 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

          Syllabus

GADE, DIRECTOR, ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL
  PROTECTION AGENCY v. NATIONAL SOLID
     WASTES MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
          the seventh circuit
No. 90-1676.   Argued March 23, 1992"Decided June 18, 1992

Pursuant to authority contained in the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970 (OSH Act or Act), the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) promulgated regulations implementing a
requirement of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
of 1986 (SARA) that standards be set for the initial and routine
training of workers who handle hazardous wastes.  Subsequently,
Illinois enacted two acts requiring the licensing of workers at certain
hazardous waste facilities.  Each state act has the dual purpose of
protecting workers and the general public and requires workers to
meet specified training and examination requirements.  Claiming,
among other things, that the acts were pre-empted by the OSH Act
and OSHA regulations, respondent, an association of businesses
involved in, inter alia, hazardous waste management, sought injunc-
tive relief against petitioner Gade's predecessor as director of the
state environmental protection agency to prevent enforcement of the
state acts.  The District Court held that the state acts were not pre-
empted because they protected public safety in addition to promoting
job safety, but it invalidated some provisions of the acts.  The Court
of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the
OSH Act pre-empts all state law that ``constitutes, in a direct, clear
and substantial way, regulation of worker health and safety,'' unless
the Secretary of Labor has explicitly approved the law pursuant to
18 of the OSH Act.  In remanding, the court did not consider which,
if any, of the provisions would be pre-empted.
Held:The judgment is affirmed.
918 F.2d 671, affirmed.
      Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court with respect
to Parts I, III, and IV, concluding that:
1.A state law requirement that directly, substantially, and specifi-
cally regulates occupational safety and health is an occupational
safety and health standard within the meaning of the OSH Act
regardless of whether it has another, nonoccupational purpose.  In
assessing a state law's impact on the federal scheme, this Court has
refused to rely solely on the legislature's professed purpose and has
looked as well to the law's effects.  See, e. g., Perez v. Campbell, 402
U.S. 637, 651-652.  State laws of general applicability, such as
traffic and fire safety laws, would generally not be pre-empted,
because they regulate workers simply as members of the general
public.  Pp.14-18.
2.The state licensing acts are pre-empted by the OSH Act to the
extent that they establish occupational safety and health standards
for training those who work with hazardous wastes.  The Act's saving
provisions are not implicated and Illinois does not have an approved
plan.  Illinois' interest in establishing standards for licensing various
occupations, cf., e. g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773,
792, cannot save from OSH Act pre-emption those provisions that
directly and substantially affect workplace safety, since any state law,
however clearly within a State's acknowledged power, must yield if
it interferes with or is contrary to federal law, Felder v. Casey,
487 U.S. 131, 138.  Nor can the acts be saved from pre-emption by
Gade's argument that they regulate a ``pre-condition'' to employment
rather than occupational safety and health, since SARA makes clear
that the training of employees engaged in hazardous waste operations
is an occupational safety and health issue and that certification
requirements before an employee may engage in such work are
occupational safety and health standards.  This Court does not
specifically consider which of the licensing acts' provisions will be
pre-empted under the foregoing analysis.  Pp.18-19.
Justice O'Connor, joined by The Chief Justice, Justice White,
and Justice Scalia, concluded in Part II that the OSH Act impliedly
pre-empts any state regulation of an occupational safety or health
issue with respect to which a federal standard has been established,
unless a state plan has been submitted and approved pursuant to
18(b) of the Act.  The Act as a whole demonstrates that Congress
intended to promote occupational safety and health while avoiding
subjecting workers and employers to duplicative regulation.  Thus, it
established a system of uniform federal standards, but gave States
the option of pre-empting the federal regulations entirely pursuant
to an approved state plan that displaces the federal standards.  This
intent is indicated principally in 18(b)'s statement that a State
``shall'' submit a plan if it wishes to ``assume responsibility'' for
developing and enforcing health and safety standards.  Gade's
interpretation of 18(b)"that the Secretary's approval is required
only if a State wishes to replace, not merely supplement, the federal
regulations"would be inconsistent with the federal scheme and is
untenable in light of the surrounding provisions.  The language and
purposes of 18(a), (c), (f), and (h) all confirm the view that the
States cannot assume an enforcement role without the Secretary's
approval, unless no federal standard is in effect.  Also unacceptable
is Gade's argument that the OSH Act does not pre-empt nonconflict-
ing state laws because those laws, like the Act, are designed to
promote worker safety.  Even where such laws share a common goal,
a state law will be pre-empted if it interferes with the methods by
which a federal statute was intended to reach that goal.  Internation-
al Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494.  Here, the Act does not
foreclose a State from enacting its own laws, but it does restrict the
ways in which it can do so.  Pp.5-14.
Justice Kennedy, agreeing that the state laws are pre-empted,
concluded that the result is mandated by the express terms of 18(b)
of the OSH Act and that the scope of pre-emption is also defined by
the statutory text.  Such a finding is not contrary to the longstanding
rule that this Court will not infer pre-emption of the States' historic
police powers absent a clear statement of intent by Congress.
Unartful though 18(b)'s language may be, its structure and lan-
guage, in conjunction with subsections (a), (c), and (f), leave little
doubt that in the OSH Act Congress intended to pre-empt supple-
mentary state regulation of an occupational safety and health issue
with respect to which a federal standard exists.  Pp. 1, 3-5.

O'Connor, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered
the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, III, and IV, in which
Rehnquist, C. J., and White, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., joined, and
an opinion with respect to Part II, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and
White and Scalia, JJ., joined.  Kennedy, J., filed an opinion concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment.  Souter, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun, Stevens, and Thomas, JJ.,
joined.



NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
             SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES--------
                      No. 90-1676
                        --------
        MARY  GADE,  DIRECTOR,  ILLINOIS  ENVIRONMENTAL
         PROTECTION AGENCY, PETITIONER v. NATIONAL SOLID
                WASTES MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
        on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
                  appeals for the seventh circuit
                          [June 18, 1992]

       Justice O'Connor announced the judgment of the Court
and delivered an opinion, Parts I, III, and IV of which
represent the views of the Court, and Part II of which is
joined by The Chief Justice, Justice White, and Justice
Scalia.
       In 1988, the Illinois General Assembly enacted the
Hazardous Waste Crane and Hoisting Equipment Operators
Licensing Act, Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 111, 7701-7717 (1989),
and the Hazardous Waste Laborers Licensing Act, Ill. Rev.
Stat., ch. 111, 7801-7815 (1989) (together, licensing
acts).  The stated purpose of the acts is both  to promote job
safety and  to protect life, limb and property.  7702,
7802.  In this case, we consider whether these  dual impact
statutes, which protect both workers and the general public,
are pre-empted by the federal Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1590, 29 U. S. C. 651 et seq.
(OSH Act), and the standards promulgated thereunder by
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA).
