 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

          Syllabus

LUJAN, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR v. DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
           the eight circuit
No. 90-1424.   Argued December 3, 1991"Decided June 12, 1992

Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 divides responsi-
bilities regarding the protection of endangered species between
petitioner Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Commerce,
and requires each federal agency to consult with the relevant Secre-
tary to ensure that any action funded by the agency is not likely to
jeopardize the continued existence or habitat of any endangered or
threatened species.  Both Secretaries initially promulgated a joint
regulation extending 7(a)(2)'s coverage to actions taken in foreign
nations, but a subsequent joint rule limited the section's geographic
scope to the United States and the high seas.  Respondents, wildlife
conservation and other environmental organizations, filed an action
in the District Court, seeking a declaratory judgment that the new
regulation erred as to 7(a)(2)'s geographic scope, and an injunction
requiring the Secretary of the Interior to promulgate a new rule
restoring his initial interpretation.  The Court of Appeals reversed
the District Court's dismissal of the suit for lack of standing.  Upon
remand, on cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court
denied the Secretary's motion, which renewed his objection to stand-
ing, and granted respondents' motion, ordering the Secretary to
publish a new rule.  The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held:The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.
911 F.2d 117, reversed and remanded.
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to
Part III-B, concluding that respondents lack standing to seek judicial
review of the rule.  Pp.3-11, 15-23.
(a)As the parties invoking federal jurisdiction, respondents bear
the burden of showing standing by establishing, inter alia, that they
have suffered an injury in fact, i. e., a concrete and particularized,
actual or imminent invasion of a legally-protected interest.  To
survive a summary judgment motion, they must set forth by affidavit
or other evidence specific facts to support their claim.  Standing is
particularly difficult to show here, since third parties, rather than
respondents, are the object of the Government action or inaction to
which respondents object.  Pp.3-6.
(b)Respondents did not demonstrate that they suffered an injury
in fact.  Assuming that they established that funded activities abroad
threaten certain species, they failed to show that one or more of their
members would thereby be directly affected apart from the members'
special interest in the subject.  See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727, 735, 739.  Affidavits of members claiming an intent to revisit
project sites at some indefinite future time, at which time they will
presumably be denied the opportunity to observe endangered animals,
do not suffice, for they do not demonstrate an ``imminent'' injury.
Respondents also mistakenly rely on a number of other novel stand-
ing theories.  Their theory that any person using any part of a
contiguous ecosystem adversely affected by a funded activity has
standing even if the activity is located far away from the area of
their use is inconsistent with this Court's opinion in Lujan v. Nation-
al Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871.  And they state purely specula-
tive, nonconcrete injuries when they argue that suit can be brought
by anyone with an interest in studying or seeing endangered animals
anywhere on the globe and anyone with a professional interest in
such animals.  Pp.6-11.
(c)The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondents had
standing on the ground that the statute's citizen-suit provision
confers on all persons the right to file suit to challenge the Secre-
tary's failure to follow the proper consultative procedure, notwith-
standing their inability to allege any separate concrete injury flowing
from that failure.  This Court has consistently held that a plaintiff
claiming only a generally available grievance about government,
unconnected with a threatened concrete interest of his own, does not
state an Article III case or controversy.  See, e. g., Fairchild v.
Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129-130.  Vindicating the public interest is
the function of the Congress and the Chief Executive.  To allow that
interest to be converted into an individual right by a statute denomi-
nating it as such and permitting all citizens to sue, regardless of
whether they suffered any concrete injury, would authorize Congress
to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief Executive's
most important constitutional duty, to ``take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed,'' Art. II, 3.  Pp.15-23.

        Scalia, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the
opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III-A, and IV, in which
Rehnquist, C. J., and White, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, JJ.,
joined, and an opinion with respect to Part III-B, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and White and Thomas, JJ., joined.  Kennedy, J., filed an
opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which
Souter, J., joined.  Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment.  Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which O'Con-
nor, J., joined.




NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.


SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
            No. 90-1424
 
MANUEL LUJAN, Jr., SECRETARY OF THE
      INTERIOR, PETITIONER v. DEFENDERS
             OF WILDLIFE et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
       appeals for the eighth circuit
               [June 12, 1992]

  Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court with
respect to Parts I, II, III-A, and IV, and an opinion with
respect to Part III-B in which the Chief Justice, Justice
White, and Justice Thomas join.
  This case involves a challenge to a rule promulgated by
the Secretary of the Interior interpreting 7 of the Endan-
gered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), 87 Stat. 892, as amended,
16 U. S. C. 1536, in such fashion as to render it applicable
only to actions within the United States or on the high seas.
The preliminary issue, and the only one we reach, is
whether the respondents here, plaintiffs below, have
standing to seek judicial review of the rule.
                      I
  The ESA, 87 Stat. 884, as amended, 16 U. S. C. 1531 et
seq., seeks to protect species of animals against threats to
their continuing existence caused by man.  See generally
TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153 (1978).  The ESA instructs the
Secretary of the Interior to promulgate by regulation a list
of those species which are either endangered or threatened
under enumerated criteria, and to define the critical habitat
of these species.  16 U. S. C. 1533, 1536.  Section 7(a)(2)
of the Act then provides, in pertinent part:
``Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and
with the assistance of the Secretary [of the Interior],
insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried
out by such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of any endangered species or
threatened species or result in the destruction or
adverse modification of habitat of such species which is
determined by the Secretary, after consultation as
appropriate with affected States, to be critical.''  16
U. S. C. 1536(a)(2).
In 1978, the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), on behalf of the
Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Commerce
respectively, promulgated a joint regulation stating that the
obligations imposed by 7(a)(2) extend to actions taken in
foreign nations.  43 Fed. Reg. 874 (1978).  The next year,
however, the Interior Department began to reexamine its
position.  Letter from Leo Kuliz, Solicitor, Department of
the Interior, to Assistant Secretary, Fish and Wildlife and
Parks, Aug. 8, 1979.  A revised joint regulation, reinterpret-
ing 7(a)(2) to require consultation only for actions taken in
the United States or on the high seas, was proposed in
1983, 48 Fed. Reg. 29990 (1983), and promulgated in 1986,
51 Fed. Reg. 19926 (1986); 50 C.F.R. 402.01 (1991).
  Shortly thereafter, respondents, organizations dedicated
to wildlife conservation and other environmental causes,
filed this action against the Secretary of the Interior,
seeking a declaratory judgment that the new regulation is
in error as to the geographic scope of 7(a)(2), and an
injunction requiring the Secretary to promulgate a new
regulation restoring the initial interpretation.  The District
Court granted the Secretary's motion to dismiss for lack of
standing.  Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 658 F. Supp. 43,
47-48 (Minn. 1987).  The Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit reversed by a divided vote.  Defenders of Wildlife v.
Hodel, 851 F. 2d 1035 (1988).  On remand, the Secretary
moved for summary judgment on the standing issue, and
respondents moved for summary judgment on the merits.
The District Court denied the Secretary's motion, on the
ground that the Eighth Circuit had already determined the
standing question in this case; it granted respondents'
merits motion, and ordered the Secretary to publish a
revised regulation.  Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 707 F.
Supp. 1082 (Minn. 1989).  The Eighth Circuit affirmed.  911
F. 2d 117 (1990).  We granted certiorari, 500 U. S. ___
(1991).

                     II
  While the Constitution of the United States divides all
power conferred upon the Federal Government into  legisla-
tive Powers, Art. I, 1,  [t]he executive Power, Art. II, 1,
and  [t]he judicial Power, Art. III, 1, it does not attempt
to define those terms.  To be sure, it limits the jurisdiction
of federal courts to  Cases'' and ``Controversies, but an
executive inquiry can bear the name  case (the Hoffa case)
and a legislative dispute can bear the name  controversy
(the Smoot-Hawley controversy).  Obviously, then, the
Constitution's central mechanism of separation of powers
depends largely upon common understanding of what
activities are appropriate to legislatures, to executives, and
to courts.  In The Federalist No. 48, Madison expressed the
view that  [i]t is not infrequently a question of real nicety
in legislative bodies whether the operation of a particular
measure will, or will not, extend beyond the legislative
sphere, whereas  the executive power [is] restrained within
a narrower compass and . . . more simple in its nature, and
 the judiciary [is] described by landmarks still less uncer-
tain.  The Federalist No. 48, p. 256 (Carey and McClellan
eds. 1990).  One of those landmarks, setting apart the
 Cases'' and ``Controversies that are of the justiciable sort
referred to in Article III"``serv[ing] to identify those
disputes which are appropriately resolved through the
judicial process,  Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U. S. 149, 155
(1990)"is the doctrine of standing.  Though some of its
elements express merely prudential considerations that are
part of judicial self-government, the core component of
standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-
controversy requirement of Article III.  See, e. g., Allen v.
Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 751 (1984).
  Over the years, our cases have established that the
irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains
three elements: First, the plaintiff must have suffered an
 injury in fact"an invasion of a legally-protected interest
which is (a) concrete and particularized, see id., at 756;
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 508 (1975); Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 740-741, n. 16 (1972); and (b)
 actual or imminent, not `conjectural' or `hypothetical,'
Whitmore, supra, at 155 (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
U. S. 95, 102 (1983)).  Second, there must be a causal
connection between the injury and the conduct complained
of"the injury has to be  fairly . . . trace[able] to the
challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result
[of] the independent action of some third party not before
the court.  Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U. S. 26, 41-42 (1976).  Third, it must be  likely, as
opposed to merely  speculative, that the injury will be
 redressed by a favorable decision.  Id., at 38, 43.
  The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden
of establishing these elements.  See FW/PBS, Inc. v.
Dallas, 493 U. S. 215, 231 (1990); Warth, supra, at 508.
Since they are not mere pleading requirements but rather
an indispensable part of the plaintiff's case, each element
must be supported in the same way as any other matter on
which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the
manner and degree of evidence required at the successive
stages of the litigation.  See Lujan v. National Wildlife
Federation, 497 U. S. 871, 883-889 (1990); Gladstone,
Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 114-115, and
n. 31 (1979); Simon, supra, at 45, n. 25; Warth, supra, at
527, and n. 6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  At the pleading
stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from
the defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a motion to
dismiss we  presum[e] that general allegations embrace
those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim,
National Wildlife Federation, supra, at 889.  In response to
a summary judgment motion, however, the plaintiff can no
longer rest on such  mere allegations, but must  set forth
by affidavit or other evidence  specific facts, Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 56(e), which for purposes of the summary judgment
motion will be taken to be true.  And at the final stage,
those facts (if controverted) must be  supported adequately
by the evidence adduced at trial, Gladstone, supra, at 115,
n. 31.
  When the suit is one challenging the legality of govern-
ment action or inaction, the nature and extent of facts that
must be averred (at the summary judgment stage) or
proved (at the trial stage) in order to establish standing
depends considerably upon whether the plaintiff is himself
an object of the action (or forgone action) at issue.  If he is,
there is ordinarily little question that the action or inaction
has caused him injury, and that a judgment preventing or
requiring the action will redress it.  When, however, as in
this case, a plaintiff's asserted injury arises from the
government's allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of
regulation) of someone else, much more is needed.  In that
circumstance, causation and redressability ordinarily hinge
on the response of the regulated (or regulable) third party
to the government action or inaction"and perhaps on the
response of others as well.  The existence of one or more of
the essential elements of standing  depends on the unfet-
tered choices made by independent actors not before the
courts and whose exercise of broad and legitimate discretion
the courts cannot presume either to control or to predict,
ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U. S. 605, 615 (1989) (opinion
of Kennedy, J.); see also Simon, supra, at 41-42; and it
becomes the burden of the plaintiff to adduce facts showing
that those choices have been or will be made in such
manner as to produce causation and permit redressability
of injury.  E.g., Warth, supra, at 505. Thus, when the
plaintiff is not himself the object of the government action
or inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded, but it
is ordinarily  substantially more difficult to establish.
Allen, supra, at 758; Simon, supra, at 44-45; Warth, supra,
at 505.
                     III
  We think the Court of Appeals failed to apply the
foregoing principles in denying the Secretary's motion for
summary judgment.  Respondents had not made the
requisite demonstration of (at least) injury and redress-
ability.
                      A
  Respondents' claim to injury is that the lack of consulta-
tion with respect to certain funded activities abroad
 increas[es] the rate of extinction of endangered and threat-
ened species.  Complaint 5, App. 13.  Of course, the
desire to use or observe an animal species, even for purely
aesthetic purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest for
purpose of standing.  See, e. g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U. S., at 734.   But the `injury in fact' test requires more
than an injury to a cognizable interest.  It requires that the
party seeking review be himself among the injured.  Id., at
734-735.  To survive the Secretary's summary judgment
motion, respondents had to submit affidavits or other
evidence showing, through specific facts, not only that listed
species were in fact being threatened by funded activities
abroad, but also that one or more of respondents' members
would thereby be  directly affected apart from their
```special interest' in th[e] subject.  Id., at 735, 739.  See
generally Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising
Comm'n., 432 U. S. 333, 343 (1977).
  With respect to this aspect of the case, the Court of
Appeals focused on the affidavits of two Defenders' mem-
bers"Joyce Kelly and Amy Skilbred.  Ms. Kelly stated that
she traveled to Egypt in 1986 and  observed the traditional
habitat of the endangered nile crocodile there and intend[s]
to do so again, and hope[s] to observe the crocodile directly,
and that she  will suffer harm in fact as a result of [the]
American . . . role . . . in overseeing the rehabilitation of the
Aswan High Dam on the Nile . . . and [in] develop[ing] . . .
Egypt's . . . Master Water Plan.  App. 101.  Ms. Skilbred
averred that she traveled to Sri Lanka in 1981 and  ob-
served th[e] habitat of  endangered species such as the
Asian elephant and the leopard at what is now the site of
the Mahaweli Project funded by the Agency for Internation-
al Development (AID), although she  was unable to see any
of the endangered species;  this development project, she
continued,  will seriously reduce endangered, threatened,
and endemic species habitat including areas that I visited
. . . [, which] may severely shorten the future of these
species; that threat, she concluded, harmed her because
she  intend[s] to return to Sri Lanka in the future and
hope[s] to be more fortunate in spotting at least the
endangered elephant and leopard.  Id., at 145-146.  When
Ms. Skilbred was asked at a subsequent deposition if and
when she had any plans to return to Sri Lanka, she
reiterated that  I intend to go back to Sri Lanka, but
confessed that she had no current plans:  I don't know
[when].  There is a civil war going on right now.  I don't
know.  Not next year, I will say.  In the future.  Id., at 318.
  We shall assume for the sake of argument that these
affidavits contain facts showing that certain agency-funded
projects threaten listed species"though that is question-
able.  They plainly contain no facts, however, showing how
damage to the species will produce  imminent injury to
Mss. Kelly and Skilbred.  That the women  had visited the
areas of the projects before the projects commenced proves
nothing.  As we have said in a related context,  `[p]ast
exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present
case or controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unac-
companied by any continuing, present adverse effects.'
Lyons, 461 U. S., at 102 (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414
U. S. 488, 495-496 (1974)).  And the affiants' profession of
an  inten[t] to return to the places they had visited
before"where they will presumably, this time, be deprived
of the opportunity to observe animals of the endangered
species"is simply not enough.  Such  some day inten-
tions"without any description of concrete plans, or indeed
even any specification of when the some day will be"do not
support a finding of the  actual or imminent injury that
our cases require.  See supra, at 4.
       Besides relying upon the Kelly and Skilbred affidavits,
respondents propose a series of novel standing theories.
The first, inelegantly styled  ecosystem nexus, proposes
that any person who uses any part of a  contiguous ecosys-
tem adversely affected by a funded activity has standing
even if the activity is located a great distance away.  This
approach, as the Court of Appeals correctly observed, is
inconsistent with our opinion in National Wildlife Federa-
tion, which held that a plaintiff claiming injury from
environmental damage must use the area affected by the
challenged activity and not an area roughly  in the vicinity
of it.  497 U. S., at 887-889; see also Sierra Club, 405 U. S.,
at 735.  It makes no difference that the general-purpose
section of the ESA states that the Act was intended in part
 to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which
endangered species and threatened species depend may be
conserved, 16 U. S. C. 1531(b).  To say that the Act
protects ecosystems is not to say that the Act creates (if it
were possible) rights of action in persons who have not been
injured in fact, that is, persons who use portions of an
ecosystem not perceptibly affected by the unlawful action in
question.
  Respondents' other theories are called, alas, the  animal
nexus approach, whereby anyone who has an interest in
studying or seeing the endangered animals anywhere on the
globe has standing; and the  vocational nexus approach,
under which anyone with a professional interest in such
animals can sue.  Under these theories, anyone who goes to
see Asian elephants in the Bronx Zoo, and anyone who is a
keeper of Asian elephants in the Bronx Zoo, has standing
to sue because the Director of AID did not consult with the
Secretary regarding the AID-funded project in Sri Lanka.
This is beyond all reason.  Standing is not  an ingenious
academic exercise in the conceivable, United States v.
