Slip opinion

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus
(headnote) will be released, as is being
done in connection with this case, at
the time the opinion is issued.  The
syllabus constitutes no part of the
opinion of the Court but has been pre-
pared by the Reporter of Decisions for
the convenience of the reader.  See
United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200
U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

              Syllabus

ANKENBRANDT, AS NEXT FRIEND AND MOTHER OF L.R., et al. v. RICHARDS et al.

 certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the fifth circuit
No. 91-367.   Argued March 31, 1992"Decided June
              15, 1992

Petitioner brought this suit on behalf of her
daughters in the District Court, alleging feder-
al jurisdiction based on the diversity-of-citi-
zenship provision of 28 U.S.C. 1332, and seek-
ing monetary damages for alleged torts commit-
ted against the girls by their father and his
female companion, the respondents here.  The
court granted respondents' motion to dismiss
without prejudice, ruling in the alternative
that it lacked jurisdiction because the case
fell within the ``domestic relations'' exception
to diversity jurisdiction and that its decision
to dismiss was justified under the abstention
principles announced in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37.  The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held:
1.A domestic relations exception to federal
diversity jurisdiction exists as a matter of
statutory construction.  Pp.3-11.
(a)The exception stems from Barber v. Barber,
21 How. 582, 584, in which the Court announced
in dicta, without citation of authority or dis-
cussion of foundation, that federal courts have
no jurisdiction over suits for divorce or the
allowance of alimony.  The lower federal courts
have ever since recognized a limitation on their
jurisdiction based on that statement, and this
Court is unwilling to cast aside an understood
rule that has existed for nearly a century and
a half.  Pp.3-5.
(b)An examination of Article III, 2, of the
Constitution and of Barber and its progeny
makes clear that the Constitution does not
mandate the exclusion of domestic relations
cases from federal-court jurisdiction.  Rather,
the origins of the exception lie in the statuto-
ry requirements for diversity jurisdiction.  De
La Rama v. De La Rama, 201 U.S. 303, 307.  Pp.5-
-7.
(c)That the domestic relations exception
exists is demonstrated by the inclusion of the
defining phrase, ``all suits of a civil nature at
common law or in equity,'' in the pre-1948 ver-
sions of the diversity statute, by Barber's
implicit interpretation of that phrase to ex-
clude divorce and alimony actions, and by Cong-
ress' silent acceptance of this construction
for nearly a century.  Considerations of stare
decisis have particular strength in this con-
text, where the legislative power is implicated,
and Congress remains free to alter what this
Court has done.  Patterson v. McLean Credit Un-
ion, 491 U.S. 164, 172-173.  Furthermore, it may
be presumed that Congress amended the diversi-
ty statute in 1948 to replace the law/equity
distinction with 1332's ``all civil actions''
phrase with full cognizance of the Court's long-
standing interpretation of the prior statutes,
and that, absent any indication of an intent to
the contrary, Congress adopted that interpre-
tation in reenacting the statute.  Pp.7-11.
2.The domestic relations exception does not
permit a district court to refuse to exercise
diversity jurisdiction over a tort action for
damages.  The exception, as articulated by this
Court since Barber, encompasses only cases
involving the issuance of a divorce, alimony, or
child custody decree.  As so limited, the excep-
tion's validity must be reaffirmed, given the
long passage of time without any expression of
congressional dissatisfaction and sound policy
considerations of judicial economy and exper-
tise.  Because this lawsuit in no way seeks a
divorce, alimony, or child custody decree, the
Court of Appeals erred by affirming the District
Court's invocation of the domestic relations
exception.  Federal subject-matter jurisdiction
pursuant to 1332 is proper in this case.  Pp.1-
1-15.
3.The District Court erred in abstaining from
exercising jurisdiction under the Younger doc-
trine.  Although this Court has extended Younger
abstention to the civil context, it has never
applied the notions of comity so critical to
Younger where, as here, no proceeding was pend-
ing in state tribunals.  Similarly, while it is not
inconceivable that in certain circumstances the
abstention principles developed in Burford v.
Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, might be relevant in a
case involving elements of the domestic rela-
tionship even when the parties do not seek
divorce, alimony, or child custody, such absten-
tion is inappropriate here, where the status of
the domestic relationship has been determined
as a matter of state law, and in any event has
no bearing on the underlying torts alleged.
Pp.15-16.
934 F.2d 1262, reversed and remanded.

White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined.  Blackmun, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.  Ste-
vens, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judg-
ment, in which Thomas, J., joined.


Opinion
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal
revision before publication in the pre-
liminary print of the United States
Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Su-
preme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical
or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the
preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES--------
             No. 91-367
              --------
CAROL ANKENBRANDT, as next friend and mother
of l. r. and s. r., PETITIONER v. JON A. RICHARDS
               and DEBRA KESLER
  on writ of certiorari to the united states
    court of appeals for the fifth circuit
                [June 15, 1992]

  Justice White delivered the opinion of the
Court.
  This case presents the issue whether the
federal courts have jurisdiction or should ab-
stain in a case involving alleged torts committed
by the former husband of petitioner and his female
companion against petitioner's children, when the
sole basis for federal jurisdiction is the diversi-
ty- of-citizenship provision of 28 U. S. C. 1332.
