Court's analysis in Allegheny Pittsburgh is suscepti-
ble, I think, to at least three interpretations.  The first is
the one offered by petitioner.  Under her reading of the
case, properties are  similarly situated or within the same
 class for the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause
when they are located in roughly the same types of neigh-
borhoods, for example, are roughly the same size, and are
roughly the same in other, unspecified ways.  According to
petitioner, the Webster County assessor's plan violated the
Equal Protection Clause because she had failed to achieve
a  seasonable attainment of a rough equality in tax treat-
ment of all the objectively comparable properties in
Webster County, presumably those with about the same
acreage and about the same amount of coal.  Petitioner
contends that Proposition 13 suffers from similar flaws.  In
1989, she points out,  the long-time owner of a stately
7,800-square-foot, seven-bedroom mansion on a huge lot in
Beverly Hills (among the most luxurious homes in one of
the most expensive neighborhoods in Los Angeles County)
. . . paid less property tax annually than the new homeown-
er of a tiny 980-square-foot home on a small lot in an
extremely modest Venice neighborhood.  Brief for Peti-
tioner 5; see also id., at 7 (Petitioner's  1988 property tax
assessment on her unpretentious Baldwin Hills tract home
is almost identical to that of a pre-1976 owner of a fabulous
beach-front Malibu residential property worth $2.1 million,
even though her property is worth only 1/12th as much as
his).  Because California not only has not tried to repair
this systematic, intentional, and gross disparity in taxation,
but has enacted it into positive law, petitioner argues,
Proposition 13 violates the Equal Protection Clause.
       This argument rests, in my view, on a basic misunder-
standing of Allegheny Pittsburgh.  The Court there proceed-
ed on the assumption of law (assumed because the parties
did not contest it) that the initial classification, by the
State, was constitutional, and the assumption of fact
(assumed because the parties had so stipulated) that the
properties were comparable under the State's classification.
But cf. Glennon, 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev., at 271-272 (noting
that some of the properties contained coal and others did
not).  In referring to the tax treatment of a  class of
property holders, or  similarly situated property owners,
488 U. S., at 343, the Court did not purport to review the
constitutionality of the initial classification, by market
value, drawn by the State, as opposed to the further
subclassification within the initial class, by acquisition
value, drawn by the assessor.  Instead, Allegheny Pitts-
burgh assumed that whether properties or persons are
similarly situated depended on state law, and not, as
petitioner argues, on some neutral criteria such as size or
location that serve as proxies for market value.  Under that
theory, market value would be the only rational basis for
classifying property.  But the Equal Protection Clause does
not prescribe a single method of taxation.  We have consis-
tently rejected petitioner's theory, see, e. g., Ohio Oil Co. v.
Conway, 281 U. S. 146 (1930); Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsyl-
vania, 134 U. S. 232 (1890), and the Court properly rejects
it today.
       Allegheny Pittsburgh, then, does not prevent the State of
California from classifying properties on the basis of their
value at acquisition, so long as the classification is support-
ed by a rational basis.  I agree with the Court that it is,
both for the reasons given by this Court, see ante, at 9-12,
and for the reasons given by the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia in Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v.
State Board of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 P. 2d 1281
(1978).  But the classification employed by the Webster
County assessor, indistinguishable from California's, was
rational for all those reasons as well.  In answering
petitioner's argument that Allegheny Pittsburgh controls
here, respondents offer a second explanation for that case.
Justice Stevens gives much the same explanation, see
post, at 4-5, though he concludes in the end that Proposi-
tion 13, after Allegheny Pittsburgh, is unconstitutional.
