Slip opinion

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus
(headnote) will be released, as is being
done in connection with this case, at
the time the opinion is issued.  The
syllabus constitutes no part of the
opinion of the Court but has been pre-
pared by the Reporter of Decisions for
the convenience of the reader.  See
United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200
U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

              Syllabus

 PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF SOUTHEASTERN
   PENNSYLVANIA et al. v. CASEY, GOVERNOR OF
             PENNSYLVANIA, et al.
 certiorari to the united states court of ap-
 peals for the third circuit
No. 91-744.   Argued April 22, 1992"Decided June
              29, 1992

At issue are five provisions of the Pennsylvania
Abortion Control Act of 1982: 3205, which re-
quires that a woman seeking an abortion give
her informed consent prior to the procedure,
and specifies that she be provided with certain
information at least 24 hours before the abor-
tion is performed; 3206, which mandates the
informed consent of one parent for a minor to
obtain an abortion, but provides a judicial
bypass procedure; 3209, which commands that,
unless certain exceptions apply, a married wom-
an seeking an abortion must sign a statement
indicating that she has notified her husband;
3203, which defines a ``medical emergency'' that
will excuse compliance with the foregoing re-
quirements; and 3207(b), 3214(a), and 3214(f),
which impose certain reporting requirements on
facilities providing abortion services.  Before
any of the provisions took effect, the petition-
ers, five abortion clinics and a physician rep-
resenting himself and a class of doctors who
provide abortion services, brought this suit
seeking a declaratory judgment that each of the
provisions was unconstitutional on its face, as
well as injunctive relief.  The District Court
held all the provisions unconstitutional and
permanently enjoined their enforcement.  The
Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed
in part, striking down the husband notification
provision but upholding the others.
Held:The judgment in No. 91-902 is affirmed; the
judgment in No. 91-744 is affirmed in part and
reversed in part, and the case is remanded.
947 F.2d 682:  No. 91-902, affirmed; No. 91-744,
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remand-
ed.
Justice O'Connor, Justice Kennedy, and Jus-
tice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court
with respect to Parts I, II, and III, concluding
that:
1.Consideration of the fundamental constitu-
tional question resolved by Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, principles of institutional integrity, and
the rule of stare decisis require that Roe's
essential holding be retained and reaffirmed as
to each of its three parts:  (1) a recognition of
a woman's right to choose to have an abortion
before fetal viability and to obtain it without
undue interference from the State, whose prev-
iability interests are not strong enough to
support an abortion prohibition or the imposi-
tion of substantial obstacles to the woman's
effective right to elect the procedure; (2) a
confirmation of the State's power to restrict
abortions after viability, if the law contains
exceptions for pregnancies endangering a woma-
n's life or health; and (3) the principle that the
State has legitimate interests from the outset
of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the
woman and the life of the fetus that may become
a child.  Pp.1-27.
(a)A reexamination of the principles that
define the woman's rights and the State's au-
thority regarding abortions is required by the
doubt this Court's subsequent decisions have
cast upon the meaning and reach of Roe's cen-
tral holding, by the fact that The Chief Justice
would overrule Roe, and by the necessity that
state and federal courts and legislatures have
adequate guidance on the subject.  Pp.1-3.
(b)Roe determined that a woman's decision to
terminate her pregnancy is a ``liberty'' protect-
ed against state interference by the substan-
tive component of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.  Neither the Bill of
Rights nor the specific practices of States at
the time of the Fourteenth Amendment's adop-
tion marks the outer limits of the substantive
sphere of such ``liberty.''  Rather, the adjudica-
tion of substantive due process claims may
require this Court to exercise its reasoned
judgment in determining the boundaries between
the individual's liberty and the demands of or-
ganized society.  The Court's decisions have
afforded constitutional protection to personal
decisions relating to marriage, see, e. g., Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, procreation, Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, family relationships,
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, child rea-
ring and education, Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, and contraception, see, e. g.,
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, and have
recognized the right of the individual to be
free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a per-
son as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453.
Roe's central holding properly invoked the rea-
soning and tradition of these precedents.  Pp.-
4-11.
(c)Application of the doctrine of stare deci-
sis confirms that Roe's essential holding should
be reaffirmed.  In reexamining that holding, the
Court's judgment is informed by a series of
prudential and pragmatic considerations desig-
ned to test the consistency of overruling the
holding with the ideal of the rule of law, and to
gauge the respective costs of reaffirming and
overruling.  Pp.11-13.
(d)Although Roe has engendered opposition,
it has in no sense proven unworkable, repre-
senting as it does a simple limitation beyond
which a state law is unenforceable.  P.13.
(e)The Roe rule's limitation on state power
could not be repudiated without serious inequi-
ty to people who, for two decades of economic
and social developments, have organized inti-
mate relationships and made choices that define
their views of themselves and their places in
society, in reliance on the availability of abor-
tion in the event that contraception should
fail.  The ability of women to participate equal-
ly in the economic and social life of the Nation
has been facilitated by their ability to control
their reproductive lives.  The Constitution
serves human values, and while the effect of
reliance on Roe cannot be exactly measured,
neither can the certain costs of overruling Roe
for people who have ordered their thinking and
living around that case be dismissed.  Pp.13-14.
(f)No evolution of legal principle has left
Roe's central rule a doctrinal anachronism dis-
counted by society.  If Roe is placed among the
cases exemplified by Griswold, supra, it is clea-
rly in no jeopardy, since subsequent constitu-
tional developments have neither disturbed, nor
do they threaten to diminish, the liberty recog-
nized in such cases.  Similarly, if Roe is seen as
stating a rule of personal autonomy and bodily
integrity, akin to cases recognizing limits on
governmental power to mandate medical treat-
ment or to bar its rejection, this Court's post-
Roe decisions accord with Roe's view that a
State's interest in the protection of life falls
short of justifying any plenary override of
individual liberty claims.  See, e. g., Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. ___,
___.  Finally, if Roe is classified as sui generis,
there clearly has been no erosion of its cen-
tral determination.  It was expressly reaffirmed
in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
462 U.S. 416 (Akron I), and Thornburgh v. Ameri-
can College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,
476 U.S. 747; and, in Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, a majority either
voted to reaffirm or declined to address the
constitutional validity of Roe's central holding.
Pp.14-17.
(g)No change in Roe's factual underpinning
has left its central holding obsolete, and none
supports an argument for its overruling.  Al-
though subsequent maternal health care advan-
ces allow for later abortions safe to the preg-
nant woman, and post-Roe neonatal care devel-
opments have advanced viability to a point
somewhat earlier, these facts go only to the
scheme of time limits on the realization of com-
peting interests.  Thus, any later divergences
from the factual premises of Roe have no bear-
ing on the validity of its central holding, that
viability marks the earliest point at which the
State's interest in fetal life is constitutional-
ly adequate to justify a legislative ban on
nontherapeutic abortions.  The soundness or
unsoundness of that constitutional judgment in
no sense turns on when viability occurs.  When-
ever it may occur, its attainment will continue
to serve as the critical fact.  Pp.17-18.
(h)A comparison between Roe and two deci-
sional lines of comparable significance"the line
identified with Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,
and the line that began with Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537"confirms the result reached here.
Those lines were overruled"by, respectively,
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 330 U.S. 379,
and Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483-
"on the basis of facts, or an understanding of
facts, changed from those which furnished the
claimed justifications for the earlier constitu-
tional resolutions.  The overruling decisions
were comprehensible to the Nation, and defensi-
ble, as the Court's responses to changed cir-
cumstances.  In contrast, because neither the
factual underpinnings of Roe's central holding
nor this Court's understanding of it has
changed (and because no other indication of
weakened precedent has been shown), the Court
could not pretend to be reexamining Roe with
any justification beyond a present doctrinal
disposition to come out differently from the
Roe Court.  That is an inadequate basis for
overruling a prior case.  Pp.19-22.
(i)Overruling Roe's central holding would not
only reach an unjustifiable result under stare
decisis principles, but would seriously weaken
the Court's capacity to exercise the judicial
power and to function as the Supreme Court of
a Nation dedicated to the rule of law.  Where
the Court acts to resolve the sort of unique,
intensely divisive controversy reflected in
Roe, its decision has a dimension not present in
normal cases and is entitled to rare precedent-
ial force to counter the inevitable efforts to
overturn it and to thwart its implementation.
Only the most convincing justification under
accepted standards of precedent could suffice
to demonstrate that a later decision overruling
the first was anything but a surrender to po-
litical pressure and an unjustified repudiation
of the principle on which the Court staked its
authority in the first instance.  Moreover, the
country's loss of confidence in the Judiciary
would be underscored by condemnation for the
Court's failure to keep faith with those who
support the decision at a cost to themselves.
A decision to overrule Roe's essential holding
under the existing circumstances would address
error, if error there was, at the cost of both
profound and unnecessary damage to the Court's
legitimacy and to the Nation's commitment to the
rule of law.  Pp.22-27.
Justice O'Connor, Justice Kennedy, and Jus-
tice Souter concluded in Part IV that an exami-
nation of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, and subse-
quent cases, reveals a number of guiding princi-
ples that should control the assessment of the
Pennsylvania statute:
(a)To protect the central right recognized by
Roe while at the same time accommodating the
State's profound interest in potential life, see,
id., at 162, the undue burden standard should be
employed.  An undue burden exists, and there-
fore a provision of law is invalid, if its pur-
pose or effect is to place substantial obsta-
cles in the path of a woman seeking an abortion
before the fetus attains viability.
(b)Roe's rigid trimester framework is rejected.
To promote the State's interest in potential
life throughout pregnancy, the State may take
measures to ensure that the woman's choice is
informed.  Measures designed to advance this
interest should not be invalidated if their
purpose is to persuade the woman to choose
childbirth over abortion.  These measures must
not be an undue burden on the right.
(c)As with any medical procedure, the State
may enact regulations to further the health or
safety of a woman seeking an abortion, but may
not impose unnecessary health regulations that
present a substantial obstacle to a woman see-
king an abortion.
(d)Adoption of the undue burden standard does
not disturb Roe's holding that regardless of
whether exceptions are made for particular
circumstances, a State may not prohibit any
woman from making the ultimate decision to ter-
minate her pregnancy before viability.
(e)Roe's holding that ``subsequent to viability,
the State in promoting its interest in the po-
tentiality of human life may, if it chooses,
regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except
where it is necessary, in appropriate medical
judgment, for the preservation of the life or
health of the mother'' is also reaffirmed.  Id.,
at 164-165.  Pp.27-37.
Justice O'Connor, Justice Kennedy, and Jus-
tice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court
with respect to Parts V-A and V-C, concluding
that:
1.As construed by the Court of Appeals, 320-
3's medical emergency definition is intended to
assure that compliance with the State's abor-
tion regulations would not in any way pose a
significant threat to a woman's life or health,
and thus does not violate the essential holding
of Roe, supra, at 164.  Although the definition
could be interpreted in an unconstitutional
manner, this Court defers to lower federal
court interpretations of state law unless they
amount to ``plain'' error.  Pp.38-39.
2.Section 3209's husband notification provi-
sion constitutes an undue burden and is there-
fore invalid.  A significant number of women will
likely be prevented from obtaining an abortion
just as surely as if Pennsylvania had outlawed
the procedure entirely.  The fact that 3209
may affect fewer than one percent of women
seeking abortions does not save it from facial
invalidity, since the proper focus of constitu-
tional inquiry is the group for whom the law is
a restriction, not the group for whom it is
irrelevant.  Furthermore, it cannot be claimed
that the father's interest in the fetus' welfare
is equal to the mother's protected liberty,
since it is an inescapable biological fact that
state regulation with respect to the fetus will
have a far greater impact on the pregnant wom-
an's bodily integrity than it will on the husband.
Section 3209 embodies a view of marriage con-
sonant with the common-law status of married
women but repugnant to this Court's present
understanding of marriage and of the nature of
the rights secured by the Constitution.  See
Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 69.  Pp.46-58.
Justice O'Connor, Justice Kennedy, and Jus-
tice Souter, joined by Justice Stevens, con-
cluded in Part V-E that all of the statute's
recordkeeping and reporting requirements, ex-
cept that relating to spousal notice, are con-
stitutional.  The reporting provision relating
to the reasons a married woman has not notified
her husband that she intends to have an abor-
tion must be invalidated because it places an
undue burden on a woman's choice.  Pp.59-60.
Justice O'Connor, Justice Kennedy, and Jus-
tice Souter concluded in Parts V-B and V-D
that:
1.Section 3205's informed consent provision is
not an undue burden on a woman's constitutional
right to decide to terminate a pregnancy.  To
the extent Akron I, 462 U.S., at 444, and Thorn-
burgh, 476 U.S., at 762, find a constitutional
violation when the government requires, as it
does here, the giving of truthful, nonmisleading
information about the nature of the abortion
procedure, the attendant health risks and those
of childbirth, and the ``probable gestational
age'' of the fetus, those cases are inconsistent
with Roe's acknowledgement of an important
interest in potential life, and are overruled.
Requiring that the woman be informed of the
availability of information relating to the con-
sequences to the fetus does not interfere with
a constitutional right of privacy between a
pregnant woman and her physician, since the
doctor-patient relation is derivative of the
woman's position, and does not underlie or ove-
rride the abortion right.  Moreover, the physic-
ian's First Amendment rights not to speak are
implicated only as part of the practice of medi-
cine, which is licensed and regulated by the
State.  There is no evidence here that requiring
a doctor to give the required information would
amount to a substantial obstacle to a woman
seeking abortion.
The premise behind Akron I's invalidation of a
waiting period between the provision of the
information deemed necessary to informed con-
sent and the performance of an abortion, id., at
450, is also wrong.  Although 3205's 24-hour
waiting period may make some abortions more
expensive and less convenient, it cannot be said
that it is invalid on the present record and in
the context of this facial challenge.  Pp.39-46.
2.Section 3206's one-parent consent require-
ment and judicial bypass procedure are consti-
tutional.  See, e. g., Ohio v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. ___, ___.  Pp.58-
-59.
Justice Blackmun concluded that application
of the strict scrutiny standard of review re-
quired by this Court's abortion precedents
results in the invalidation of all the challenged
provisions in the Pennsylvania statute, includ-
ing the reporting requirements, and therefore
concurred in the judgment that the requirement
that a pregnant woman report her reasons for
failing to provide spousal notice is unconstitu-
tional.  Pp.10, 14-15.
The Chief Justice, joined by Justice White,
Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas, concluded
that:
1.Although Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, is not
directly implicated by the Pennsylvania stat-
ute, which simply regulates and does not pro-
hibit abortion, a reexamination of the ``funda-
mental right'' Roe accorded to a woman's decision
to abort a fetus, with the concomitant require-
ment that any state regulation of abortion
survive ``strict scrutiny,'' id., at 154-156, is
warranted by the confusing and uncertain state
of this Court's post-Roe decisional law.  A re-
view of post-Roe cases demonstrates both that
they have expanded upon Roe in imposing increa-
singly greater restrictions on the States, see
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 783 (Burger, C.
J., dissenting), and that the Court has become
increasingly more divided, none of the last
three such decisions having commanded a major-
ity opinion, see Ohio v. Akron Center for Repro-
ductive Health, 497 U.S. 502; Hodgson v. Minne-
sota, 497 U.S. 417; Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services, 492 U.S. 490.  This confusion
and uncertainty complicated the task of the
Court of Appeals, which concluded that the ``un-
due burden'' standard adopted by Justice O'Con-
nor in Webster and Hodgson governs the present
cases.  Pp.1-8.
2.The Roe Court reached too far when it anal-
ogized the right to abort a fetus to the rights
involved in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390; Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1; and Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, and thereby deemed the right to
abortion to be ``fundamental.''  None of these
decisions endorsed an all-encompassing ``right
of privacy,'' as Roe, supra, at 152-153, claimed.
Because abortion involves the purposeful ter-
mination of potential life, the abortion decision
must be recognized as sui generis, different in
kind from the rights protected in the earlier
cases under the rubric of personal or family
privacy and autonomy.  And the historical tradi-
tions of the American people"as evidenced by
the English common law and by the American
abortion statutes in existence both at the time
of the Fourteenth Amendment's adoption and
Roe's issuance"do not support the view that the
right to terminate one's pregnancy is ``funda-
mental.''  Thus, enactments abridging that right
need not be subjected to strict scrutiny.
Pp.8-11.
3.The undue burden standard adopted by the
joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy,
and Souter has no basis in constitutional law
and will not result in the sort of simple limita-
tion, easily applied, which the opinion antici-
pates.  To evaluate abortion regulations under
that standard, judges will have to make the
subjective, unguided determination whether the
regulations place ``substantial obstacles'' in
the path of a woman seeking an abortion, un-
doubtedly engendering a variety of conflicting
views.  The standard presents nothing more
workable than the trimester framework the joint
opinion discards, and will allow the Court, under
the guise of the Constitution, to continue to
impart its own preferences on the States in the
form of a complex abortion code.  Pp.22-23.
4.The correct analysis is that set forth by
the plurality opinion in Webster, supra: A woma-
n's interest in having an abortion is a form of
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause,
but States may regulate abortion procedures in
ways rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.  P.24.
5.Section 3205's requirements are rationally
related to the State's legitimate interest in
assuring that a woman's consent to an abortion
be fully informed.  The requirement that a phy-
sician disclose certain information about the
abortion procedure and its risks and alterna-
tives is not a large burden and is clearly re-
lated to maternal health and the State's inter-
est in informed consent.  In addition, a State
may rationally decide that physicians are bet-
ter qualified than counselors to impart this
information and answer questions about the
abortion alternatives' medical aspects.  The
requirement that information be provided about
the availability of paternal child support and
state-funded alternatives is also related to
the State's informed consent interest and fur-
thers the State's interest in preserving unborn
life.  That such information might create some
uncertainty and persuade some women to forgo
abortions only demonstrates that it might make
a difference and is therefore relevant to a
woman's informed choice.  In light of this plural-
ity's rejection of Roe's ``fundamental right''
approach to this subject, the Court's contrary
holding in Thornburgh is not controlling here.
For the same reason, this Court's previous
holding invalidating a State's 24-hour mandato-
ry waiting period should not be followed.  The
waiting period helps ensure that a woman's deci-
sion to abort is a well-considered one, and
rationally furthers the State's legitimate in-
terest in maternal health and in unborn life.  It
may delay, but does not prohibit, abortions; and
both it and the informed consent provisions do
not apply in medical emergencies.  Pp.24-27.
6.The statute's parental consent provision is
entirely consistent with this Court's previous
decisions involving such requirements.  See,
e. g., Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas
City, Missouri, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476.
It is reasonably designed to further the Stat-
e's important and legitimate interest ``in the
welfare of its young citizens, whose immaturity,
inexperience, and lack of judgment may some-
times impair their ability to exercise their
rights wisely,'' Hodgson, supra, at 444.  Pp.27--
29.
7.Section 3214(a)'s requirement that abortion
facilities file a report on each abortion is
constitutional because it rationally furthers
the State's legitimate interests in advancing
the state of medical knowledge concerning ma-
ternal health and prenatal life, in gathering
statistical information with respect to patien-
ts, and in ensuring compliance with other provi-
sions of the Act, while keeping the reports
completely confidential.  Public disclosure of
other reports made by facilities receiving pub-
lic funds"those identifying the facilities and
any parent, subsidiary, or affiliated organiza-
tions, 3207(b), and those revealing the total
number of abortions performed, broken down by
trimester, 3214(f)"are rationally related to
the State's legitimate interest in informing
taxpayers as to who is benefiting from public
funds and what services the funds are support-
ing; and records relating to the expenditure of
public funds are generally available to the
public under Pennsylvania law.  Pp.34-35.
Justice Scalia, joined by The Chief Justice,
Justice White, and Justice Thomas, concluded
that a woman's decision to abort her unborn
child is not a constitutionally protected ``libe-
rty'' because (1) the Constitution says abso-
lutely nothing about it, and (2) the longstanding
traditions of American society have permitted
it to be legally proscribed.  See, e. g., Ohio v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S.
___, ___ (Scalia, J., concurring).  The Pennsyl-
vania statute should be upheld in its entirety
under the rational basis test.  Pp.1-3.