                       I
  Petitioner Carol Ankenbrandt, a citizen of
Missouri, brought this lawsuit on September 26,
1989, on behalf of her daughters L. R. and S. R.
against respondents Jon A. Richards and Debra
Kesler, citizens of Louisiana, in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana.  Alleging federal jurisdiction based on
the diversity of citizenship provision of 1332,
Ankenbrandt's complaint sought monetary damages
for alleged sexual and physical abuse of the
children committed by Richards and Kesler.  Rich-
ards is the divorced father of the children and
Kesler his female companion.  On December 10,
1990, the District Court granted respondents'
motion to dismiss this lawsuit.  Citing In re
Burrus, 136 U. S. 586, 593-594 (1890), for the
proposition that  [t]he whole subject of the
domestic relations of husband and wife, parent
and child, belongs to the laws of the States and
not to the laws of the United States, the court
concluded that this case fell within what has
become known as the  domestic relations excep-
tion to diversity jurisdiction, and that it lacked
jurisdiction over the case.  The court also in-
voked the abstention principles announced in
Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), to justify its
decision to dismiss the complaint without preju-
dice.  Ankenbrandt v. Richards, No. 89-4244 (ED La.
Dec. 10, 1990).  The Court of Appeals affirmed in an
unpublished opinion.  Ankenbrandt v. Richards, No.
91-3037 (CA5 May 31, 1991), judgt. order reported
at 934 F. 2d 1262.
  We granted certiorari limited to the following
questions:   (1) Is there a domestic relations
exception to federal jurisdiction? (2) If so, does
it permit a district court to abstain from exer-
cising diversity jurisdiction over a tort action
for damages? and (3) Did the District Court in
this case err in abstaining from exercising juris-
diction under the doctrine of Younger v. Harris,
[supra]?  502 U. S. ___ (1992).  We address each of
these issues in turn.
                      II
  The domestic relations exception upon which the
courts below relied to decline jurisdiction has
been invoked often by the lower federal courts.
The seeming authority for doing so originally
stemmed from the announcement in Barber v. Bar-
ber, 21 How. 582 (1859), that the federal courts
have no jurisdiction over suits for divorce or the
allowance of alimony.  In that case, the Court
heard a suit in equity brought by a wife (by her
next friend) in federal district court pursuant to
diversity jurisdiction against her former husband.
She sought to enforce a decree from a New York
state court, which had granted a divorce and
awarded her alimony.  The former husband thereup-
on moved to Wisconsin to place himself beyond the
New York courts' jurisdiction so that the divorce
decree there could not be enforced against him; he
then sued for divorce in a Wisconsin court, repre-
senting to that court that his wife had abandoned
him and failing to disclose the existence of the
New York decree.  In a suit brought by the former
wife in Wisconsin Federal District Court, the
former husband alleged that the court lacked
jurisdiction.  The court accepted jurisdiction and
gave judgment for the divorced wife.
  On appeal, it was argued that the District Court
lacked jurisdiction on two grounds: first, that
there was no diversity of citizenship because
although divorced, the wife's citizenship neces-
sarily remained that of her former husband; and
second, that the whole subject of divorce and
alimony, including a suit to enforce an alimony
decree, was exclusively ecclesiastical at the time
of the adoption of the Constitution and that the
Constitution therefore placed the whole subject
of divorce and alimony beyond the jurisdiction of
the United States courts.  Over the dissent of
three Justices, the Court rejected both argu-
ments.  After an exhaustive survey of the author-
ities, the Court concluded that a divorced wife
could acquire a citizenship separate from that of
her former husband and that a suit to enforce an
alimony decree rested within the federal courts'
equity jurisdiction.  The Court reached these
conclusions after summarily dismissing the former
husband's contention that the case involved a
subject matter outside the federal courts' juris-
diction.  In so stating, however, the Court also
announced the following limitation on federal
jurisdiction:
      Our first remark is"and we wish it to be
remembered"that this is not a suit asking the
court for the allowance of alimony.  That has
been done by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion.  The court in Wisconsin was asked to
interfere to prevent that decree from being
defeated by fraud.
   We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in
the courts of the United States upon the
subject of divorce, or for the allowance of
alimony, either as an original proceeding in
chancery or as an incident to divorce a vincu-
lo, or to one from bed and board.  Barber,
supra, at 584.
As a general matter, the dissenters agreed with
these statements, but took issue with the Court's
holding that the instant action to enforce an
alimony decree was within the equity jurisdiction
of the federal courts.
  The statements disclaiming jurisdiction over
divorce and alimony decree suits, though techni-
cally dicta, formed the basis for excluding  do-
mestic relations cases from the jurisdiction of
the lower federal courts, a jurisdictional limita-
tion those courts have recognized ever since.
The Barber Court, however, cited no authority and
did not discuss the foundation for its announce-
ment.  Since that time, the Court has dealt only
occasionally with the domestic relations limita-
tion on federal-court jurisdiction, and it has
never addressed the basis for such a limitation.
Because we are unwilling to cast aside an under-
stood rule that has been recognized for nearly a
century and a half, we feel compelled to explain
why we will continue to recognize this limitation
on federal jurisdiction.
                       A
  Counsel argued in Barber that the Constitution
prohibited federal courts from exercising juris-
diction over domestic relations cases.  Brief for
Appellant in Barber v. Barber, D.T. 1858, No. 44, pp.
4-5.  An examination of Article III, Barber itself,
and our cases since Barber makes clear that the
Constitution does not exclude domestic relations
cases from the jurisdiction otherwise granted by
statute to the federal courts.