       According to respondents, the Equal Protection Clause
permits a State itself to determine which properties are
similarly situated, as the State of California did here
(classifying properties by acquisition value) and as the State
of West Virginia did in Allegheny Pittsburgh (classifying
properties by market value).  But once a state does so,
respondents suggest, the Equal Protection Clause requires
after Allegheny Pittsburgh that properties in the same class
be accorded seasonably equal treatment and not be inten-
tionally and systematically undervalued.  Proposition 13
provides for the assessment of properties in the same state-
determined class regularly and at roughly full value; this
contrasts with the tax scheme in Webster County, where by
dividing property in the same class (by market value) into
a subclass (by acquisition value), the assessor regularly
undervalued the property similarly situated.  This, accord-
ing to respondents, made the Webster County scheme
unconstitutional, and distinguishes Proposition 13.
       Respondents' reading of Allegheny Pittsburgh is, in my
view, as misplaced as petitioner's; their test, for starters,
comes with a dubious pedigree.  In one of the cases cited in
Allegheny Pittsburgh, Allied Stores, we upheld against
an equal protection challenge a statute that exempted some
corporations from ad valorem taxes imposed on others.  Not
only does Allied Stores not even hint that the Constitution
 require[s] . . . the seasonable attainment of a rough
equality in tax treatment of similarly situated property
owners, 488 U. S., at 343, we took pains there to stress a
very different proposition:
 The States have very wide discretion in the laying of
their taxes. . . . Of course, the States, in the exercise of
their taxing power, are subject to the requirements of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.  But that clause imposes no iron rule of equality,
prohibiting the flexibility and variety that are appropri-
ate to reasonable schemes of state taxation.  The State
. . . is not required to resort to close distinctions or to
maintain a precise, scientific uniformity with reference
to composition, use or value.  Allied Stores, 358 U. S.,
at 526-527.
Two of the other cases cited in Allegheny Pittsburgh,
Sunday Lake Iron and Sioux City Bridge, also rejected
equal protection challenges, see also Charleston Fed.
Savings & Loan Assn. v. Alderson, 324 U. S. 182 (1945),
and the case in which the words intentional, systematic,
and undervaluation first appeared, Coulter v. Louisville &
Nashville R. Co., 196 U. S. 599, 609 (1905), did not explain
where the test came from or why.
       It is true that we applied the rule of Coulter to strike
down a tax system in Cumberland Coal, also cited in
Allegheny Pittsburgh.  Cumberland Coal, however, reflects
the most serious of the problems with respondents' reading
of Allegheny Pittsburgh.  As respondents understand these
two cases, their rule is categorical: A tax scheme violates
the Equal Protection Clause unless it provides for  the
seasonable attainment of a rough equality in tax treatment
or if it results in ```intentional systematic undervaluation'''
of properties similarly situated by state law, 488 U. S., at
343, 345.  This would be so regardless of whether the
inequality or the undervaluation, which may result (as in
Webster County) from further classifications of properties
within a class, is supported by a rational basis.  But not
since the coming of modern equal protection jurisprudence
has this Court supplanted the rational judgments of state
representatives with its own notions of  rough equality,
 undervaluation, or  fairness.  Cumberland Coal, which
fails even to mention rational-basis review, conflicts with
our current caselaw.  Allegheny Pittsburgh did not, in my
view, mean to return us to the era when this Court some-
times second-guessed state tax officials.  In rejecting today
respondents' reading of Allegheny Pittsburgh, the Court, as
I understand it, agrees.
       This brings me to the third explanation for Allegheny
Pittsburgh, the one offered today by the Court.  The Court
proceeds in what purports to be our standard equal protec-
tion framework, though it reapplies an old, and to my mind
discredited, gloss to rational-basis review.  The Court
concedes that the  Equal Protection Clause does not
demand for purposes of rational-basis review that a
legislature or governing decisionmaker actually articulate
at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classifi-
cation.  Ante, at 13 (citing United States Railroad Retire-
ment Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 166, 179 (1980)).  This principle
applies, the Court acknowledges, not only to an initial
classification but to all further classifications within a class.