O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., announced
the judgment of the Court and delivered the opin-
ion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III,
V-A, V-C, and VI, in which Blackmun and Stevens,
JJ., joined, an opinion with respect to Part V-E,
in which Stevens, J., joined, and an opinion with
respect to Parts IV, V-B, and V-D.  Stevens, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting
in part.  Blackmun, J., filed an opinion concurring
in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part.  Rehnquist, C. J., filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part, in which White, Scalia, and
Thomas, JJ., joined.  Scalia, J., filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White and
Thomas, JJ., joined.



Opinion
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal
revision before publication in the pre-
liminary print of the United States
Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Su-
preme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical
or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the
preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES--------
       Nos. 91-744 and 91-902
              --------
 PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF SOUTHEASTERN
       PENNSYLVANIA, et al., PETITIONERS
91-744                v.
         ROBERT P. CASEY, et al., etc.

        ROBERT P. CASEY, et al., etc.,
                  PETITIONERS
91-902                v.
      PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF SOUTHEASTERN
              PENNSYLVANIA et al.
  on writs of certiorari to the united states
court of
         appeals for the third circuit
                [June 29, 1992]

  Justice O'Connor, Justice Kennedy, and Justice
Souter announced the judgment of the Court and
delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to
Parts I, II, III, V-A, V-C, and VI, an opinion with
respect to Part V-E, in which Justice Stevens
joins, and an opinion with respect to Parts IV, V-
B, and V-D.
                       I
  Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of
doubt.  Yet 19 years after our holding that the
Constitution protects a woman's right to termi-
nate her pregnancy in its early stages, Roe v.
Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), that definition of
liberty is still questioned.  Joining the respon-
dents as amicus curiae, the United States, as it
has done in five other cases in the last decade,
again asks us to overrule Roe.  See Brief for
Respondents 104-117; Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 8.
  At issue in these cases are five provisions of
the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982 as
amended in 1988 and 1989.  18 Pa. Cons. Stat.
3203-3220 (1990).  Relevant portions of the Act
are set forth in the appendix.  Infra, at 60.  The
Act requires that a woman seeking an abortion
give her informed consent prior to the abortion
procedure, and specifies that she be provided
with certain information at least 24 hours before
the abortion is performed.  3205.  For a minor to
obtain an abortion, the Act requires the informed
consent of one of her parents, but provides for a
judicial bypass option if the minor does not wish
to or cannot obtain a parent's consent.  3206.
Another provision of the Act requires that,
unless certain exceptions apply, a married woman
seeking an abortion must sign a statement indi-
cating that she has notified her husband of her
intended abortion.  3209.  The Act exempts
compliance with these three requirements in the
event of a  medical emergency, which is defined
in 3203 of the Act.  See 3203, 3205(a), 3206(a),
3209(c).  In addition to the above provisions
regulating the performance of abortions, the Act
imposes certain reporting requirements on facili-
ties that provide abortion services.  3207(b),
3214(a), 3214(f).
  Before any of these provisions took effect, the
petitioners, who are five abortion clinics and one
physician representing himself as well as a class
of physicians who provide abortion services,
brought this suit seeking declaratory and injunc-
tive relief.  Each provision was challenged as
unconstitutional on its face.  The District Court
entered a preliminary injunction against the
enforcement of the regulations, and, after a 3-
day bench trial, held all the provisions at issue
here unconstitutional, entering a permanent
injunction against Pennsylvania's enforcement of
them.  744 F. Supp. 1323 (ED Pa. 1990).  The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in part and
reversed in part, upholding all of the regulations
except for the husband notification requirement.
947 F. 2d 682 (1991). We granted certiorari.  502
U. S. ____ (1992).
  The Court of Appeals found it necessary to
follow an elaborate course of reasoning even to
identify the first premise to use to determine
whether the statute enacted by Pennsylvania
meets constitutional standards.  See 947 F. 2d, at
687-698.  And at oral argument in this Court, the
attorney for the parties challenging the statute
took the position that none of the enactments can
be upheld without overruling Roe v. Wade.  Tr. of
Oral Arg. 5-6.  We disagree with that analysis; but
we acknowledge that our decisions after Roe cast
doubt upon the meaning and reach of its holding.
Further, the Chief Justice admits that he would
overrule the central holding of Roe and adopt the
rational relationship test as the sole criterion
of constitutionality.  See post, at ___.  State and
federal courts as well as legislatures throughout
the Union must have guidance as they seek to
address this subject in conformance with the
Constitution.  Given these premises, we find it
imperative to review once more the principles
that define the rights of the woman and the
legitimate authority of the State respecting the
termination of pregnancies by abortion proce-
dures.
  After considering the fundamental constitution-
al questions resolved by Roe, principles of insti-
tutional integrity, and the rule of stare decisis,
we are led to conclude this: the essential holding
of Roe v. Wade should be retained and once again
reaffirmed.
  It must be stated at the outset and with clarity
that Roe's essential holding, the holding we
reaffirm, has three parts.  First is a recognition
of the right of the woman to choose to have an
abortion before viability and to obtain it without
undue interference from the State.  Before via-
bility, the State's interests are not strong
enough to support a prohibition of abortion or the
imposition of a substantial obstacle to the
woman's effective right to elect the procedure.
Second is a confirmation of the State's power to
restrict abortions after fetal viability, if the
law contains exceptions for pregnancies which
endanger a woman's life or health.  And third is the
principle that the State has legitimate interests
from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting
the health of the woman and the life of the fetus
that may become a child.  These principles do not
contradict one another; and we adhere to each.
                      II
  Constitutional protection of the woman's deci-
sion to terminate her pregnancy derives from the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
It declares that no State shall  deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.  The controlling word in the case
before us is  liberty.  Although a literal reading
of the Clause might suggest that it governs only
the procedures by which a State may deprive
persons of liberty, for at least 105 years, at
least since Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 660-661
(1887), the Clause has been understood to contain
a substantive component as well, one  barring
certain government actions regardless of the
fairness of the procedures used to implement
them.  Daniels v. Williams, 474 U. S. 327, 331 (1986).
As Justice Brandeis (joined by Justice Holmes)
observed,  [d]espite arguments to the contrary
which had seemed to me persuasive, it is settled
that the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment applies to matters of substantive law
as well as to matters of procedure.  Thus all
fundamental rights comprised within the term
liberty are protected by the Federal Constitution
from invasion by the States.  Whitney v. Califor-
nia, 274 U. S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring).   [T]he guaranties of due process, though
having their roots in Magna Carta's `per legem
terrae' and considered as procedural safeguards
`against executive usurpation and tyranny,' have
in this country `become bulwarks also against
arbitrary legislation.'  Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S.
497, 541 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting from dismiss-
al on jurisdictional grounds) (quoting Hurtado v.
California, 110 U. S. 516, 532 (1884)).
  The most familiar of the substantive liberties
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment are those
recognized by the Bill of Rights.  We have held
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates most of the Bill of Rights
against the States.  See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U. S. 145, 147-148 (1968).  It is tempting, as a
means of curbing the discretion of federal judges,
to suppose that liberty encompasses no more than
those rights already guaranteed to the individual
against federal interference by the express
provisions of the first eight amendments to the
Constitution.  See Adamson v. California, 332 U. S.
46, 68-92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).  But of
course this Court has never accepted that view.
  It is also tempting, for the same reason, to
suppose that the Due Process Clause protects
only those practices, defined at the most specific
level, that were protected against government
interference by other rules of law when the Four-
teenth Amendment was ratified.  See Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U. S. 110, 127-128, n. 6 (1989) (opinion
of Scalia, J.).  But such a view would be inconsis-
tent with our law.  It is a promise of the Consti-
tution that there is a realm of personal liberty
which the government may not enter.  We have
vindicated this principle before.  Marriage is
mentioned nowhere in the Bill of Rights and inter-
racial marriage was illegal in most States in the
19th century, but the Court was no doubt correct
in finding it to be an aspect of liberty protected
against state interference by the substantive
component of the Due Process Clause in Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 12 (1967) (relying, in an opinion
for eight Justices, on the Due Process Clause).
Similar examples may be found in Turner v. Safley,
482 U. S. 78, 94-99 (1987); in Carey v. Population
Services International, 431 U. S. 678, 684-686
(1977); in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479,
481-482 (1965), as well as in the separate opinions
of a majority of the Members of the Court in that
case, id., at 486-488 (Goldberg J., joined by
Warren, C. J., and Brennan, J., concurring) (ex-
pressly relying on due process), id., at 500-502
(Harlan, J., concurring in judgment) (same), id., at
502-507 (White, J., concurring in judgment) (same);
in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510,
534-535 (1925); and in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S.
390, 399-403 (1923).
  Neither the Bill of Rights nor the specific
practices of States at the time of the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment marks the outer limits
of the substantive sphere of liberty which the
Fourteenth Amendment protects.  See U. S. Const.,
Amend. 9.  As the second Justice Harlan recog-
nized:
 [T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by
the Due Process Clause cannot be found in or
limited by the precise terms of the specific
guarantees elsewhere provided in the Consti-
tution.  This `liberty' is not a series of iso-
lated points pricked out in terms of the taking
of property; the freedom of speech, press, and
religion; the right to keep and bear arms; the
freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures; and so on.  It is a rational continuum
which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom
from all substantial arbitrary impositions and
purposeless restraints, . . . and which also
recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive
judgment must, that certain interests require
particularly careful scrutiny of the state
needs asserted to justify their abridgment.
Poe v. Ullman, supra, at 543 (Harlan, J., dis-
senting from dismissal on jurisdictional
grounds).
Justice Harlan wrote these words in addressing an
issue the full Court did not reach in Poe v. Ullman,
but the Court adopted his position four Terms
later in Griswold v. Connecticut, supra.  In Griswo-
ld, we held that the Constitution does not permit
a State to forbid a married couple to use contra-
ceptives.  That same freedom was later guaran-
teed, under the Equal Protection Clause, for
unmarried couples.  See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U. S. 438 (1972).  Constitutional protection was
extended to the sale and distribution of contra-
ceptives in Carey v. Population Services Interna-
tional, supra.  It is settled now, as it was when the
Court heard arguments in Roe v. Wade, that the
Constitution places limits on a State's right to
interfere with a person's most basic decisions
about family and parenthood, see Carey v. Popula-
tion Services International, supra; Moore v. East
Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
supra; Loving v. Virginia, supra; Griswold v. Con-
necticut, supra; Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. William-
son, 316 U. S. 535 (1942); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, supra; Meyer v. Nebraska, supra, as well as
bodily integrity.  See, e.g., Washington v. Harper,
494 U. S. 210, 221-222 (1990); Winston v. Lee, 470
U. S. 753 (1985); Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165
(1952).
  The inescapable fact is that adjudication of
substantive due process claims may call upon the
Court in interpreting the Constitution to exer-
cise that same capacity which by tradition courts
always have exercised: reasoned judgment.  Its
boundaries are not susceptible of expression as
a simple rule.  That does not mean we are free to
invalidate state policy choices with which we
disagree; yet neither does it permit us to shrink
from the duties of our office.  As Justice Harlan
observed:
      Due process has not been reduced to any
formula; its content cannot be determined by
reference to any code.  The best that can be
said is that through the course of this Cour-
t's decisions it has represented the balance
which our Nation, built upon postulates of
respect for the liberty of the individual, has
struck between that liberty and the demands
of organized society.  If the supplying of
content to this Constitutional concept has of
necessity been a rational process, it certain-
ly has not been one where judges have felt
free to roam where unguided speculation might
take them.  The balance of which I speak is the
balance struck by this country, having regard
to what history teaches are the traditions
from which it developed as well as the tradi-
tions from which it broke.  That tradition is a
living thing.  A decision of this Court which
radically departs from it could not long sur-
vive, while a decision which builds on what has
survived is likely to be sound.  No formula
could serve as a substitute, in this area, for
judgment and restraint.  Poe v. Ullman, 367
U. S., at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting from dis-
missal on jurisdictional grounds).
See also Rochin v. California, supra, at 171-172
(Frankfurter, J., writing for the Court) ( To
believe that this judicial exercise of judgment
could be avoided by freezing `due process of law'
at some fixed stage of time or thought is to
suggest that the most important aspect of con-
stitutional adjudication is a function for inani-
mate machines and not for judges).
  Men and women of good conscience can disagree,
and we suppose some always shall disagree, about
the profound moral and spiritual implications of
terminating a pregnancy, even in its earliest
stage.  Some of us as individuals find abortion
offensive to our most basic principles of morali-
ty, but that cannot control our decision.  Our
obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to
mandate our own moral code.  The underlying
constitutional issue is whether the State can
resolve these philosophic questions in such a
definitive way that a woman lacks all choice in the
matter, except perhaps in those rare circum-
stances in which the pregnancy is itself a danger
to her own life or health, or is the result of rape
or incest.
  It is conventional constitutional doctrine that
where reasonable people disagree the government
can adopt one position or the other.  See, e.g.,
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726 (1963); Williamson
v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U. S. 483
(1955).  That theorem, however, assumes a state of
affairs in which the choice does not intrude upon
a protected liberty.  Thus, while some people might
disagree about whether or not the flag should be
saluted, or disagree about the proposition that it
may not be defiled, we have ruled that a State may
not compel or enforce one view or the other.  See
West Virginia State Bd. of Education v. Barnette,
319 U. S. 624 (1943); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S. 397
(1989).
  Our law affords constitutional protection to
personal decisions relating to marriage, procre-
ation, contraception, family relationships, child
rearing, and education.  Carey v. Population Ser-
vices International, 431 U. S., at 685.  Our cases
recognize  the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting
a person as the decision whether to bear or beget
a child.  Eisenstadt v. Baird, supra, at 453 (em-
phasis in original).  Our precedents  have re-
spected the private realm of family life which the
state cannot enter.  Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U. S. 158, 166 (1944).  These matters, involving the
most intimate and personal choices a person may
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal
dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.  At the
heart of liberty is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe,
and of the mystery of human life.  Beliefs about
these matters could not define the attributes of
personhood were they formed under compulsion of
the State.
  These considerations begin our analysis of the
woman's interest in terminating her pregnancy but
cannot end it, for this reason: though the abor-
tion decision may originate within the zone of
conscience and belief, it is more than a philosoph-
ic exercise.  Abortion is a unique act.  It is an act
fraught with consequences for others: for the
woman who must live with the implications of her
decision; for the persons who perform and assist
in the procedure; for the spouse, family, and
society which must confront the knowledge that
these procedures exist, procedures some deem
nothing short of an act of violence against
innocent human life; and, depending on one's
beliefs, for the life or potential life that is
aborted.  Though abortion is conduct, it does not
follow that the State is entitled to proscribe it
in all instances.  That is because the liberty of
the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the
human condition and so unique to the law.  The
mother who carries a child to full term is subject
to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain
that only she must bear.  That these sacrifices
have from the beginning of the human race been
endured by woman with a pride that ennobles her in
the eyes of others and gives to the infant a bond
of love cannot alone be grounds for the State to
insist she make the sacrifice.  Her suffering is
too intimate and personal for the State to insist,
without more, upon its own vision of the woman's
role, however dominant that vision has been in the
course of our history and our culture.  The
destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large
extent on her own conception of her spiritual
imperatives and her place in society.
  It should be recognized, moreover, that in some
critical respects the abortion decision is of the
same character as the decision to use contracep-
tion, to which Griswold v. Connecticut, Eisenstadt
v. Baird, and Carey v. Population Services Interna-
tional, afford constitutional protection.  We have
no doubt as to the correctness of those deci-
sions.  They support the reasoning in Roe relating
to the woman's liberty because they involve
personal decisions concerning not only the mean-
ing of procreation but also human responsibility
and respect for it.  As with abortion, reasonable
people will have differences of opinion about
these matters.  One view is based on such rever-
ence for the wonder of creation that any pregnan-
cy ought to be welcomed and carried to full term
no matter how difficult it will be to provide for
the child and ensure its well-being.  Another is
that the inability to provide for the nurture and
care of the infant is a cruelty to the child and an
anguish to the parent.  These are intimate views
with infinite variations, and their deep, personal
character underlay our decisions in Griswold,
Eisenstadt, and Carey.  The same concerns are
present when the woman confronts the reality
that, perhaps despite her attempts to avoid it,
she has become pregnant.
  It was this dimension of personal liberty that
Roe sought to protect, and its holding invoked the
reasoning and the tradition of the precedents we
have discussed, granting protection to substan-
tive liberties of the person.  Roe was, of course,
an extension of those cases and, as the decision
itself indicated, the separate States could act in
some degree to further their own legitimate
interests in protecting pre-natal life.  The
extent to which the legislatures of the States
might act to outweigh the interests of the woman
in choosing to terminate her pregnancy was a
subject of debate both in Roe itself and in deci-
sions following it.
  While we appreciate the weight of the arguments
made on behalf of the State in the case before us,
arguments which in their ultimate formulation
conclude that Roe should be overruled, the reser-
vations any of us may have in reaffirming the
central holding of Roe are outweighed by the
explication of individual liberty we have given
combined with the force of stare decisis.  We turn
now to that doctrine.
                      III
                       A
  The obligation to follow precedent begins with
necessity, and a contrary necessity marks its
outer limit.  With Cardozo, we recognize that no
judicial system could do society's work if it eyed
each issue afresh in every case that raised it.
See B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process
149 (1921).  Indeed, the very concept of the rule of
law underlying our own Constitution requires such
continuity over time that a respect for precedent
is, by definition, indispensable.  See Powell, Stare
Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 1991 Journal of
Supreme Court History 13, 16.  At the other ex-
treme, a different necessity would make itself
felt if a prior judicial ruling should come to be
seen so clearly as error that its enforcement was
