NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

                 Syllabus

CONNECTICUT NATIONAL BANK v. GERMAIN,
TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE OF O'SULLIVAN'S
FUEL OIL CO., INC.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the second circuit
No. 90-1791.   Argued January 21, 1992-Decided March 9, 1992

In a suit by respondent Germain, the trustee of a bankrupt debtor's
 estate, seeking to hold petitioner Connecticut National Bank (CNB)
 liable for various torts and breaches of contract, the Bankruptcy
 Court denied CNB's motion to strike Germain's demand for a jury
 trial, and the District Court affirmed.  The Court of Appeals dis-
 missed CNB's attempted appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that
 a court of appeals may exercise jurisdiction over an interlocutory
 order in bankruptcy only when the district court issues the order
 after having withdrawn the case from the bankruptcy court, and not
 when the district court acts in its capacity as a bankruptcy court of
 appeals.
Held:An interlocutory order issued by a district court sitting as a court
 of appeals in bankruptcy is appealable under the unambiguous
 language of 28 U.S.C. 1292.  That section provides for review in
 the courts of appeals, in certain circumstances, of ``[i]nterlocutory
 orders of the district courts,'' and does not limit such review to orders
 issued by district courts sitting as bankruptcy trial courts rather than
 appellate courts.  Title 28 U.S.C. 158(d)-which gives the courts
 of appeals jurisdiction over, inter alia, appeals from all final orders
 of district courts sitting as appellate courts in bankruptcy, but is
 silent as to review of interlocutory orders-does not limit the un-
 adorned words of 1y negative implication.  Contrary to
 Germain's contention, giving effect to 1292's companion provision,
 1291-which confers jurisdiction over appeals from ``final decisions
 of the district courts'' acting in any capacity-would not render
 158(d) wholly superfluous.  Although 1291 and 158(d) do overlap,
 158(d) also confers jurisdiction over the final decisions of bankruptcy
 appellate panels, such that each section reaches cases that the other
 does not.  Redundancies across statutes are not unusual events in
 drafting, and where, as here, there is no positive repugnancy between
 two laws, a court must give effect to both.  Pp.2-6.
926 F.2d 191, reversed and remanded.

 Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined.  Stevens, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.  O'Connor, J., filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment, in which White and Blackmun,
JJ., joined.
-------------------------------

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
--------
No. 90-1791
--------
CONNECTICUT NATIONAL BANK, PETITIONER v.
THOMAS M. GERMAIN, trustee for the estate
of O'SULLIVAN'S FUEL OIL CO., INC.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the second circuit
[March 9, 1992]

  Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
  In this case, we determine the appealability of an
interlocutory order issued by a district court sitting as a
court of appeals in bankruptcy.
                      I
  In 1984, O'Sullivan's Fuel Oil Co. filed a bankruptcy
petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Connecticut.  Although the case began as a
reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code,
in 1986 the Bankruptcy Court converted it into a liquida-
tion under Chapter 7.  Petitioner Connecticut National
Bank (CNB) is successor in interest to one of O'Sullivan's
creditors.  Respondent Thomas M. Germain is trustee of
O'Sullivan's estate.
  On June 1, 1987, Germain sued CNB in Connecticut state
court, seeking to hold the bank liable for various torts and
breaches of contract.  CNB removed the suit to the United
States District Court for the District of Connecticut, which,
pursuant to local rule, automatically referred the proceed-
ing to the Bankruptcy Court overseeing the liquidation.
Germain then filed a demand for a jury trial.  CNB moved
to strike Germain's demand.  The Bankruptcy Court denied
CNB's motion, In re O'Sullivan's Fuel Oil Co., 103 B. R. 388
(Conn. 1989), and the District Court affirmed, Germain v.
Connecticut Nat. Bank, 112 B. R. 57 (Conn. 1990).
  CNB then tried to appeal to the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, but the court dismissed for lack of jurisdic-
tion.  926 F. 2d 191 (1991).  The Second Circuit held that a
court of appeals may exercise jurisdiction over interlocutory
orders in bankruptcy only when a district court issues the
order after having withdrawn a proceeding or case from a
bankruptcy court, and not when the district court acts in its
capacity as a bankruptcy court of appeals.  We granted
certiorari, 502 U. S. ___ (1991), and now reverse and
remand.
                     II
  Courts of appeals have jurisdiction over ``[i]nterlocutory
orders of the district courts of the United States'' under 28
U. S. C. 1292.  CNB contends that 1292(b) applies by its
terms in this case, and that the Second Circuit therefore
could have exercised discretionary jurisdiction over its
appeal.  Germain argues that 1292 does not apply at all
in this case because Congress limited 1292 through 28
U. S. C. 158(d), which deals with bankruptcy jurisdiction.
CNB responds that nothing in 158(d) limits 1292.  We
agree with CNB.
  Bankruptcy appeals are governed for the most part by 28
U. S. C. 158.  This section comprises four subsections,
three of which concern us here.  Subsection (a) gives the
district courts authority to hear appeals from final and
interlocutory orders of the bankruptcy courts.  The District
Court, as we have noted, had jurisdiction under this
provision to hear CNB's appeal from the Bankruptcy Court.
Subsection (b) permits the judicial council of any circuit to
establish a bankruptcy appellate panel to fill the role of the
district courts under subsection (a).  Subsection (d), which
is pivotal in this case, provides:
   ``The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals
   from all final decisions, judgments, orders, and decrees
   entered under subsections (a) and (b) of this section.''
Neither this subsection nor any other part of 158 mentions
interlocutory orders entered by the district courts in
bankruptcy.  The parties agree, as they must, that 158 did
not confer jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals.
  Germain contends that the Court of Appeals did not have
jurisdiction under 1292 either, for 158(d), in his view,
precludes jurisdiction under 1292 by negative implication.
Germain reasons as follows:  Although  28 U. S. C. 1291
and 1292 appear to cover the universe of decisions issued by
the district courts - with 1291 conferring jurisdiction over
appeals from final decisions of the district courts, and
1292 conferring jurisdiction over certain interlocutory ones
- that cannot in fact be so.  If 1291 did cover all final
decisions by a district court, he argues, that section would
render 158(d) superfluous, since a final decision issued by
a district court sitting as a bankruptcy appellate court is
still a final decision of a district court.  If 158(d) is to have
effect, Germain contends, then that section must be
exclusive within its own domain, which he defines as the
universe of orders issued by district courts sitting pursuant
to 158(a) as courts of appeals in bankruptcy.  When a
district court enters an order in that capacity, Germain
concludes, only 158(d) can confer jurisdiction, and if it
does not, nothing else can.  Germain claims to find support
for his view in his reading of the legislative history of
158(d).
  Contrary to Germain's contention, we need not choose
between giving effect on the one hand to 1291 and on the
other to 158(d), for the statutes do not pose an either-or
proposition.  Section 1291 confers jurisdiction over appeals
from ``final decisions of the district courts'' acn any
capacity.  Section 158(d), in contrast, confers jurisdiction
over appeals from final decisions of the district courts when
they act as bankruptcy appellate courts under 158(a), and
also confers jurisdiction over final decisions of the appellate
panels in bankruptcy acting under 158(b).  Sections 1291
and 158(d) do overlap, therefore, but each section confers
jurisdiction over cases that the other section does not reach.
  Redundancies across statutes are not unusual events in
drafting, and so long as there is no ``positive repugnancy''
between two laws, Wood v. United States, 16 Pet. 342, 363
(1842), a court must give effect to both.  Because giving
effect to both 1291 and 158(d) would not render one or
the other wholly superfluous, we do not have to read
158(d) as precluding courts of appeals, by negative
implication, from exercising jurisdiction under 1291 over
district courts sitting in bankruptcy.  We similarly do not
have to read 158(d) as precluding jurisdiction under
1292.  While courts should disfavor interpretations of
statutes that render language superfluous, in this case that
canon does not apply.
  In any event, canons of construction are no more than
rules of thumb that help courts determine the meaning of
legislation, and in interpreting a statute a court should
always turn first to one, cardinal canon before all others.
We have stated time and again that courts must presume
that a legislature says in a statute what it means and
means in a statute what it says there.  See, e. g., United
States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U. S. 235, 241-242
(1989); United States v. Goldenberg, 168 U. S. 95, 102-103
(1897); Oneale v. Thornton, 6 Cranch 53, 68 (1810).  When
the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first
canon is also the last: ``judicial inquiry is complete.''  Rubin
v. United States, 449 U. S. 424, 430 (1981); see also Ron
Pair Enterprises, supra, at 241.
  Germain says that legislative history points to a different
result.  But we think that judicial inquiry into the applica-
bility of 1292 begins and ends with what 1292 does say
and with what 158(d) does not.  Section 1292 provides for
review in the courts of appeals, in certain circumstances, of
``[i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts of the United
States.''  Section 158(d) is silent as to review of interlocuto-
ry orders.  Nowhere does 1292 limit review to orders
issued by district courts sitting as trial courts in bankruptcy
rather than appellate courts, and nowhere else, whether in
158(d) or any other statute, has Congress indicated that
the unadorned words of 1292 are in some way limited by
implication.  ``It would be dangerous in the extreme to infer
. . . that a case for which the words of an instrument
expressly provide, shall be exempted from its operation.''
Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 202 (1819); see also
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Public Employment Relations
Bd., 485 U. S. 589, 598 (1988).  There is no reason to infer
from either 1292 or 158(d) that Congress meant to limit
appellate review of interlocutory orders in bankruptcy
proceedings.  So long as a party to a proceeding or case in
bankruptcy meets the conditions imposed by 1292, a court
of appeals may rely on that statute as a basis for jurisdic-
tion.
  The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit is reversed and this case remanded for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
                            It is so ordered.
-------------------------------