 Nevertheless, this Court's review does require that a
purpose may conceivably or `may reasonably have been the
purpose and policy' of the relevant governmental decision-
maker, the Court says, ante, at 13 (quoting Allied Stores,
supra, at 528-529), and  Allegheny Pittsburgh was the rare
case where the facts precluded any plausible inference that
the reason for the unequal assessment practice was to
achieve the benefits of an acquisition-value tax scheme,
ante, at 13.  Rather than obeying the  law of a State,
generally applied, the county assessor had administered an
 aberrational enforcement policy, 488 U. S., at 344, n. 4.
See ante, at 13.  According to the Court, therefore, the
problem in Allegheny Pittsburgh was that the Webster
County scheme, though otherwise rational, was irrational
because it was contrary to state law.  Any rational bases
underlying the acquisition-value scheme were  implausible
(or  unreasonable) because they were made so by the Con-
stitution and laws of the State of West Virginia.
       That explanation, like petitioner's and respondents', is in
tension with settled case law.  Even if the assessor did
violate West Virginia law (and that she did is open to
question, see In re 1975 Tax Assessments Against Oneida
Coal Co., "" W. Va. "", "", 360 S. E. 2d 560, 564
(1987)), she would not have violated the Equal Protection
Clause.  A violation of state law does not by itself constitute
a violation of the Federal Constitution.  We made that clear
in Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U. S. 1 (1944), for instance,
where a candidate for state office complained that members
of the local canvassing board had refused to certify his
name as a nominee to the Secretary of State, thus violating
an Illinois statute.  Because the plaintiff had not alleged,
say, that the defendants had meant to discriminate against
him on racial grounds, but merely that they had failed to
comply with a statute, we rejected the argument that the
defendants had thereby violated the Equal Protection
Clause.
 [N]ot every denial of a right conferred by state law
involves a denial of the equal protection of the laws,
even though the denial of the right to one person may
operate to confer it on another. . . .  [W]here the official
action purports to be in conformity to the statutory
classification, an erroneous or mistaken performance of
the statutory duty, although a violation of the statute,
is not without more a denial of the equal protection of
the laws.  Id., at 8.
See also Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Browning, 310
U. S. 362 (1940).
       The Court today promises not to have overruled Snowden,
see ante, at 14, n. 8, but its disclaimer, I think, is in vain.
For if, as the Court suggests, what made the assessor's
method unreasonable was her supposed violation of state
law, the Court's interpretation of Allegheny Pittsburgh
recasts in this case the proposition that we had earlier
rejected.  See Glennon, 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev., at 268-269;
Cohen, 38 UCLA L. Rev., at 93-94; Ely, Another Spin on
Allegheny Pittsburgh, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 107, 108-109
(1990).  In repudiating Snowden, moreover, the Court
threatens settled principles not only of the Fourteenth
Amendment but of the Eleventh.  We have held that the
Eleventh Amendment bars federal courts from ordering
state actors to conform to the dictates of state law.
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465
U. S. 89 (1984).  After today, however, a plaintiff might be
able invoke federal jurisdiction to have state actors obey
state law, for a claim that the state actor has violated state
law appears to have become a claim that he has violated
the Constitution.  See Cohen, supra, at 103; Ely, supra, at
109-110 ( [B]y the Court's logic, all violations of state
law"at least those violations that end (as most do) in the
treatment of some people better than others"are theoreti-
cally convertible into violations of the Equal Protection
Clause).
       I understand that the Court prefers to distinguish
Allegheny Pittsburgh, but in doing so, I think, the Court has
left our equal protection jurisprudence in disarray.  The
analysis appropriate to this case is straightforward.  Unless
a classification involves suspect classes or fundamental
rights, judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause
demands only a conceivable rational basis for the chal-
lenged state distinction.  See Fritz, supra; Kassel v. Consoli-
dated Freightways Corp. of Delaware, 450 U. S. 662,
702-706, and n. 13 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  This
basis need not be one identified by the State itself; in fact,
States need not articulate any reasons at all for their
actions.  See ibid.  Proposition 13, I believe, satisfies this
standard"but so, for the same reasons, did the scheme
employed in Webster County.  See Brief for Pacific Legal
Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae 7, 9-10, Brief for Na-
tional Association of Counties et al. as Amici Curiae 9-13,
Brief for Respondent 31-32, in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal
Co. v. County Comm'n of Webster County, O. T. 1988, Nos.