for that very reason doomed.
  Even when the decision to overrule a prior case
is not, as in the rare, latter instance, virtually
foreordained, it is common wisdom that the rule of
stare decisis is not an  inexorable command, and
certainly it is not such in every constitutional
case, see Burnet v. Coronado Oil Gas Co., 285 U. S.
393, 405-411 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  See
also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. ____, ____ (1991)
(slip op., at ___) (Souter, J., joined by Kennedy, J.,
concurring); Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U. S. 203, 212
(1984).  Rather, when this Court reexamines a prior
holding, its judgment is customarily informed by a
series of prudential and pragmatic considerations
designed to test the consistency of overruling a
prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law,
and to gauge the respective costs of reaffirming
and overruling a prior case.  Thus, for example, we
may ask whether the rule has proved to be intol-
erable simply in defying practical workability,
Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U. S. 111, 116 (1965);
whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance
that would lend a special hardship to the conse-
quences of overruling and add inequity to the
cost of repudiation, e. g., United States v. Title
Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U. S.  472, 486 (1924); whether
related principles of law have so far developed as
to have left the old rule no more than a remnant
of abandoned doctrine, see Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 173-174 (1989); or
whether facts have so changed or come to be seen
so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of
significant application or justification, e.g.,
Burnet, supra, at 412 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
  So in this case we may inquire whether Roe's
central rule has been found unworkable; whether
the rule's limitation on state power could be
removed without serious inequity to those who
have relied upon it or significant damage to the
stability of the society governed by the rule in
question; whether the law's growth in the inter-
vening years has left Roe's central rule a doc-
trinal anachronism discounted by society; and
whether Roe's premises of fact have so far
changed in the ensuing two decades as to render
its central holding somehow irrelevant or unjus-
tifiable in dealing with the issue it addressed.
                       1
  Although Roe has engendered opposition, it has
in no sense proven  unworkable, see Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. S.
528, 546 (1985), representing as it does a simple
limitation beyond which a state law is unenforce-
able.  While Roe has, of course, required judicial
assessment of state laws affecting the exercise
of the choice guaranteed against government
infringement, and although the need for such
review will remain as a consequence of today's
decision, the required determinations fall within
judicial competence.
                       2
  The inquiry into reliance counts the cost of a
rule's repudiation as it would fall on those who
have relied reasonably on the rule's continued
application.  Since the classic case for weighing
reliance heavily in favor of following the earlier
rule occurs in the commercial context, see Payne
v. Tennessee, supra, at ____ (slip op., at ___),
where advance planning of great precision is most
obviously a necessity, it is no cause for surprise
that some would find no reliance worthy of consid-
eration in support of Roe.
  While neither respondents nor their amici in so
many words deny that the abortion right invites
some reliance prior to its actual exercise, one
can readily imagine an argument stressing the
dissimilarity of this case to one involving prop-
erty or contract.  Abortion is customarily chosen
as an unplanned response to the consequence of
unplanned activity or to the failure of conven-
tional birth control, and except on the assumption
that no intercourse would have occurred but for
Roe's holding, such behavior may appear to justify
no reliance claim.  Even if reliance could be
claimed on that unrealistic assumption, the
argument might run, any reliance interest would be
de minimis.  This argument would be premised on the
hypothesis that reproductive planning could take
virtually immediate account of any sudden resto-
ration of state authority to ban abortions.
  To eliminate the issue of reliance that easily,
however, one would need to limit cognizable reli-
ance to specific instances of sexual activity.
But to do this would be simply to refuse to face
the fact that for two decades of economic and
social developments, people have organized
intimate relationships and made choices that
define their views of themselves and their places
in society, in reliance on the availability of
abortion in the event that contraception should
fail.  The ability of women to participate equally
in the economic and social life of the Nation has
been facilitated by their ability to control their
reproductive lives.  See, e.g., R. Petchesky,
Abortion and Woman's Choice 109, 133, n. 7 (rev. ed.
1990).  The Constitution serves human values, and
while the effect of reliance on Roe cannot be
exactly measured, neither can the certain cost of
overruling Roe for people who have ordered their
thinking and living around that case be dismissed.
                       3
  No evolution of legal principle has left Roe's
doctrinal footings weaker than they were in 1973.
No development of constitutional law since the
case was decided has implicitly or explicitly left
Roe behind as a mere survivor of obsolete consti-
tutional thinking.
  It will be recognized, of course, that Roe stands
at an intersection of two lines of decisions, but
in whichever doctrinal category one reads the
case, the result for present purposes will be the
same.  The Roe Court itself placed its holding in
the succession of cases most prominently exempli-
fied by Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965),
see Roe, 410 U. S., at 152-153.  When it is so seen,
Roe is clearly in no jeopardy, since subsequent
constitutional developments have neither dis-
turbed, nor do they threaten to diminish, the
scope of recognized protection accorded to the
liberty relating to intimate relationships, the
family, and decisions about whether or not to
beget or bear a child.  See, e.g., Carey v. Popula-
tion Services International, 431 U. S. 678 (1977);
Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 678 (1977).
  Roe, however, may be seen not only as an exem-
plar of Griswold liberty but as a rule (whether or
not mistaken) of personal autonomy and bodily
integrity, with doctrinal affinity to cases recog-
nizing limits on governmental power to mandate
medical treatment or to bar its rejection.  If so,
our cases since Roe accord with Roe's view that a
State's interest in the protection of life falls
short of justifyingany plenary override of individual liberty claims.
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497
U. S. 261,278 (1990); Cf., e.g., Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S.
____, ____ (1992) (slip. op., at 7); Washington v.
Harper, 494 U. S.210 (1990); see also, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342
U. S. 165 (1952); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S.
11, 24-30 (1905).
  Finally, one could classify Roe as sui generis.  If
the case is so viewed, then there clearly has been
no erosion of its central determination.  The
original holding resting on the concurrence of
seven Members of the Court in 1973 was expressly
affirmed by a majority of six in 1983, see Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462
U. S. 416 (1983) (Akron I), and by a majority of five
in 1986, see Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U. S. 747
(1986), expressing adherence to the constitutional
ruling despite legislative efforts in some States
to test its limits.  More recently, in Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services, 492 U. S. 490 (1989),
although two of the present authors questioned
the trimester framework in a way consistent with
our judgment today, see id., at 518 (Rehnquist C.
J., joined by White, and Kennedy, JJ.); id., at 529
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment), a majority of the Court either decided
to reaffirm or declined to address the constitu-
tional validity of the central holding of Roe.  See
Webster, 492 U. S., at 521 (Rehnquist, C. J., joined
by White and Kennedy, JJ.); id., at 525-526 (O'Con-
nor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment); id., at 537, 553 (Blackmun, J., joined by
Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); id., at 561-563 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
  Nor will courts building upon Roe be likely to
hand down erroneous decisions as a consequence.
Even on the assumption that the central holding
of Roe was in error, that error would go only to
the strength of the state interest in fetal
protection, not to the recognition afforded by the
Constitution to the woman's liberty.  The latter
aspect of the decision fits comfortably within the
framework of the Court's prior decisions including
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U. S. 535
(1942), Griswold, supra, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S.
1 (1967), and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438
(1972), the holdings of which are  not a series of
isolated points, but mark a  rational continuum.
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S., at 543 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).  As we described in Carey v. Population
Services International, supra, the liberty which
encompasses those decisions
      includes `the interest in independence in
  making certain kinds of important decisions.'
  While the outer limits of this aspect of
  [protected liberty] have not been marked by
  the Court, it is clear that among the deci-
sions that an individual may make without
  unjustified government interference are
  personal decisions `relating to marriage,
  procreation, contraception, family relation-
ships, and child rearing and education.'
  Id., at 684-685 (citations omitted).
The soundness of this prong of the Roe analysis
is apparent from a consideration of the alterna-
tive.  If indeed the woman's interest in deciding
whether to bear and beget a child had not been
recognized as in Roe, the State might as readily
restrict a woman's right to choose to carry a
pregnancy to term as to terminate it, to further
asserted state interests in population control,
or eugenics, for example.  Yet Roe has been sensi-
bly relied upon to counter any such suggestions.
E.g., Arnold v. Board of Education of Escambia
County, Ala., 880 F. 2d 305, 311 (CA11 1989) (relying
upon Roe and concluding that government officials
violate the Constitution by coercing a minor to
have an abortion); Avery v. County of Burke, 660 F.
2d 111, 115 (CA4 1981) (county agency inducing
teenage girl to undergo unwanted sterilization on
the basis of misrepresentation that she had
sickle cell trait); see also In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10,
355 A. 2d 647, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New
Jersey, 429 U. S. 922 (1976) (relying on Roe in
finding a right to terminate medical treatment).  In
any event, because Roe's scope is confined by the
fact of its concern with postconception potential
life, a concern otherwise likely to be implicated
only by some forms of contraception protected
independently under Griswold and later cases, any
error in Roe is unlikely to have serious ramifica-
tions in future cases.
                       4
  We have seen how time has overtaken some of
Roe's factual assumptions: advances in maternal
health care allow for abortions safe to the
mother later in pregnancy than was true in 1973,
see Akron I, supra, at 429, n. 11, and advances in
neonatal care have advanced viability to a point
somewhat earlier.  Compare Roe, 410 U. S., at 160,
with Webster, supra, at 515-516 (opinion of Rehnqu-
ist, C.J.); see Akron I, supra, at 457, and n. 5
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).  But these facts go only
to the scheme of time limits on the realization of
competing interests, and the divergences from the
factual premises of 1973 have no bearing on the
validity of Roe's central holding, that viability
marks the earliest point at which the State's
interest in fetal life is constitutionally ade-
quate to justify a legislative ban on nontherape-
utic abortions.  The soundness or unsoundness of
that constitutional judgment in no sense turns on
whether viability occurs at approximately 28
weeks, as was usual at the time of Roe, at 23 to 24
weeks, as it sometimes does today, or at some
moment even slightly earlier in pregnancy, as it
may if fetal respiratory capacity can somehow be
enhanced in the future.  Whenever it may occur,
the attainment of viability may continue to serve
as the critical fact, just as it has done since Roe
was decided; which is to say that no change in
Roe's factual underpinning has left its central
holding obsolete, and none supports an argument
for overruling it.
                       5
  The sum of the precedential inquiry to this
point shows Roe's underpinnings unweakened in any
way affecting its central holding.  While it has
engendered disapproval, it has not been unwork-
able.  An entire generation has come of age free
to assume Roe's concept of liberty in defining the
capacity of women to act in society, and to make
reproductive decisions; no erosion of principle
going to liberty or personal autonomy has left
Roe's central holding a doctrinal remnant; Roe
portends no developments at odds with other
precedent for the analysis of personal liberty;
and no changes of fact have rendered viability
more or less appropriate as the point at which the
balance of interests tips.  Within the bounds of
normal stare decisis analysis, then, and subject
to the considerations on which it customarily
turns, the stronger argument is for affirming
Roe's central holding, with whatever degree of
personal reluctance any of us may have, not for
overruling it.
                       B
  In a less significant case, stare decisis analy-
sis could, and would, stop at the point we have
reached.  But the sustained and widespread debate
Roe has provoked calls for some comparison
between that case and others of comparable
dimension that have responded to national con-
troversies and taken on the impress of the con-
troversies addressed.  Only two such decisional
lines from the past century present themselves
for examination, and in each instance the result
reached by the Court accorded with the principles
we apply today.
  The first example is that line of cases identi-
fied with Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905),
which imposed substantive limitations on legisla-
tion limiting economic autonomy in favor of health
and welfare regulation, adopting, in Justice
Holmes' view, the theory of laissez-faire.  Id., at
75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).  The Lochner decisions
were exemplified by Adkins v. Children's Hospital
of D.C., 261 U. S. 525 (1923), in which this Court
held it to be an infringement of constitutionally
protected liberty of contract to require the
employers of adult women to satisfy minimum wage
standards.  Fourteen years later, West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937), signalled
the demise of Lochner by overruling Adkins.  In the
meantime, the Depression had come and, with it,
the lesson that seemed unmistakable to most
people by 1937, that the interpretation of con-
tractual freedom protected in Adkins rested on
fundamentally false factual assumptions about
the capacity of a relatively unregulated market
to satisfy minimal levels of human welfare.  See
West Coast Hotel Co., supra, at 399.  As Justice
Jackson wrote of the constitutional crisis of 1937
shortly before he came on the bench,  The older
world of laissez faire was recognized everywhere
outside the Court to be dead.  R. Jackson, The
Struggle for Judicial Supremacy 85 (1941).  The
facts upon which the earlier case had premised a
constitutional resolution of social controversy
had proved to be untrue, and history's demonstra-
tion of their untruth not only justified but
required the new choice of constitutional princi-
ple that West Coast Hotel announced.  Of course, it
was true that the Court lost something by its
misperception, or its lack of prescience, and the
Court-packing crisis only magnified the loss; but
the clear demonstration that the facts of eco-
nomic life were different from those previously
assumed warranted the repudiation of the old law.
  The second comparison that 20th century histo-
ry invites is with the cases employing the sepa-
rate-but-equal rule for applying the Fourteenth
Amendment's equal protection guarantee.  They
began with Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896),
holding that legislatively mandated racial segre-
gation in public transportation works no denial of
equal protection, rejecting the argument that
racial separation enforced by the legal machinery
of American society treats the black race as
inferior.  The Plessy Court considered  the
underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to
consist in the assumption that the enforced
separation of the two races stamps the colored
race with a badge of inferiority.  If this be so, it
is not by reason of anything found in the act, but
solely because the colored race chooses to put
that construction upon it.  Id., at at 551.  Wheth-
er, as a matter of historical fact, the Justices in
the Plessy majority believed this or not, see id.,
at 557, 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting), this under-
standing of the implication of segregation was the
stated justification for the Court's opinion.  But
this understanding of the facts and the rule it
was stated to justify were repudiated in Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954).  As one
commentator observed, the question before the
Court in Brown was  whether discrimination in-
heres in that segregation which is imposed by law
in the twentieth century in certain specific
states in the American Union.  And that question
has meaning and can find an answer only on the
ground of history and of common knowledge about
the facts of life in the times and places afore-
said.  Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation
Decisions, 69 Yale L. J. 421, 427 (1960).
  The Court in Brown addressed these facts of life
by observing that whatever may have been the
understanding in Plessy's time of the power of
segregation to stigmatize  those who were segre-
gated with a  badge of inferiority, it was clear
by 1954 that legally sanctioned segregation had
just such an effect, to the point that racially
separate public educational facilities were
deemed inherently unequal.  374 U. S., at 494-495.
Society's understanding of the facts upon which a
constitutional ruling was sought in 1954 was thus
fundamentally different from the basis claimed for
the decision in 1896.  While we think Plessy was
wrong the day it was decided, see Plessy, supra, at
552-564 (Harlan, J., dissenting), we must also
recognize that the Plessy Court's explanation for
its decision was so clearly at odds with the facts
apparent to the Court in 1954 that the decision to
reexamine Plessy was on this ground alone not
only justified but required.
  West Coast Hotel and Brown each rested on facts,
or an understanding of facts, changed from those
which furnished the claimed justifications for the
earlier constitutional resolutions.  Each case
was comprehensible as the Court's response to
facts that the country could understand, or had
come to understand already, but which the Court
of an earlier day, as its own declarations dis-
closed, had not been able to perceive.  As the
decisions were thus comprehensible they were
also defensible, not merely as the victories of
one doctrinal school over another by dint of
numbers (victories though they were), but as
applications of constitutional principle to facts
as they had not been seen by the Court before.  In
constitutional adjudication as elsewhere in life,
changed circumstances may impose new obligations,
and the thoughtful part of the Nation could
accept each decision to overrule a prior case as
a response to the Court's constitutional duty.
    Because the case before us presents no such
occasion it could be seen as no such response.
Because neither the factual underpinnings of
Roe's central holding nor our understanding of it
has changed (and because no other indication of
weakened precedent has been shown) the Court
could not pretend to be reexamining the prior law
with any justification beyond a present doctrinal
disposition to come out differently from the
Court of 1973.  To overrule prior law for no other
reason than that would run counter to the view
repeated in our cases, that a decision to over-
rule should rest on some special reason over and
above the belief that a prior case was wrongly
decided.  See, e.g., Mitchell v. W.T. Grant, 416 U. S.
600, 636 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ( A basic
change in the law upon a ground no firmer than a
change in our membership invites the popular
misconception that this institution is little
different from the two political branches of the
Government.  No misconception could do more
lasting injury to this Court and to the system of
law which it is our abiding mission to serve); Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 677 (1961) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting).
                       C
  The examination of the conditions justifying the
repudiation of Adkins by West Coast Hotel and
Plessy by Brown is enough to suggest the terrible
price that would have been paid if the Court had
not overruled as it did.  In the present case,
however, as our analysis to this point makes
clear, the terrible price would be paid for over-
ruling.  Our analysis would not be complete,
however, without explaining why overruling Roe's
central holding would not only reach an unjustifi-
able result under principles of stare decisis, but
would seriously weaken the Court's capacity to
exercise the judicial power and to function as the
Supreme Court of a Nation dedicated to the rule
of law.  To understand why this would be so it is
necessary to understand the source of this
Court's authority, the conditions necessary for
its preservation, and its relationship to the
country's understanding of itself as a constitu-
tional Republic.
  The root of American governmental power is
revealed most clearly in the instance of the
power conferred by the Constitution upon the
Judiciary of the United States and specifically
upon this Court.  As Americans of each succeeding
generation are rightly told, the Court cannot buy
support for its decisions by spending money and,
except to a minor degree, it cannot independently
coerce obedience to its decrees.  The Court's
power lies, rather, in its legitimacy, a product of
substance and perception that shows itself in the
people's acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to
determine what the Nation's law means and to
declare what it demands.
  The underlying substance of this legitimacy is
of course the warrant for the Court's decisions in