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U. S. 669, 688 (1973), but as we have said
requires, at the summary judgment stage, a factual showing
of perceptible harm.  It is clear that the person who
observes or works with a particular animal threatened by
a federal decision is facing perceptible harm, since the very
subject of his interest will no longer exist.  It is even
plausible"though it goes to the outermost limit of plausibil-
ity"to think that a person who observes or works with
animals of a particular species in the very area of the world
where that species is threatened by a federal decision is
facing such harm, since some animals that might have been
the subject of his interest will no longer exist, see Japan
Whaling Assn. v. American Cetacean Soc., 478 U. S. 221,
231, n. 4 (1986).  It goes beyond the limit, however, and
into pure speculation and fantasy, to say that anyone who
observes or works with an endangered species, anywhere in
the world, is appreciably harmed by a single project
affecting some portion of that species with which he has no
more specific connection.
                      B
  Besides failing to show injury, respondents failed to
demonstrate redressability.  Instead of attacking the
separate decisions to fund particular projects allegedly
causing them harm, the respondents chose to challenge a
more generalized level of government action (rules regard-
ing consultation), the invalidation of which would affect all
overseas projects.  This programmatic approach has obvious
practical advantages, but also obvious difficulties insofar as
proof of causation or redressability is concerned.  As we
have said in another context,  suits challenging, not
specifically identifiable Government violations of law, but
the particular programs agencies establish to carry out
their legal obligations . . . [are], even when premised on
allegations of several instances of violations of law, . . .
rarely if ever appropriate for federal-court adjudication.
Allen, 468 U. S., at 759-760.
  The most obvious problem in the present case is redress-
ability.  Since the agencies funding the projects were not
parties to the case, the District Court could accord relief
only against the Secretary: He could be ordered to revise
his regulation to require consultation for foreign projects.
But this would not remedy respondents' alleged injury
unless the funding agencies were bound by the Secretary's
regulation, which is very much an open question.  Whereas
in other contexts the ESA is quite explicit as to the Secre-
tary's controlling authority, see, e. g., 16 U. S. C.
1533(a)(1) ( The Secretary shall promulgate regulations
determining endangered species); 1535(d)(1) ( The Secre-
tary is authorized to provide financial assistance to any
State), with respect to consultation the initiative, and
hence arguably the initial responsibility for determining
statutory necessity, lies with the agencies, see 1536(a)(2)
( Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with
the assistance of the Secretary, insure that any funded
action is not likely to jeopardize endangered or threatened
species) (emphasis added)).  When the Secretary promulgat-
ed the regulation at issue here, he thought it was binding
on the agencies, see 51 Fed. Reg., at 19928 (1986).  The
Solicitor General, however, has repudiated that position
here, and the agencies themselves apparently deny the
Secretary's authority.  (During the period when the Secre-
tary took the view that 7(a)(2) did apply abroad, AID and
FWS engaged in a running controversy over whether
consultation was required with respect to the Mahaweli
project, AID insisting that consultation applied only to
domestic actions.)
  Respondents assert that this legal uncertainty did not
affect redressability (and hence standing) because the
District Court itself could resolve the issue of the Secre-
tary's authority as a necessary part of its standing inquiry.
Assuming that it is appropriate to resolve an issue of law
such as this in connection with a threshold standing
inquiry, resolution by the District Court would not have
remedied respondents' alleged injury anyway, because it
would not have been binding upon the agencies.  They were
not parties to the suit, and there is no reason they should
be obliged to honor an incidental legal determination the
suit produced.  The Court of Appeals tried to finesse this
problem by simply proclaiming that  [w]e are satisfied that
an injunction requiring the Secretary to publish [respon-
dents' desired] regulatio[n] . . . would result in consulta-
tion.  Defenders of Wildlife, 851 F. 2d, at 1042, 1043-1044.
We do not know what would justify that confidence,
particularly when the Justice Department (presumably
after consultation with the agencies) has taken the position
that the regulation is not binding.  The short of the matter
is that redress of the only injury-in-fact respondents
complain of requires action (termination of funding until
consultation) by the individual funding agencies; and any
relief the District Court could have provided in this suit
against the Secretary was not likely to produce that action.
  A further impediment to redressability is the fact that the
agencies generally supply only a fraction of the funding for
a foreign project.  AID, for example, has provided less than
10% of the funding for the Mahaweli Project.  Respondents
have produced nothing to indicate that the projects they
have named will either be suspended, or do less harm to
listed species, if that fraction is eliminated.  As in Simon,
426 U. S., at 43-44, it is entirely conjectural whether the
nonagency activity that affects respondents will be altered
or affected by the agency activity they seek to achieve.
There is no standing.
                     IV
  The Court of Appeals found that respondents had
standing for an additional reason: because they had
suffered a  procedural injury.  The so-called  citizen-suit
provision of the ESA provides, in pertinent part, that  any
person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf (A) to
enjoin any person, including the United States and any
other governmental instrumentality or agency . . . who is
alleged to be in violation of any provision of this chapter.
16 U. S. C. 1540(g).  The court held that, because 7(a)(2)
requires interagency consultation, the citizen-suit provision
creates a  procedural righ[t] to consultation in all  per-
sons"so that anyone can file suit in federal court to
challenge the Secretary's (or presumably any other official's)
failure to follow the assertedly correct consultative proce-
dure, notwithstanding their inability to allege any discrete
injury flowing from that failure.  911 F. 2d, at 121-122.  To
understand the remarkable nature of this holding one must
be clear about what it does not rest upon: This is not a case
where plaintiffs are seeking to enforce a procedural require-
ment the disregard of which could impair a separate
concrete interest of theirs (e.g., the procedural requirement
for a hearing prior to denial of their license application, or
the procedural requirement for an environmental impact
statement before a federal facility is constructed next door
to them).  Nor is it simply a case where concrete injury
has been suffered by many persons, as in mass fraud or
mass tort situations.  Nor, finally, is it the unusual case in
which Congress has created a concrete private interest in
the outcome of a suit against a private party for the
government's benefit, by providing a cash bounty for the
victorious plaintiff.  Rather, the court held that the injury-
in-fact requirement had been satisfied by congressional
conferral upon all persons of an abstract, self-contained,
noninstrumental  right to have the Executive observe the
procedures required by law.  We reject this view.
  We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a
generally available grievance about government"claiming
only harm to his and every citizen's interest in proper
application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief
that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does
the public at large"does not state an Article III case or
controversy.  For example, in Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U. S.
126, 129-130 (1922), we dismissed a suit challenging the
propriety of the process by which the Nineteenth Amend-
ment was ratified.  Justice Brandeis wrote for the Court:
 [This is] not a case within the meaning of . . . Article
III . . . . Plaintiff has [asserted] only the right, pos-
sessed by every citizen, to require that the Government
be administered according to law and that the public
moneys be not wasted.  Obviously this general right
does not entitle a private citizen to institute in the
federal courts a suit . . . .  Ibid.
In Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923), we
dismissed for lack of Article III standing a taxpayer suit
challenging the propriety of certain federal expenditures.
We said:
``The party who invokes the power [of judicial review]
must be able to show not only that the statute is
invalid but that he has sustained or is immediately in
danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of
its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some
indefinite way in common with people generally. . . .
Here the parties plaintiff have no such case. . . .
[T]heir complaint . . . is merely that officials of the
executive department of the government are executing
and will execute an act of Congress asserted to be
unconstitutional; and this we are asked to prevent.  To
do so would be not to decide a judicial controversy, but
to assume a position of authority over the governmen-
tal acts of another and co-equal department, an author-
ity which plainly we do not possess.''  Id., at 488-489.
In Ex parte Levitt, 302 U. S. 633 (1937), we dismissed a
suit contending that Justice Black's appointment to this
Court violated the Ineligibility Clause, Art. I, 6, cl. 2.   It
is an established principle, we said,  that to entitle a
private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine
the validity of executive or legislative action he must show
that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of
sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action and it
is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest
common to all members of the public.  Id., at 634.  See also
Doremus v. Board of Ed. of Hawthorne, 342 U. S. 429,
433-434 (1952) (dismissing taxpayer action on the basis of
Frothingham.).
  More recent cases are to the same effect.  In United
States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166 (1974), we dismissed for
lack of standing a taxpayer suit challenging the Govern-
ment's failure to disclose the expenditures of the Central
Intelligence Agency, in alleged violation of the constitution-
al requirement, Art. I, 9, cl. 7, that  a regular Statement
and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public
Money shall be published from time to time.  We held that
such a suit rested upon an impermissible  generalized
grievance, and was inconsistent with  the framework of
Article III because  the impact on [plaintiff] is plainly
undifferentiated and common to all members of the public.
Richardson, supra, at 171, 176-177.  And in Schlesinger v.
Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208 (1974),
we dismissed for the same reasons a citizen-taxpayer suit
contending that it was a violation of the Incompatibility
Clause, Art. I, 6, cl. 2, for Members of Congress to hold
commissions in the military Reserves.  We said that the
challenged action,  standing alone, would adversely affect
only the generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional
governance . . . .  We reaffirm Levitt in holding that
standing to sue may not be predicated upon an interest of
th[is] kind . . . .  Schlesinger, supra, at 217, 220.  Since
Schlesinger we have on two occasions held that an injury
amounting only to the alleged violation of a right to have
the Government act in accordance with law was not
judicially cognizable because  assertion of a right to a
particular kind of Government conduct, which the Govern-
ment has violated by acting differently, cannot alone satisfy
the requirements of Art. III without draining those require-
ments of meaning.  Allen, 468 U. S., at 754; Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 483 (1982).  And only
two Terms ago, we rejected the notion that Article III
permits a citizen-suit to prevent a condemned criminal's
execution on the basis of  the public interest protections of
the Eighth Amendment; once again,  [t]his allegation
raise[d] only the generalized interest of all citizens in
constitutional governance . . . and [was] an inadequate
basis on which to grant . . . standing.  Whitmore, 495 U. S.,
at 160.
  To be sure, our generalized-grievance cases have typically
involved Government violation of procedures assertedly
ordained by the Constitution rather than the Congress.  But
there is absolutely no basis for making the Article III
inquiry turn on the source of the asserted right.  Whether
the courts were to act on their own, or at the invitation of
Congress, in ignoring the concrete injury requirement
described in our cases, they would be discarding a principle
fundamental to the separate and distinct constitutional role
of the Third Branch"one of the essential elements that
identifies those  Cases'' and ``Controversies that are the
business of the courts rather than of the political branches.
 The province of the court, as Chief Justice Marshall said
in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137, 170 (1803)  is,
solely, to decide on the rights of individuals.  Vindicating
the public interest (including the public interest in govern-
ment observance of the Constitution and laws) is the
function of Congress and the Chief Executive.  The question
presented here is whether the public interest in proper
administration of the laws (specifically, in agencies' obser-
vance of a particular, statutorily prescribed procedure) can
be converted into an individual right by a statute that
denominates it as such, and that permits all citizens (or, for
that matter, a subclass of citizens who suffer no distinctive
concrete harm) to sue.  If the concrete injury requirement
has the separation-of-powers significance we have always
said, the answer must be obvious: To permit Congress to
convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive
officers' compliance with the law into an  individual right
vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer
from the President to the courts the Chief Executive's most
important constitutional duty, to  take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed, Art. II, 3.  It would enable the
courts, with the permission of Congress,  to assume a
position of authority over the governmental acts of another
and co-equal department, Frothingham v. Mellon, 262
U. S., at 489, and to become  `virtually continuing monitors
of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action.'  Allen,
468 U. S., at 760 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U. S. 1, 15
(1972)).  We have always rejected that vision of our role:
``When Congress passes an Act empowering administra-
tive agencies to carry on governmental activities, the
power of those agencies is circumscribed by the authori-
ty granted.  This permits the courts to participate in
law enforcement entrusted to administrative bodies
only to the extent necessary to protect justiciable
individual rights against administrative action fairly
beyond the granted powers. . . .  This is very far from
assuming that the courts are charged more than
administrators or legislators with the protection of the
rights of the people.  Congress and the Executive
supervise the acts of administrative agents. . . .  But
under Article III, Congress established courts to
adjudicate cases and controversies as to claims of
infringement of individual rights whether by unlawful
action of private persons or by the exertion of unautho-
rized administrative power.''
Stark v. Wickard, 321 U. S. 288, 309-310 (1944).   Individu-
al rights, within the meaning of this passage, do not mean
public rights that have been legislatively pronounced to
belong to each individual who forms part of the public.  See
also Sierra Club, 405 U. S., at 740-741, n. 16.
  Nothing in this contradicts the principle that  [t]he . . .
injury required by Art. III may exist solely by virtue of
`statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates
standing.'  Warth, 422 U. S., at 500 (quoting Linda R. S.
v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 617, n. 3 (1973)).  Both of the
cases used by Linda R. S. as an illustration of that princi-
ple involved Congress's elevating to the status of legally
cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were
previously inadequate in law (namely, injury to an indivi-
dual's personal interest in living in a racially integrated
community, see Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
409 U. S. 205, 208-212 (1972), and injury to a company's
interest in marketing its product free from competition, see
Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 390 U. S. 1, 6 (1968)).  As
we said in Sierra Club,  [Statutory] broadening [of] the
categories of injury that may be alleged in support of
standing is a different matter from abandoning the require-
ment that the party seeking review must himself have
suffered an injury.  405 U. S., at 738.  Whether or not the
principle set forth in Warth can be extended beyond that
distinction, it is clear that in suits against the government,
at least, the concrete injury requirement must remain.
                  *   *   *
  We hold that respondents lack standing to bring this
action and that the Court of Appeals erred in denying the
summary judgment motion filed by the United States.  The
opinion of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed, and the
cause remanded for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
                            It is so ordered.




            SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                       No. 90-1424
 
           MANUEL LUJAN, Jr., SECRETARY OF THE
                 INTERIOR, PETITIONER v. DEFENDERS
                        OF WILDLIFE et al.
        on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
                  appeals for the eighth circuit
                          [June 12, 1992]

       Justice Kennedy, with whom Justice Souter joins,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
       Although I agree with the essential parts of the Court's
analysis, I write separately to make several observations.
       I agree with the Court's conclusion in Part III-A that, on
the record before us, respondents have failed to demon-
strate that they themselves are  among the injured.  Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 735 (1972).  This component
of the standing inquiry is not satisfied unless
``[p]laintiffs . . . demonstrate a `personal stake in the
outcome.' . . . Abstract injury is not enough.  The
plaintiff must show that he `has sustained or is imme-
diately in danger of sustaining some direct injury' as
the result of the challenged official conduct and the
injury or threat of injury must be both `real and imme-
diate,' not `conjectural' or `hypothetical.'''  Los Angeles
v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 101-102 (1983) (citations
omitted).
    While it may seem trivial to require that Mss. Kelly and
Skilbred acquire airline tickets to the project sites or
announce a date certain upon which they will return, see
ante, at 8, this is not a case where it is reasonable to
assume that the affiants will be using the sites on a regular
basis, see Sierra Club v. Morton, supra, at 735, n. 8, nor do
the affiants claim to have visited the sites since the projects
commenced.  With respect to the Court's discussion of
respondents'  ecosystem nexus,  animal nexus, and
 vocational nexus theories, ante, at 9-11, I agree that on
this record respondents' showing is insufficient to establish
standing on any of these bases.  I am not willing to fore-
close the possibility, however, that in different circumstanc-
es a nexus theory similar to those proffered here might
support a claim to standing.  See Japan Whaling Assn. v.
American Cetacean Soc., 478 U. S. 221, 231, n. 4 (1986)
( respondents . . . undoubtedly have alleged a sufficient
`injury in fact' in that the whale watching and studying of
their members will be adversely affected by continued
whale harvesting).
       In light of the conclusion that respondents have not
demonstrated a concrete injury here sufficient to support
standing under our precedents, I would not reach the issue
of redressability that is discussed by the plurality in Part
III-B.
       I also join Part IV of the Court's opinion with the follow-
ing observations.  As government programs and policies
become more complex and far-reaching, we must be
sensitive to the articulation of new rights of action that do
not have clear analogs in our common-law tradition.
Modern litigation has progressed far from the paradigm of
Marbury suing Madison to get his commission, Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), or Ogden seeking an
injunction to halt Gibbons' steamboat operations.  Gibbons
v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824).  In my view, Congress has the
power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation
that will give rise to a case or controversy where none
existed before, and I do not read the Court's opinion to
suggest a contrary view.  See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S.
490, 500 (1975); ante, at 22-23.  In exercising this power,
however, Congress must at the very least identify the injury
it seeks to vindicate and relate the injury to the class of
persons entitled to bring suit.  The citizen-suit provision of
the Endangered Species Act does not meet these minimal
requirements, because while the statute purports to confer
a right on  any person . . . to enjoin . . . the United States
and any other governmental instrumentality or agency . . .
who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this
chapter, it does not of its own force establish that there is
an injury in  any person by virtue of any  violation.  16
U. S. C. 1540(g)(1)(A).
       The Court's holding that there is an outer limit to the
power of Congress to confer rights of action is a direct and
necessary consequence of the case and controversy limita-
tions found in Article III.  I agree that it would exceed
those limitations if, at the behest of Congress and in the
absence of any showing of concrete injury, we were to
entertain citizen-suits to vindicate the public's nonconcrete
interest in the proper administration of the laws.  While it
does not matter how many persons have been injured by
the challenged action, the party bringing suit must show
that the action injures him in a concrete and personal way.