87-1303, 87-1310; ante, at 9-12.  Allegheny Pittsburgh
appears to have survived today's decision.  I wonder,
though, about its legacy.
                                ***
       I concur in the judgment of the Court and join Part II-A
of its opinion.



            SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES--------
                       No. 90-1912
                        --------
           STEPHANIE NORDLINGER, PETITIONER v.
               KENNETH HAHN, in his capacity as TAX
              ASSESSOR FOR LOS ANGELES COUNTY, et al.
          on writ of certiorari to the court of appeal of
               california, second appellate district
                          [June 18, 1992]

       Justice Stevens, dissenting.
       During the two past decades, California property owners
have enjoyed extraordinary prosperity.  As the State's
population has mushroomed, so has the value of its real
estate.  Between 1976 and 1986 alone, the total assessed
value of California property subject to property taxation
increased tenfold.  Simply put, those who invested in
California real estate in the 1970s are among the most
fortunate capitalists in the world.
       Proposition 13 has provided these successful investors
with a tremendous windfall and, in doing so, has created
severe inequities in California's property tax scheme.
These property owners (hereinafter  the Squires) are
guaranteed that, so long as they retain their property and
do not improve it, their taxes will not increase more than
2% in any given year.  As a direct result of this windfall for
the Squires, later purchasers must pay far more than their
fair share of property taxes.
       The specific disparity that prompted petitioner to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of Proposition 13 is the fact that
her annual property tax bill is almost 5 times as large as
that of her neighbors who own comparable homes: While
her neighbors' 1989 taxes averaged less than $400, petition-
er was taxed $1,700.  App. 18-20.  This disparity is not
unusual under Proposition 13.  Indeed, some homeowners
pay 17 times as much in taxes as their neighbors with
comparable property.  See id., at 76-77.  For vacant land,
the disparities may be as great as 500 to 1.  App. to Pet. for
Cert. A7.  Moreover, as Proposition 13 controls the taxation
of commercial property as well as residential property, the
regime greatly favors the commercial enterprises of the
Squires, placing new businesses at a substantial disadvan-
tage.
       As a result of Proposition 13, the Squires, who own 44%
of the owner-occupied residences, paid only 25% of the total
taxes collected from homeowners in 1989.  Report of Senate
Commission on Property Tax Equity and Revenue to the
California State Senate 33 (1991) (Commission Report).
These disparities are aggravated by 2 of Proposition 13,
which exempts from reappraisal a property owner's home
and up to $1 million of other real property when that
property is transferred to a child of the owner.  This
exemption can be invoked repeatedly and indefinitely,
allowing the Proposition 13 windfall to be passed from
generation to generation.  As the California Senate Com-
mission on Property Tax Equity and Revenue observed:
 The inequity is clear.  One young family buys a new
home and is assessed at full market value.  Another
young family inherits its home, but pays taxes based on
their parents' date of acquisition even though both
homes are of identical value.  Not only does this
constitutional provision offend a policy of equal tax
treatment for taxpayers in similar situations, it ap-
pears to favor the housing needs of children with home-
owner-parents over children with non-homeowner-
parents.  With the repeal of the state's gift and inheri-
tance tax in 1982, the rationale for this exemption is
negligible.  Commission Report, at 9-10.
The Commission was too generous.  To my mind, the
rationale for such disparity is not merely  negligible, it is
nonexistent.  Such a law establishes a privilege of a
medieval character: Two families with equal needs and
equal resources are treated differently solely because of
their different heritage.