the Constitution and the lesser sources of legal
principle on which the Court draws.  That sub-
stance is expressed in the Court's opinions, and
our contemporary understanding is such that a
decision without principled justification would be
no judicial act at all.  But even when justification
is furnished by apposite legal principle, something
more is required.  Because not every conscien-
tious claim of principled justification will be
accepted as such, the justification claimed must
be beyond dispute.  The Court must take care to
speak and act in ways that allow people to accept
its decisions on the terms the Court claims for
them, as grounded truly in principle, not as
compromises with social and political pressures
having, as such, no bearing on the principled
choices that the Court is obliged to make.  Thus,
the Court's legitimacy depends on making legally
principled decisions under circumstances in which
their principled character is sufficiently plausi-
ble to be accepted by the Nation.
  The need for principled action to be perceived
as such is implicated to some degree whenever
this, or any other appellate court, overrules a
prior case.  This is not to say, of course, that
this Court cannot give a perfectly satisfactory
explanation in most cases.  People understand
that some of the Constitution's language is hard
to fathom and that the Court's Justices are
sometimes able to perceive significant facts or
to understand principles of law that eluded their
predecessors and that justify departures from
existing decisions.  However upsetting it may be
to those most directly affected when one judi-
cially derived rule replaces another, the country
can accept some correction of error without
necessarily questioning the legitimacy of the
Court.
  In two circumstances, however, the Court would
almost certainly fail to receive the benefit of
the doubt in overruling prior cases.  There is,
first, a point beyond which frequent overruling
would overtax the country's belief in the Court's
good faith.  Despite the variety of reasons that
may inform and justify a decision to overrule, we
cannot forget that such a decision is usually
perceived (and perceived correctly) as, at the
least, a statement that a prior decision was
wrong.  There is a limit to the amount of error
that can plausibly be imputed to prior courts.  If
that limit should be exceeded, disturbance of
prior rulings would be taken as evidence that
justifiable reexamination of principle had given
way to drives for particular results in the short
term.  The legitimacy of the Court would fade with
the frequency of its vacillation.
      That first circumstance can be described as
hypothetical; the second is to the point here and
now.  Where, in the performance of its judicial
duties, the Court decides a case in such a way as
to resolve the sort of intensely divisive contro-
versy reflected in Roe and those rare, comparable
cases, its decision has a dimension that the
resolution of the normal case does not carry.  It
is the dimension present whenever the Court's
interpretation of the Constitution calls the
contending sides of a national controversy to end
their national division by accepting a common
mandate rooted in the Constitution.
  The Court is not asked to do this very often,
having thus addressed the Nation only twice in
our lifetime, in the decisions of Brown and Roe.
But when the Court does act in this way, its
decision requires an equally rare precedential
force to counter the inevitable efforts to over-
turn it and to thwart its implementation.  Some of
those efforts may be mere unprincipled emotional
reactions; others may proceed from principles
worthy of profound respect.  But whatever the
premises of opposition may be, only the most
convincing justification under accepted standards
of precedent could suffice to demonstrate that a
later decision overruling the first was anything
but a surrender to political pressure, and an
unjustified repudiation of the principle on which
the Court staked its authority in the first
instance.  So to overrule under fire in the ab-
sence of the most compelling reason to reexamine
a watershed decision would subvert the Court's
legitimacy beyond any serious question.  Cf. Brown
v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294, 300 (1955)
(Brown II) ( [I]t should go without saying that the
vitality of th[e] constitutional principles [an-
nounced in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S.
483 (1954),] cannot be allowed to yield simply
because of disagreement with them).
  The country's loss of confidence in the judiciary
would be underscored by an equally certain and
equally reasonable condemnation for another
failing in overruling unnecessarily and under
pressure.  Some cost will be paid by anyone who
approves or implements a constitutional decision
where it is unpopular, or who refuses to work to
undermine the decision or to force its reversal.
The price may be criticism or ostracism, or it may
be violence.  An extra price will be paid by those
who themselves disapprove of the decision's
results when viewed outside of constitutional
terms, but who nevertheless struggle to accept
it, because they respect the rule of law.  To all
those who will be so tested by following, the Court
implicitly undertakes to remain steadfast, lest in
the end a price be paid for nothing.  The promise
of constancy, once given, binds its maker for as
long as the power to stand by the decision sur-
vives and the understanding of the issue has not
changed so fundamentally as to render the commit-
ment obsolete.  From the obligation of this prom-
ise this Court cannot and should not assume any
exemption when duty requires it to decide a case
in conformance with the Constitution.  A willing
breach of it would be nothing less than a breach
of faith, and no Court that broke its faith with
the people could sensibly expect credit for
principle in the decision by which it did that.
  It is true that diminished legitimacy may be
restored, but only slowly.  Unlike the political
branches, a Court thus weakened could not seek to
regain its position with a new mandate from the
voters, and even if the Court could somehow go to
the polls, the loss of its principled character
could not be retrieved by the casting of so many
votes.  Like the character of an individual, the
legitimacy of the Court must be earned over time.
So, indeed, must be the character of a Nation of
people who aspire to live according to the rule of
law.  Their belief in themselves as such a people
is not readily separable from their understanding
of the Court invested with the authority to
decide their constitutional cases and speak
before all others for their constitutional ideals.
If the Court's legitimacy should be undermined,
then, so would the country be in its very ability
to see itself through its constitutional ideals.
The Court's concern with legitimacy is not for the
sake of the Court but for the sake of the Nation
to which it is responsible.
  The Court's duty in the present case is clear.
In 1973, it confronted the already-divisive issue
of governmental power to limit personal choice to
undergo abortion, for which it provided a new
resolution based on the due process guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment.  Whether or not a
new social consensus is developing on that issue,
its divisiveness is no less today than in 1973, and
pressure to overrule the decision, like pressure
to retain it, has grown only more intense.  A
decision to overrule Roe's essential holding under
the existing circumstances would address error,
if error there was, at the cost of both profound
and unnecessary damage to the Court's legitimacy,
and to the Nation's commitment to the rule of law.
It is therefore imperative to adhere to the
essence of Roe's original decision, and we do so
today.
                      IV
  From what we have said so far it follows that it
is a constitutional liberty of the woman to have
some freedom to terminate her pregnancy.  We
conclude that the basic decision in Roe was based
on a constitutional analysis which we cannot now
repudiate.  The woman's liberty is not so unlimit-
ed, however, that from the outset the State
cannot show its concern for the life of the un-
born, and at a later point in fetal development the
State's interest in life has sufficient force so
that the right of the woman to terminate the
pregnancy can be restricted.
  That brings us, of course, to the point where
much criticism has been directed at Roe, a criti-
cism that always inheres when the Court draws a
specific rule from what in the Constitution is but
a general standard.  We conclude, however, that
the urgent claims of the woman to retain the
ultimate control over her destiny and her body,
claims implicit in the meaning of liberty, require
us to perform that function.  Liberty must not be
extinguished for want of a line that is clear.  And
it falls to us to give some real substance to the
woman's liberty to determine whether to carry her
pregnancy to full term.
  We conclude the line should be drawn at viabili-
ty, so that before that time the woman has a right
to choose to terminate her pregnancy.  We adhere
to this principle for two reasons.  First, as we
have said, is the doctrine of stare decisis.  Any
judicial act of line-drawing may seem somewhat
arbitrary, but Roe was a reasoned statement,
elaborated with great care.  We have twice reaf-
firmed it in the face of great opposition.  See
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 U. S., at 759; Akron I, 462 U. S.,
at 419-420.  Although we must overrule those
parts of Thornburgh and Akron I which, in our view,
are inconsistent with Roe's statement that the
State has a legitimate interest in promoting the
life or potential life of the unborn, see infra, at
___, the central premise of those cases repre-
sents an unbroken commitment by this Court to the
essential holding of Roe.  It is that premise which
we reaffirm today.
  The second reason is that the concept of viabil-
ity, as we noted in Roe, is the time at which there
is a realistic possibility of maintaining and
nourishing a life outside the womb, so that the
independent existence of the second life can in
reason and all fairness be the object of state
protection that now overrides the rights of the
woman.  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at 163.  Consis-
tent with other constitutional norms, legisla-
tures may draw lines which appear arbitrary
without the necessity of offering a justification.
But courts may not.  We must justify the lines we
draw.  And there is no line other than viability
which is more workable.  To be sure, as we have
said, there may be some medical developments that
affect the precise point of viability, see supra,
at ___, but this is an imprecision within tolerable
limits given that the medical community and all
those who must apply its discoveries will continue
to explore the matter.  The viability line also has,
as a practical matter, an element of fairness.  In
some broad sense it might be said that a woman
who fails to act before viability has consented to
the State's intervention on behalf of the develop-
ing child.
  The woman's right to terminate her pregnancy
before viability is the most central principle of
Roe v. Wade.  It is a rule of law and a component of
liberty we cannot renounce.
  On the other side of the equation is the inter-
est of the State in the protection of potential
life.  The Roe Court recognized the State's  im-
portant and legitimate interest in protecting the
potentiality of human life.  Roe, supra, at 162.
The weight to be given this state interest, not
the strength of the woman's interest, was the
difficult question faced in Roe.  We do not need to
say whether each of us, had we been Members of
the Court when the valuation of the State inter-
est came before it as an original matter, would
have concluded, as the Roe Court did, that its
weight is insufficient to justify a ban on abor-
tions prior to viability even when it is subject to
certain exceptions.  The matter is not before us
in the first instance, and coming as it does after
nearly 20 years of litigation in Roe's wake we are
satisfied that the immediate question is not the
soundness of Roe's resolution of the issue, but
the precedential force that must be accorded to
its holding.  And we have concluded that the
essential holding of Roe should be reaffirmed.
  Yet it must be remembered that Roe v. Wade
speaks with clarity in establishing not only the
woman's liberty but also the State's  important
and legitimate interest in potential life.  Roe,
supra, at 163.  That portion of the decision in Roe
has been given too little acknowledgement and
implementation by the Court in its subsequent
cases.  Those cases decided that any regulation
touching upon the abortion decision must survive
strict scrutiny, to be sustained only if drawn in
narrow terms to further a compelling state inter-
est.  See, e.g., Akron I, supra, at 427.  Not all of
the cases decided under that formulation can be
reconciled with the holding in Roe itself that the
State has legitimate interests in the health of
the woman and in protecting the potential life
within her.  In resolving this tension, we choose
to rely upon Roe, as against the later cases.
  Roe established a trimester framework to govern
abortion regulations.  Under this elaborate but
rigid construct, almost no regulation at all is
permitted during the first trimester of pregnancy;
regulations designed to protect the woman's
health, but not to further the State's interest
inpotential life, are permitted during the second
trimester; and during the third trimester, when
the fetus is viable, prohibitions are permitted
provided the life or health of the mother is not at
stake.  Roe v. Wade, supra, at 163-166.  Most of our
cases since Roe have involved the application of
rules derived from the trimester framework.  See,
e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetri-
cians and Gynecologists, supra; Akron I, supra.
  The trimester framework no doubt was erected
to ensure that the woman's right to choose not
become so subordinate to the State's interest in
promoting fetal life that her choice exists in
theory but not in fact.  We do not agree, however,
that the trimester approach is necessary to
accomplish this objective.  A framework of this
rigidity was unnecessary and in its later inter-
pretation sometimes contradicted the State's
permissible exercise of its powers.
  Though the woman has a right to choose to
terminate or continue her pregnancy before
viability, it does not at all follow that the State
is prohibited from taking steps to ensure that
this choice is thoughtful and informed.  Even in
the earliest stages of pregnancy, the State may
enact rules and regulations designed to encour-
age her to know that there are philosophic and
social arguments of great weight that can be
brought to bear in favor of continuing the preg-
nancy to full term and that there are procedures
and institutions to allow adoption of unwanted
children as well as a certain degree of state
assistance if the mother chooses to raise the
child herself.   `[T]he Constitution does not
forbid a State or city, pursuant to democratic
processes, from expressing a preference for
normal childbirth.'  Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services, 492 U. S., at 511 (opinion of the
Court) (quoting Poelker v. Doe, 432 U. S. 519, 521
(1977)).  It follows that States are free to enact
laws to provide a reasonable framework for a
woman to make a decision that has such profound
and lasting meaning.  This, too, we find consistent
with Roe's central premises, and indeed the inevi-
table consequence of our holding that the State
has an interest in protecting the life of the
unborn.
  We reject the trimester framework, which we do
not consider to be part of the essential holding
of Roe.  See  Webster v. Reproductive Health Ser-
vices, supra, at 518 (opinion of Rehnquist, C. J.);
id., at 529 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment) (describing the trimester
framework as  problematic).  Measures aimed at
ensuring that a woman's choice contemplates the
consequences for the fetus do not necessarily
interfere with the right recognized in Roe, al-
though those measures have been found to be
inconsistent with the rigid trimester framework
announced in that case.  A logical reading of the
central holding in Roe itself, and a necessary
reconciliation of the liberty of the woman and the
interest of the State in promoting prenatal life,
require, in our view, that we abandon the trimes-
ter framework as a rigid prohibition on all previa-
bility regulation aimed at the protection of fetal
life.  The trimester framework suffers from these
basic flaws: in its formulation it misconceives the
nature of the pregnant woman's interest; and in
practice it undervalues the State's interest in
potential life, as recognized in Roe.  As our
jurisprudence relating to all liberties save
perhaps abortion has recognized, not every law
which makes a right more difficult to exercise is,
ipso facto, an infringement of that right.  An
example clarifies the point.  We have held that not
every ballot access limitation amounts to an
infringement of the right to vote.  Rather, the
States are granted substantial flexibility in
establishing the framework within which voters
choose the candidates for whom they wish to vote.
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U. S. 780, 788 (1983);
Norman v. Reed, 502 U. S. ___ (1992).
  The abortion right is similar.  Numerous forms of
state regulation might have the incidental effect
of increasing the cost or decreasing the avail-
ability of medical care, whether for abortion or
any other medical procedure.  The fact that a law
which serves a valid purpose, one not designed to
strike at the right itself, has the incidental
effect of making it more difficult or more expen-
sive to procure an abortion cannot be enough to
invalidate it.  Only where state regulation impos-
es an undue burden on a woman's ability to make
this decision does the power of the State reach
into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause.  See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497
U. S. 417, 458-459 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment in part); Ohio v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U. S.
502, --- (1990) (Akron II) (opinion of Kennedy, J.)
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, supra, at
530 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in judgment); Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U. S., at 828
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); Simopoulos v. Virginia,
462 U. S. 506, 520 (1983) (O'Connor, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment); Planned Par-
enthood Assn. of Kansas City v. Ashcroft, 462 U. S.
476, 505 (1983) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part); Akron I, 462
U. S., at 464 (O'Connor, J., joined by White and
Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting); Bellotti v. Baird, 428
U. S. 132, 147 (1976) (Bellotti I).
  For the most part, the Court's early abortion
cases adhered to this view.  In Maher v. Roe, 432
U. S. 464, 473-474 (1977), the Court explained:
 Roe did not declare an unqualified `constitution-
al right to an abortion,' as the District Court
seemed to think.  Rather, the right protects the
woman from unduly burdensome interference with
her freedom to decide whether to terminate her
pregnancy.  See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179,
198 (1973) ( [T]he interposition of the hospital
abortion committee is unduly restrictive of the
patient's rights); Bellotti I, supra, at 147 (State
may not  impose undue burdens upon a minor
capable of giving an informed consent); Harris v.
McRae, 448 U. S. 297, 314 (1980) (citing Maher,
supra).  Cf. Carey v. Population Services Interna-
tional, 431 U. S., at 688 ( [T]he same test must be
applied to state regulations that burden an
individual's right to decide to prevent conception
or terminate pregnancy by substantially limiting
access to the means of effectuating that decision
as is applied to state statutes that prohibit the
decision entirely).
  These considerations of the nature of the
abortion right illustrate that it is an overstate-
ment to describe it as a right to decide whether
to have an abortion  without interference from
the State, Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v.
Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 61 (1976).  All abortion
regulations interfere to some degree with a
woman's ability to decide whether to terminate her
pregnancy.  It is, as a consequence, not surprising
that despite the protestations contained in the
original Roe opinion to the effect that the Court
was not recognizing an absolute right, 410 U. S., at
154-155, the Court's experience applying the
trimester framework has led to the striking down
of some abortion regulations which in no real
sense deprived women of the ultimate decision.
Those decisions went too far because the right
recognized by Roe is a right  to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters
so fundamentally affecting a person as the deci-
sion whether to bear or beget a child.  Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U. S., at 453.  Not all governmental
intrusion is of necessity unwarranted; and that
brings us to the other basic flaw in the trimester
framework: even in Roe's terms, in practice it
undervalues the State's interest in the potential
life within the woman.
  Roe v. Wade was express in its recognition of the
State's  important and legitimate interest[s] in
preserving and protecting the health of the
pregnant woman [and] in protecting the potentiali-
ty of human life.  410 U. S., at 162.  The trimester
framework, however, does not fulfill Roe's own
promise that the State has an interest in pro-
tecting fetal life or potential life.  Roe began the
contradiction by using the trimester framework to
forbid any regulation of abortion designed to
advance that interest before viability.  Id., at
163.  Before viability, Roe and subsequent cases
treat all governmental attempts to influence a
woman's decision on behalf of the potential life
within her as unwarranted.  This treatment is, in
our judgment, incompatible with the recognition
that there is a substantial state interest in
potential life throughout pregnancy.  Cf. Webster,
492 U. S., at 519 (opinion of Rehnquist, C. J.); Akron
I, supra, at 461 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
  The very notion that the State has a substan-
tial interest in potential life leads to the con-
clusion that not all regulations must be deemed
unwarranted.  Not all burdens on the right to
decide whether to terminate a pregnancy will be
undue.  In our view, the undue burden standard is
the appropriate means of reconciling the State's
interest with the woman's constitutionally pro-
tected liberty.
  The concept of an undue burden has been utilized
by the Court as well as individual members of the
Court, including two of us, in ways that could be
considered inconsistent.  See, e.g., Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 497 U. S., at --- (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in judgment); Akron II,
497 U. S., at --- (opinion of Kennedy, J.); Thorn-
burgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, 476 U. S., at 828-829 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); Akron I, supra, at 461-466 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting); Harris v. McRae, supra, at 314;
Maher v. Roe, supra, at 473; Beal v. Doe, 432 U. S.
438, 446 (1977); Bellotti I, supra, at 147.  Because
we set forth a standard of general application to
which we intend to adhere, it is important to
clarify what is meant by an undue burden.
  A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for
the conclusion that a state regulation has the
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obsta-
cle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of
a nonviable fetus.  A statute with this purpose is
invalid because the means chosen by the State to
further the interest in potential life must be
calculated to inform the woman's free choice, not
hinder it.  And a statute which, while furthering
the interest in potential life or some other valid
state interest, has the effect of placing a sub-
stantial obstacle in the path of a woman's choice
cannot be considered a permissible means of
serving its legitimate ends.  To the extent that
the opinions of the Court or of individual Justic-
es use the undue burden standard in a manner that
is inconsistent with this analysis, we set out
what in our view should be the controlling stan-
dard.  Cf. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S. ---, ---
(1991) (slip op., at 20) (attempting to  define the
doctrine of abuse of the writ with more precision
after acknowledging tension among earlier cases).
In our considered judgment, an undue burden is an
unconstitutional burden.  See Akron II, supra, at
--- (opinion of Kennedy, J.).  Understood another
way, we answer the question, left open in previous
opinions discussing the undue burden formulation,
whether a law designed to further the State's
interest in fetal life which imposes an undue
burden on the woman's decision before fetal
viability could be constitutional.  See, e.g., Akron
I, supra, at 462-463 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).  The
answer is no.
  Some guiding principles should emerge.  What is
at stake is the woman's right to make the ultimate
decision, not a right to be insulated from all
others in doing so.  Regulations which do no more
than create a structural mechanism by which the
State, or the parent or guardian of a minor, may
express profound respect for the life of the
unborn are permitted, if they are not a substan-
tial obstacle to the woman's exercise of the right
to choose.  See infra, at ___-___ (addressing
Pennsylvania's parental consent requirement).
Unless it has that effect on her right of choice,
a state measure designed to persuade her to
choose childbirth over abortion will be upheld if
reasonably related to that goal.  Regulations
designed to foster the health of a woman seeking
an abortion are valid if they do not constitute an
undue burden.
  Even when jurists reason from shared premises,
some disagreement is inevitable.  Compare Hodgs-
on, 497 U. S., at ------- (opinion of Kennedy, J.)
with id., at ------- (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment in part).  That is
to be expected in the application of any legal
standard which must accommodate life's complexi-
ty.  We do not expect it to be otherwise with
respect to the undue burden standard.  We give
this summary:
  (a) To protect the central right recognized by
Roe v. Wade while at the same time accommodating
the State's profound interest in potential life, we
will employ the undue burden analysis as explained
in this opinion.  An undue burden exists, and
therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its
purpose or effect is to place a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abor-
tion before the fetus attains viability.
  (b) We reject the rigid trimester framework of
Roe v. Wade.  To promote the State's profound
interest in potential life, throughout pregnancy
the State may take measures to ensure that the
woman's choice is informed, and measures designed
to advance this interest will not be invalidated
as long as their purpose is to persuade the woman
to choose childbirth over abortion.  These mea-
sures must not be an undue burden on the right.
  (c) As with any medical procedure, the State may
enact regulations to further the health or safety
of a woman seeking an abortion.  Unnecessary
health regulations that have the purpose or
effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a
woman seeking an abortion impose an undue burden
on the right.
  (d) Our adoption of the undue burden analysis
does not disturb the central holding of Roe v.
Wade, and we reaffirm that holding.  Regardless of
whether exceptions are made for particular
circumstances, a State may not prohibit any woman
from making the ultimate decision to terminate her
pregnancy before viability.
  (e) We also reaffirm Roe's holding that  subse-
quent to viability, the State in promoting its
interest in the potentiality of human life may, if
it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion
except where it is necessary, in appropriate
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life
or health of the mother.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at
164-165.
  These principles control our assessment of the
Pennsylvania statute, and we now turn to the
issue of the validity of its challenged provisions.
                       V
  The Court of Appeals applied what it believed to
be the undue burden standard and upheld each of
the provisions except for the husband notifica-
tion requirement.  We agree generally with this
conclusion, but refine the undue burden analysis
in accordance with the principles articulated
above.  We now consider the separate statutory
sections at issue.
                       A
  Because it is central to the operation of vari-
ous other requirements, we begin with the statut-
e's definition of medical emergency.  Under the
statute, a medical emergency is
 [t]hat condition which, on the basis of the
physician's good faith clinical judgment, so
complicates the medical condition of a preg-
nant woman as to necessitate the immediate
abortion of her pregnancy to avert her death
or for which a delay will create serious risk
of substantial and irreversible impairment of
a major bodily function.  18 Pa. Cons. Stat.
(1990).  3203.
Petitioners argue that the definition is too
narrow, contending that it forecloses the possi-
bility of an immediate abortion despite some
significant health risks.  If the contention were
correct, we would be required to invalidate the
restrictive operation of the provision, for the
essential holding of Roe forbids a State from
interfering with a woman's choice to undergo an
abortion procedure if continuing her pregnancy
would constitute a threat to her health.  410 U. S.,
at 164.  See also Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S., at 316.
  The District Court found that there were three
serious conditions which would not be covered by
the statute: preeclampsia, inevitable abortion,
and premature ruptured membrane.  744 F. Supp., at
1378.  Yet, as the Court of Appeals observed, 947
F. 2d, at 700-701, it is undisputed that under some
circumstances each of these conditions could lead
to an illness with substantial and irreversible
consequences.  While the definition could be
interpreted in an unconstitutional manner, the
Court of Appeals construed the phrase  serious
risk to include those circumstances.  Id., at 701.
It stated:  we read the medical emergency excep-
tion as intended by the Pennsylvania legislature
to assure that compliance with its abortion
regulations would not in any way pose a signifi-
cant threat to the life or health of a woman.
Ibid.  As we said in Brockett v. Spokane Arcades,
Inc., 472 U. S. 491, 499-500 (1985):  Normally, . . .
we defer to the construction of a state statute
given it by the lower federal courts.  Indeed, we
have said that we will defer to lower court inter-
pretations of state law unless they amount to
 plain error.  Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U. S. 109, 118
(1943).  This  `reflect[s] our belief that district
courts and courts of appeals are better schooled
in and more able to interpret the laws of their
respective States.'  Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U. S.
474, 482 (1988) (citation omitted).  We adhere to
that course today, and conclude that, as con-
strued by the Court of Appeals, the medical
emergency definition imposes no undue burden on
a woman's abortion right.
                       B
  We next consider the informed consent require-
ment.  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 3205.  Except in a
medical emergency, the statute requires that at
least 24 hours before performing an abortion a
physician inform the woman of the nature of the
procedure, the health risks of the abortion and of
childbirth, and the  probable gestational age of
the unborn child.  The physician or a qualified
nonphysician must inform the woman of the avail-
ability of printed materials published by the
State describing the fetus and providing informa-
tion about medical assistance for childbirth,
information about child support from the father,
and a list of agencies which provide adoption and
other services as alternatives to abortion.  An
abortion may not be performed unless the woman
certifies in writing that she has been informed of
the availability of these printed materials and
has been provided them if she chooses to view
them.
  Our prior decisions establish that as with any
medical procedure, the State may require a woman
to give her written informed consent to an abor-
tion.  See Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v.
Danforth, 428 U. S., at 67.  In this respect, the
statute is unexceptional.  Petitioners challenge
the statute's definition of informed consent
because it includes the provision of specific
information by the doctor and the mandatory
24-hour waiting period.  The conclusions reached
by a majority of the Justices in the separate
opinions filed today and the undue burden stan-
dard adopted in this opinion require us to over-
rule in part some of the Court's past decisions,
decisions driven by the trimester framework's
prohibition of all previability regulations de-
signed to further the State's interest in fetal
life.
  In Akron I, 462 U. S. 416 (1983), we invalidated an
ordinance which required that a woman seeking an
abortion be provided by her physician with specif-
ic information  designed to influence the woman's
informed choice between abortion or childbirth.
Id., at 444.  As we later described the Akron I
holding in Thornburgh v. American College of Obste-
tricians and Gynecologists, 476 U. S., at 762, there
were two purported flaws in the Akron ordinance:
the information was designed to dissuade the
woman from having an abortion and the ordinance
imposed  a rigid requirement that a specific body
of information be givenin all cases, irrespective
of the particular needs of the patient . . . .  Ibid.
    To the extent Akron I and Thornburgh find a
constitutional violation when the government
requires, as it does here, the giving of truthful,
nonmisleading information about the nature of the
procedure, the attendant health risks and those
of childbirth, and the  probable gestational age
of the fetus, those cases go too far, are incon-
sistent with Roe's acknowledgment of an important
interest in potential life, and are overruled.
This is clear even on the very terms of Akron I
and Thornburgh.  Those decisions, along with
Danforth, recognize a substantial government
interest justifying a requirement that a woman be
apprised of the health risks of abortion and childbirth.
E.g., Danforth, supra, at 66-67.  It cannot be
questioned that psychological well-being is a
facet of health.  Nor can it be doubted that most
women considering an abortion would deem the
impact on the fetus relevant, if not dispositive,
to the decision.  In attempting to ensure that a
woman apprehend the full consequences of her
decision, the State furthers the legitimate
purpose of reducing the risk that a woman may
elect an abortion, only to discover later, with
devastating psychological consequences, that her
decision was not fully informed.  If the informa-
tion the State requires to be made available to
the woman is truthful and not misleading, the
requirement may be permissible.
  We also see no reason why the State may not
require doctors to inform a woman seeking an
abortion of the availability of materials relating
to the consequences to the fetus, even when
those consequences have no direct relation to
her health.  An example illustrates the point.  We
would think it constitutional for the State to
require that in order for there to be informed
consent to a kidney transplant operation the
recipient must be supplied with information about
risks to the donor as well as risks to himself or
herself.  A requirement that the physician make
available information similar to that mandated by
the statute here was described in Thornburgh as
 an outright attempt to wedge the Commonwealth's
message discouraging abortion into the privacy of
the informed-consent dialogue between the woman
and her physician.  476 U. S., at 762.  We conclude,
however, that informed choice need not be defined
in such narrow terms that all considerations of
the effect on the fetus are made irrelevant.  As
we have made clear, we depart from the holdings of
Akron I and Thornburgh to the extent that we
permit a State to further its legitimate goal of
protecting the life of the unborn by enacting
legislation aimed at ensuring a decision that is
mature and informed, even when in so doing the
State expresses a preference for childbirth over
abortion.  In short, requiring that the woman be
informed of the availability of information relat-
ing to fetal development and the assistance
available should she decide to carry the pregnan-
cy to full term is a reasonable measure to insure
an informed choice, one which might cause the
woman to choose childbirth over abortion.  This
requirement cannot be considered a substantial
obstacle to obtaining an abortion, and, it follows,
there is no undue burden.
  Our prior cases also suggest that the  strait-
jacket,  Thornburgh, supra, at 762 (quoting Danfo-
rth, supra, at 67, n. 8), of particular information
which must be given in each case interferes with
a constitutional right of privacy between a
pregnant woman and her physician.  As a prelimi-
nary matter, it is worth noting that the statute
now before us does not require a physician to
comply with the informed consent provisions  if he
or she can demonstrate by a preponderance of the
evidence, that he or she reasonably believed that
furnishing the information would have resulted in
a severely adverse effect on the physical or
mental health of the patient.  18 Pa. Cons. Stat.
3205 (1990).  In this respect, the statute does
not prevent the physician from exercising his or
her medical judgment.
  Whatever constitutional status the doctor-
patient relation may have as a general matter, in
the present context it is derivative of the
woman's position.  The doctor-patient relation
does not underlie or override the two more gener-
al rights under which the abortion right is justi-
fied: the right to make family decisions and the
right to physical autonomy.  On its own, the
doctor-patient relation here is entitled to the
same solicitude it receives in other contexts.
Thus, a requirement that a doctor give a woman
certain information as part of obtaining her
consent to an abortion is, for constitutional
purposes, no different from a requirement that a
doctor give certain specific information about
any medical procedure.
  All that is left of petitioners' argument is an
asserted First Amendment right of a physician not
to provide information about the risks of abor-
tion, and childbirth, in a manner mandated by the
State.  To be sure, the physician's First Amend-
ment rights not to speak are implicated, see
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705 (1977), but only as
part of the practice of medicine, subject to
reasonable licensing and regulation by the State.
Cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U. S. 589, 603 (1977).  We see
no constitutional infirmity in the requirement
that the physician provide the information man-
dated by the State here.
  The Pennsylvania statute also requires us to
reconsider the holding in Akron I that the State
may not require that a physician, as opposed to a
qualified assistant, provide information relevant
to a woman's informed consent.  462 U. S., at 448.
Since there is no evidence on this record that
requiring a doctor to give the information as
provided by the statute would amount in practical
terms to a substantial obstacle to a woman
seeking an abortion, we conclude that it is not an
undue burden.  Our cases reflect the fact that the
Constitution gives the States broad latitude to
decide that particular functions may be performed
only by licensed professionals, even if an objec-
tive assessment might suggest that those same
tasks could be performed by others.  See William-
son v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U. S. 483
(1955).  Thus, we uphold the provision as a reason-
able means to insure that the woman's consent is
informed.
  Our analysis of Pennsylvania's 24-hour waiting
period between the provision of the information
deemed necessary to informed consent and the
performance of an abortion under the undue
burden standard requires us to reconsider the
premise behind the decision in Akron I invalidating
a parallel requirement.  In Akron I we said:  Nor
are we convinced that the State's legitimate
concern that the woman's decision be informed is
reasonably served by requiring a 24-hour delay
as a matter of course.  462 U. S., at 450.  We
consider that conclusion to be wrong.  The idea
that important decisions will be more informed and
deliberate if they follow some period of reflec-
tion does not strike us as unreasonable, particu-
larly where the statute directs that important
information become part of the background of the
decision.  The statute, as construed by the Court
of Appeals, permits avoidance of the waiting
period in the event of a medical emergency and the
record evidence shows that in the vast majority
of cases, a 24-hour delay does not create any
appreciable health risk.  In theory, at least, the
waiting period is a reasonable measure to imple-
ment the State's interest in protecting the life of
the unborn, a measure that does not amount to an
undue burden.
    Whether the mandatory 24-hour waiting period is
nonetheless invalid because in practice it is a
substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to
terminate her pregnancy is a closer question.  The
findings of fact by the District Court indicate
that because of the distances many women must
travel to reach an abortion provider, the practi-
cal effect will often be a delay of much more than
a day because the waiting period requires that a
woman seeking an abortion make at least two
visits to the doctor.  The District Court also
found that in many instances this will increase
the exposure of women seeking abortions to  the
harassment and hostility of anti-abortion pro-
testors demonstrating outside a clinic.  744 F.
Supp., at 1351.  As a result, the District Court
found that for those women who have the fewest
financial resources, those who must travel long
distances, and those who have difficulty explain-
ing their whereabouts to husbands, employers, or
others, the 24-hour waiting period will be  par-
ticularly burdensome.  Id., at 1352.
  These findings are troubling in some respects,
but they do not demonstrate that the waiting
period constitutes an undue burden.  We do not
doubt that, as the District Court held, the waiting
period has the effect of  increasing the cost and
risk of delay of abortions, id., at 1378, but the
District Court did not conclude that the increa-
sed costs and potential delays amount to sub-
stantial obstacles.  Rather, applying the trimes-
ter framework's strict prohibition of all regula-
tion designed to promote the State's interest in
potential life before viability, see id., at 1374,
the District Court concluded that the waiting
period does not further the state  interest in
maternal health and  infringes the physician's
discretion to exercise sound medical judgment.
Id., at 1378.  Yet, as we have stated, under the
undue burden standard a State is permitted to
enact persuasive measures which favor childbirth
over abortion, even if those measures do not
further a health interest.  And while the waiting
period does limit a physician's discretion, that is
not, standing alone, a reason to invalidate it.  In
light of the construction given the statute's
definition of medical emergency by the Court of
Appeals, and the District Court's findings, we
cannot say that the waiting period imposes a real
health risk.
  We also disagree with the District Court's
conclusion that the  particularly burdensome
effects of the waiting period on some women
require its invalidation.  A particular burden is
not of necessity a substantial obstacle.  Whether
a burden falls on a particular group is a distinct
inquiry from whether it is a substantial obstacle
even as to the women in that group.  And the
District Court did not conclude that the waiting
period is such an obstacle even for the women who
are most burdened by it.  Hence, on the record
before us, and in the context of this facial
challenge, we are not convinced that the 24-hour
waiting period constitutes an undue burden.
  We are left with the argument that the various
aspects of the informed consent requirement are
unconstitutional because they place barriers in
the way of abortion on demand.  Even the broadest
reading of Roe, however, has not suggested that
there is a constitutional right to abortion on
demand.  See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S., at 189.
Rather, the right protected by Roe is a right to
decide to terminate a pregnancy free of undue
interference by the State.  Because the informed
consent requirement facilitates the wise exercise
of that right it cannot be classified as an inter-
ference with the right Roe protects.  The informed
consent requirement is not an undue burden on
that right.            C
      Section 3209 of Pennsylvania's abortion law
provides, except in cases of medical emergency,
that no physician shall perform an abortion on a
married woman without receiving a signed state-
ment from the woman that she has notified her
spouse that she is about to undergo an abortion.
The woman has the option of providing an alterna-
tive signed statement certifying that her husband
is not the man who impregnated her; that her
husband could not be located; that the pregnancy
is the result of spousal sexual assault which she
has reported; or that the woman believes that
notifying her husband will cause him or someone
else to inflict bodily injury upon her.  A physician
who performs an abortion on a married woman
without receiving the appropriate signed state-
ment will have his or her license revoked, and is
liable to the husband for damages.
  The District Court heard the testimony of
numerous expert witnesses, and made detailed
findings of fact regarding the effect of this
statute.  These included:
      273.  The vast majority of women consult
their husbands prior to deciding to terminate
their pregnancy. . . .
        .      .      .       .      .