This requirement is not just an empty formality.  It
preserves the vitality of the adversarial process by assuring
both that the parties before the court have an actual, as
opposed to professed, stake in the outcome, and that  the
legal questions presented . . . will be resolved, not in the
rarefied atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete
factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the
consequences of judicial action.  Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 472 (1982).  In addition, the
requirement of concrete injury confines the Judicial Branch
to its proper, limited role in the constitutional framework
of government.
       An independent judiciary is held to account through its
open proceedings and its reasoned judgments.  In this
process it is essential for the public to know what persons
or groups are invoking the judicial power, the reasons that
they have brought suit, and whether their claims are
vindicated or denied.  The concrete injury requirement
helps assure that there can be an answer to these ques-
tions; and, as the Court's opinion is careful to show, that is
part of the constitutional design.
       With these observations, I concur in Parts I, II, III-A, and
IV of the Court's opinion and in the judgment of the Court.



          SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                       No. 90-1424
 
           MANUEL LUJAN, Jr., SECRETARY OF THE
                 INTERIOR, PETITIONER v. DEFENDERS
                        OF WILDLIFE et al.
        on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
                  appeals for the eighth circuit
                          [June 12, 1992]

       Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment.
       Because I am not persuaded that Congress intended the
consultation requirement in 7(a)(2) of the Endangered
Species Act of 1973 (ESA), 16 U. S. C. 1536(a)(2), to apply
to activities in foreign countries, I concur in the judgment
of reversal. I do not, however, agree with the Court's
conclusion that respondents lack standing because the
threatened injury to their interest in protecting the environ-
ment and studying endangered species is not  imminent.
Nor do I agree with the plurality's additional conclusion
that respondents' injury is not  redressable in this
litigation.
                         I
       In my opinion a person who has visited the critical
habitat of an endangered species, has a professional
interest in preserving the species and its habitat, and
intends to revisit them in the future has standing to
challenge agency action that threatens their destruction.
Congress has found that a wide variety of endangered
species of fish, wildlife, and plants are of  aesthetic,
ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scien-
tific value to the Nation and its people.  16 U. S. C.
1531(a)(3).  Given that finding, we have no license to
demean the importance of the interest that particular
individuals may have in observing any species or its
habitat, whether those individuals are motivated by
aesthetic enjoyment, an interest in professional research, or
an economic interest in preservation of the species.  Indeed,
this Court has often held that injuries to such interests are
sufficient to confer standing, and the Court reiterates that
holding today.  See ante, at 6.
       The Court nevertheless concludes that respondents have
not suffered  injury in fact because they have not shown
that the harm to the endangered species will produce
 imminent injury to them.  See ante, at 7-8.  I disagree.
An injury to an individual's interest in studying or enjoying
a species and its natural habitat occurs when someone
(whether it be the government or a private party) takes
action that harms that species and habitat.  In my judg-
ment, therefore, the  imminence of such an injury should
be measured by the timing and likelihood of the threatened
environmental harm, rather than"as the Court seems to
suggest, ante, at 8-9, and n. 2"by the time that might
elapse between the present and the time when the individu-
als would visit the area if no such injury should occur.
       To understand why this approach is correct and consis-
tent with our precedent, it is necessary to consider the
purpose of the standing doctrine.  Concerned about  the
proper"and properly limited"role of the courts in a demo-
cratic society, we have long held that  Art. III judicial
power exists only to redress or otherwise to protect against
injury to the complaining party.  Warth v. Seldin, 422
U. S. 490, 498-499 (1975).  The plaintiff must have a
 personal stake in the outcome sufficient to  assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumina-
tion of difficult . . . questions.  Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S.
186, 204 (1962).  For that reason,  [a]bstract injury is not
enough.  It must be alleged that the plaintiff `has sustained
or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct
injury' as the result of the challenged statute or official
conduct. . . . The injury or threat of injury must be both
`real and immediate,' not `conjectural,' or `hypothetical.'
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 494 (1974) (quoting
Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U. S. 103, 109-110 (1969)).
       Consequently, we have denied standing to plaintiffs
whose likelihood of suffering any concrete adverse effect
from the challenged action was speculative.  See, e.g.,
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U. S. 149, 158-159 (1990); Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 105 (1983); O'Shea, 414
U. S., at 497.  In this case, however, the likelihood that
respondents will be injured by the destruction of the
endangered species is not speculative.  If respondents are
genuinely interested in the preservation of the endangered
species and intend to study or observe these animals in the
future, their injury will occur as soon as the animals are
destroyed.  Thus the only potential source of  speculation
in this case is whether respondents' intent to study or
observe the animals is genuine.  In my view, Joyce Kelly
and Amy Skillbred have introduced sufficient evidence to
negate petitioner's contention that their claims of injury are
 speculative or  conjectural.  As Justice Blackmun
explains, post, at 3, a reasonable finder of fact could
conclude, from their past visits, their professional back-
grounds, and their affidavits and deposition testimony, that
Ms. Kelly and Ms. Skillbred will return to the project sites
and, consequently, will be injured by the destruction of the
endangered species and critical habitat.
       The plurality also concludes that respondents' injuries are
not redressable in this litigation for two reasons.  First,
respondents have sought only a declaratory judgment that
the Secretary of the Interior's regulation interpreting
7(a)(2) to require consultation only for agency actions in
the United States or on the high seas is invalid and an
injunction requiring him to promulgate a new regulation
requiring consultation for agency actions abroad as well.
But, the plurality opines, even if respondents succeed and
a new regulation is promulgated, there is no guarantee that
federal agencies that are not parties to this case will
actually consult with the Secretary.  See Ante, at 12-14.
Furthermore, the plurality continues, respondents have not
demonstrated that federal agencies can influence the
behavior of the foreign governments where the affected
projects are located.  Thus, even if the agencies consult with
the Secretary and terminate funding for foreign projects,
the foreign governments might nonetheless pursue the
projects and jeopardize the endangered species.  See Ante,
at 15.  Neither of these reasons is persuasive.
      We must presume that if this Court holds that 7(a)(2)
requires consultation, all affected agencies would abide by
that interpretation and engage in the requisite consulta-
tions.  Certainly the Executive Branch cannot be heard to
argue that an authoritative construction of the governing
statute by this Court may simply be ignored by any agency
head.  Moreover, if Congress has required consultation
between agencies, we must presume that such consultation
will have a serious purpose that is likely to produce
tangible results.  As Justice Blackmun explains, post, at
10-12, it is not mere speculation to think that foreign
governments, when faced with the threatened withdrawal
of United States assistance, will modify their projects to
mitigate the harm to endangered species.
                         II

       Although I believe that respondents have standing, I
nevertheless concur in the judgment of reversal because I
am persuaded that the Government is correct in its submis-
sion that 7(a)(2) does not apply to activities in foreign
countries.  As with all questions of statutory construction,
the question whether a statute applies extraterritorially is
one of congressional intent.  Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336
U. S. 281, 284-285 (1949).  We normally assume that
 Congress is primarily concerned with domestic conditions,
id., at 285, and therefore presume that  `legislation of
Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to
apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States.'  EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S. ___
(1991) (quoting Foley Bros., 336 U. S., at 285).
       Section 7(a)(2) provides, in relevant part:
 Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and
with the assistance of the Secretary [of the Interior or
Commerce, as appropriate], insure that any action
authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency
(hereinafter in this section referred to as an `agency
action') is not likely to jeopardize the continued exis-
tence of any endangered species or threatened species
or result in the destruction or adverse modification of
habitat of such species which is determined by the
Secretary, after consultation as appropriate with
affected States, to be critical, unless such agency has
been granted an exemption for such action by the
Committee pursuant to subsection (h) of this sec-
tion. . . .''  16 U. S. C. 1536(a)(2).
Nothing in this text indicates that the section applies in
foreign countries.  Indeed, the only geographic reference
in the section is in the  critical habitat clause, which
mentions  affected States.  The Secretary of the Interior
and the Secretary of Commerce have consistently taken the
position that they need not designate critical habitat in
foreign countries.  See 42 Fed. Reg. 4869 (1977) (initial
regulations of the Fish and Wildlife Service and the
National Marine Fisheries Service on behalf of the Secre-
tary of Interior and the Secretary of Commerce).  Conse-
quently, neither Secretary interprets 7(a)(2) to require
federal agencies to engage in consultations to insure that
their actions in foreign countries will not adversely affect
the critical habitat of endangered or threatened species.
     That interpretation is sound, and, in fact, the Court of
Appeals did not question it.  There is, moreover, no
indication that Congress intended to give a different
geographic scope to the two clauses in 7(a)(2).  To the
contrary, Congress recognized that one of the  major
causes of extinction of endangered species is the  destruc-
tion of natural habitat.  S. Rep. No. 93-307, p. 2 (1973);
see also, H. Rep. No. 93-412, p. 2 (1973); TVA v. Hill, 437
U. S. 153, 179 (1978).  It would thus be illogical to conclude
that Congress required federal agencies to avoid jeopardy
to endangered species abroad, but not destruction of critical
habitat abroad.