       In my opinion, such disparate treatment of similarly
situated taxpayers is arbitrary and unreasonable.  Although
the Court today recognizes these gross inequities, see ante,
at 4, n.2, its analysis of the justification for those inequities
consists largely of a restatement of the benefits that accrue
to long-time property owners.  That a law benefits those it
benefits cannot be an adequate justification for severe
inequalities such as those created by Proposition 13.
                                 I
       The standard by which we review equal protection
challenges to state tax regimes is well-established and
properly deferential.   Where taxation is concerned and no
specific federal right, apart from equal protection, is
imperiled, the States have large leeway in making classifi-
cations and drawing lines which in their judgment produce
reasonable systems of taxation.  Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore
Auto Parts Co., 410 U. S. 356, 359 (1973).  Thus, as the
Court today notes, the issue in this case is  whether the
difference in treatment between newer and older owners
rationally furthers a legitimate state interest.  Ante, at 8.
       But deference is not abdication and  rational basis
scrutiny is still scrutiny.  Thus we have, on several recent
occasions, invalidated tax schemes under such a standard
of review.  See e.g., Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County
Comm'n of Webster County, 488 U. S. 336 (1989); Hooper v.
Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U. S. 612, 618 (1985);
Williams v. Vermont, 472 U. S. 14 (1985); Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U. S. 869 (1985); cf. Zobel v. Williams,
457 U. S. 55, 60-61 (1982).
       Just three Terms ago, this Court unanimously invalidated
Webster County, West Virginia's assessment scheme under
rational-basis scrutiny.  Webster County employed a de
facto Proposition 13 assessment system: The County
assessed recently purchased property on the basis of its
purchase price but made only occasional adjustments
(averaging 3-4% per year) to the assessments of other
properties.  Just as in this case,  [t]his approach systemati-
cally produced dramatic differences in valuation between
. . . recently transferred property and otherwise comparable
surrounding land.  Allegheny Pittsburgh, 488 U. S., at 341.
       The  `[i]ntentional systematic undervaluation,' id., at
345, found constitutionally infirm in Allegheny Pittsburgh
has been codified in California by Proposition 13.  That the
discrimination in Allegheny Pittsburgh was de facto and the
discrimination in this case de jure makes little difference.
 The purpose of the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment is to secure every person within the
State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a
statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted
agents.  Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U. S. 350,
352-353 (1918) (emphasis added).  If anything, the inequal-
ity created by Proposition 13 is constitutionally more
problematic because it is the product of a state-wide policy
rather than the result of an individual assessor's mal-
administration.
       Nor can Allegheny Pittsburgh be distinguished because
West Virginia law established a market-value assessment
regime.  Webster County's scheme was constitutionally
invalid not because it was a departure from state law, but
because it involved the relative  `systematic undervaluation
. . . [of] property in the same class' (as that class was
defined by state law).  Allegheny Pittsburgh, 488 U. S., at
345 (emphasis added).  Our decisions have established that
the Equal Protection Clause is offended as much by the
arbitrary delineation of classes of property (as in this case)
as by the arbitrary treatment of properties within the same
class (as in Allegheny Pittsburgh).  See Brown-Forman Co.
v. Kentucky, 217 U. S. 563, 573 (1910); Cumberland Coal
Co. v. Board of Revision, 284 U. S. 23, 28-30 (1931).  Thus,
if our unanimous holding in Allegheny Pittsburgh was
sound"and I remain convinced that it was"it follows
inexorably that Proposition 13, like Webster County's
assessment scheme, violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Indeed, in my opinion, state-wide discrimination is far more
invidious than a local aberration that creates a tax dis-parity.
       The States, of course, have broad power to classify
property in their taxing schemes and if the  classification is
neither capricious nor arbitrary, and rests upon some
reasonable consideration of difference or policy, there is no
denial of the equal protection of the law.  Brown-Forman
Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U. S., at 573.  As we stated in Alleghe-
ny Pittsburgh, a  State may divide different kinds of
property into classes and assign to each class a different tax
burden so long as those divisions and burdens are reason-
able.  488 U. S., at 344.