  Article III, 2, of the Constitution provides in
pertinent part:
      Section 2.  The judicial Power shall extend
to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority;"to all Cases
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls;"to all Cases of admiralty and
maritime Jurisdiction;"to Controversies to
which the United States shall be a Party;"to
Controversies between two or more
States;"between a State and Citizens of anot-
her State;"between Citizens of different
States;"between Citizens of the same State
claiming Land under Grants of different
States, and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects.
This section delineates the absolute limits on the
federal courts' jurisdiction.  But in articulating
three different terms to define jurisdic-
tion"``Cases, in Law and Equity,  Cases, and
 Controversies"this provision contains no
limitation on subjects of a domestic relations
nature.  Nor did Barber purport to ground the
domestic relations exception in these constitu-
tional limits on federal jurisdiction.  The Court's
discussion of federal judicial power to hear suits
of a domestic relations nature contains no men-
tion of the Constitution, see Barber, supra, at
584, and it is logical to presume that the Court
based its statement limiting such power on nar-
rower statutory, rather than broader constitu-
tional, grounds.  Cf. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v.
Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades
Council, Inc., 485 U. S. 568, 575 (1988).
  Subsequent decisions confirm that Barber was
not relying on constitutional limits in justifying
the exception.  In one such case, for instance, the
Court stated the  long established rule that
federal courts lack jurisdiction over certain
domestic relations matters as having been based
on the assumptions that  husband and wife cannot
usually be citizens of different States, so long
as the marriage relation continues (a rule which
has been somewhat relaxed in recent cases), and
for the further reason that a suit for divorce in
itself involves no pecuniary value.  De La Rama v.
De La Rama, 201 U. S. 303, 307 (1906).  Since Article
III contains no monetary limit on suits brought
pursuant to federal diversity jurisdiction, De La
Rama's articulation of the  rule in terms of the
statutory requirements for diversity jurisdic-
tion further supports the view that the exception
is not grounded in the Constitution.
      Moreover, even while citing with approval the
Barber language purporting to limit the jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts over domestic rela-
tions matters, the Court has heard appeals from
territorial courts involving divorce, see, e.g., De
La Rama, supra; Simms v. Simms, 175 U. S. 162 (1899),
and has upheld the exercise of original jurisdic-
tion by federal courts in the District of Columbia
to decide divorce actions, see, e.g., Glidden Co. v.
Zdanok, 370 U. S. 530, 581, n. 54 (1962).  Thus, even
were the statements in De La Rama referring to the
statutory prerequisites of diversity jurisdiction
alone not persuasive testament to the statutory
origins of the rule, by hearing appeals from
legislative, or Article I courts, this Court implic-
itly has made clear its understanding that the
source of the constraint on jurisdiction from
Barber was not Article III; otherwise the Court
itself would have lacked jurisdiction over appeals
from these legislative courts.  See National
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U. S.
582, 643 (1949) (Vinson, C. J., dissenting) ( We can
no more review a legislative court's decision of a
case which is not among those enumerated in Art.
III than we can hear a case from a state court
involving purely state law questions).  We there-
fore have no difficulty concluding that when the
Barber Court  disclaim[ed] altogether any juris-
diction in the courts of the United States upon
the subject of divorce, 21 How., at 584, it was
not basing its statement on the Constitution.
                    B
  That Article III, 2, does not mandate the
exclusion of domestic relations cases from feder-
al-court jurisdiction, however, does not mean
that such courts necessarily must retain and
exercise jurisdiction over such cases.  Other
constitutional provisions explain why this is so.
Article I, 8, cl. 9, for example, authorizes Con-
gress  [t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the
supreme Court and Article III, 1, states that
 [t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish.  The Court's cases
state the rule that  if inferior federal courts
were created, [Congress was not] required to
invest them with all the jurisdiction it was autho-
rized to bestow under Art. III.  Palmore v. United
States, 411 U. S. 389, 401 (1973).
  This position has held constant since at least
1845, when the Court stated that  the judicial
power of the United States . . . is (except in
enumerated instances, applicable exclusively to
this court) dependent for its distribution and
organization, and for the modes of its exercise,
entirely upon the action of Congress, who possess
the sole power of creating the tribunals (inferior
to the Supreme Court) . . . and of investing them
with jurisdiction either limited, concurrent, or
exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from
them in the exact degrees and character which to
Congress may seem proper for the public good.
Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 236, 245.  See Sheldon v.
Sill, 8 How. 441 (1850); Plaquemines Tropical Fruit
Co. v. Henderson, 170 U. S. 511 (1898); Kline v. Burke
Constr. Co., 260 U. S. 226 (1922); Lockerty v. Phil-
lips, 319 U. S. 182 (1943).  We thus turn our atten-
tion to the relevant jurisdictional statutes.
  The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that  the
circuit courts shall have original cognizance,
concurrent with the courts of the several States,
of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in
equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclu-
sive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred
dollars, and . . . an alien is a party, or the suit is
between a citizen of the State where the suit is
brought, and a citizen of another State.  Act of
Sept. 24, 1789, 11, 1 Stat. 78. (Emphasis added.)