       The lack of an express indication that the consultation
requirement  applies extraterritorially is particularly sig-
nificant because other sections of the ESA expressly deal
with the problem of protecting endangered species abroad.
Section 8, for example, authorizes the President to provide
assistance to  any foreign country (with its consent) . . . in
the development and management of programs in that
country which [are] . . . necessary or useful for the conser-
vation of any endangered species or threatened species
listed by the Secretary pursuant to section 1533 of this
title.  16 U. S. C. 1537(a).  It also directs the Secretary of
Interior,  through the Secretary of State, to  encourage
foreign countries to conserve fish and wildlife and to enter
into bilateral or multilateral agreements.  1537(b).
Section 9 makes it unlawful to import endangered species
into (or export them from) the United States or to otherwise
traffic in endangered species  in interstate or foreign
commerce.  1538(a)(1)(A), (E), (F).  Congress thus
obviously thought about endangered species abroad and
devised specific sections of the ESA to protect them.  In this
context, the absence of any explicit statement that the
consultation requirement is applicable to agency actions in
foreign countries suggests that Congress did not intend that
7(a)(2) apply extraterritorially.
       Finally, the general purpose of the ESA does not evince
a congressional intent that the consultation requirement be
applicable to federal agency actions abroad.  The congressio-
nal findings explaining the need for the ESA emphasize
that  various species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the
United States have been rendered extinct as a consequence
of economic growth and development untempered by
adequate concern and conservation, and that these species
 are of aesthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recre-
ational, and scientific value to the Nation and its people.
1531(1), (3) (emphasis added).  The lack of similar
findings about the harm caused by development in other
countries suggests that Congress was primarily concerned
with balancing development and conservation goals in this
country.
       In short, a reading of the entire statute persuades me
that Congress did not intend the consultation requirement
in 7(a)(2) to apply to activities in foreign countries.
Accordingly, notwithstanding my disagreement with the
Court's disposition of the standing question, I concur in its
judgment.




            SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                       No. 90-1424
 
           MANUEL LUJAN, Jr., SECRETARY OF THE
                 INTERIOR, PETITIONER v. DEFENDERS
                        OF WILDLIFE et al.
        on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
                  appeals for the eighth circuit
                          [June 12, 1992]

       Justice Blackmun, with whom Justice O'Connor joins,
dissenting.
       I part company with the Court in this case in two
respects.  First, I believe that respondents have raised
genuine issues of fact"sufficient to survive summary
judgment"both as to injury and as to redressability.
Second, I question the Court's breadth of language in
rejecting standing for  procedural injuries.  I fear the Court
seeks to impose fresh limitations on the constitutional
authority of Congress to allow citizen-suits in the federal
courts for injuries deemed  procedural in nature.  I dissent.
                                 I
       Article III of the Constitution confines the federal courts
to adjudication of actual ``cases'' and ``controversies.''  To
ensure the presence of a ``case'' or ``controversy,'' this Court
has held that Article III requires, as an irreducible mini-
mum, that a plaintiff allege (1) an injury that is (2) ``fairly
traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct'' and
that is (3) ``likely to be redressed by the requested relief.''
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
                                 A
       To survive petitioner's motion for summary judgment on
standing, respondents need not prove that they are actually
or imminently harmed.  They need show only a ``genuine
issue'' of material fact as to standing.  Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.
56(c).  This is not a heavy burden.  A ``genuine issue'' exists
so long as ``the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party [respondents].''
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
This Court's ``function is not [it]self to weigh the evidence
and determine the truth of the matter but to determine
whether there is a genuine issue for trial.''  Id., at 249.
       The Court never mentions the ``genuine issue'' standard.
Rather, the Court refers to the type of evidence it feels
respondents failed to produce, namely, ``affidavits or other
evidence showing, through specific facts'' the existence of
injury.  Ante, at 6.  The Court thereby confuses respondents'
evidentiary burden (i.e., affidavits asserting ``specific facts'')
in withstanding a summary judgment motion under Rule
56(e) with the standard of proof (i.e., the existence of a
``genuine issue'' of ``material fact'') under Rule 56(c).
                                 1
       Were the Court to apply the proper standard for summa-
ry judgment, I believe it would conclude that the sworn
affidavits and deposition testimony of Joyce Kelly and Amy
Skilbred advance sufficient facts to create a genuine issue
for trial concerning whether one or both would be immi-
nently harmed by the Aswan and Mahaweli projects.  In the
first instance, as the Court itself concedes, the affidavits
contained facts making it at least ``questionable'' (and
therefore within the province of the factfinder) that certain
agency-funded projects threaten listed species.  Ante, at 7.
The only remaining issue, then, is whether Kelly and
Skilbred have shown that they personally would suffer
imminent harm.
       I think a reasonable finder of fact could conclude from the
information in the affidavits and deposition testimony that
either Kelly or Skilbred will soon return to the project sites,
thereby satisfying the ``actual or imminent'' injury standard.
The Court dismisses Kelly's and Skilbred's general state-
ments that they intended to revisit the project sites as
``simply not enough.''  Ante, at 8.  But those statements did
not stand alone.  A reasonable finder of fact could conclude,
based not only upon their statements of intent to return,
but upon their past visits to the project sites, as well as
their professional backgrounds, that it was likely that Kelly
and Skilbred would make a return trip to the project areas.
Contrary to the Court's contention that Kelly's and
Skilbred's past visits ``proves nothing,'' ante, at 8, the fact
of their past visits could demonstrate to a reasonable
factfinder that Kelly and Skilbred have the requisite
resources and personal interest in the preservation of the
species endangered by the Aswan and Mahaweli projects to
make good on their intention to return again.  Cf. Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983) (``Past wrongs
were evidence bearing on whether there is a real and
immediate threat of repeated injury'') (internal quotations
omitted).  Similarly, Kelly's and Skilbred's professional
backgrounds in wildlife preservation, see App. 100, 144,
309-310, also make it likely"at least far more likely than
for the average citizen"that they would choose to visit
these areas of the world where species are vanishing.
       By requiring a ``description of concrete plans'' or ``specifi-
cation of when the some day [for a return visit] will be,''
ante, at 8, the Court, in my view, demands what is likely an
empty formality.  No substantial barriers prevent Kelly or
Skilbred from simply purchasing plane tickets to return to
the Aswan and Mahaweli projects.  This case differs from
other cases in which the imminence of harm turned largely
on the affirmative actions of third parties beyond a
plaintiff's control.  See Whitmore v. Arkansas, ___ U.S. ___,
___-___ (1990) (harm to plaintiff death-row inmate from
fellow inmate's execution depended on the court's one day
reversing plaintiff's conviction or sentence and considering
comparable sentences at resentencing); Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 461 U.S., at 105 (harm dependent on police's
arresting plaintiff again and subjecting him to chokehold);
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 372 (1976) (harm rested upon
``what one of a small unnamed minority of policemen might
do to them in the future because of that unknown police-
man's perception of departmental disciplinary procedures'');
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-498 (1974) (harm
from discriminatory conduct of county magistrate and judge
dependent on plaintiffs' being arrested, tried, convicted, and
sentenced); Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 109 (1969)
(harm to plaintiff dependent on a former Congressman's
(then serving a 14-year term as a judge) running again for
Congress).  To be sure, a plaintiff's unilateral control over
his or her exposure to harm does not necessarily render the
harm non-speculative.  Nevertheless, it suggests that a
finder of fact would be far more likely to conclude the harm
is actual or imminent, especially if given an opportunity to
hear testimony and determine credibility.
       I fear the Court's demand for detailed descriptions of
future conduct will do little to weed out those who are
genuinely harmed from those who are not.  More likely, it
will resurrect a code-pleading formalism in federal court
summary judgment practice, as federal courts, newly
doubting their jurisdiction, will demand more and more
particularized showings of future harm.  Just to survive
summary judgment, for example, a property owner claiming
a decline in the value of his property from governmental
action might have to specify the exact date he intends to
sell his property and show that there is a market for the
property, lest it be surmised he might not sell again.  A
nurse turned down for a job on grounds of her race had
better be prepared to show on what date she was prepared
to start work, that she had arranged daycare for her child,
and that she would not have accepted work at another
hospital instead.  And a Federal Torts Claims Act plaintiff
alleging loss of consortium should make sure to furnish this
Court with a ``description of concrete plans'' for her nightly
schedule of attempted activities.