       Consistent with this standard, the Court has long upheld
tax classes based on the taxpayer's ability to pay, see, e.g.,
Fox v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 294 U. S. 87, 101
(1935); the nature (tangible or intangible) of the property,
see, e.g., Klein v. Jefferson County Board of Tax Supervi-
sors, 282 U. S. 19, 23-24 (1930); the use of the property,
see, e.g., Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U. S. 114 (1900); and
the status (corporate or individual) of the property owner,
see, e.g., Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410
U. S. 356 (1973).  Proposition 13 employs none of these
familiar classifications.  Instead it classifies property based
on its nominal purchase price: All property purchased for
the same price is taxed the same amount (leaving aside the
2% annual adjustment).  That this scheme can be named
(an  acquisition value system) does not render it any less
arbitrary or unreasonable.  Under Proposition 13, a
majestic estate purchased for $150,000 in 1975 (and now
worth more than $2 million) is placed in the same tax class
as a humble cottage purchased today for $150,000.  The
only feature those two properties have in common is that
somewhere, sometime a sale contract for each was executed
that contained the price  $150,000.  Particularly in an
environment of phenomenal real property appreciation, to
classify property based on its purchase price is  palpably
arbitrary.  Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U. S.
522, 530 (1959).
                                II
       Under contemporary equal protection doctrine, the test of
whether a classification is arbitrary is  whether the
difference in treatment between [earlier and later purchas-
ers] rationally furthers a legitimate state interest.  Ante,
at 8.  The adjectives and adverbs in this standard are more
important than the nouns and verbs.
       A legitimate state interest must encompass the interests
of members of the disadvantaged class and the community
at large as well as the direct interests of the members of
the favored class.  It must have a purpose or goal indepen-
dent of the direct effect of the legislation and one  `that we
may reasonably presume to have motivated an impartial
legislature.'  Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473
U. S. 432, 452, n.4 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting
United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U. S.
166, 180-181 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)).
That a classification must find justification outside itself
saves judicial review of such classifications from becoming
an exercise in tautological reasoning.
 A State cannot deflect an equal protection challenge by
observing that in light of the statutory classification all
those within the burdened class are similarly situated.
The classification must reflect pre-existing differences;
it cannot create new ones that are supported by only
their own bootstraps.  `The Equal Protection Clause
requires more of a state law than nondiscriminatory
application within the class it establishes.'  Rinaldi v.
Yeager, 384 U. S. 305, 308 (1966).  Williams v. Ver-
mont, 472 U. S. 14, 27 (1985).
If the goal of the discriminatory classification is not
independent from the policy itself,  each choice [of classifi-
cation] will import its own goal, each goal will count as
acceptable, and the requirement of a `rational' choice-goal
relation will be satisfied by the very making of the choice.
Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitu-
tional Law, 79 Yale L. J. 1205, 1247 (1970).
       A classification rationally furthers a state interest when
there is some fit between the disparate treatment and the
legislative purpose.  As noted above, in the review of tax
statutes we have allowed such fit to be generous and
approximate, recognizing that  rational distinctions may be
made with substantially less than mathematical exacti-
tude.  New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U. S. 297, 303 (1976).
Nonetheless, in some cases the underinclusiveness or the
overinclusiveness of a classification will be so severe that it
cannot be said that the legislative distinction  rationally
furthers the posited state interest.  See, e.g., Jimenez v.
Weinberger, 417 U. S. 628, 636-638 (1974).
       The Court's cursory analysis of Proposition 13 pays little
attention to either of these aspects of the controlling
standard of review.  The first state interest identified by the
Court is California's  interest in local neighborhood preser-
vation, continuity, and stability.  Ante, at 9 (citing Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926)).  It is beyond
question that  inhibit[ing the] displacement of lower income
families by the forces of gentrification, ante, at 9-10, is a
legitimate state interest; the central issue is whether the
disparate treatment of earlier and later purchasers ratio-
nally furthers this goal.  Here the Court offers not an
analysis, but only a conclusion:  By permitting older owners
to pay progressively less in taxes than new owners of
comparable property, [Proposition 13] rationally furthers
this interest.  Ante, at 10.