The defining phrase,  all suits of a civil nature
at common law or in equity, remained a key ele-
ment of statutory provisions demarcating the
terms of diversity jurisdiction until 1948, when
Congress amended the diversity jurisdiction
provision to eliminate this phrase and replace in
its stead the term  all civil actions.  1948
Judicial Code and Judiciary Act, 62 Stat. 930, 28
U. S. C. 1332.
  The Barber majority itself did not expressly
refer to the diversity statute's use of the
limitation on  suits of a civil nature at common
law or in equity.  The dissenters in Barber,
however, implicitly made such a reference, for
they suggested that the federal courts had no
power over certain domestic relations actions
because the court of chancery lacked authority
to issue divorce and alimony decrees.  Stating
that  the origin and the extent of [the federal
courts'] jurisdiction must be sought in the laws of
the United States, and in the settled rules and
principles by which those laws have bound them,
the dissenters contended that  as the jurisdic-
tion of the chancery in England does not extend to
or embrace the subjects of divorce and alimony,
and as the jurisdiction of the courts of the
United States in chancery is bounded by that of
the chancery in England, all power or cognizance
with respect to those subjects by the courts of
the United States in chancery is equally exclud-
ed.  Barber, supra, at 605 (Daniel, J., dissenting).
Hence, in the dissenters' view, a suit seeking such
relief would not fall within the statutory lan-
guage  all suits of a civil nature at common law or
in equity.  Because the Barber Court did not
disagree with this reason for accepting the
jurisdictional limitation over the issuance of
divorce and alimony decrees, it may be inferred
fairly that the jurisdictional limitation recog-
nized by the Court rested on this statutory basis
and that the disagreement between the Court and
the dissenters thus centered only on the extent
of the limitation.
  We have no occasion here to join the historical
debate over whether the English court of chan-
cery had jurisdiction to handle certain domestic
relations matters, though we note that commenta-
tors have found some support for the Barber
majority's interpretation.  Certainly it was not
unprecedented at the time for the Court to infer,
from what it understood to be English chancery
practice, some guide to the meaning of the 1789
Act's jurisdictional grant.  See, e.g., Robinson v.
Campbell, 3 Wheat. 212, 221-222 (1818).  We thus are
content to rest our conclusion that a domestic
relations exception exists as a matter of statu-
tory construction not on the accuracy of the
historical justifications on which it was seeming-
ly based, but rather on Congress' apparent accep-
tance of this construction of the diversity
jurisdiction provisions in the years prior to 1948,
when the statute limited jurisdiction to  suits of
a civil nature at common law or in equity.  As the
court in Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v.
Rosenstiel, 490 F. 2d 509, 514 (CA2 1973) observed,
 [m]ore than a century has elapsed since the
Barber dictum without any intimation of Congres-
sional dissatisfaction. . . .  Whatever Article III
may or may not permit, we thus accept the Barber
dictum as a correct interpretation of the Con-
gressional grant.  Considerations of stare
decisis have particular strength in this context,
where  the legislative power is implicated, and
Congress remains free to alter what we have
done.  Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S.
164, 172-173 (1989).
  When Congress amended the diversity statute in
1948 to replace the law/equity distinction with
the phrase  all civil actions, we presume Con-
gress did so with full cognizance of the Court's
nearly century-long interpretation of the prior
statutes, which had construed the statutory
diversity jurisdiction to contain an exception for
certain domestic relations matters.  With respect
to the 1948 amendment, the Court has previously
stated that ``no changes of law or policy are to be
presumed from changes of language in the revision
unless an intent to make such changes is clearly
expressed.''  Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prod-
ucts Corp., 353 U. S. 222, 227 (1957); see also
Finley v. United States, 490 U. S. 545, 554 (1989).
With respect to such a longstanding and well-
known construction of the diversity statute, and
where Congress made substantive changes to the
statute in other respects, see 28 U. S. C. 1332
note, we presume, absent any indication that
Congress intended to alter this exception, see
ibid.; Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 2, Advisory Committee
Note 3, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 555, that Congress
 adopt[ed] that interpretation when it reenacted
the diversity statute.  Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S.
575, 580 (1978).
                      III
  In the more than 100 years since this Court laid
the seeds for the development of the domestic
relations exception, the lower federal courts
have applied it in a variety of circumstances.
See, e.g., cases cited in n. 1, supra.  Many of these
applications go well beyond the circumscribed
situations posed by Barber and its progeny.
Barber itself disclaimed federal jurisdiction over
a narrow range of domestic relations issues
involving the granting of a divorce and a decree
of alimony, see 21 How., at 584, and stated the
limits on federal-court power to intervene prior
to the rendering of such orders:
 It is, that when a court of competent juris-
diction over the subject-matter and the
parties decrees a divorce, and alimony to the
wife as its incident, and is unable of itself to
enforce the decree summarily upon the hus-
band, that courts of equity will interfere to
prevent the decree from being defeated by
fraud.  The interference, however, is limited
to cases in which alimony has been decreed;
then only to the extent of what is due, and
always to cases in which no appeal is pending
from the decree for the divorce or for alimo-
ny.''  Id., at 591.
The Barber Court thus did not intend to strip
the federal courts of authority to hear cases
arising from the domestic relations of persons
unless they seek the granting or modification of
a divorce or alimony decree.  The holding of the
case itself sanctioned the exercise of federal
jurisdiction over the enforcement of an alimony
decree that had been properly obtained in a state
court of competent jurisdiction.  Contrary to the
Barber dissenters' position, the enforcement of
such validly obtained orders does not  regulate
the domestic relations of society and produce an
 inquisitorial authority in which federal tribu-
nals  enter the habitations and even into the
chambers and nurseries of private families, and
inquire into and pronounce upon the morals and
habits and affections or antipathies of the
members of every household.  Id., at 602 (Daniel,
J., dissenting).  And from the conclusion that the
federal courts lacked jurisdiction to issue
divorce and alimony decrees, there was no dis-
sent.  See Barber, supra, at 604 (Daniel, J., dis-
senting) (noting that  [u]pon questions of settle-
ment or of contract connected with marriages, the
court of chancery will undertake the enforcement
of such contracts, but does not decree alimony as
such, and independently of such contracts).  See
also Simms v. Simms, 175 U. S. 162, 167 (1899) (stat-
ing that  [i]t may therefore be assumed as indubi-
table that the Circuit Courts of the United
States have no jurisdiction, either of suits for
divorce, or of claims for alimony, whether made in
a suit for divorce, or by an original proceeding in
equity, before a decree for such alimony in a
state court).