                                 2
       The Court also concludes that injury is lacking, because
respondents' allegations of ``ecosystem nexus'' failed to
demonstrate sufficient proximity to the site of the environ-
mental harm.  Ante, at 9.  To support that conclusion, the
Court mischaracterizes our decision in Lujan v. National
Wildlife Federation, ___ U.S. ___ (1990), as establishing a
general rule that ``a plaintiff claiming injury from environ-
mental damage must use the area affected by the chal-
lenged activity.''  Ante, at 9.  In National Wildlife Federa-
tion, the Court required specific geographical proximity
because of the particular type of harm alleged in that case:
harm to the plaintiff's visual enjoyment of nature from
mining activities.  Id., at ___.  One cannot suffer from the
sight of a ruined landscape without being close enough to
see the sites actually being mined.  Many environmental
injuries, however, cause harm distant from the area
immediately affected by the challenged action.  Environ-
mental destruction may affect animals traveling over vast
geographical ranges, see, e.g., Japan Whaling Assn. v.
American Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221 (1986) (harm to
American whale watchers from Japanese whaling activi-
ties), or rivers running long geographical courses, see, e.g.,
Arkansas v. Oklahoma, ___ U.S. ___ (1992) (harm to
Oklahoma residents from wastewater treatment plant 39
miles from border).  It cannot seriously be contended that
a litigant's failure to use the precise or exact site where
animals are slaughtered or where toxic waste is dumped
into a river means he or she cannot show injury.
       The Court also rejects respondents' claim of vocational or
professional injury.  The Court says that it is ``beyond all
reason'' that a zoo ``keeper'' of Asian elephants would have
standing to contest his government's participation in the
eradication of all the Asian elephants in another part of the
world.  Ante, at 10.  I am unable to see how the distant
location of the destruction necessarily (for purposes of ruling
at summary judgment) mitigates the harm to the elephant
keeper.  If there is no more access to a future supply of the
animal that sustains a keeper's livelihood, surely there is
harm.
       I have difficulty imagining this Court applying its rigid
principles of geographic formalism anywhere outside the
context of environmental claims.  As I understand it,
environmental plaintiffs are under no special constitutional
standing disabilities.  Like other plaintiffs, they need show
only that the action they challenge has injured them,
without necessarily showing they happened to be physically
near the location of the alleged wrong.  The Court's decision
today should not be interpreted  to foreclose the possibility
. . . that in different circumstances a nexus theory similar
to those proffered here might support a claim to standing.
Ante, at 2 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).

                           B
       A plurality of the Court suggests that respondents have
not demonstrated redressability: a likelihood that a court
ruling in their favor would remedy their injury.  Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc.,
438 U.S. 59, 74-75, and n. 20 (1978) (plaintiff must show
``substantial likelihood'' that relief requested will redress
the injury).  The plurality identifies two obstacles.  The first
is that the ``action agencies'' (e.g., the Agency for Interna-
tional Development) cannot be required to undertake
consultation with petitioner Secretary, because they are not
directly bound as parties to the suit and are otherwise not
indirectly bound by being subject to petitioner Secretary's
regulation.  Petitioner, however, officially and publicly has
taken the position that his regulations regarding consulta-
tion under 7 of the Act are binding on action agencies.  50
CFR 402.14(a) (1991).  And he has previously taken the
same position in this very litigation, having stated in his
answer to the complaint that petitioner ``admits the Fish
and Wildlife Service (FWS) was designated the lead agency
for the formulation of regulations concerning section 7 of
the ESA.''  App. 246.  I cannot agree with the plurality that
the Secretary (or the Solicitor General) is now free, for the
convenience of this appeal, to disavow his prior public and
litigation positions.  More generally, I cannot agree that the
Government is free to play ``Three-Card Monte'' with its
description of agencies' authority to defeat standing against
the agency given the lead in administering a statutory
scheme.
       Emphasizing that none of the action agencies are parties
to this suit (and having rejected the possibility of their
being indirectly bound by petitioner's regulation), the
plurality concludes that ``there is no reason they should be
obliged to honor an incidental legal determination the suit
produced.''  Ante, at 13.  I am not as willing as the plurality
is to assume that agencies at least will not try to follow the
law.  Moreover, I wonder if the plurality has not overlooked
the extensive involvement from the inception of this
litigation by the Department of State and the Agency for
International Development.  Under principles of collateral
estoppel, these agencies are precluded from subsequently
relitigating the issues decided in this suit.
       ``[O]ne who prosecutes or defends a suit in the name of
       another to establish and protect his own right, or who
       assists in the prosecution or defense of an action in aid of
       some interest of his own, and who does this openly to the
       knowledge of the opposing party, is as much bound by the
       judgment and as fully entitled to avail himself of it as an
       estoppel against an adverse party, as he would be if he
       had been a party to the record.''  Souffront v. Compagnie
       des Sucreries, 217 U.S. 475, 487 (1910).
This principle applies even to the Federal Government.  In
Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979), this Court
held that the Government was estopped from relitigating in
federal court the constitutionality of Montana's gross
receipts tax, because that issue previously had been
litigated in state court by an individual contractor whose
litigation had been financed and controlled by the Federal
Government.  ``Thus, although not a party, the United
States plainly had a sufficient `laboring oar' in the conduct
of the state-court litigation to actuate principles of estop-
pel.''  Id., at 155.  See also United States v. Mendoza, 464
U.S. 154, 164, n. 9 (1984) (Federal Government estopped
where it ``constituted a `party' in all but a technical sense'').
In my view, the action agencies have had sufficient ``labor-
ing oars'' in this litigation since its inception to be bound
from subsequent relitigation of the extraterritorial scope of
the 7 consultation requirement.  As a result, I believe
respondents' injury would likely be redressed by a favorable
decision.
       The second redressability obstacle relied on by the
plurality is that ``the [action] agencies generally supply only
a fraction of the funding for a foreign project.''  Ante, at
14-15.  What this Court might ``generally'' take to be true
does not eliminate the existence of a genuine issue of fact
to withstand summary judgment.  Even if the action
agencies supply only a fraction of the funding for a particu-
lar foreign project, it remains at least a question for the
finder of fact whether threatened withdrawal of that
fraction would affect foreign government conduct sufficient-
ly to avoid harm to listed species.
       The plurality states that ``AID, for example, has provided
less than 10% of the funding for the Mahaweli project.''
Ante, at 15.  The plurality neglects to mention that this
``fraction'' amounts to $170 million, see App. 159, not so
paltry a sum for a country of only 16 million people with a
gross national product of less than $6 billion in 1986 when
respondents filed the complaint in this action.  Federal
Research Division, Library of Congress, Sri Lanka: A
Country Study (Area Handbook Series) xvi-xvii (1990).
       The plurality flatly states: ``Respondents have produced
nothing to indicate that the projects they have named will
. . . do less harm to listed species, if that fraction is elimi-
nated.''  Ante, at 15.  As an initial matter, the relevant
inquiry is not, as the plurality suggests, what will happen
if AID or other agencies stop funding projects, but what will
happen if AID or other agencies comply with the consulta-
tion requirement for projects abroad.  Respondents filed suit
to require consultation, not a termination of funding.
Respondents have raised at least a genuine issue of fact
that the projects harm endangered species and that the
actions of AID and other U.S. agencies can mitigate that
harm.
       The plurality overlooks an Interior Department memo-
randum listing eight endangered or threatened species in
the Mahaweli project area and recounting that ``[t]he Sri
Lankan government has requested the assistance of AID in
mitigating the negative impacts to the wildlife involved.''
App. 78.  Further, a letter from the Director of the Fish and
Wildlife Service to AID states:
       ``The Sri Lanka government lacks the necessary finances
       to undertake any long-term management programs to
       avoid the negative impacts to the wildlife.  The donor
       nations and agencies that are financing the [Mahaweli
       project] will be the key as to how successfully the wildlife
       is preserved.  If wildlife problems receive the same level
       of attention as the engineering project, then the negative
       impacts to the environment can be alleviated.  This
       means that there has to be long-term funding in suffi-
cient amounts to stem the negative impacts of this
       project.''  Id., at 216.
I do not share the plurality's astonishing confidence that, on
the record here, a factfinder could only conclude that AID
was powerless to ensure the protection of listed species at
the Mahaweli project.
       As for the Aswan project, the record again rebuts the
plurality's assumption that donor agencies are without any
authority to protect listed species.  Kelly asserted in her
affidavit"and it has not been disputed"that the Bureau of
Reclamation was ``overseeing'' the rehabilitation of the
Aswan project.  App. 101.  See also id., at 65 (Bureau of
Reclamation publication stating: ``In 1982, the Egyptian
government . . . requested that Reclamation serve as its
engineering advisor for the nine-year [Aswan] rehabilitation
project'').