                                 I
       The OSH Act authorizes the Secretary of Labor to
promulgate federal occupational safety and health stan-
dards.  29 U. S. C. 655.  In the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Congress directed
the Secretary of Labor to  promulgate standards for the
health and safety protection of employees engaged in
hazardous waste operations pursuant to her authority
under the OSH Act.  SARA, Pub. L. 99-499, Title I, 126,
100 Stat. 1690-1692, codified at note following 29 U. S. C.
655.  In relevant part, SARA requires the Secretary to
establish standards for the initial and routine training of
workers who handle hazardous wastes.
       In response to this congressional directive, OSHA, to
which the Secretary has delegated certain of her statutory
responsibilities, see Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U. S. ___, ___
n. 1 (1991) (slip op., at 2, n. 1), promulgated regulations on
 Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response,
including detailed regulations on worker training require-
ments.  51 Fed. Reg. 45654, 45665-45666 (1986) (interim
regulations); 54 Fed. Reg. 9294, 9320-9321 (1989) (final
regulations), codified at 29 CFR 1910.120 (1991).  The
OSHA regulations require, among other things, that
workers engaged in an activity that may expose them to
hazardous wastes receive a minimum of 40 hours of
instruction off the site, and a minimum of three days actual
field experience under the supervision of a trained supervi-
sor.  29 CFR 1910.120(e)(3)(i).  Workers who are on the
site only occasionally or who are working in areas that have
been determined to be under the permissible exposure
limits must complete at least 24 hours of off-site instruction
and one day of actual field experience.  1910.120(e)(3)(ii)
and (iii).  On-site managers and supervisors directly
responsible for hazardous waste operations must receive the
same initial training as general employees, plus at least
eight additional hours of specialized training on various
health and safety programs.  1910.120(e)(4).  Employees
and supervisors are required to receive eight hours of
refresher training annually.  1910.120(e)(8).  Those who
have satisfied the training and field experience requirement
receive a written certification; uncertified workers are
prohibited from engaging in hazardous waste operations.
1910.120(e)(6).
       In 1988, while OSHA's interim hazardous waste regula-
tions were in effect, the State of Illinois enacted the
licensing acts at issue here.  The laws are designated as
acts  in relation to environmental protection, and their
stated aim is to protect both employees and the general
public by licensing hazardous waste equipment operators
and laborers working at certain facilities.  Both acts require
a license applicant to provide a certified record of at least
40 hours of training under an approved program conducted
within Illinois, to pass a written examination, and to
complete an annual refresher course of at least eight hours
of instruction.  Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 111, 7705(c) and (e),
7706(c) and (d), 7707(b), 7805(c) and (e), 7806(b).  In
addition, applicants for a hazardous waste crane operator's
license must submit  a certified record showing operation of
equipment used in hazardous waste handling for a mini-
mum of 4,000 hours.  7705(d).  Employees who work
without the proper license, and employers who knowingly
permit an unlicensed employee to work, are subject to
escalating fines for each offense.  7715, 7716, 7814.
       The respondent in this case, National Solid Waste
Management Association (the Association), is a national
trade association of businesses that remove, transport,
dispose, and handle waste material, including hazardous
waste.  The Association's members are subject to the OSH
Act and OSHA regulations, and are therefore required to
train, qualify, and certify their hazardous waste remedia-
tion workers.  29 CFR 1910.120 (1991).  For hazardous
waste operations conducted in Illinois, certain of the
workers employed by the Association's members are also
required to obtain licenses pursuant to the Illinois licensing
acts.  Thus, for example, some of the Association's members
must ensure that their employees receive not only the three
days of field experience required for certification under the
OSHA regulations, but also the 500 days of experience
(4,000 hours) required for licensing under the state stat-
utes.
       Shortly before the state licensing acts were due to go into
effect, the Association brought a declaratory judgment
action in United States District Court against Bernard
Killian, the former Director of the Illinois Environmental
Protection Agency (IEPA); petitioner Mary Gade is Killian's
successor in office and has been substituted as a party
pursuant to this Court's Rule 35.3.  The Association sought
to enjoin IEPA from enforcing the Illinois licensing acts,
claiming that the acts were pre-empted by the OSH Act and
OSHA regulations and that they violated the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution.  The District
Court held that state laws that attempt to regulate work-
place safety and health are not pre-empted by the OSH Act
when the laws have a  legitimate and substantial purpose
apart from promoting job safety.  App. to Pet. for Cert. 54.
Applying this standard, the District Court held that the
Illinois licensing acts were not pre-empted because each
protected public safety in addition to promoting job safety.
Id., at 56-57.  The court indicated that it would uphold a
state regulation implementing the 4000-hour experience
requirement, as long as it did not conflict with federal
regulations, because it was reasonable to conclude that
workers who satisfy the requirement  will be better skilled
than those who do not; and better skilled means fewer
accidents, which equals less risk to public safety and the
environment.  Id., at 59.  At the same time, the District
Court invalidated the requirement that applicants for a
hazardous waste license be trained  within Illinois on the
ground that the provision did not contribute to Illinois's
stated purpose of protecting public safety.  Id., at 57-58.
The court declined to consider the Association's Commerce
Clause challenge for lack of ripeness.  Id., at 61-62.
       On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part.
National Solid Wastes Management Assn. v. Killian, 918
F. 2d 671 (1990).  The Court of Appeals held that the OSH
Act pre-empts all state law that  constitutes, in a direct,
clear and substantial way, regulation of worker health and
safety, unless the Secretary has explicitly approved the
state law.  Id., at 679.  Because many of the regulations
mandated by the Illinois licensing acts had not yet reached
their final form, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to
the District Court without considering which, if any, of the
Illinois provisions would be pre-empted.  Id., at 684.  The
court made clear, however, its view that Illinois  cannot
regulate worker health and safety under the guise of
environmental regulation, and it rejected the District
Court's conclusion that the State's 4000-hour experience
requirement could survive pre-emption simply because the
rule might also enhance public health and safety.  Ibid.
Writing separately, Judge Easterbrook expressed doubt that
the OSH Act pre-empts nonconflicting state laws.  Id., at
685-688.  He concluded, however, that if the OSH Act does
pre-empt state law, the majority had employed an appropri-
ate test for determining whether the Illinois acts were
superseded.  Id., at 688.
       We granted certiorari, 502 U. S. ___ (1991), to resolve a
conflict between the decision below and decisions in which
other Courts of Appeals have found the OSH Act to have a
much narrower pre-emptive effect on  dual impact state
regulations.  See Associated Industries of Massachusetts v.