  Subsequently, this Court expanded the domestic
relations exception to include decrees in child
custody cases.  In a child custody case brought
pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus, for instance,
the Court held void a writ issued by a Federal
District Court to restore a child to the custody
of the father.   As to the right to the control and
possession of this child, as it is contested by its
father and its grandfather, it is one in regard to
which neither the Congress of the United States
nor any authority of the United States has any
special jurisdiction.  In re Burrus, 136 U. S. 586,
594 (1890).
  Although In re Burrus technically did not involve
a construction of the diversity statute, as we
understand Barber to have done, its statement
that  [t]he whole subject of the domestic rela-
tions of husband and wife, parent and child,
belongs to the laws of the States and not to the
laws of the United States, id., at 593-594, has
been interpreted by the federal courts to apply
with equal vigor in suits brought pursuant to
diversity jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Bennett v.
Bennett, 221 U. S. App. D. C. 90, 93, 682 F. 2d 1039,
1042 (1982); Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F. 2d 1018, 1025
(CA3 1975); Hernstadt v. Hernstadt, 373 F. 2d 316,
317 (CA2 1967); see generally 13B C. Wright, A.
Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Proce-
dure 3609, pp. 477-479, nn. 28-32 (1984).  This
application is consistent with Barber's directive
to limit federal courts' exercise of diversity
jurisdiction over suits for divorce and alimony
decrees.  See Barber, supra, at 584.  We con-
clude, therefore, that the domestic relations
exception, as articulated by this Court since
Barber, divests the federal courts of power to
issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees.
Given the long passage of time without any ex-
pression of congressional dissatisfaction, we
have no trouble today reaffirming the validity of
the exception as it pertains to divorce and
alimony decrees and child custody orders.
  Not only is our conclusion rooted in respect for
this long-held understanding, it is also supported
by sound policy considerations.  Issuance of
decrees of this type not infrequently involves
retention of jurisdiction by the court and deploy-
ment of social workers to monitor compliance.  As
a matter of judicial economy, state courts are
more eminently suited to work of this type than
are federal courts, which lack the close associa-
tion with state and local government organiza-
tions dedicated to handling issues that arise out
of conflicts over divorce, alimony, and child
custody decrees.  Moreover, as a matter of
judicial expertise, it makes far more sense to
retain the rule that federal courts lack power to
issue these types of decrees because of the
special proficiency developed by state tribunals
over the past century and a half in handling
issues that arise in the granting of such decrees.
See Lloyd v. Loeffler, supra, at 492.
  By concluding, as we do, that the domestic
relations exception encompasses only cases
involving the issuance of a divorce, alimony, or
child custody decree, we necessarily find that the
Court of Appeals erred by affirming the District
Court's invocation of this exception.  This lawsuit
in no way seeks such a decree; rather, it alleges
that respondents Richards and Kesler committed
torts against L. R. and S. R., Ankenbrandt's chil-
dren by Richards.  Federal subject-matter juris-
diction pursuant to 1332 thus is proper in this
case.  We now address whether, even though
subject-matter jurisdiction might be proper,
sufficient grounds exist to warrant abstention
from the exercise of that jurisdiction.
                      IV
  The Court of Appeals, as did the District Court,
stated abstention as an alternative ground for
its holding.  The District Court quoted another
federal court to the effect that  `[a]bstention,
that doctrine designed to promote federal-state
comity, is required when to render a decision
would disrupt the establishment of a coherent
state policy.'  App. to Pet. for Cert. A-6 (quoting
Zaubi v. Hoejme, 530 F. Supp. 831, 836 (WD Pa. 1980)).
It is axiomatic, however, that  [a]bstention from
the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the excep-
tion, not the rule.'  Colorado River Water Conser-
vation Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 800, 813
(1976).  Abstention rarely should be invoked,
because the federal courts have a  virtually
unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the juris-
diction given them.  Id., at 817.
  The courts below cited Younger v. Harris, 401
U. S. 37 (1971), to support their holdings to abstain
in this case.  In so doing, the courts clearly
erred.  Younger itself held that, absent unusual
circumstances, a federal court could not inter-
fere with a pending state criminal prosecution.
Id., at 54.  Though we have extended Younger
abstention to the civil context, see, e.g., Middle-
sex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Assn.,
457 U. S. 423 (1982); Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v.
Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U. S. 619 (1986);
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U. S. 1 (1987), we
have never applied the notions of comity so
critical to Younger's  Our Federalism when no
state proceeding was pending nor any assertion of
important state interests made.  In this case,
there is no allegation by respondents of any
pending state proceedings, and Ankenbrandt
contends that such proceedings ended prior to her
filing this lawsuit.  Absent any pending proceeding
in state tribunals, therefore, application by the
lower courts of Younger abstention was clearly
erroneous.