  ``279.  The `bodily injury' exception could not
be invoked by a married woman whose husband,
if notified, would, in her reasonable belief,
threaten to (a) publicize her intent to have an
abortion to family, friends or acquaintances;
(b) retaliate against her in future child cus-
tody or divorce proceedings; (c) inflict psy-
chological intimidation or emotional harm upon
her, her children or other persons; (d) inflict
bodily harm on other persons such as children,
family members or other loved ones; or (e) use
his control over financesto deprive of necessary
monies for herself or herchildren. . . .
        .      .      .       .      .

  ``281.  Studies reveal that family violence
occurs in two million families in the United
States.  This figure, however, is a conserva-
tive one that substantially understates
(because battering is usually not reported
until it reaches life-threatening proportions)
the actual number of families affected by
domestic violence.  In fact, researchers
estimate that one of every two women will be
battered at some time in their life. . . .

  ``282.  A wife may not elect to notify her
husband of her intention to have an abortion
for a variety of reasons, including the husba-
nd's illness, concernabout her own health,
the imminent failure of the marriage, or the
husband's absolute opposition to the abortion. . . .

  ``283.  The required filing of the spousal
consent form would require plaintiff-clinics
to change their counseling procedures and
force women to reveal their most intimate
decision-making on pain of criminal sanctions.
The confidentiality of these revelations could
not be guaranteed, since the woman's records
are not immune from subpoena. . . .

  ``284.  Women of all class levels, educational
backgrounds, and racial, ethnic and religious
groups are battered. . . .

  ``285.  Wife-battering or abuse can take on
many physical and psychological forms.  The
nature and scope of the battering can cover a
broad range of actions and be gruesome and
torturous. . . .

  ``286.  Married women, victims of battering,
have been killed in Pennsylvania and through-
out the United States. . . .

  ``287.  Battering can often involve a sub-
stantial amount of sexual abuse, including
marital rape and sexual mutilation. . . .

  ``288.  In a domestic abuse situation, it is
common for the battering husband to also
abuse the children in an attempt to coerce the
wife. . . .

  ``289.  Mere notification of pregnancy is
frequently a flashpoint for battering and
violence within the family.  The number of
battering incidents is high during the preg-
nancy and often the worst abuse can be asso-
ciated with pregnancy. . . .  The battering
husband may deny parentage and use the preg-
nancy as an excuse for abuse. . . .

  ``290.  Secrecy typically shrouds abusive
families.  Family members are instructed not
to tell anyone, especially police or doctors,
about the abuse and violence.  Battering
husbands often threaten their wives or her
children with further abuse if she tells an
outsider of the violence and tells her that
nobody will believe her.  A battered woman,
therefore, is highly unlikely to disclose the
violence against her for fear of retaliation
by the abuser. . . .

  ``291.  Even when confronted directly by
medical personnel or other helping profes-
sionals, battered women often will not admit
to the battering because they have not admit-
ted to themselves that they are battered. . . .

        .      .      .       .      .
  ``294.  A woman in a shelter or a safe house
unknown to her husband is not `reasonably
likely' to have bodily harm inflicted upon her
by her batterer, however her attempt to
notify her husband pursuant to section 3209
could accidentally disclose her whereabouts
to her husband.  Her fear of future ramifica-
tions would be realistic under the circum-
stances.

  ``295.  Marital rape is rarely discussed with
others or reported to law enforcement au-
thorities, and of those reported only few are
prosecuted. . . .

  ``296.  It is common for battered women to
have sexual intercourse with their husbands
to avoid being battered.  While this type of
coercive sexual activity would be spousal
sexual assault as defined by the Act, many
women may not consider it to be so and others
would fear disbelief. . . .

  ``297.  The marital rape exception to section
3209 cannot be claimed by women who are
victims of coercive sexual behavior other
than penetration.  The 90-day reporting
requirement of the spousal sexual assault
statute, 18 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. 3218(c), fur-
ther narrows the class of sexually abused
wives who can claim the exception, since many
of these women may be psychologically unable
to discuss or report the rape for several
years after the incident. . . .

  ``298.  Because of the nature of the batter-
ing relationship, battered women are unlikely
to avail themselves of the exceptions to
section 3209 of the Act, regardless of wheth-
er the section applies to them.''  744 F. Supp.,
at 1360-1362.

  These findings are supported by studies of
domestic violence.  The American Medical Associa-
tion (AMA) has published a summary of the recent
research in this field, which indicates that in an
average 12-month period in this country, approxi-
mately two million women are the victims of severe
assaults by their male partners.  In a 1985 sur-
vey, women reported that nearly one of every
eight husbands had assaulted their wives during
the past year.  The AMA views these figures as
 marked underestimates, because the nature of
these incidents discourages women from reporting
them, and because surveys typically exclude the
very poor, those who do not speak English well,
and women who are homeless or in institutions or
hospitals when the survey is conducted.  Accord-
ing to the AMA,  [r]esearchers on family violence
agree that the true incidence of partner violence
is probably double the above estimates; or four
million severely assaulted women per year.
Studies suggest that from one-fifth to one-third
of all women will be physically assaulted by a
partner or ex-partner during their lifetime.  AMA
Council on Scientific Affairs, Violence Against
Women 7 (1991) (emphasis in original).  Thus on an
average day in the United States, nearly 11,000
women are severely assaulted by their male
partners.  Many of these incidents involve sexual
assault.  Id., at 3-4; Shields & Hanneke, Battered
Wives' Reactions to Marital Rape, in The Dark Side
of Families: Current Family Violence Research 131,
144 (D. Finkelhor, R. Gelles, G. Hataling, & M. Straus
eds. 1983).  In families where wife-beating takes
place, moreover, child abuse is often present as
well.  Violence Against Women, supra, at 12.
  Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling
picture.  Physical violence is only the most
visible form of abuse. Psychological abuse, par-
ticularly forced social and economic isolation of
women, is also common.  L. Walker, The Battered
Woman Syndrome 27-28 (1984).  Many victims of
domestic violence remain with their abusers,
perhaps because they perceive no superior alter-
native.  Herbert, Silver, & Ellard, Coping with an
Abusive Relationship: I. How and Why do Women
Stay?, 53 J. Marriage & the Family 311 (1991).  Many
abused women who find temporary refuge in shel-
ters return to their husbands, in large part
because they have no other source of income.
Aguirre, Why Do They Return? Abused Wives in
Shelters, 30 J. Nat. Assn. of Social Workers 350,
352 (1985).  Returning to one's abuser can be
dangerous.  Recent Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion statistics disclose that 8.8% of all homicide
victims in the United States are killed by their
spouse.  Mercy & Saltzman, Fatal Violence Among
Spouses in the United States, 1976-85, 79 Am. J.
Public Health 595 (1989).  Thirty percent of female
homicide victims are killed by their male partners.
Domestic Violence: Terrorism in the Home, Hearing
before the Subcommittee on Children, Family,
Drugs and Alcoholism of the Senate Committee on
Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.,
3 (1990).
  The limited research that has been conducted
with respect to notifying one's husband about an
abortion, although involving samples too small to
be representative, also supports the District
Court's findings of fact.  The vast majority of
women notify their male partners of their decision
to obtain an abortion.  In many cases in which
married women do not notify their husbands, the
pregnancy is the result of an extramarital affair.
Where the husband is the father, the primary
reason women do not notify their husbands is that
the husband and wife are experiencing marital
difficulties, often accompanied by incidents of
violence.  Ryan & Plutzer, When Married Women Have
Abortions: Spousal Notification and Marital
Interaction, 51 J. Marriage & the Family 41, 44
(1989).
  This information and the District Court's find-
ings reinforce what common sense would suggest.
In well-functioning marriages, spouses discuss
important intimate decisions such as whether to
bear a child.  But there are millions of women in
this country who are the victims of regular
physical and psychological abuse at the hands of
their husbands.  Should these women become
pregnant, they may have very good reasons for
not wishing to inform their husbands of their
decision to obtain an abortion.  Many may have
justifiable fears of physical abuse, but may be no
less fearful of the consequences of reporting
prior abuse to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
Many may have a reasonable fear that notifying
their husbands will provoke further instances of
child abuse; these women are not exempt from
3209's notification requirement.  Many may fear
devastating forms of psychological abuse from
their husbands, including verbal harassment,
threats of future violence, the destruction of
possessions, physical confinement to the home,
the withdrawal of financial support, or the dis-
closure of the abortion to family and friends.
These methods of psychological abuse may act as
even more of a deterrent to notification than the
possibility of physical violence, but women who
are the victims of the abuse are not exempt from
3209's notification requirement.  And many women
who are pregnant as a result of sexual assaults
by their husbands will be unable to avail them-
selves of the exception for spousal sexual as-
sault, 3209(b)(3), because the exception requires
that the woman have notified law enforcement
authorities within 90 days of the assault, and her
husband will be notified of her report once an
investigation begins.  3128(c).  If anything in this
field is certain, it is that victims of spousal
sexual assault are extremely reluctant to report
the abuse to the government; hence, a great many
spousal rape victims will not be exempt from the
notification requirement imposed by 3209.
  The spousal notification requirement is thus
likely to prevent a significant number of women
from obtaining an abortion.  It does not merely
make abortions a little more difficult or expen-
sive to obtain; for many women, it will impose a
substantial obstacle.  We must not blind ourselves
to the fact that the significant number of women
who fear for their safety and the safety of their
children are likely to be deterred from procuring
an abortion as surely as if the Commonwealth had
outlawed abortion in all cases.
  Respondents attempt to avoid the conclusion
that 3209 is invalid by pointing out that it
imposes almost no burden at all for the vast
majority of women seeking abortions.  They begin
by noting that only about 20 percent of the women
who obtain abortions are married.  They then note
that of these women about 95 percent notify their
husbands of their own volition.  Thus, respondents
argue, the effects of 3209 are felt by only one
percent of the women who obtain abortions.
Respondents argue that since some of these women
will be able to notify their husbands without
adverse consequences or will qualify for one of
the exceptions, the statute affects fewer than
one percent of women seeking abortions.  For this
reason, it is asserted, the statute cannot be
invalid on its face.  See Brief for Respondents
83-86.  We disagree with respondents' basic
method of analysis.
  The analysis does not end with the one percent
of women upon whom the statute operates; it
begins there.  Legislation is measured for consis-
tency with the Constitution by its impact on those
whose conduct it affects.  For example, we would
not say that a law which requires a newspaper to
print a candidate's reply to an unfavorable
editorial is valid on its face because most news-
papers would adopt the policy even absent the law.
See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418
U. S. 241 (1974).  The proper focus of constitu-
tional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a
restriction, not the group for whom the law is
irrelevant.
  Respondents' argument itself gives implicit
recognition to this principle, at one of its criti-
cal points.  Respondents speak of the one percent
of women seeking abortions who are married and
would choose not to notify their husbands of
their plans.  By selecting as the controlling class
women who wish to obtain abortions, rather than
all women or all pregnant women, respondents in
effect concede that 3209 must be judged by
reference to those for whom it is an actual rather
than irrelevant restriction.  Of course, as we
have said, 3209's real target is narrower even
than the class of women seeking abortions identi-
fied by the State: it is married women seeking
abortions who do not wish to notify their hus-
bands of their intentions and who do not qualify
for one of the statutory exceptions to the notice
requirement.  The unfortunate yet persisting
conditions we document above will mean that in a
large fraction of the cases in which 3209 is
relevant, it will operate as a substantial obsta-
cle to a woman's choice to undergo an abortion.  It
is an undue burden, and therefore invalid.
     This conclusion is in no way inconsistent with
our decisions upholding parental notification or
consent requirements.  See, e.g., Akron II, 497
U. S., at ---; Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622 (1979)
(Bellotti II); Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v.
Danforth, 428 U. S., at 74.  Those enactments, and
our judgment that they are constitutional, are
based on the quite reasonable assumption that
minors will benefit from consultation with their
parents and that children will often not realize
that their parents have their best interests at
heart.  We cannot adopt a parallel assumption
about adult women.
  We recognize that a husband has a  deep and
proper concern and interest . . . in his wife's
pregnancy and in the growth and development of
the fetus she is carrying. Danforth, supra, at 69.
With regard to the children he has fathered and
raised, the Court has recognized his  cognizable
and substantial interest in their custody.
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 651-652 (1972);
see also Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U. S. 246 (1978);
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U. S. 380 (1979); Lehr v.
Robertson, 463 U. S. 248 (1983).  If this case con-
cerned a State's ability to require the mother to
notify the father before taking some action with
respect to a living child raised by both, there-
fore, it would be reasonable to conclude as a
general matter that the father's interest in the
welfare of the child and the mother's interest are
equal.
  Before birth, however, the issue takes on a very
different cast.  It is an inescapable biological
fact that state regulation with respect to the
child a woman is carrying will have a far greater
impact on the mother's liberty than on the father-
's.  The effect of state regulation on a woman's
protected liberty is doubly deserving of scrutiny
in such a case, as the State has touched not only
upon the private sphere of the family but upon the
very bodily integrity of the pregnant woman.  Cf.
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497
U. S., at 281.  The Court has held that  when the
wife and the husband disagree on this decision,
the view of only one of the two marriage partners
can prevail.  Inasmuch as it is the woman who
physically bears the child and who is the more
directly and immediately affected by the pregnan-
cy, as between the two, the balance weighs in her
favor.  Danforth, supra, at 71.  This conclusion
rests upon the basic nature of marriage and the
nature of our Constitution:   [T]he marital couple
is not an independent entity with a mind and heart
of its own, but an association of two individuals
each with a separate intellectual and emotional
makeup.  If the right of privacy means anything, it
is the right of the individual, married or single,
to be free from unwarranted governmental intru-
sion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget
a child.  Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S., at 453
(emphasis in original).  The Constitution protects
individuals, men and women alike, from unjustified
state interference, even when that interference
is enacted into law for the benefit of their
spouses.
  There was a time, not so long ago, when a differ-
ent understanding of the family and of the Consti-
tution prevailed.  In Bradwell v. Illinois, 16 Wall.
130 (1873), three Members of this Court reaffirmed
the common-law principle that  a woman had no
legal existence separate from her husband, who
was regarded as her head and representative in
the social state; and, notwithstanding some
recent modifications of this civil status, many of
the special rules of law flowing from and depen-
dent upon this cardinal principle still exist in full
force in most States.  Id., at 141 (Bradley J.,
joined by Swayne and Field, JJ., concurring in
judgment).  Only one generation has passed since
this Court observed that  woman is still regarded
as the center of home and family life, with
attendant  special responsibilities that pre-
cluded full and independent legal status under the
Constitution.  Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U. S. 57, 62
(1961).  These views, of course, are no longer
consistent with our understanding of the family,
the individual, or the Constitution.
  In keeping with our rejection of the common-law
understanding of a woman's role within the family,
the Court held in Danforth that the Constitution
does not permit a State to require a married
woman to obtain her husband's consent before
undergoing an abortion.  428 U. S., at 69.  The
principles that guided the Court in Danforth
should be our guides today.  For the great many
women who are victims of abuse inflicted by their
husbands, or whose children are the victims of
such abuse, a spousal notice requirement enables
the husband to wield an effective veto over his
wife's decision.  Whether the prospect of notifica-
tion itself deters such women from seeking abor-
tions, or whether the husband, through physical
force or psychological pressure or economic
coercion, prevents his wife from obtaining an
abortion until it is too late, the notice require-
ment will often be tantamount to the veto found
unconstitutional in Danforth.  The women most
affected by this law"those who most reasonably
fear the consequences of notifying their husbands
that they are pregnant"are in the gravest danger.
  The husband's interest in the life of the child
his wife is carrying does not permit the State to
empower him with this troubling degree of authori-
ty over his wife.  The contrary view leads to
consequences reminiscent of the common law.  A
husband has no enforceable right to require a
wife to advise him before she exercises her
personal choices.  If a husband's interest in the
potential life of the child outweighs a wife's
liberty, the State could require a married woman
to notify her husband before she uses a postfer-
tilization contraceptive.  Perhaps next in line
would be a statute requiring pregnant married
women to notify their husbands before engaging in
conduct causing risks to the fetus.  After all, if
the husband's interest in the fetus' safety is a
sufficient predicate for state regulation, the
State could reasonably conclude that pregnant
wives should notify their husbands before drink-
ing alcohol or smoking.  Perhaps married women
should notify their husbands before using contra-
ceptives or before undergoing any type of sur-
gery that may have complications affecting the
husband's interest in his wife's reproductive
organs.  And if a husband's interest justifies
notice in any of these cases, one might reason-
ably argue that it justifies exactly what the
Danforth Court held it did not justify"a require-
ment of the husband's consent as well.  A State
may not give to a man the kind of dominion over his
wife that parents exercise over their children.
  Section 3209 embodies a view of marriage conso-
nant with the common-law status of married women
but repugnant to our present understanding of
marriage and of the nature of the rights secured
by the Constitution.  Women do not lose their
constitutionally protected liberty when they
marry.  The Constitution protects all individuals,
male or female, married or unmarried, from the
abuse of governmental power, even where that
power is employed for the supposed benefit of a
member of the individual's family.  These consider-
ations confirm our conclusion that 3209 is
invalid.
                       D
  We next consider the parental consent provision.
Except in a medical emergency, an unemancipated
young woman under 18 may not obtain an abortion
unless she and one of her parents (or guardian)
provides informed consent as defined above.  If
neither a parent nor a guardian provides consent,
a court may authorize the performance of an
abortion upon a determination that the young
woman is mature and capable of giving informed
consent and has in fact given her informed con-
sent, or that an abortion would be in her best
interests.
  We have been over most of this ground before.
Our cases establish, and we reaffirm today, that
a State may require a minor seeking an abortion to
obtain the consent of a parent or guardian,
provided that there is an adequate judicial
bypass procedure.  See, e.g., Akron II, 497 U. S.,
at ---; Hodgson, 497 U. S., at ---; Akron I, supra,
at 440; Bellotti II, supra, at 643-644 (plurality
opinion).  Under these precedents, in our view, the
one-parent consent requirement and judicial
bypass procedure are constitutional.
  The only argument made by petitioners respect-
ing this provision and to which our prior decisions
do not speak is the contention that the parental
consent requirement is invalid because it re-
quires informed parental consent.  For the most
part, petitioners' argument is a reprise of their
argument with respect to the informed consent
requirement in general, and we reject it for the
reasons given above.  Indeed, some of the provi-
sions regarding informed consent have particular
force with respect to minors: the waiting period,
for example, may provide the parent or parents of
a pregnant young woman the opportunity to con-
sult with her in private, and to discuss the
consequences of her decision in the context of
the values and moral or religious principles of
their family.  See Hodgson, supra, at ---.
                       E
   Under the recordkeeping and reporting require-
ments of the statute, every facility which per-
forms abortions is required to file a report
stating its name and address as well as the name
and address of any related entity, such as a
controlling or subsidiary organization.  In the
case of state-funded institutions, the informa-
tion becomes public.
  For each abortion performed, a report must be
filed identifying: the physician (and the second
physician where required); the facility; the refer-
ring physician or agency; the woman's age; the
number of prior pregnancies and prior abortions
she has had; gestational age; the type of abortion
procedure; the date of the abortion; whether
there were any pre-existing medical conditions
which would complicate pregnancy; medical compli-
cations with the abortion; where applicable, the
basis for the determination that the abortion was
medically necessary; the weight of the aborted
fetus; and whether the woman was married, and if
so, whether notice was provided or the basis for
the failure to give notice.  Every abortion facili-
ty must also file quarterly reports showing the
number of abortions performed broken down by
trimester.  See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 3207, 3214
(1990).  In all events, the identity of each woman
who has had an abortion remains confidential.
  In Danforth, 428 U. S., at 80, we held that recor-
dkeeping and reporting provisions  that are
reasonably directed to the preservation of
maternal health and that properly respect a
patient's confidentiality and privacy are permis-
sible.  We think that under this standard, all the
provisions at issue here except that relating to
spousal notice are constitutional.  Although they
do not relate to the State's interest in informing
the woman's choice, they do relate to health.  The
collection of information with respect to actual
patients is a vital element of medical research,
and so it cannot be said that the requirements
serve no purpose other than to make abortions
more difficult.  Nor do we find that the require-
ments impose a substantial obstacle to a woman's
choice.  At most they might increase the cost of
some abortions by a slight amount.  While at some
point increased cost could become a substantial
obstacle, there is no such showing on the record
before us.
  Subsection (12) of the reporting provision
requires the reporting of, among other things, a
married woman's  reason for failure to provide
notice to her husband.  3214(a)(12).  This provi-
sion in effect requires women, as a condition of
obtaining an abortion, to provide the Common-
wealth with the precise information we have
already recognized that many women have pressing
reasons not to reveal.  Like the spousal notice
requirement itself, this provision places an undue
burden on a woman's choice, and must be invalidat-
ed for that reason.