       I find myself unable to agree with the plurality's analysis
of redressability, based as it is on its invitation of executive
lawlessness, ignorance of principles of collateral estoppel,
unfounded assumptions about causation, and erroneous
conclusions about what the record does not say.  In my
view, respondents have satisfactorily shown a genuine issue
of fact as to whether their injury would likely be redressed
by a decision in their favor.
                                II
       The Court concludes that any ``procedural injury'' suffered
by respondents is insufficient to confer standing.  It rejects
the view that the  injury-in-fact requirement . . . [is]
satisfied by congressional conferral upon all person of an
abstract, self-contained, noninstrumental `right' to have the
Executive observe the procedures required by law.  Ante,
at 16.  Whatever the Court might mean with that very
broad language, it cannot be saying that ``procedural
injuries'' as a class are necessarily insufficient for purposes
of Article III standing.
       Most governmental conduct can be classified as ``proce-
dural.''  Many injuries caused by governmental conduct,
therefore, are categorizable at some level of generality as
``procedural'' injuries.  Yet, these injuries are not categori-
cally beyond the pale of redress by the federal courts.
When the Government, for example, ``procedurally'' issues
a pollution permit, those affected by the permittee's
pollutants are not without standing to sue.  Only later cases
will tell just what the Court means by its intimation that
``procedural'' injuries are not constitutionally cognizable
injuries.  In the meantime, I have the greatest of sympathy
for the courts across the country that will struggle to
understand the Court's standardless exposition of this
concept today.
       The Court expresses concern that allowing judicial
enforcement of ``agencies' observance of a particular,
statutorily prescribed procedure'' would ``transfer from the
President to the courts the Chief Executive's most impor-
tant constitutional duty, to `take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed,' Art. II, sec. 3.''  Ante, at 20.  In fact, the
principal effect of foreclosing judicial enforcement of such
procedures is to transfer power into the hands of the
Executive at the expense"not of the courts"but of Con-
gress, from which that power originates and emanates.
       Under the Court's anachronistically formal view of the
separation of powers, Congress legislates pure, substantive
mandates and has no business structuring the procedural
manner in which the Executive implements these man-
dates.  To be sure, in the ordinary course, Congress does
legislate in black-and-white terms of affirmative commands
or negative prohibitions on the conduct of officers of the
Executive Branch.  In complex regulatory areas, however,
Congress often legislates, as it were, in procedural shades
of gray.  That is, it sets forth substantive policy goals and
provides for their attainment by requiring Executive Branch
officials to follow certain procedures, for example, in the
form of reporting, consultation, and certification require-
ments.
       The Court recently has considered two such procedurally
oriented statutes.  In Japan Whaling Assn. v. American
Cetacean Society, 478 U.S. 221 (1986), the Court examined
a statute requiring the Secretary of Commerce to certify to
the President that foreign nations were not conducting
fishing operations or trading which ``diminis[h] the effec-
tiveness'' of an international whaling convention.  Id., at
226.  The Court expressly found standing to sue.  Id., at
230-231, n. 4.  In Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens
Council, 490 U.S. 332, 348 (1989), this Court considered
injury from violation of the ``action-forcing'' procedures of
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), in particu-
lar the requirements for issuance of environmental impact
statements.
       The consultation requirement of 7 of the Endangered
Species Act is a similar, action-forcing statute.  Consulta-
tion is designed as an integral check on federal agency
action, ensuring that such action does not go forward
without full consideration of its effects on listed species.
Once consultation is initiated, the Secretary is under a duty
to provide to the action agency ``a written statement setting
forth the Secretary's opinion, and a summary of the
information on which the opinion is based, detailing how
the agency action affects the species or its critical habitat.''
16 U.S.C. 1536(b)(3)(A).  The Secretary is also obligated to
suggest ``reasonable and prudent alternatives'' to prevent
jeopardy to listed species.  Ibid.  The action agency must
undertake as well its own ``biological assessment for the
purpose of identifying any endangered species or threatened
species'' likely to be affected by agency action.  1536(c)(1).
After the initiation of consultation, the action agency ``shall
not make any irreversible or irretrievable commitment of
resources'' which would foreclose the ``formulation or
implementation of any reasonable and prudent alternative
measures'' to avoid jeopardizing listed species.  1536(d).
These action-forcing procedures are  designed to protect
some threatened concrete interest, ante, at 17, n. 8, of
persons who observe and work with endangered or threat-
ened species.  That is why I am mystified by the Court's
unsupported conclusion that  [t]his is not a case where
plaintiffs are seeking to enforce a procedural requirement
the disregard of which could impair a separate concrete
interest of theirs.  Ante, at 15.
       Congress legislates in procedural shades of gray not to
aggrandize its own power but to allow maximum Executive
discretion in the attainment of Congress' legislative goals.
Congress could simply impose a substantive prohibition on
executive conduct; it could say that no agency action shall
result in the loss of more than 5% of any listed species.
Instead, Congress sets forth substantive guidelines and
allows the Executive, within certain procedural constraints,
to decide how best to effectuate the ultimate goal.  See
American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105
(1946).  The Court never has questioned Congress' authority
to impose such procedural constraints on executive power.
Just as Congress does not violate separation of powers by
structuring the procedural manner in which the Executive
shall carry out the laws, surely the federal courts do not
violate separation of powers when, at the very instruction
and command of Congress, they enforce these procedures.
       To prevent Congress from conferring standing for
``procedural injuries'' is another way of saying that Congress
may not delegate to the courts authority deemed ``executive''
in nature.  Ante, at 20 (Congress may not ``transfer from the
President to the courts the Chief Executive's most impor-
tant constitutional duty, to `take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed,' Art. II, sec. 3'').  Here Congress seeks
not to delegate ``executive'' power but only to strengthen the
procedures it has legislatively mandated. ``We have long
recognized that the nondelegation doctrine does not prevent
Congress from seeking assistance, within proper limits,
from its coordinate Branches.''  Touby v. United States, ___
U.S. ___, ___ (1991).  ``Congress does not violate the
Constitution merely because it legislates in broad terms,
leaving a certain degree of discretion to executive or judicial
actors'' (emphasis added).  Ibid.
       Ironically, this Court has previously justified a relaxed
review of congressional delegation to the Executive on
grounds that Congress, in turn, has subjected the exercise
of that power to judicial review.  INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919, 953-954, n. 16 (1983); American Power & Light Co. v.
SEC, 329 U.S., at 105-106.  The Court's intimation today
that procedural injuries are not constitutionally cognizable
threatens this understanding upon which Congress has
undoubtedly relied.  In no sense is the Court's suggestion
compelled by our ``common understanding of what activities
are appropriate to legislatures, to executives, and to courts.''
Ante, at 3.  In my view, it reflects an unseemly solicitude
for an expansion of power of the Executive Branch.
       It is to be hoped that over time the Court will acknowl-
edge that some classes of procedural duties are so en-
meshed with the prevention of a substantive, concrete harm
that an individual plaintiff may be able to demonstrate a
sufficient likelihood of injury just through the breach of
that procedural duty.  For example, in the context of the
NEPA requirement of environmental-impact statements,
this Court has acknowledged ``it is now well settled that
NEPA itself does not mandate particular results [and]
simply prescribes the necessary process,'' but ``these proce-
dures are almost certain to affect the agency's substantive
decision.''  Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490
U.S., 332, 350 (1989) (emphasis added).  See also Andrus v.
Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 350-351 (1979) (``If environmen-
tal concerns are not interwoven into the fabric of agency
planning, the `action-forcing' characteristics of [the environ-
mental-impact statement requirement] would be lost'').
This acknowledgement of an inextricable link between
procedural and substantive harm does not reflect improper
appellate factfinding.  It reflects nothing more than the
proper deference owed to the judgment of a coordinate
branch"Congress"that certain procedures are directly tied
to protection against a substantive harm.
       In short, determining ``injury'' for Article III standing
purposes is a fact-specific inquiry.  ``Typically . . . the
standing inquiry requires careful judicial examination of a
complaint's allegations to ascertain whether the particular
plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the particular
claims asserted.''  Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S., at 752.  There
may be factual circumstances in which a congressionally
imposed procedural requirement is so insubstantially
connected to the prevention of a substantive harm that it
cannot be said to work any conceivable injury to an individ-
ual litigant.  But, as a general matter, the courts owe
substantial deference to Congress' substantive purpose in
imposing a certain procedural requirement.  In all events,
``[o]ur separation-of-powers analysis does not turn on the
labeling of an activity as `substantive' as opposed to `proce-
dural.'  Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 393
(1989).  There is no room for a per se rule or presumption
excluding injuries labeled ``procedural'' in nature.

                            III
       In conclusion, I cannot join the Court on what amounts
to a slash-and-burn expedition through the law of environ-
mental standing.  In my view, ``[t]he very essence of civil
liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to
claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an
injury.''  Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803).
       I dissent.