Snow, 898 F. 2d 274, 279 (CA1 1990); Environmental
Encapsulating Corp. v. New York City, 855 F. 2d 48, 57
(CA2 1988); Manufacturers Assn. of Tri-County v. Knepper,
801 F. 2d 130, 138 (CA3 1986), cert. denied, 484 U. S. 815
(1987); New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey,
774 F. 2d 587, 593 (CA3 1985).
                                II
       Before addressing the scope of the OSH Act's pre-emption
of dual impact state regulations, we consider petitioner's
threshold argument, drawn from Judge Easterbrook's
separate opinion below, that the Act does not pre-empt
nonconflicting state regulations at all.   [T]he question
whether a certain state action is pre-empted by federal law
is one of congressional intent.  ```The purpose of Congress is
the ultimate touchstone.'''''  Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck,
471 U. S. 202, 208 (1985) (quoting Malone v. White Motor
Corp., 435 U. S. 497, 504 (1978)).   To discern Congress'
intent we examine the explicit statutory language and the
structure and purpose of the statute.  Ingersoll-Rand Co.
v. McClendon, 498 U. S. ___, ___ (1990) (slip op., at 3); see
also FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U. S. ___, ___ (1990) (slip
op., at 3-4).
       In the OSH Act, Congress endeavored  to assure so far as
possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe
and healthful working conditions.  29 U. S. C. 651(b).  To
that end, Congress authorized the Secretary of Labor to
set mandatory occupational safety and health standards
applicable to all businesses affecting interstate commerce,
29 U. S. C. 652(b)(3), and thereby brought the Federal
Government into a field that traditionally had been occu-
pied by the States.  Federal regulation of the workplace was
not intended to be all-encompassing, however.  First,
Congress expressly saved two areas from federal pre-
emption.  Section 4(b)(4) of the OSH Act states that the Act
does not  supersede or in any manner affect any workmen's
compensation law or . . . enlarge or diminish or affect in
any other manner the common law or statutory rights,
duties, or liabilities of employers and employees under any
law with respect to injuries, diseases, or death of employees
arising out of, or in the course of, employment.  29 U. S. C.
653(b)(4).  Section 18(a) provides that the Act does not
 prevent any State agency or court from asserting jurisdic-
tion under State law over any occupational safety or health
issue with respect to which no [federal] standard is in
effect.  29 U. S. C. 667(a).
       Congress not only reserved certain areas to state regula-
tion, but it also, in 18(b) of the Act, gave the States the
option of pre-empting federal regulation entirely.  That
section provides:
 Submission of State plan for development and
enforcement of State standards to preempt
applicable Federal standards.
        ``Any State which, at any time, desires to assume
responsibility for development and enforcement therein
of occupational safety and health standards relating to
any occupational safety or health issue with respect to
which a Federal standard has been promulgated [by
the Secretary under the OSH Act] shall submit a State
plan for the development of such standards and their
enforcement.  29 U. S. C. 667(b).
About half the States have received the Secretary's approv-
al for their own state plans as described in this provision.
29 CFR pts. 1952, 1956 (1991).  Illinois is not among them.
       In the decision below, the Court of Appeals held that
18(b)  unquestionably pre-empts any state law or
regulation that establishes an occupational health and
safety standard on an issue for which OSHA has already
promulgated a standard, unless the State has obtained the
Secretary's approval for its own plan. 918 F. 2d, at 677.
Every other federal and state court confronted with an OSH
Act pre-emption challenge has reached the same conclu-
sion, and so do we.
       Pre-emption may be either expressed or implied, and  is
compelled whether Congress' command is explicitly stated
in the statute's language or implicitly contained in its
structure and purpose.  Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430
U. S. 519, 525 (1977); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463
U. S. 85, 95 (1983); Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn.
v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141, 152-153 (1982).  Absent
explicit pre-emptive language, we have recognized at least
two types of implied pre-emption:  field pre-emption, where
the scheme of federal regulation is ```so pervasive as to
make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room
for the States to supplement it,''' id., at 153 (quoting Rice
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947)), and
conflict pre-emption, where  compliance with both federal
and state regulations is a physical impossibility, Florida
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132,
142-143 (1963), or where state law  stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress.  Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S.
52, 67 (1941); Felder v. Casey, 487 U. S. 131, 138 (1988);
Perez v. Campbell, 402 U. S. 637, 649 (1971).
       Our ultimate task in any pre-emption case is to deter-
mine whether state regulation is consistent with the
structure and purpose of the statute as a whole.  Looking to
 the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and
policy, Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U. S. 41, 51
(1987) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), we
hold that nonapproved state regulation of occupational
safety and health issues for which a federal standard is in
effect is impliedly pre-empted as in conflict with the full
purposes and objectives of the OSH Act.  Hines v. Davido-
witz, supra.  The design of the statute persuades us that
Congress intended to subject employers and employees to
only one set of regulations, be it federal or state, and that
the only way a State may regulate an OSHA-regulated
occupational safety and health issue is pursuant to an
approved state plan that displaces the federal standards.
       The principal indication that Congress intended to pre-
empt state law is 18(b)'s statement that a State  shall
submit a plan if it wishes to  assume responsibility for
 development and enforcement . . . of occupational safety
and health standards relating to any occupational safety or
health issue with respect to which a Federal standard has
been promulgated.  The unavoidable implication of this
provision is that a State may not enforce its own occupa-
tional safety and health standards without obtaining the
Secretary's approval, and petitioner concedes that 18(b)
would require an approved plan if Illinois wanted to
 assume responsibility for the regulation of occupational
safety and health within the State.  Petitioner contends,
however, that an approved plan is necessary only if the
State wishes completely to replace the federal regulations,
not merely to supplement them.  She argues that the
correct interpretation of 18(b) is that posited by Judge
Easterbrook below: i.e., a State may either  oust the
federal standard by submitting a state plan to the Secretary
for approval or  add to the federal standard without
seeking the Secretary's approval.  918 F. 2d, at 685 (Easter-
brook, J., dubitante).
       Petitioner's interpretation of 18(b) might be plausible
were we to interpret that provision in isolation, but it
simply is not tenable in light of the OSH Act's surrounding
provisions.   [W]e must not be guided by a single sentence
or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the
whole law.  Dedeaux, supra, at 51 (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).  The OSH Act as a whole
evidences Congress' intent to avoid subjecting workers and
employers to duplicative regulation; a State may develop an
occupational safety and health program tailored to its own
needs, but only if it is willing completely to displace the
applicable federal regulations.
       Cutting against petitioner's interpretation of 18(b) is the
language of 18(a), which saves from pre-emption any state
law regulating an occupational safety and health issue with
respect to which no federal standard is in effect.  29
U. S. C. 667(a).  Although this is a saving clause, not a
pre-emption clause, the natural implication of this provision
is that state laws regulating the same issue as federal laws
are not saved, even if they merely supplement the federal
standard.  Moreover, if petitioner's reading of 18(b) were
correct, and if a State were free to enact nonconflicting
safety and health regulations, then 18(a) would be
superfluous:  there is no possibility of conflict where there
is no federal regulation.  Because  [i]t is our duty `to give
effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute,'
United States v. Menasche, 348 U. S. 528, 538-539 (1955)
(quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 147, 152 (1883)),
we conclude that 18(a)'s preservation of state authority in
the absence of a federal standard presupposes a background
pre-emption of all state occupational safety and health
standards whenever a federal standard governing the same
issue is in effect.