  It is not inconceivable, however, that in certain
circumstances, the abstention principles devel-
oped in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315 (1943),
might be relevant in a case involving elements of
the domestic relationship even when the parties
do not seek divorce, alimony, or child custody.
This would be so when a case presents  difficult
questions of state law bearing on policy problems
of substantial public import whose importance
transcends the result in the case then at bar.
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist., supra, at
814.  Such might well be the case if a federal suit
were filed prior to effectuation of a divorce,
alimony, or child custody decree, and the suit
depended on a determination of the status of the
parties.  Where, as here, the status of the domes-
tic relationship has been determined as a matter
of state law, and in any event has no bearing on
the underlying torts alleged, we have no difficul-
ty concluding that Burford abstention is inappro-
priate in this case.
                     V
  We thus conclude that the Court of Appeals
erred by affirming the District Court's rulings to
decline jurisdiction based on the domestic rela-
tions exception to diversity jurisdiction and to
abstain under the doctrine of Younger v. Harris,
supra.  The exception has no place in a suit such
as this one, in which a former spouse sues another
on behalf of children alleged to have been abused.
Because the allegations in this complaint do not
request the District Court to issue a divorce,
alimony, or child custody decree, we hold that the
suit is appropriate for the exercise of 1332
jurisdiction given the existence of diverse
citizenship between petitioner and respondents
and the pleading of the relevant amount in con-
troversy.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of
the Court of Appeals and remand the case for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                             It is so ordered.


Concur 1
      SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES--------
             No. 91-367
              --------
CAROL ANKENBRANDT, as next friend and mother
of l. r. and s. r., PETITIONER v. JON A. RICHARDS
               and DEBRA KESLER
  on writ of certiorari to the united states
    court of appeals for the fifth circuit
                [June 15, 1992]

      Justice Blackmun, concurring in the judgment.
  I agree with the Court that the District Court
had jurisdiction over petitioner's claims in tort.
Moreover, I agree that the federal courts should
not entertain claims for divorce, alimony, and
child custody.  I am unable to agree, however, that
the diversity statute contains any  exception
for domestic relations matters.  The Court goes
to remarkable lengths to craft an exception that
is simply not in the statute and is not supported
by the case law.  In my view, the longstanding,
unbroken practice of the federal courts in refus-
ing to hear domestic relations cases is precedent
at most for continued discretionary abstention
rather than mandatory limits on federal jurisdic-
tion.  For these reasons I concur only in the
Court's judgment.
                       I
  The Court holds that the diversity statute
contains an  exception for cases seeking the
issuance of a divorce, alimony, or child custody
decree.  Ante, at 11-15.  Yet no such exception
appears in the statute.  The diversity statute is
not ambiguous at all.  It extends the jurisdiction
of the district courts to  all civil actions
between diverse parties involving the requisite
amount in controversy (emphasis added).  28 U. S. C.
1332.
  This Court has recognized that in the absence of
a  clearly expressed intention to the contrary,
the language of the statute itself is ordinarily
 conclusive.  See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety
Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102, 108
(1980).  The Court apparently discovers in the
history of the diversity statute and this Court's
own case law a clearly expressed intention con-
trary to the words of the statute.  First, the
Court observes that the diversity statute for-
merly extended only to  all suits of a civil nature
at common law or in equity rather than to  all
civil actions.  Ante, at 8-9.  Then the Court
interprets this Court's decision in Barber v.
Barber, 21 How. 582 (1859), to read into this  com-
mon law or equity limitation an exclusion of
matters, such as actions for divorce and alimony,
that were not cognizable in the English courts of
common law and equity.  Ante, at 9.  The Court
points to what it regards as Congress'  apparent
acceptance of this construction of the diversity
statute.  Ante, at 10.  Finally, notwithstanding
Congress' replacement in 1948 of the  common law
and equity limitation with the phrase  all civil
actions, the Court considers this to be evidence
that Congress adopted the prior  well-known
construction of the diversity statute.  Ante, at
11.
  I have great difficulty with the Court's ap-
proach.  Starting at the most obvious point, I do
not see how a language change that, if anything,
expands the jurisdictional scope of the statute
can be said to constitute evidence of approval of
a prior narrow construction.  Any inaction on
the part of Congress in 1948 in failing expressly
to mention domestic relations matters in the
diversity statute reflects the fact, as is dis-
cussed below, that Congress likely had no idea
until the Court's decision today that the diversi-
ty statute contained an exception for domestic
relations matters.
  This leads to my primary concern: the Court's
conclusion that Congress understood Barber as an
interpretation of the diversity statute.  Barber
did not express any intent to construe the diver-
sity statute"clearly, Barber  cited no authority
and did not discuss the foundation for its an-
nouncement disclaiming jurisdiction over divorce
and alimony matters.  Ante, at 5.  As the Court
puts it, it may only be  inferred that the basis
for declining jurisdiction was the diversity
statute.  Ante, at 9.  It is inferred not from
anything in the Barber majority opinion.  Rather, it
is inferred from the comments of a dissenting
justice and the absence of rebuttal by the Barber
majority.  Ante, at 9.  The Court today has a
difficult enough time arriving at this unlikely
interpretation of the Barber decision.  I cannot
imagine that Congress ever assembled this con-
struction on its own.