       I disagree.  In my opinion, Proposition 13 sweeps too
broadly and operates too indiscriminately to  rationally
further the State's interest in neighborhood preservation.
No doubt there are some early purchasers living on fixed or
limited incomes who could not afford to pay higher taxes
and still maintain their homes.  California has enacted
special legislation to respond to their plight.  Those
concerns cannot provide an adequate justification for
Proposition 13.  A state-wide, across-the-board tax windfall
for all property owners and their descendants is no more a
 rational means for protecting this small subgroup than a
blanket tax exemption for all taxpayers named Smith would
be a rational means to protect a particular taxpayer named
Smith who demonstrated difficulty paying her tax bill.
       Even within densely populated Los Angeles County,
residential property comprises less than half of the market
value of the property tax roll.  App. 45.  It cannot be said
that the legitimate state interest in preserving neighbor-
hood character is  rationally furthered by tax benefits for
owners of commercial, industrial, vacant, and other nonresi-
dential properties.  It is just short of absurd to conclude
that the legitimate state interest in protecting a relatively
small number of economically vulnerable families is
 rationally furthered by a tax windfall for all 9,787,887
property owners in California.
      The Court's conclusion is unsound not only because of the
lack of numerical fit between the posited state interest and
Proposition 13's inequities but also because of the lack of
logical fit between ends and means.  Although the State
may have a valid interest in preserving some neighbor-
hoods,  Proposition 13 not only  inhibit[s the] displace-
ment of settled families, it also inhibits the transfer of
unimproved land, abandoned buildings, and substandard
uses.  Thus, contrary to the Court's suggestion, Proposition
13 is not like a zoning system.  A zoning system functions
by recognizing different uses of property and treating those
different uses differently.  See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U. S., at 388-390.  Proposition 13 treats all property
alike, giving all owners tax breaks, and discouraging the
transfer or improvement of all property"the developed and
the dilapidated, the neighborly and the nuisance.
       In short, although I agree with the Court that  neighbor-
hood preservation is a legitimate state interest, I cannot
agree that a tax windfall for all persons who purchased
property before 1978 rationally furthers that interest.  To
my mind, Proposition 13 is too blunt a tool to accomplish
such a specialized goal.  The severe inequalities created by
Proposition 13 cannot be justified by such an interest.
       The second state interest identified by the Court is the
 reliance interests of the earlier purchasers.  Here I find
the Court's reasoning difficult to follow.  Although the
protection of reasonable reliance interests is a legitimate
governmental purpose, see Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U. S.
728, 746 (1984), this case does not implicate such interests.
A reliance interest is created when an individual justifiably
acts under the assumption that an existing legal condition
will persist; thus reliance interests are most often implicat-
ed when the government provides some benefit and then
acts to eliminate the benefit.  See, e.g., New Orleans v.
Dukes, 427 U. S. 297 (1976).  In this case, those who
purchased property before Proposition 13 was enacted
received no assurances that assessments would only
increase at a limited rate; indeed, to the contrary, many
purchased property in the hope that property values (and
assessments) would appreciate substantially and quickly.
It cannot be said, therefore, that the earlier purchasers of
property somehow have a reliance interest in limited tax
increases.
       Perhaps what the Court means is that post-Proposition
13 purchasers have less reliance interests than pre-Proposi-
tion 13 purchasers.  The Court reasons that the State may
tax earlier and later purchasers differently because
 an existing owner rationally may be thought to have
vested expectations in his property or home that are
more deserving of protection than the anticipatory
expectations of a new owner at the point of purchase.