       Our understanding of the implications of 18(b) is
likewise bolstered by 18(c) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. 667(c),
which sets forth the conditions that must be satisfied before
the Secretary can approve a plan submitted by a State
under subsection (b).  State standards that affect interstate
commerce will be approved only if they  are required by
compelling local conditions and  do not unduly burden
interstate commerce.  667(c)(2).  If a State could supple-
ment federal regulations without undergoing the 18(b)
approval process, then the protections that 18(c) offers to
interstate commerce would easily be undercut.  It would
make little sense to impose such a condition on state
programs intended to supplant federal regulation and not
those that merely supplement it:  the burden on interstate
commerce remains the same.
       Section 18(f) also confirms our view that States are not
permitted to assume an enforcement role without the
Secretary's approval, unless no federal standard is in effect.
That provision gives the Secretary the authority to with-
draw her approval of a state plan.  29 U. S. C. 667(f).
Once approval is withdrawn, the plan  cease[s] to be in
effect and the State is permitted to assert jurisdiction
under its occupational health and safety law only for those
cases  commenced before the withdrawal of the plan.  Ibid.
Under petitioner's reading of 18(b), 18(f) should permit
the continued exercise of state jurisdiction over purely
 supplemental and nonconflicting standards.  Instead,
18(f) assumes that the State loses the power to enforce all
of its occupational safety and health standards once
approval is withdrawn.
       The same assumption of exclusive federal jurisdiction in
the absence of an approved state plan is apparent in the
transitional provisions contained in 18(h) of the Act.  29
U. S. C. 667(h).  Section 18(h) authorized the Secretary of
Labor, during the first two years after passage of the Act,
to enter into an agreement with a State by which the State
would be permitted to continue to enforce its own occupa-
tional health and safety standards for two years or until
final action was taken by the Secretary pursuant to 18(b),
whichever was earlier.  Significantly, 18(h) does not say
that such an agreement is only necessary when the State
wishes fully to supplant federal standards.  Indeed, the
original Senate version of the provision would have allowed
a State to enter into such an agreement only when it
wished to enforce standards  not in conflict with Federal
occupational health and safety standards, a category which
included  any State occupational health and safety standard
which provides for more stringent health and safety
regulations than do the Federal standards.  S. 2193,
17(h), reprinted in 116 Cong. Rec. 37637 (1970).  Although
that provision was eliminated from the final draft of the
bill, thereby allowing agreements for the temporary
enforcement of less stringent state standards, it is indica-
tive of the congressional understanding that a State was
required to enter into a transitional agreement even when
its standards were stricter than federal standards.  The
Secretary's contemporaneous interpretation of 18(h) also
expresses that understanding.  See 29 CFR 1901.2 (1972)
( Section 18(h) permits the Secretary to provide an alterna-
tive to the exclusive Federal jurisdiction [over] occupational
safety and health issue[s].  This alternative is temporary
and may be considered a step toward the more permanent
alternative to exclusive Federal jurisdiction provided by
sections 18(b) and (c) following submission and approval of
a plan submitted by a State for the development and
enforcement of occupational safety and health standards)
(emphases added).
       Looking at the provisions of 18 as a whole, we conclude
that the OSH Act precludes any state regulation of an
occupational safety or health issue with respect to which a
federal standard has been established, unless a state plan
has been submitted and approved pursuant to 18(b).  Our
review of the Act persuades us that Congress sought to
promote occupational safety and health while at the same
time avoiding duplicative, and possibly counterproductive,
regulation.  It thus established a system of uniform federal
occupational health and safety standards, but gave States
the option of pre-empting federal regulations by developing
their own occupational safety and health programs.  In
addition, Congress offered the States substantial federal
grant monies to assist them in developing their own
programs.  See OSH Act 23, 29 U. S. C. 672(a), (b), and
(f) (for three years following enactment, the Secretary may
award up to 90% of the costs to a State of developing a
state occupational safety and health plan); 29 U. S. C.
672(g) (States that develop approved plans may receive
funding for up to 50% of the costs of operating their
occupational health and safety programs).  To allow a State
selectively to  supplement certain federal regulations with
ostensibly nonconflicting standards would be inconsistent
with this federal scheme of  establishing uniform federal
standards, on the one hand, and encouraging States to
assume full responsibility for development and enforcement
of their own OSH programs, on the other.
       We cannot accept petitioner's argument that the OSH Act
does not pre-empt nonconflicting state laws because those
laws, like the Act, are designed to promote worker safety.
In determining whether state law  stands as an obstacle to
the full implementation of a federal law, Hines v. Davido-
witz, 312 U. S., at 67,  it is not enough to say that the
ultimate goal of both federal and state law is the same.
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U. S. 481, 494
(1987).   A state law also is pre-empted if it interferes with
the methods by which the federal statute was designed to
reach th[at] goal.  Ibid.; see also Michigan Canners &
Freezers Assn., Inc. v. Agricultural Marketing and Bargain-
ing Bd., 467 U. S. 461, 477 (1984) (state statute establish-
ing association to represent agricultural producers pre-
empted even though it and the federal Agricultural Fair
Practices Act  share the goal of augmenting the producer's
bargaining power); Wisconsin Dept. of Industry v. Gould
Inc., 475 U. S. 282, 286-287 (1986) (state statute prevent-
ing three-time violators of the National Labor Relations Act
from doing business with the State is pre-empted even
though state law was designed to reinforce requirements of
federal Act).  The OSH Act does not foreclose a State from
enacting its own laws to advance the goal of worker safety,
but it does restrict the ways in which it can do so.  If a
State wishes to regulate an issue of worker safety for which
a federal standard is in effect, its only option is to obtain
the prior approval of the Secretary of Labor, as described in
18 of the Act.
                                III
       Petitioner next argues that, even if Congress intended to
pre-empt all nonapproved state occupational safety and
health regulations whenever a federal standard is in effect,
the OSH Act's pre-emptive effect should not be extended to
state laws that address public safety as well as occupational
safety concerns.  As we explained in Part II, we understand
18(b) to mean that the OSH Act pre-empts all state
 occupational safety and health standards relating to any
occupational safety or health issue with respect to which a
Federal standard has been promulgated.  29 U. S. C.
667(b).  We now consider whether a dual impact law can
be an  occupational safety and health standard subject to
pre-emption under the Act.
       The OSH Act defines an  occupational safety and health
standard as  a standard which requires conditions, or the
adoption or use of one or more practices, means, methods,
operations, or processes, reasonably necessary or appropri-
ate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of
employment.  29 U. S. C. 652(8).  Any state law require-
ment designed to promote health and safety in the work-
place falls neatly within the Act's definition of an  occupa-
tional safety and health standard.  Clearly, under this
definition, a state law that expressly declares a legislative
purpose of regulating occupational health and safety would,
in the absence of an approved state plan, be pre-empted by
an OSHA standard regulating the same subject matter.