  In any event, at least three subsequent deci-
sions of this Court seriously undermine any
inference that Barber's recognition of a domestic
relations  exception traces to a  common law or
equity limitation of the diversity statute.  In
Simms v. Simms, 175 U. S. 162 (1899), the Court heard
an appeal by a husband from the Supreme Court of
the Territory of Arizona affirming the territorial
District Court's dismissal of his bill for divorce
and its award to his wife of alimony and counsel
fees pendente lite.  The wife sought dismissal of
the appeal to this Court because the suit in-
volved domestic relations.  In contrast to Barber,
the Court undertook an extensive review and
discussion of the statutory bases for its juris-
diction over the appeal.  It expressly recognized
that its appellate jurisdiction was confined to
 those cases, and those cases only, at law or in
equity.  175 U. S., at 167 (emphasis added).
Nevertheless, the Court in Simms did not find the
 common law or equity limitation to be a bar to
jurisdiction.  The Court distinguished Barber,
not on grounds that the jurisdictional statute in
Barber was limited to cases in law and equity while
that in Simms was not"indeed, it could not be so
distinguished.  The Court distinguished Barber on
grounds that it involved domestic relations
matters in the States rather than in the territo-
ries.  It reasoned that the whole subject of
domestic relations  belongs to the laws of the
State, and not to the laws of the United States,
while  [i]n the Territories of the United States,
Congress has the entire dominion and sovereignty,
national and local.  Id., at 167-168.  Today the
Court infers an interpretation of Barber that the
Court in Simms plainly rejected.
  The second decision undermining the Court's
interpretation of Barber is De La Rama v. De La
Rama, 201 U. S. 303 (1906), in which the Court took
jurisdiction over an appeal from the Supreme
Court of the Philippine Islands in a wife's action
for divorce and alimony.  Citing Barber, De La Rama
explained the historical reasons that federal
courts have not exercised jurisdiction over
actions for divorce and alimony.  The  common law
or equity limitation the Court now finds so
significant was not among those reasons.  This
was so even though the appellate jurisdictional
statute at issue there extended to  all actions,
cases, causes, and proceedings, 32 Stat. 695,
opening the door for the Court easily to have
distinguished Barber on the grounds of the  com-
mon law or equity limitation in the diversity
statute.  Instead, explicitly reaffirming the
grounds relied upon in Simms for distinguishing
Barber, the Court pointed to the absence of any
need to defer to the States' regulation of the
area of domestic relations in the context of an
appeal from a nonstate, territorial court.  Id., at
308.
  The third decision is Ohio ex rel. Popovici v.
Agler, 280 U. S. 379 (1930).  In Popovici, a Roumani-
an vice-consul was sued by his wife in an Ohio
state court for a divorce and alimony.  He defend-
ed by claiming that the Ohio state court had no
jurisdiction to grant the divorce, because federal
statutes granted exclusive jurisdiction to the
federal courts of  all suits and proceedings
against . . . consuls or vice-consuls and  all
suits against consuls and vice-consuls.  280
U. S., at 382-383 (quoting the Act of March 3, 1911,
c. 231, 36 Stat. 1161, 1093).  Rejecting this claim,
Justice Holmes observed for a unanimous Court
that the jurisdictional statutes  do not affect
the present case if it be true as has been un-
questioned for three-quarters of a century that
the Courts of the United States have no jurisdic-
tion over divorce.  Id., at 383.  The Court traced
this absence of jurisdiction not to the diversity
statute but apparently to the Constitution
itself:
 If when the Constitution was adopted the
common understanding was that the domestic
relations of husband and wife and parent and
child were matters reserved to the States,
there is no difficulty in construing the in-
strument accordingly and not much in dealing
with the statutes.  `Suits against consuls and
vice-consuls' must be taken to refer to ordi-
nary civil proceedings and not to include what
formerly would have belonged to the ecclesi-
astical Courts.  Id., at 383-384.

I think it implausible to believe that, especially
after Popovici, Congress could be said to have
accepted this Court's decision in Barber as simply
a construction of the diversity statute.
Accordingly, the Court is without a requisite
foundation for ratifying what Congress intended.
Compare Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283-284 (1972)
(declining to overturn prior precedent explicitly
exempting professional baseball from antitrust
laws where Congress  by its positive inaction
has allowed prior decisions to stand).
  Even assuming the Court today correctly inter-
prets Barber, its extension of any domestic
relations  exception to the diversity statute
for child custody matters is not warranted by any
known principles of statutory construction.  The
Court relies on In re Burrus, 136 U. S. 586 (1890), in
which the Court denied the  jurisdiction of a
federal district court to issue a writ of habeas
corpus in favor of a father to recover the care
and custody of his child from the child's grandfa-
ther.  That case did not involve the diversity
statute, but rather the habeas corpus statute,
and the Court expressly declined to address the
diversity statute.  Id., at 597.  To the Court
today this is just a  technica[l] distinction.
Ante, at 13.  I find it germane, because, to the
best of my knowledge, a court is not at liberty to
craft exceptions to statutes that are not at
issue in a case.