A new owner has full information about the scope of
future tax liability before acquiring the property, and
if he thinks the future tax burden is too demanding, he
can decide not to complete the purchase at all.  By
contrast, the existing owner, already saddled with his
purchase, does not have the option of deciding not to
buy his home if taxes become prohibitively high.  Ante,
at 10.
This simply restates the effects of Proposition 13.  A pre-
Proposition 13 owner has  vested expectations in reduced
taxes only because Proposition 13 gave her such expecta-
tions; a later purchaser has no such expectations because
Proposition 13 does not provide her such expectations.  But
the same can be said of any arbitrary protection for an
existing class of taxpayers.  Consider a law that establishes
that homes with even street numbers would be taxed at
twice the rate of homes with odd street numbers.  It is
certainly true that the even-numbered homeowners could
not decide to  unpurchase their homes and that those
considering buying an even-numbered home would know
that it came with an extra tax burden, but certainly that
would not justify the arbitrary imposition of disparate tax
burdens based on house numbers.  So it is in this case.
Proposition 13 provides a benefit for earlier purchasers and
imposes a burden on later purchasers.  To say that the later
purchasers know what they are getting into does not
answer the critical question: Is it reasonable and constitu-
tional to tax early purchasers less than late purchasers
when at the time of taxation their properties are compara-
ble?  This question the Court does not answer.
       Distilled to its essence, the Court seems to be saying that
earlier purchasers can benefit under Proposition 13 because
earlier purchasers benefit under Proposition 13.  If, howev-
er, a law creates a disparity, the State's interest preserving
that disparity cannot be a  legitimate state interest
justifying that inequity.  As noted above, a statute's
disparate treatment must be justified by a purpose distinct
from the very effects created by that statute.  Thus, I
disagree with the Court that the severe inequities wrought
by Proposition 13 can be justified by what the Court calls
the  reliance interests of those who benefit from that
scheme.
       In my opinion, it is irrational to treat similarly situated
persons differently on the basis of the date they joined the
class of property owners.  Until today, I would have thought
this proposition far from controversial.  In Zobel v. Wil-
liams, 457 U. S. 55 (1982), we ruled that Alaska's program
of distributing cash dividends on the basis of the recipient's
years of residency in the State violated the Equal Protection
Clause.  The Court wrote:
            If the states can make the amount of a cash divi-
dend depend on length of residence, what would
preclude varying university tuition on a sliding scale
based on years of residence"-or even limiting access of
finite public facilities, eligibility for student loans, for
civil service jobs, or for government contracts by length
of domicile?  Could states impose different taxes based
on length of residence?  Alaska's reasoning could open
the door to state apportionment of other rights, bene-
fits, and services according to length of residency.  It
would permit the states to divide citizens into expand-
ing numbers of permanent classes.  Such a result
would be clearly impermissible.  Id., at 64 (emphasis
added) (footnotes omitted).
    Similarly, the Court invalidated on equal protection
grounds New Mexico's policy of providing a permanent tax
exemption for Vietnam veterans who had been state
residents before May 8, 1976, but not to more recent
arrivals.  Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U. S.
612 (1985).  The Court expressly rejected the State's claim
that it had a legitimate interest in providing special
rewards to veterans who lived in the State before 1976 and
concluded that  [n]either the Equal Protection Clause, nor
this Court's precedents, permit the State to prefer estab-
lished resident veterans over newcomers in the retroactive
apportionment of an economic benefit.  Id., at 623.
       As these decisions demonstrate, the selective provision of
benefits based on the timing of one's membership in a class
(whether that class be the class of residents or the class of
property owners) is rarely a  legitimate state interest.
Similarly situated neighbors have an equal right to share
in the benefits of local government.  It would obviously be
unconstitutional to provide one with more or better fire or
police protection than the other; it is just as plainly
unconstitutional to require one to pay five times as much in
property taxes as the other for the same government
services.  In my opinion, the severe inequalities created by
Proposition 13 are arbitrary and unreasonable and do not
rationally further a legitimate state interest.
       Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.