But petitioner asserts that if the state legislature articu-
lates a purpose other than (or in addition to) workplace
health and safety, then the OSH Act loses its pre-emptive
force.  We disagree.
       Although  part of the pre-empted field is defined by
reference to the purpose of the state law in question, . . .
another part of the field is defined by the state law's actual
effect.  English v. General Electric Co., 496 U. S. 72, 84
(1990) (citing Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy
Resources Conservation and Development Comm'n, 461 U. S.
190, 212-213 (1983)).  In assessing the impact of a state
law on the federal scheme, we have refused to rely solely on
the legislature's professed purpose and have looked as well
to the effects of the law.  As we explained over two decades
ago:
 We can no longer adhere to the aberrational doctrine
. . . that state law may frustrate the operation of
federal law as long as the state legislature in passing
its law had some purpose in mind other than one of
frustration.  Apart from the fact that it is at odds with
the approach taken in nearly all our Supremacy Clause
cases, such a doctrine would enable state legislatures
to nullify nearly all unwanted federal legislation by
simply publishing a legislative committee report
articulating some state interest or policy"other than
frustration of the federal objective"that would be
tangentially furthered by the proposed state law. . . .
[A]ny state legislation which frustrates the full effec-
tiveness of federal law is rendered invalid by the
Supremacy Clause.  Perez v. Campbell, 402 U. S., at
651-652.

See also Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373
U. S., at 141-142 (focus on  whether the purposes of the
two laws are parallel or divergent tends to  obscure more
than aid in determining whether state law is pre-empted
by federal law) (emphasis deleted); Hughes v. Oklahoma,
441 U. S. 322, 336 (1979) ( [W]hen considering the purpose
of a challenged statute, this Court is not bound by `[t]he
name, description or characterization given it by the
legislature or the courts of the State,' but will determine for
itself the practical impact of the law) (quoting Lacoste v.
Louisiana Dept. of Conservation, 263 U. S. 545, 550 (1924));
Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 272 U. S. 605, 612
(1926) (pre-emption analysis turns not on whether federal
and state laws  are aimed at distinct and different evils
but whether they  operate upon the same object).
       Our precedents leave no doubt that a dual impact state
regulation cannot avoid OSH Act pre-emption simply
because the regulation serves several objectives rather than
one.  As the Court of Appeals observed,  [i]t would defeat
the purpose of section 18 if a state could enact measures
stricter than OSHA's and largely accomplished through
regulation of worker health and safety simply by asserting
a non-occupational purpose for the legislation.  918 F. 2d,
at 679.  Whatever the purpose or purposes of the state law,
pre-emption analysis cannot ignore the effect of the chal-
lenged state action on the pre-empted field.  The key
question is thus at what point the state regulation suffi-
ciently interferes with federal regulation that it should be
deemed pre-empted under the Act.
       In English v. General Electric Co., supra, we held that a
state tort claim brought by an employee of a nuclear-fuels
production facility against her employer was not pre-empted
by a federal whistle-blower provision because the state law
did not have a  direct and substantial effect on the federal
scheme.  Id., at 85.  In the decision below, the Court of
Appeals relied on English to hold that, in the absence of the
approval of the Secretary, the OSH Act pre-empts all state
law that  constitutes, in a direct, clear and substantial way,
regulation of worker health and safety.  918 F. 2d, at 679.
We agree that this is the appropriate standard for deter-
mining OSH Act pre-emption.  On the other hand, state
laws of general applicability (such as laws regarding traffic
safety or fire safety) that do not conflict with OSHA
standards and that regulate the conduct of workers and
non-workers alike would generally not be pre-empted.
Although some laws of general applicability may have a
 direct and substantial effect on worker safety, they cannot
fairly be characterized as  occupational standards, because
they regulate workers simply as members of the general
public.  In this case, we agree with the court below that a
law directed at workplace safety is not saved from pre-
emption simply because the State can demonstrate some
additional effect outside of the workplace.
       In sum, a state law requirement that directly, substan-
tially, and specifically regulates occupational safety and
health is an occupational safety and health standard within
the meaning of the Act.  That such a law may also have a
nonoccupational impact does not render it any less of an
occupational standard for purposes of pre-emption analysis.
If the State wishes to enact a dual impact law that regu-
lates an occupational safety or health issue for which a
federal standard is in effect, 18 of the Act requires that
the State submit a plan for the approval of the Secretary.
                                IV
       We recognize that  the States have a compelling interest
in the practice of professions within their boundaries, and
that as part of their power to protect the public health,
safety, and other valid interests they have broad power to
establish standards for licensing practitioners and regulat-
ing the practice of professions.  Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar, 421 U. S. 773, 792 (1975); see also Ferguson v. Skrupa,
372 U. S. 726, 731 (1963); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S.
114, 122 (1889).  But under the Supremacy Clause, from
which our pre-emption doctrine is derived,  any state law,
however clearly within a State's acknowledged power,
which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must
yield.  Felder v. Casey, 487 U. S., at 138 (quoting Free v.
Bland, 369 U. S. 663, 666 (1962)); see also De Canas v.
Bica, 424 U. S. 351, 357 (1976) ( even state regulation
designed to protect vital state interests must give way to
paramount federal legislation).  We therefore reject
petitioner's argument that the State's interest in licensing
various occupations can save from OSH Act pre-emption
those provisions that directly and substantially affect
workplace safety.
       We also reject petitioner's argument that the Illinois acts
do not regulate occupational safety and health at all, but
are instead a  pre-condition to employment.  By that
reasoning, the OSHA regulations themselves would not be
considered occupational standards.  SARA, however, makes
clear that the training of employees engaged in hazardous
waste operations is an occupational safety and health issue,
see supra, at 1-2, and that certification requirements before
an employee may engage in such work are occupational
safety and health standards, see ibid.  Because neither of
the OSH Act's saving provisions are implicated, and
because Illinois does not have an approved state plan under
18(b), the state licensing acts are pre-empted by the OSH
Act to the extent they establish occupational safety and
health standards for training those who work with hazard-
ous wastes.  Like the Court of Appeals, we do not specifical-
ly consider which of the licensing acts' provisions will stand
or fall under the pre-emption analysis set forth above.
       The judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby

                                                   Affirmed.



           SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES--------
                       No. 90-1676
                        --------
        MARY  GADE,  DIRECTOR,  ILLINOIS  ENVIRONMENTAL
           PROTECTION AGENCY, PETITIONER v. NATIONAL
             SOLID WASTES MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
        on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
                  appeals for the seventh circuit
                          [June 18, 1992]

       Justice Kennedy, concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment.
       Though I concur in the Court's judgment and with the
ultimate conclusion that the state law is pre-empted, I
would find express pre-emption from the terms of the
federal statute.  I cannot agree that we should denominate
this case as one of implied pre-emption.  The contrary view
of the plurality is based on an undue expansion of our
implied pre-emption jurisprudence which, in my view, is
neither wise nor necessary.
       As both the majority and dissent acknowledge, we have
identified three circumstances in which a federal statute
pre-empts state law:  First, Congress can adopt express
language defining the existence and scope of pre-emption.