                      II
                       A
  To reject the Court's construction of the
diversity statute is not, however, necessarily to
reject the federal courts' longstanding practice
of declining to hear certain domestic relations
cases.  My point today is that no coherent  juris-
dictional explanation for this practice emerges
from our line of such cases, and it is unreason-
able to presume that Congress divined and ac-
cepted one from these cases.  To be sure, this
Court's old line of domestic relations cases
disclaimed  jurisdiction over domestic relations
matters well before the growth and general accep-
tance in recent decades of modern doctrines of
federal abstention that distinguish the refusal
to exercise jurisdiction from disclaiming jurisdic-
tion altogether.  See generally C. Wright, Law of
Federal Courts 302-330 (1983) (discussing growth
of traditional abstention doctrines).  See also
Francis v. Henderson, 425 U. S. 536, 538-539 (1976)
(recognizing abstention in the context of the
habeas corpus statute where  considerations of
comity and concerns for the orderly administra-
tion of criminal justice require).  Nevertheless,
the common concern reflected in these earlier
cases is, in modern terms, abstentional"and not
jurisdictional"in nature.  These cases are pre-
mised not upon a concern for the historical
limitation of equity jurisdiction of the English
courts, but upon the virtually exclusive primacy
at that time of the States in the regulation of
domestic relations.  As noted above, in Simms and
De La Rama, this Court justified its exercise of
jurisdiction over actions for divorce and alimony
not by any reference to the scope of equity
jurisdiction but by reference to the absence of
any interest of the States in appeals from courts
in territories controlled by the National Govern-
ment.  Similarly, in cases wholly outside the
 common law or equity limitation of the diversity
statute, the Court has denied federal court
review.  Popovici, supra (consuls and vice-consuls
statutes); In re Burrus, supra (habeas corpus).  As
the Court once stated:  The whole subject of the
domestic relations of husband and wife, parent
and child, belongs to the laws of the States and
not to the laws of the United States.  In re
Burrus, 136 U. S., at 593-594.
  Whether the interest of States remains a suffi-
cient justification today for abstention is
uncertain in view of the expansion in recent years
of federal law in the domestic relations area.
I am confident, nonetheless, that the unbroken and
unchallenged practice of the federal courts since
before the War Between the States of declining to
hear certain domestic relations cases provides
the very rare justification for continuing to do
so.  It is not without significance, moreover, that,
because of this historical practice of the federal
courts, the States have developed specialized
courts and institutions in family matters, while
Congress and the federal courts generally have
not done so.  Absent a contrary command of Con-
gress, the federal courts properly should ab-
stain, at least from diversity actions tradition-
ally excluded from the federal courts, such as
those seeking divorce, alimony, and child custody.
  The Court is correct that abstention  rarely
should be invoked.  Ante, at 15.  But rarer
still"and by far the greater affront to Con-
gress"should be the occasions when this Court
invents statutory exceptions that are simply not
there.  It is one thing for this Court to defer to
more than a century of practice unquestioned by
Congress.  It is quite another to defer on a
pretext that Congress legislated what in fact it
never did.  Although there is no occasion to
resolve the issue in definitive fashion in this
case, I would suggest that principles of absten-
tion provide a more principled basis for the
Court's continued disinclination to entertain
domestic relations matters.
                       B
  Whether or not the domestic relations  excep-
tion is properly grounded in principles of ab-
stention or principles of jurisdiction, I do not
believe this case falls within the exception.  This
case only peripherally involves the subject of
 domestic relations.   Domestic relations
actions are loosely classifiable into four cate-
gories.  The first, or  core, category involves
declarations of status, e.g., marriage, annulment,
divorce, custody, and paternity.  The second, or
 semi-core, category involves declarations of
rights or obligations arising from status (or
former status), e.g., alimony, child support, and
division of property.  The third category consists
of secondary suits to enforce declarations of
status, rights, or obligations.  The final, catch-
all category covers the suits not directly involv-
ing status or obligations arising from status but
that nonetheless generally relate to domestic
relations matters, e.g., tort suits between family
or former family members for sexual abuse, bat-
tering, or intentional infliction of emotional
distress.  None of this Court's prior cases that
consider the domestic relations  exception
involves the type of periphery domestic relations
claim at issue here.
  Petitioner does not seek a determination of
status or obligations arising from status.
Moreover, any federal court determination of
petitioner's claims will neither upset a prior
state court determination of status or obliga-
tions appurtenant to status, nor pre-empt a
pending state court determination of this nature.
Compare Moore v. Sims, 442 U. S. 415 (1979) (applying
Younger abstention doctrine to prevent federal
court action seeking to enjoin pending state child
custody proceeding brought by state authorities).
While petitioner's claims do not involve a federal
question or statute"the presence of which would
strongly counsel against abstention, see Colorado
River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S.
800, 815, n. 21 (1976)"petitioner's state law tort
claims for money damages are easily cognizable in
a federal court.  All these considerations favor
the exercise of federal jurisdiction over petitio-
ner's claims.

Concur 2
      SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES--------
             No. 91-367
              --------
CAROL ANKENBRANDT, as next friend and mother
of l. r. and s. r., PETITIONER v. JON A. RICHARDS
               and DEBRA KESLER
  on writ of certiorari to the united states
    court of appeals for the fifth circuit
                [June 15, 1992]

       Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Thomas
joins, concurring in the judgment.
     This should be an exceedingly easy case.  As
demonstrated by each of the opinions, whatever
belief one holds as to the existence, origin, or
scope of a  domestic relations exception, the
exception does not apply here.  However one
understands 18th-century English chancery
practice and however one construes the Judiciary
Act of 1789, the result is the same.  The judgment
of the Court of Appeals must be reversed.  For
that reason, I would leave for another day con-
sideration of whether any domestic relations
cases necessarily fall outside of the jurisdiction
of the federalcourts and of what, if any, principle would justify
such an exception to federal jurisdiction.
     As I agree that this case does not come within
any domestic relations exception that might exist,
I concur in the judgment.