                      VI
  Our Constitution is a covenant running from the
first generation of Americans to us and then to
future generations.  It is a coherent succession.
Each generation must learn anew that the Consti-
tution's written terms embody ideas and aspira-
tions that must survive more ages than one.  We
accept our responsibility not to retreat from
interpreting the full meaning of the covenant in
light of all of our precedents.  We invoke it once
again to define the freedom guaranteed by the
Constitution's own promise, the promise of liber-
ty.
                *      *      *
  The judgment in No. 91-902 is affirmed.  The
judgment in No. 91-744 is affirmed in part and
reversed in part,and the case is remanded for proceedings consis-
tent with this opinion, including consideration of
the question of severability.
                             It is so ordered.
 

          APPENDIX TO OPINION
Selected Provisions of the 1988 and 1989
Amendments to the Pennsylvania
Abortion Control Act of 1982

        18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (1990).
  ``3203.  Definitions.
       .       .      .      .       .

   `Medical emergency.'  That condition which, on
the basis of the physician's good faith clinical
judgment, so complicates the medical condition of
a pregnant woman as to necessitate the immediate
abortion of her pregnancy to avert her death or
for which a delay will create serious risk of
substantial and irreversible impairment of major
bodily function.''

  ``3205.  Informed Consent.
  ``(a) General Rule. " No abortion shall be per-
formed or induced except with the voluntary and
informed consent of the woman upon whom the
abortion is to be performed or induced.  Except in
the case of a medical emergency, consent to an
abortion is voluntary and informed if and only if:
``(1)  At least 24 hours prior to the abortion,
       the physician who is to perform the abor-
       tion or the referring physician has orally
       informed the woman of:
           ``(i) The nature of the proposed proce-
                 dure or treatment and of those
                 risks and alternatives to the pro-
                 cedure or treatment that a rea-
                 sonable patient would consider
                 material to the decision of whether
                 or not to undergo the abortion.

         ``(ii)  The probable gestational age of the
                 unborn child at the time the abortion
                 is to be performed.
       ``(iii)   The medical risks associated with car-
                 rying her child to term.
``(2)  At least 24 hours prior to the abortion,
       the physician who is to perform the
       abortion or the referring physician, or
       a qualified physician assistant, health
       care practitioner, technician or social
       worker to whom the responsibility has
       been delegated by either physician, has
       informed the pregnant woman that:
       ``(i) The department publishes printed
             materials which describe the un-
             born child and list agencies which
             offer alternatives to abortion and
             that she has a right to review the
             printed materials and that a copy
             will be provided to her free of
             charge if she chooses to review it.
      ``(ii) Medical assistance benefits may be av-
             ailable for prenatal care, childbirth and
             neonatal care, and that more detailed
             information on the availability of such
             assistance is contained in the printed
             materials published by the department.
     ``(iii) The father of the unborn child is liable
             to assist in the support of her child,
             even in instances where he has offered
             to pay for the abortion.  In the case of
             rape, this information may be omitted.
``(3) A copy of the printed materials has been
      pro-vided to the woman if she chooses to
      view these materials.
``(4) The pregnant woman certifies in writing,
      prior to the abortion, that the informa-
tion required to be provided under para-
graphs (1), (2) and (3) has been provided.
``(b) Emergency. " Where a medical emergency
compels the performance of an abortion, the
physician shall inform the woman, prior to the
abortion if possible, of the medical indications
supporting his judgment that an abortion is
necessary to avert her death or to avert sub-
stantial and irreversible impairment of major
bodily function.
  ``(c) Penalty. " Any physician who violates the
provisions of this section is guilty of `unprofes-
sional conduct' and his license for the practice of
medicine and surgery shall be subject to suspen-
sion or revocation in accordance with procedures
provided under the act of October 5, 1978 (P.L.
1109, No. 261), known as the Osteopathic Medical
Practice Act, the act of December 20, 1985 (P.L.
457, No. 112), known as the Medical Practice Act of
1985, or their successor acts.  Any physician who
performs or induces an abortion without first
obtaining the certification required by subsec-
tion (a)(4) or with knowledge or reason to know
that the informed consent of the woman has not
been obtained shall for the first offense be
guilty of a summary offense and for each subse-
quent offense be guilty of a misdemeanor of the
third degree.  No physician shall be guilty of
violating this section for failure to furnish the
information required by subsection (a) if he or she
can demonstrate, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that he or she reasonably believed that
furnishing the information would have resulted in
a severely adverse effect on the physical or
mental health of the patient.
  ``(d) Limitation on Civil Liability. " Any physician
who complies with the provisions of this section
may not be held civilly liable to his patient for
failure to obtain informed consent to the abor-
tion within the meaning of that term as defined by
the act of October 15, 1975 (P.L. 390, No. 111), known
as the Health Care Services Malpractice Act.''  ``3206.
Parental Consent.
  ``(a) General rule. " Except in the case of a
medical emergency or except as provided in this
section, if a pregnant woman is less than 18 years
of age and not emancipated, or if she has been
adjudged an incompetent under 20 Pa. C.S. 5511
(relating to petition and hearing; examination by
court-appointed physician), a physician shall not
perform an abortion upon her unless, in the case
of a woman who is less than 18 years of age, he
first obtains the informed consent both of the
pregnant woman and of one of her parents; or, in
the case of a woman who is incompetent, he first
obtains the informed consent of her guardian.  In
deciding whether to grant such consent, a preg-
nant woman's parent or guardian shall consider
only their child's or ward's best interests.  In the
case of a pregnancy that is the result of incest,
where the father is a party to the incestuous act,
the pregnant woman need only obtain the consent
of her mother.
  ``(b) Unavailability of parent or guardian. " If
both parents have died or are otherwise unavail-
able to the physician within a reasonable time and
in a reasonable manner, consent of the pregnant
woman's guardian or guardians shall be sufficient.
If the pregnant woman's parents are divorced,
consent of the parent having custody shall be
sufficient.  If neither any parent nor a legal
guardian is available to the physician within a
reasonable time and in a reasonable manner,
consent of any adult person standing in loco
parentis shall be sufficient.
  ``(c) Petition to the court for consent. " If both
of the parents or guardians of the pregnant woman
refuse to consent to the performance of an
abortion or if she elects not to seek the consent
of either of her parents or of her guardian, the
court of common pleas of the judicial district in
which the applicant resides or in which the abor-
tion is sought shall, upon petition or motion,
after an appropriate hearing, authorize a physi-
cian to perform the abortion if the court deter-
mines that the pregnant woman is mature and
capable of giving informed consent to the pro-
posed abortion, and has, in fact, given such
consent.
  ``(d) Court order. " If the court determines that
the pregnant woman is not mature and capable of
giving informed consent or if the pregnant woman
does not claim to be mature and capable of giving
informed consent, the court shall determine
whether the performance of an abortion upon her
would be in her best interests.  If the court
determines that the performance of an abortion
would be in the best interests of the woman, it
shall authorize a physician to perform the abor-
tion.
  ``(e) Representation in proceedings. " The preg-
nant woman may participate in proceedings in the
court on her own behalf and the court may appoint
a guardian ad litem to assist her.  The court
shall, however, advise her that she has a right to
court appointed counsel, and shall provide her
with such counsel unless she wishes to appear
with private counsel or has knowingly and intelli-
gently waived representation by counsel.''

  ``3207.  Abortion Facilities.
       .       .      .      .       .
  ``(b) Reports. " Within 30 days after the effec-
tive date of this chapter, every facility at which
abortions are performed shall file, and update
immediately upon any change, a report with the
department, containing the following information:
``(1)Name and address of the facility.
``(2)Name and address of any parent, subsidiary or
     affiliated organizations, corporations or associations.
``(3)Name and address of any parent, subsid-
     iary or affiliated organizations, corpo-
     rations or associations having contempo-
     raneous commonality of ownership, bene-
     ficial interest, directorship or officer-
     ship with any other facility.
The information contained in those reports which
are filed pursuant to this subsection by facili-
ties which receive State-appropriated funds
during the 12-calendar-month period immediately
preceding a request to inspect or copy such
reports shall be deemed public information.
Reports filed by facilities which do not receive
State-appropriated funds shall only be available
to law enforcement officials, the State Board of
Medicine and the State Board of Osteopathic
Medicine for use in the performance of their
official duties.  Any facility failing to comply with
the provisions of this subsection shall be as-
sessed by the department a fine of $500 for each
day it is in violation hereof.''

  ``3208.  Printed Information.
  ``(a) General Rule. " The department shall cause
to be published in English, Spanish and Vietnam-
ese, within 60 days after this chapter becomes
law, and shall update on an annual basis, the
following easily comprehensible printed materials:
``(1)Geographically indexed materials designed
     to inform the woman of public and private
     agencies and services available to assist
     a woman through pregnancy, upon child-
     birth and while the child is dependent,
     including adoption agencies, which shall
     include a comprehensive list of the agen-
     cies available, a description of the ser-
     vices they offer and a description of the
     manner, including telephone numbers, in
     which they might be contacted, or, at the
     option of the department, printed materi-
     als including a toll-free 24-hour a day
     telephone number which may be called to
     obtain, orally, such a list and description
     of agencies in the locality of the caller
     and of the services they offer.  The
     materials shall provide information on
     the availability of medical assistance
     benefits for prenatal care, childbirth and
     neonatal care, and state that it is unlaw-
     ful for any individual to coerce a woman
     to undergo abortion, that any physician
     who performs an abortion upon a woman
     without obtaining her informed consent or
     without according her a private medical
     consultation may be liable to her for
     damages in a civil action at law, that the
     father of a child is liable to assist in the
     support of that child, even in instances
     where the father has offered to pay for
     an abortion and that the law permits
     adoptive parents to pay costs of prena-
     tal care, childbirth and neonatal care.
``(2)Materials designed to inform the woman of
     the probable anatomical and physiological
     characteristics of the unborn child at
     two-week gestational increments from
     fertilization to full term, including pic-
     tures representing the development of
     unborn children at two-week gestational
     increments, and any relevant information
     on the possibility of the unborn child's
     survival; provided that any such pictures
     or drawings must contain the dimensions
     of the fetus and must be realistic and
     appropriate for the woman's stage of
     pregnancy.  The materials shall be objec-
     tive, non-judgmental and designed to
     convey only accurate scientific informa-
     tion about the unborn child at the vari-
     ous gestational ages.  The material shall
     also contain objective information de-
     scribing the methods of abortion proce-
     dures commonly employed, the medical
     risks commonly associated with each such
     procedure, and the medical risks commonly
     associated with carrying a child to term.
``(b)Format. " The materials shall be printed in a
     typeface large enough to be clearly legible.
``(c)Free distribution. " The materials required
     under this section shall be available at no cost
     from the department upon request and in appropri-
     ate number to any person, facility or hospital.''

  ``3209.  Spousal Notice.
  ``(a) Spousal notice required. " In order to
further the Commonwealth's interest in promoting
the integrity of the marital relationship and to
protect a spouse's interests in having children
within marriage and in protecting the prenatal life
of that spouse's child, no physician shall perform
an abortion on a married woman, except as provid-
ed in subsections (b) and (c), unless he or she has
received a signed statement, which need not be
notarized, from the woman upon whom the abortion
is to be performed, that she has notified her
spouse that she is about to undergo an abortion.
The statement shall bear a notice that any false
statement made therein is punishable by law.
  ``(b) Exceptions. " The statement certifying that
the notice required by subsection (a) has been
given need not be furnished where the woman
provides the physician a signed statement certi-
fying at least one of the following:
``(1)   Her spouse is not the father of the child.
``(2)Her spouse, after diligent effort, could
     not be located.
``(3)The pregnancy is a result of spousal
     sexual assault as described in section
     3128 (relating to spousal sexual assault),
     which has been reported to a law enforce-
     ment agency having the requisite juris-
     diction.
``(4)The woman has reason to believe that the
     furnishing of notice to her spouse is
     likely to result in the infliction of bodily
     injury upon her by her spouse or by an-
     other individual.
Such statement need not be notarized, but shall
bear a notice that any false statements made
therein are punishable by law.
  ``(c) Medical emergency. " The requirements of
subsection (a) shall not apply in case of a medical
emergency.
  ``(d) Forms. " The department shall cause to be
published, forms which may be utilized for purpos-
es of providing the signed statements required by
subsections (a) and (b).  The department shall
distribute an adequate supply of such forms to all
abortion facilities in this Commonwealth.
  ``(e) Penalty; civil action. " Any physician who
violates the provisions of this section is guilty
of `unprofessional conduct,' and his or her license
for the practice of medicine and surgery shall be
subject to suspension or revocation in accor-
dance with procedures provided under the act of
October 5, 1978 (P.L. 1109, No. 261), known as the
Osteopathic Medical Practice Act, the act of
December 20, 1985 (P.L. 457, No. 112), known as the
Medical Practice Act of 1985, or their successor
acts.  In addition, any physician who knowingly
violates the provisions of this section shall be
civilly liable to the spouse who is the father of
the aborted child for any damages caused thereby
and for punitive damages in the amount of $5,000,
and the court shall award a prevailing plaintiff a
reasonable attorney fee as part of costs.''

  ``3214.  Reporting.
  ``(a) General rule. " For the purpose of promotion
of maternal health and life by adding to the sum of
medical and public health knowledge through the
compilation of relevant data, and to promote the
Commonwealth's interest in protection of the
unborn child, a report of each abortion performed
shall be made to the department on forms pre-
scribed by it.  The report forms shall not identify
the individual patient by name and shall include
the following information:
  ``(1)  Identification of the physician who
      performed the abortion, the concurring
      physician as required by section 3211(c-)
      (2) (relating to abortion on unborn child
      of 24 or more weeks gestational age),
      the second physician as required by
      section 3211(c)(5) and the facility where
      the abortion was performed and of the
      referring physician, agency or service,
      if any.
  ``(2)The county and state in which the woman
      resides.
  ``(3)The woman's age.
  ``(4)The number of prior pregnancies and
      prior abortions of the woman.
  ``(5)The gestational age of the unborn child
      at the time of the abortion.
  ``(6)The type of procedure performed or
      prescribed and the date of the abortion.
  ``(7)Pre-existing medical conditions of the
      woman which would complicate pregnancy,
      if any, and if known, any medical compli-
      cation which resulted from the abortion
      itself.
  ``(8)The basis for the medical judgment of
      the physician who performed the abor-
      tion that the abortion was necessary to
      prevent either the death of the preg-
      nant woman or the substantial and irre-
      versible impairment of a major bodily
      function of the woman, where an abortion
      has been performed pursuant to section
      3211(b)(1).
  ``(9)The weight of the aborted child for any
      abortion performed pursuant to section
      3211(b)(1).
``(10)Basis for any medical judgment that a
      medical emergency existed which excused
      the physician from compliance with any
      provision of this chapter.
``(11)The information required to be reported
      under section 3210(a) (relating to deter-
      mination of gestational age).
``(12)Whether the abortion was performed
      upon a married woman and, if so, whether
      notice to her spouse was given.  If no
      notice to her spouse was given, the
      report shall also indicate the reason
      for failure to provide notice.
    .       .      .      .       .