Second, state law is pre-empted where Congress creates a
scheme of federal regulation so pervasive as to leave no
room for supplementary state regulation.  And third,  state
law is pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts
with federal law.  English v. General Electric Co., 496 U. S.
72, 78-79 (1990); ante, at 8; post, at 1-2.  This third form
of pre-emption, so-called actual conflict pre-emption, occurs
either  where it is impossible for a private party to comply
with both state and federal requirements . . . or where state
law `stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'
English, supra, at 79 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U. S. 52, 67 (1941)).  The plurality would hold today that
state occupational safety and health standards regulating
an issue on which a federal standard exists conflict with
Congress' purpose to  subject employers and employees to
only one set of regulations.  Ante, at 9.  This is not an
application of our pre-emption standards, it is but a conclu-
sory statement of pre-emption, as it assumes that Congress
intended exclusive federal jurisdiction.  I do not see how
such a mode of analysis advances our consideration of the
case.
       Our decisions establish that a high threshold must be
met if a state law is to be pre-empted for conflicting with
the purposes of a federal Act.  Any conflict must be  irrecon-
cilable . . . .  The existence of a hypothetical or potential
conflict is insufficient to warrant the pre-emption of the
state statute.  Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U. S. 654,
659 (1982); see also English, supra, at 90 ( The `teaching of
this Court's decisions . . . enjoin[s] seeking out conflicts
between state and federal regulation where none clearly
exists.' (quoting Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362
U. S. 440, 446 (1960)); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State
Energy Resources Conservation and Development Comm'n,
461 U. S. 190, 222-223 (1983).  In my view, this type of pre-
emption should be limited to state laws which impose
prohibitions or obligations which are in direct contradiction
to Congress' primary objectives, as conveyed with clarity in
the federal legislation.
       I do not believe that supplementary state regulation of an
occupational safety and health issue can be said to create
the sort of actual conflict required by our decisions.  The
purpose of state supplementary regulation, like the federal
standards promulgated by the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) is to protect worker safety
and health.  Any potential tension between a scheme of
federal regulation of the workplace and a concurrent,
supplementary state scheme would not, in my view, rise to
the level of  actual conflict described in our pre-emption
cases.  Absent the express provisions of 18 of the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH), 29 U. S. C.
667, I would not say that state supplementary regulation
conflicts with the purposes of the OSH Act, or that it
 interferes with the methods by which the federal statute
was designed to reach [its] goal.  Ante, at 13 (quoting
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U. S. 481, 494
(1987)).
       The plurality's broad view of actual conflict  pre-emption
is contrary to two basic principles of our pre-emption
jurisprudence.  First, we begin  with the assumption that
the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be
superseded . . . unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress, Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331
U. S. 218, 230 (1947); see also ante, at 6.  Second,  `the
purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone' in all pre-
emption cases.  Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U. S. 497,
504 (1978) (quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375
U. S. 96, 103 (1963)).  A free-wheeling judicial inquiry into
whether a state statute is in tension with federal objectives
would undercut the principle that it is Congress rather than
the courts that pre-empts state law.
       Nonetheless, I agree with the Court that  the OSH Act
pre-empts all state `occupational safety and health stan-
dards relating to any occupational safety or health issue
with respect to which a Federal standard has been promul-
gated.'''  Ante, at 15 (quoting 29 U. S. C. 667(b)).  I
believe, however, that this result is mandated by the
express terms of 18(b) of the OSH Act.  It follows from
this that the pre-emptive scope of the Act is also limited to
the language of the statute.  When the existence of pre-
emption is evident from the statutory text, our inquiry must
begin and end with the statutory framework itself.
         A finding of express pre-emption in this case is not
contrary to our longstanding rule that we will not infer pre-
emption of the States' historic police powers absent a clear
statement of intent by Congress.  Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., supra, at 230; Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S.
519, 525 (1977); English, 496 U. S., at 79.  Though most
statutes creating express pre-emption contain an explicit
statement to that effect, a statement admittedly lacking in
18(b), we have never required any particular magic words
in our express pre-emption cases.  Our task in all pre-emp-
tion cases is to enforce the  clear and manifest purpose of
Congress. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., supra, at 230.
We have held, in express pre-emption cases, that Congress'
intent must be divined from the language, structure, and
purposes of the statute as a whole.  Ingersoll-Rand Co. v.
McClendon, 498 U. S. ___, ___ (1990) (slip op., at 3); Pilot
Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U. S. 41, 51 (1987).  The
language of the OSH statute sets forth a scheme in light of
which the provisions of 18 must be interpreted, and from
which the express pre-emption that displaces state law
follows.
       As the plurality's analysis amply demonstrates, ante, at
8-12, Congress has addressed the issue of pre-emption in
the OSH Act.  The dissent's position that the Act does not
pre-empt supplementary state regulation becomes most
implausible when the language of 18(b) is considered in
conjunction with the other provisions of 18.  Section 18(b)
provides as follows:
            Any State which . . . desires to assume responsibility
for development and enforcement therein of occupation-
al safety and health standards relating to any occupa-
tional safety or health issue with respect to which a
Federal standard has been promulgated . . . shall
submit a State plan . . . .  29 U. S. C. 667(b) (empha-
sis added).
The statute is clear:  When a State desires to assume
responsibility for an occupational safety and health issue
already addressed by the Federal Government, it must
submit a state plan.  The most reasonable inference from
this language is that when a State does not submit and
secure approval of a state plan, it may not enforce occupa-
tional safety and health standards in that area.  Any doubt
that this is what Congress intended disappears when
subsection (b) is considered in conjunction with subsections
(a), (c), and (f).  Ante, at 9-11.  I will not reiterate the
plurality's persuasive discussion on this point.  Unartful
though the language of 18(b) may be, the structure and
language of 18 leave little doubt that in the OSH statute
Congress intended to pre-empt supplementary state regula-
tion of an occupational safety and health issue with respect
to which a federal standard exists.
       In this regard I disagree with the dissent, see post, and
find unconvincing its conclusion that Congress intended to
allow concurrent state and federal jurisdiction over occupa-
tional safety and health issues.  The dissent would give the
States, rather than the Federal Government, the power to
decide whether as to any particular occupational safety and
health issue there will exist a single or dual regulatory
scheme.  Under this theory the State may choose exclusive
federal jurisdiction by not regulating; or exclusive state
jurisdiction by submitting a state plan; or dual regulation
by adopting supplementary rules, as Illinois did here.  That
position undermines the authority of OSHA in many
respects.  For example, 18(c)(2) of the OSH Act allows
OSHA to disapprove state plans which  unduly burden
interstate commerce.  The dissent would eviscerate this
important administrative mechanism by allowing the States
to sidestep OSHA's authority through the mechanism of
supplementary regulation.  See ante, at 10-11.  Further-
more, concurrent state and federal jurisdiction might
interfere with the enforcement of the federal regulations
without creating a situation where compliance with both
schemes is a physical impossibility, which the dissent would
require for pre-emption.  Post, at 7; see also Brief for
Respondent 32-33.  I would not attribute to Congress the
intent to create such a hodge-podge scheme of authority.