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
--------
No. 90-1791
--------
CONNECTICUT NATIONAL BANK, PETITIONER v.
THOMAS M. GERMAIN, trustee for the estate
of O'SULLIVAN'S FUEL OIL CO., INC.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the second circuit
[March 9, 1992]

  Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment.
  Whenever there is some uncertainty about the meaning
of a statute, it is prudent to examine its legislative his-
tory.  In this case, such an examination is appropriate
because petitioner's interpretation of 28 U. S. C. 158(d)
creates an unusual overlap with 28 U. S. C. 1291.
  Rejecting petitioner's position, the Court of Appeals
concluded that in enacting the current system of bank-
ruptcy appeals, Congress limited the scope
U. S. C. 1292(b), excluding review by the courts of appeals
of certain interlocutory bankruptcy orders.  If Congress had
intended such a significant change in the scheme of
appellate jurisdiction, some indication of this purpose would
almost certainly have found its way into the legislative
history.  The legislative record, however, contains no
mention of an intent to limit the scope of 1292(b).  This
silence tends to support the conclusion that no such change
was intended.
  Accordingly, notwithstanding the inferences drawn by the
Court of Appeals, the legislative history is not only consis-
tent with petitioner's interpretation of the statute, but also
actually supports it.  For this reason, and because I agree
with the Court's textual analysis, I concur in its judgment.
-------------------------------


SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
--------
No. 90-1791
--------
CONNECTICUT NATIONAL BANK, PETITIONER v.
THOMAS M. GERMAIN, trustee for the estate
of O'SULLIVAN'S FUEL OIL CO., INC.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the second circuit
[March 9, 1992]

  Justice O'Connor, with whom Justice White and
Justice Blackmun join, concurring in the judgment.
  I agree that when Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. 158(d) as
part of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984, Congress probably did not intend to deprive the
Courts of Appeals of their longstanding jurisdiction over
interlocutory appeals in bankruptcy cases.  But I think we
should admit that this construction of the statutes does
render 158(d) largely superfluous, and that we do strive
to interpret statutes so as to avoid redundancy.  Cf. ante, at
4-5.  In this case, I think it far more likely that Congress
inadvertently created a redundancy than that Congress
intended to withdraw appellate jurisdiction over interlocu-
tory bankruptcy appeals by the roundabout method of re-
conferring jurisdiction over appeals from final bankruptcy
orders.  I would reverse the judgment below only for this
reason.