My views in this regard are confirmed by the fact that
OSHA has as a consistent matter, since the enactment of
the OSH Act, viewed 18 as providing it with exclusive
jurisdiction in areas where it issues a standard.  29 CFR
1901.2 (1991); 36 Fed. Reg. 7006 (1971); Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae 12-21.  Therefore, while the
dissent may be correct that as a theoretical matter the
separate provisions of 18 may be reconciled with allowing
concurrent jurisdiction, it is neither a natural nor a sound
reading of the statutory scheme.
       The necessary implication of finding express pre-emption
in this case is that the pre-emptive scope of the OSH Act is
defined by the language of 18(b).  Because this provision
requires federal approval of state occupational safety and
health standards alone, only state laws fitting within that
description are pre-empted.  For that reason I agree with
the Court that state laws of general applicability are not
pre-empted.  Ante, at 16.  I also agree that  a state law
requirement that directly, substantially, and specifically
regulates occupational safety and health is an occupational
safety and health standard within the meaning of the Act,
ante, at 16-17, and therefore falls within the scope of pre-
emption.  So-called  dual impact state regulations which
meet this standard are pre-empted by the OSH Act, regard-
less of any additional purpose the law may serve, or effect
the law may have, outside the workplace.  As a final
matter, I agree that the Illinois Acts are not saved because
they operate through a licensing mechanism rather than
through direct regulation of the workplace.  I therefore join
all but Part II of the Court's opinion, and concur in the
judgment of the Court.


           SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES--------
                       No. 90-1676
                        --------
        MARY  GADE,  DIRECTOR,  ILLINOIS  ENVIRONMENTAL
          PROTECTION AGENCY, PETITIONER v. NATIONAL SOLID
                 WASTES MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
        on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
                  appeals for the seventh circuit
                          [June 18, 1992]

       Justice Souter, with whom Justice Blackmun, Justice
Stevens, and Justice Thomas join, dissenting.
       The Court holds today that 18 of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970 (Act), 29 U. S. C. 667, pre-
empts state regulation of any occupational safety or health
issue as to which there is a federal standard, whether or
not the state regulation conflicts with the federal standard
in the sense that enforcement of one would preclude
application of the other.  With respect, I dissent.  In light of
our rule that federal pre-emption of state law is only to be
found in a clear congressional purpose to supplant exercises
of the States' traditional police powers, the text of the Act
fails to support the Court's conclusion.
                                 I
       Our cases recognize federal pre-emption of state law in
three variants: express pre-emption, field pre-emption, and
conflict pre-emption.  Express pre-emption requires  explicit
pre-emptive language.  See Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v.
State Energy Resources Conservation and Development
Comm'n, 461 U. S.  190, 203 (1983), citing Jones v. Rath
Packing Co., 430 U. S.  519, 525 (1977).  Field pre-emption
is wrought by a manifestation of congressional intent to
occupy an entire field such that even without a federal rule
on some particular matter within the field, state regulation
on that matter is pre-empted, leaving it untouched by either
state or federal law.  461 U. S., at 204.  Finally, there is
conflict pre-emption in either of two senses.  The first is
found when compliance with both state and federal law is
impossible, ibid., the second when a state law  stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress.  Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941).
       The plurality today finds pre-emption of this last sort,
discerning a conflict between any state legislation on a
given issue as to which a federal standard is in effect, and
a congressional purpose  to subject employers and employ-
ees to only one set of regulations. Ante, at 8.  Thus, under
the plurality's reading, any regulation on an issue as to
which a federal standard has been promulgated has been
pre-empted.  As one commentator has observed, this kind
of purpose-conflict pre-emption, which occurs when state
law is held to  undermin[e] a congressional decision in favor
of national uniformity of standards, presents  a situation
similar in practical effect to that of federal occupation of a
field.  L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 486 (2d ed.
1988).  Still, whether the pre-emption at issue is described
as occupation of each narrow field in which a federal
standard has been promulgated, as pre-emption of those
regulations that conflict with the federal objective of single
regulation, or, as Justice Kennedy describes it, as express
pre-emption, see ante, at 4 (opinion concurring in part and
concurring in judgment), the key is congressional intent,
and I find the language of the statute insufficient to
demonstrate an intent to pre-empt state law in this way.
                                II
       Analysis begins with the presumption that  Congress did
not intend to displace state law.  Maryland v. Louisiana,
451 U. S.  725, 746 (1981).   Where, as here, the field which
Congress is said to have pre-empted has been traditionally
occupied by the States, see, e.g., U. S. Const., Art. I, 10;
Patapsco Guano Co. v. North Carolina, 171 U. S. 345, 358
(1898), `we start with the assumption that the historic
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose
of Congress.'  Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S.
218, 230 (1947).  This assumption provides assurance that
the `federal-state balance,' United States v. Bass, 404 U. S.
336, 349 (1971), will not be disturbed unintentionally by
Congress or unnecessarily by the courts.  But when Con-
gress has `unmistakably . . . ordained,' Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142 (1963),
that its enactments alone are to regulate a part of com-
merce, state laws regulating that aspect of commerce must
fall.  Jones, supra, at 525.  Subject to this principle, the
enquiry into the possibly pre-emptive effect of federal
legislation is an exercise of statutory construction.  If the
statute's terms can be read sensibly not to have a pre-
emptive effect, the presumption controls and no pre-emption
may be inferred.
                                III
       At first blush, respondent's strongest argument might
seem to rest on 18(a) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. 667(a), the
full text of which is this:
 (a) Assertion of State standards in absence of applica-
ble Federal standards
        ``Nothing in this chapter shall prevent any State
agency or court from asserting jurisdiction under State
law over any occupational safety or health issue with
respect to which no standard is in effect under section
655 of this title.
That is to say, where there is no federal standard in effect,
there is no pre-emption.  The plurality reasons that there
must be pre-emption, however, when there is a federal
standard in effect, else 18(a) would be rendered superflu-
ous because  there is no possibility of conflict where there
is no federal regulation.  Ante, at 10.
       The plurality errs doubly.  First, its premise is incorrect.
In the sense in which the plurality uses the term, there is
the possibility of  conflict even absent federal regulation
since the mere enactment of a federal law like the Act may
amount to an occupation of an entire field, preventing state
regulation.  Second, the necessary implication of 18(a) is
not that every federal regulation pre-empts all state law on
the issue in question, but only that some federal regulations
may pre-empt some state law.  The plurality ignores the
possibility that the provision simply rules out field pre-emp-
tion and is otherwise entirely compatible with the possibili-
ty that pre-emption will occur only when actual conflict
between a federal regulation and a state rule renders
compliance with both impossible.  Indeed, if Congress had
meant to say that any state rule should be pre-empted if it
deals with an issue as to which there is a federal regulation
in effect, the text of subsection (a) would have been a very
inept way of trying to make the point.  It was not, however,
an inept way to make the different point that Congress
intended no field pre-emption of the sphere of health and
safety subject to regulation, but not necessarily regulated,
under the Act.  Unlike the case where field pre-emption
occurs, the provision tells us, absence of a federal standard
leaves a State free to do as it will on the issue.  Beyond
this, subsection (a) does not necessarily mean anything, and
the provision is perfectly consistent with the conclusion that
as long as compliance with both a federal standard and a
state regulation is not physically impossible, see Florida
Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142-143
(1963), each standard shall be enforceable.  If, indeed, the
presumption against pre-emption means anything, 18(a)
must be read in just this way.
       Respondent also relies on 18(b), 29 U. S. C. 667(b):
 (b) Submission of State plan for development and
enforcement of State standards to preempt applicable
Federal standards
        ``Any State which, at any time, desires to assume
responsibility for development and enforcement therein
of occupational safety and health standards relating to
any occupational safety or health issue with respect to
which a Federal standard has been promulgated under
section 655 of this title shall submit a State plan for
the development of such standards and their enforce-
ment.
Respondent argues that the necessary implication of this
provision is clear: the only way that a state rule on a
particular occupational safety and health issue may be
enforced once a federal standard on the issue is also in
place is by incorporating the state rule in a plan approved
by the Secretary.
       As both the plurality and Justice Kennedy acknowledge,
however, that is not the necessary implication of 18(b).
See ante, at 9 (plurality opinion); ante, at 5 (opinion con-
curring in part and concurring in judgment).  The subsec-
tion simply does not say that unless a plan is approved,
state law on an issue is pre-empted by the promulgation of
a federal standard.  In fact it tugs the other way, and in
actually providing a mechanism for a State to  assume re-
sponsibility for an issue with respect to which a federal
standard has been promulgated (that is, to pre-empt federal
law), 18(b) is far from pre-emptive of anything adopted by
the States.  Its heading, enacted as part of the statute and
properly considered under our canons of construction for
whatever light it may shed, see, e.g., Strathearn S.S. Co. v.
Dillon, 252 U. S. 348, 354 (1920); FTC v. Mandel Brothers,
359 U. S. 385 (1959), speaks expressly of the  development
and enforcement of State standards to preempt applicable
Federal standards.  The provision does not in any way
provide that absent such state pre-emption of federal rules,
the State may not even supplement the federal standards
with consistent regulations of its own.  Once again, nothing
in the provision's language speaks one way or the other to
the question whether promulgation of a federal standard
pre-empts state regulation, or whether, in the absence of a
plan, consistent federal and state regulations may coexist.
The provision thus makes perfect sense on the assumption
that a dual regulatory scheme is permissible but subject to
state pre-emption if the State wishes to shoulder enough of
the federal mandate to gain approval of a plan.
       Nor does the provision setting out conditions for the
Secretary's approval of a plan indicate that a state regula-
tion on an issue federally addressed is never enforceable
unless incorporated in a plan so approved.  Subsection (c)(2)
requires the Secretary to approve a plan when in her
judgment, among other things, it will not  unduly burden
interstate commerce.  29 U. S. C. 667(c)(2).  Respondent
argues, and the plurality concludes, that if state regulations
were not pre-empted, this provision would somehow suggest
that States acting independently could enforce regulations
that did burden interstate commerce unduly.  Brief for
Respondent 17; see ante, at 10.  But this simply does not
follow.  The subsection puts a limit on the Secretary's
authority to approve a plan that burdens interstate com-
merce, thus capping the discretion that might otherwise
have been read into the congressional delegation of authori-
ty to the Secretary to approve state plans.  From this
restriction applying only to the Secretary's federal authority
it is clearly a non sequitur to conclude that pre-emption
must have been intended to avoid the equally objectionable
undue burden that independent state regulation might
otherwise impose.  Quite the contrary; the dormant Com-
merce Clause can take care of that, without any need to
assume pre-emption.
       The final provision that arguably suggests pre-emption
merely by promulgation of a federal standard is 18(h), 29
U. S. C. 667(h):
 (h) Temporary enforcement of State standards
        ``The Secretary may enter into an agreement with a
State under which the State will be permitted to
continue to enforce one or more occupational health
and safety standards in effect in such State until final
action is taken by the Secretary with respect to a plan
submitted by a State under subsection (b) of this
section, or two years from December 29, 1970, which-
ever is earlier.
This provision of course expired in 1972, but its language
may suggest something about the way Congress understood
the rest of 18.  Since, all are agreed, a State would not
have had reason to file a plan unless a federal standard
was in place, 18(h) necessarily refers to a situation in
which there is a federal standard.  Respondent argues that
the provision for agreements authorizing continued enforce-
ment of a state standard following adoption of a federal
standard on the issue it addresses implies that, absent
such agreement, a State would have been barred from
enforcing any standard of its own.
       Once again, however, that is not the necessary implica-
tion of the text.  A purely permissive provision for enforce-
ment of state regulations does not imply that all state
regulations are otherwise unenforceable.  All it necessarily
means is that the Secretary could agree to permit the State
for a limited time to enforce whatever State regulations
would otherwise have been pre-empted, as would have been
true when they actually so conflicted with the federal
standard that an employer could not comply with them and
still comply with federal law as well.  Thus, in the case of
a State wishing to submit a plan, the provision as I read it
would have allowed for the possibility of just one transition,
from the pre-Act state law to the post-Act state plan.  Read
as the Court reads it, however, employers and employees in
such a State would have been subjected first to state law on
a given issue; then, after promulgation of a federal stan-
dard, to that standard; and then, after approval of the plan,
to a new state regime.  One enforced readjustment would
have been better than two, and the statute is better read
accordingly.
                                IV
       In sum, our rule is that the traditional police powers of
the State survive unless Congress has made a purpose to
pre-empt them clear.  See Rice, 331 U. S., at 230.  The Act
does not, in so many words, pre-empt all state regulation of
issues on which federal standards have been promulgated,
and respondent's contention at oral argument that reading
subsections (a), (b), and (h) could leave no other  logical
conclusion but one of pre-emption is wrong.  Each provision
can be read consistently with the others without any
implication of pre-emptive intent.  See National Solid
Wastes Management Assn. v. Killian, 918 F. 2d 671,
685-688 (CA7 1990) (Easterbrook, J., dubitante).  They are
in fact just as consistent with a purpose and objective to
permit overlapping state and federal regulation as with one
to guarantee that employers and employees would be
subjected to only one regulatory regime.  Restriction to one
such regime by precluding supplemental state regulation
might or might not be desirable.  But in the absence of any
clear expression of congressional intent to pre-empt, I can
only conclude that, as long as compliance with federally
promulgated standards does not render obedience to Illinois'
regulations impossible, the enforcement of the state law is
not prohibited by the Supremacy Clause.  I respectfully
dissent.