  ``(f) Report by facility. " Every facility in which
an abortion is performed within this Commonwealth
during any quarter year shall file with the de-
partment a report showing the total number of
abortions performed within the hospital or other
facility during that quarter year.  This report
shall also show the total abortions performed in
each trimester of pregnancy.  Any report shall be
available for public inspection and copying only if
the facility receives State-appropriated funds
within the 12-calendar-month period immediately
preceding the filing of the report.  These reports
shall be submitted on a form prescribed by the
department which will enable a facility to indicate
whether or not it is receiving State-appropriated
funds.  If the facility indicates on the form that
it is not receivingState-appropriated funds, the department shall
regard its report as confidential unless it re-
ceives other evidence which causes it to conclude
that the facility receives State-appropriated
funds.''
Concur/dissent 1
      SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES--------
       Nos. 91-744 and 91-902
              --------
 PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF SOUTHEASTERN
       PENNSYLVANIA, et al., PETITIONERS
91-744                v.
         ROBERT P. CASEY, et al., etc.

        ROBERT P. CASEY, et al., etc.,
                  PETITIONERS
91-902                v.
      PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF SOUTHEASTERN
              PENNSYLVANIA et al.
  on writs of certiorari to the united states
court of
         appeals for the third circuit
                [June 29, 1992]
      Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dis-
senting in part.
  The portions of the Court's opinion that I have
joined are more important than those with which I
disagree.  I shall therefore first comment on
significant areas of agreement, and then explain
the limited character of my disagreement.
                       I
  The Court is unquestionably correct in conclud-
ing that the doctrine of stare decisis has con-
trolling significance in a case of this kind, not-
withstanding an individual justice's concerns
about the merits.  The central holding of Roe v.
Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), has been a  part of our
law for almost two decades.  Planned Parenthood
of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 101 (1976)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).  It was a natural sequel to the protection
of individual liberty established in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965).  See also Carey v.
Population Services Int'l, 431 U. S. 678, 687, 702
(1977)  (White, J., concurring in part and concurring
in result).  The societal costs of overruling Roe
at this late date would be enormous.  Roe is an
integral part of a correct understanding of both
the concept of liberty and the basic equality of
men and women.
   Stare decisis also provides a sufficient basis
for my agreement with the joint opinion's reaffir-
mation of Roe's post-viability analysis.  Specifi-
cally, I accept the proposition that  [i]f the
State is interested in protecting fetal life after
viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abor-
tion during that period, except when it is neces-
sary to preserve the life or health of the moth-
er.  410 U. S., at 163-164; see ante, at 36-37.
  I also accept what is implicit in the Court's
analysis, namely, a reaffirmation of Roe's expla-
nation of why the State's obligation to protect
the life or health of the mother must take prece-
dence over any duty to the unborn.  The Court in
Roe carefully considered, and rejected, the
State's argument  that the fetus is a `person'
within the language and meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment.  410 U. S., at 156.  After analyzing the
usage of  person in the Constitution, the Court
concluded that that word  has application only
postnatally.  Id., at 157.  Commenting on the
contingent property interests of the unborn that
are generally represented by guardians ad litem,
the Court noted:  Perfection of the interests
involved, again, has generally been contingent
upon live birth.  In short, the unborn have never
been recognized in the law as persons in the whole
sense.  Id., at 162.  Accordingly, an abortion is
not  the termination of life entitled to Four-
teenth Amendment protection.  Id., at 159.  From
this holding, there was no dissent, see id., at 173;
indeed, no member of the Court has ever ques-
tioned this fundamental proposition.  Thus, as a
matter of federal constitutional law, a developing
organism that is not yet a  person does not have
what is sometimes described as a  right to
life.  This has been and, by the Court's holding
today, remains a fundamental premise of our
constitutional law governing reproductive auton-
omy.
                      II
  My disagreement with the joint opinion begins
with its understanding of the trimester framework
established in Roe.  Contrary to the suggestion of
the joint opinion, ante, at 33, it is not a  contra-
diction to recognize that the State may have a
legitimate interest in potential human life and, at
the same time, to conclude that that interest
does not justify the regulation of abortion
before viability (although other interests, such
as maternal health, may).  The fact that the
State's interest is legitimate does not tell us
when, if ever, that interest outweighs the preg-
nant woman's interest in personal liberty.  It is
appropriate, therefore, to consider more careful-
ly the nature of the interests at stake.
  First, it is clear that, in order to be legitimate,
the State's interest must be secular; consistent
with the First Amendment the State may not
promote a theological or sectarian interest.  See
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, 476 U. S. 747, 778 (1986) (Stevens,
J., concurring); see generally Webster v. Repro-
ductive Health Services, 492 U. S. 490, 563-572
(1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).  Moreover, as discussed above,
the state interest in potential human life is not
an interest in loco parentis, for the fetus is not
a person.
  Identifying the State's interests"which the
States rarely articulate with any precision"ma-
kes clear that the interest in protecting poten-
tial life is not grounded in the Constitution.  It
is, instead, an indirect interest supported by
both humanitarian and pragmatic concerns.  Many
of our citizens believe that any abortion reflects
an unacceptable disrespect for potential human
life and that the performance of more than a
million abortions each year is intolerable; many
find third-trimester abortions performed when the
fetus is approaching personhood particularly
offensive.  The State has a legitimate interest in
minimizing such offense.  The State may also have
a broader interest in expanding the population,
believing society would benefit from the services
of additional productive citizens"or that the
potential human lives might include the occasional
Mozart or Curie.  These are the kinds of concerns
that comprise the State's interest in potential
human life.
  In counterpoise is the woman's constitutional
interest in liberty.  One aspect of this liberty is
a right to bodily integrity, a right to control
one's person.  See e.g., Rochin v. California, 342
U. S. 165 (1952); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535
(1942).  This right is neutral on the question of
abortion: The Constitution would be equally
offended by an absolute requirement that all
women undergo abortions as by an absolute prohi-
bition on abortions.   Our whole constitutional
heritage rebels at the thought of giving govern-
ment the power to control men's minds.  Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 565 (1969).  The same holds
true for the power to control women's bodies.
  The woman's constitutional liberty interest also
involves her freedom to decide matters of the
highest privacy and the most personal nature.  Cf.
Whalen v. Roe, 409 U. S. 589, 598-600 (1977).  A
woman considering abortion faces  a difficult
choice having serious and personal consequences
of major importance to her own future"perhaps to
the salvation of her own immortal soul.  Thornbu-
rgh, 476 U. S., at 781.  The authority to make such
traumatic and yet empowering decisions is an
element of basic human dignity.  As the joint
opinion so eloquently demonstrates, a woman's
decision to terminate her pregnancy is nothing
less than a matter of conscience.
  Weighing the State's interest in potential life
and the woman's liberty interest, I agree with the
joint opinion that the State may  `expres[s] a
preference for normal childbirth,' that the State
may take steps to ensure that a woman's choice
 is thoughtful and informed, and that  States
are free to enact laws to provide a reasonable
framework for a woman to make a decision that has
such profound and lasting meaning.  Ante, at 30.
Serious questions arise, however, when a State
attempts to  persuade the woman to choose
childbirth over abortion.  Ante, at 36.  Decisional
autonomy must limit the State's power to inject
into a woman's most personal deliberations its own
views of what is best.  The State may promote its
preferences by funding childbirth, by creating and
maintaining alternatives to abortion, and by
espousing the virtues of family; but it must
respect the individual's freedom to make such
judgments.
  This theme runs throughout our decisions
concerning reproductive freedom.  In general,
Roe's requirement that restrictions on abortions
before viability be justified by the State's
interest in maternal health has prevented States
from interjecting regulations designed to influ-
ence a woman's decision.  Thus, we have upheld
regulations of abortion that are not efforts to
sway or direct a woman's choice but rather are
efforts to enhance the deliberative quality of
that decision or are neutral regulations on the
health aspects of her decision.  We have, for
example, upheld regulations requiring written
informed consent, see Planned Parenthood of
Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52 (1976); limited
recordkeeping and reporting, see ibid.; and pa-
thology reports, see Planned Parenthood Assn. of
Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U. S. 476
(1983); as well as various licensing and qualifica-
tion provisions, see e.g., Roe, 410 U. S., at 150;
Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U. S. 506 (1983).  Con-
versely, we have consistently rejected state
efforts to prejudice a woman's choice, either by
limiting the information available to her, see
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U. S. 809 (1975), or by
 requir[ing] the delivery of information designed
`to influence the woman's informed choice between
abortion or childbirth.'  Thornburgh, 476 U. S., at
760; see also Akron v. Akron Center for Reproduc-
tive Health, Inc., 462 U. S. 416, 442-449 (1983).
  In my opinion, the principles established in this
long line of cases and the wisdom reflected in
Justice Powell's opinion for the Court in Akron
(and followed by the Court just six years ago in
Thornburgh) should govern our decision today.
Under these principles, 3205(a)(2)(i)-(iii) of the
Pennsylvania statute are unconstitutional.
Those sections require a physician or counselor
to provide the woman with a range of materials
clearly designed to persuade her to choose not to
undergo the abortion.  While the State is free,
pursuant to 3208 of the Pennsylvania law, to
produce and disseminate such material, the State
may not inject such information into the woman's
deliberations just as she is weighing such an
important choice.
  Under this same analysis, 3205(a)(1)(i) and (iii)
of the Pennsylvania statute are constitutional.
Those sections, which require the physician to
inform a woman of the nature and risks of the
abortion procedure and the medical risks of
carrying to term, are neutral requirements
comparable to those imposed in other medical
procedures.  Those sections indicate no effort by
the State to influence the woman's choice in any
way.  If anything, such requirements enhance,
rather than skew, the woman's decisionmaking.  III
  The 24-hour waiting period required by 3205-
(a)(1)-(2) of the Pennsylvania statute raises even
more serious concerns.  Such a requirement
arguably furthers the State's interests in two
ways, neither of which is constitutionally permis-
sible.
  First, it may be argued that the 24-hour delay
is justified by the mere fact that it is likely to
reduce the number of abortions, thus furthering
the State's interest in potential life.  But such
an argument would justify any form of coercion
that placed an obstacle in the woman's path.  The
State cannot further its interests by simply
wearing down the ability of the pregnant woman to
exercise her constitutional right.
  Second, it can more reasonably be argued that
the 24-hour delay furthers the State's interest
in ensuring that the woman's decision is informed
and thoughtful.  But there is no evidence that the
mandated delay benefits women or that it is
necessary to enable the physician to convey any
relevant information to the patient.  The manda-
tory delay thus appears to rest on outmoded and
unacceptable assumptions about the decisionmak-
ing capacity of women.  While there are well-
established and consistently maintained reasons
for the State to view with skepticism the ability
of minors to make decisions, see Hodgson v. Minne-
sota, 497 U. S. 417, 449 (1990), none of those
reasons applies to an adult woman's decisionmak-
ing ability.  Just as we have left behind the belief
that a woman must consult her husband before
undertaking serious matters, see ante, at 54-57,
so we must reject the notion that a woman is less
capable of deciding matters of gravity.  Cf. Reed
v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71 (1971).
  In the alternative, the delay requirement may be
premised on the belief that the decision to termi-
nate a pregnancy is presumptively wrong.  This
premise is illegitimate.  Those who disagree
vehemently about the legality and morality of
abortion agree about one thing: The decision to
terminate a pregnancy is profound and difficult.
No person undertakes such a decision lightly"and
States may not presume that a woman has failed to
reflect adequately merely because her conclusion
differs from the State's preference.  A woman who
has, in the privacy of her thoughts and conscien-
ce, weighed the options and made her decision
cannot be forced to reconsider all, simply because
the State believes she has come to the wrong
conclusion.
    Part of the constitutional liberty to choose is
the equal dignity to which each of us is entitled.
A woman who decides to terminate her pregnancy is
entitled to the same respect as a woman who
decides to carry the fetus to term.  The mandato-
ry waiting period denies women that equal respect.

                      IV
  In my opinion, a correct application of the
 undue burden standard leads to the same con-
clusion concerning the constitutionality of these
requirements.  A state-imposed burden on the
exercise of a constitutional right is measured
both by its effects and by its character: A burden
may be  undue either because the burden is too
severe or because it lacks a legitimate, rational
justification.
   The 24-hour delay requirement fails both parts
of this test.  The findings of the District Court
establish the severity of the burden that the
24-hour delay imposes on many pregnant women.
Yet even in those cases in which the delay is not
especially onerous, it is, in my opinion,  undue
because there is no evidence that such a delay
serves a useful and legitimate purpose.  As
indicated above, there is no legitimate reason to
require a woman who has agonized over her deci-
sion to leave the clinic or hospital and return
again another day.  While a general requirement
that a physician notify her patients about the
risks of a proposed medical procedure is appro-
priate, a rigid requirement that all patients wait
24 hours or (what is true in practice) much longer
to evaluate the significance of information that
is either common knowledge or irrelevant is an
irrational and, therefore,  undue burden.
  The counseling provisions are similarly infirm.
Whenever government commands private citizens to
speak or to listen, careful review of the justifi-
cation for that command is particularly appropri-
ate.  In this case, the Pennsylvania statute
directs that counselors provide women seeking
abortions with information concerning alterna-
tives to abortion, the availability of medical
assistance benefits, and the possibility of child-
support payments.  3205(a)(2)(i)-(iii).  The
statute requires that this information be given
to all women seeking abortions, including those
for whom such information is clearly useless, such
as those who are married, those who have under-
gone the procedure in the past and are fully
aware of the options, and those who are fully
convinced that abortion is their only reasonable
option.  Moreover, the statute requires physi-
cians to inform all of their patients of  the
probable gestational age of the unborn child.
3205(a)(1)(ii).  This information is of little deci-
sional value in most cases, because 90% of all
abortions are performed during the first trimes-
ter when fetal age has less relevance than when
the fetus nears viability.  Nor can the informa-
tion required by the statute be justified as
relevant to any  philosophic or  social argu-
ment, ante, at 30, either favoring or disfavoring
the abortion decision in a particular case.  In
light of all of these facts, I conclude that the
information requirements in 3205(a)(1)(ii) and
3205(a)(2)(i)-(iii) do not serve a useful purpose
and thus constitute an unnecessary"and there-
fore undue"burden on the woman's constitutional
liberty to decide to terminate her pregnancy.

  Accordingly, while I disagree with Parts IV, V-B,
and V-D of the joint opinion, I join the remain-
der of the Court's opinion.
Concur/dissent 2
      SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES--------
       Nos. 91-744 and 91-902
              --------
      PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF SOUTHEASTERN
       PENNSYLVANIA, et al., PETITIONERS
91-744                v.
         ROBERT P. CASEY, et al., etc.

        ROBERT P. CASEY, et al., etc.,
                  PETITIONERS
91-902                v.
      PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF SOUTHEASTERN
              PENNSYLVANIA et al.
  on writs of certiorari to the united states
court of
         appeals for the third circuit
                [June 29, 1992]

  Justice Blackmun, concurring in part, concur-
ring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in
part.
  I join parts I, II, III, V-A, V-C, and VI of the
joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter, ante.
  Three years ago, in Webster v. Reproductive
Health Serv., 492 U. S. 490 (1989), four Members of
this Court appeared poised to  cas[t] into dark-
ness the hopes and visions of every woman in this
country who had come to believe that the Consti-
tution guaranteed her the right to reproductive
choice.  Id., at 557 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  See
id., at 499 (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.); id., at 532
(opinion of Scalia, J.).  All that remained between
the promise of Roe and the darkness of the plural-
ity was a single, flickering flame.  Decisions since
Webster gave little reason to hope that this flame
would cast much light.  See, e.g., Ohio v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U. S. 502, 524
(1990) (opinion of Blackmun, J.).  But now, just when
so many expected the darkness to fall, the flame
has grown bright.
  I do not underestimate the significance of
today's joint opinion.  Yet I remain steadfast in
my belief that the right to reproductive choice is
entitled to the full protection afforded by this
Court before Webster.  And I fear for the darkness
as four Justices anxiously await the single vote
necessary to extinguish the light.
                       I
  Make no mistake, the joint opinion of Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter is an act of per-
sonal courage and constitutional principle.  In
contrast to previous decisions in which Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy postponed reconsideration
of Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), the authors of
the joint opinion today join Justice Stevens and
me in concluding that  the essential holding of
Roe should be retained and once again reaffirmed.
Ante, at 3.  In brief, five Members of this Court
today recognize that  the Constitution protects
a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy in its
early stages.  Id., at 1.
  A fervent view of individual liberty and the
force of stare decisis have led the Court to this
conclusion.  Ante, at 11.  Today a majority reaf-
firms that the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment establishes  a realm of person-
al liberty which the government may not enter,
ante, at 5"a realm whose outer limits cannot be
determined by interpretations of the Constitution
that focus only on the specific practices of
States at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted.  See ante, at 6.  Included within this
realm of liberty is  `the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamen-
tally affecting a person as the decision whether
to bear or beget a child.'  Ante, at 9, quoting
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 453 (1972)
(emphasis in original).   These matters, involving
the most intimate and personal choices a person
may make in a lifetime, choices central to person-
al dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.  Ante, at
9 (emphasis added).  Finally, the Court today
recognizes that in the case of abortion,  the
liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique
to the human condition and so unique to the law.
The mother who carries a child to full term is
subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to
pain that only she must bear.  Ante, at 10.
  The Court's reaffirmation of Roe's central
holding is also based on the force of stare deci-
sis.   [N]o erosion of principle going to liberty or
personal autonomy has left Roe's central holding
a doctrinal remnant; Roe portends no developments
at odds with other precedent for the analysis of
personal liberty; and no changes of fact have
rendered viability more or less appropriate as
the point at which the balance of interests tips.
Ante, at 18.  Indeed, the Court acknowledges that
Roe's limitation on state power could not be
removed  without serious inequity to those who
have relied upon it or significant damage to the
stability of the society governed by the rule in
question.  Ante, at 13.  In the 19 years since Roe
was decided, that case has shaped more than
reproductive planning" an entire generation has
come of age free to assume Roe's concept of
liberty in defining the capacity of women to act in
society and to make reproductive decisions.
Ante, at 18.  The Court understands that, having
 call[ed] the contending sides . . . to end their
national division by accepting a common mandate
rooted in the Constitution, ante, at 24, a deci-
sion to overrule Roe  would seriously weaken the
Court's capacity to exercise the judicial power
and to function as the Supreme Court of a Nation
dedicated to the rule of law.  Ante, at 22.  What
has happened today should serve as a model for
future Justices and a warning to all who have
tried to turn this Court into yet another politi-
cal branch.
  In striking down the Pennsylvania statute's
spousal notification requirement, the Court has
established a framework for evaluating abortion
regulations that responds to the social context
of women facing issues of reproductive choice.
In determining the burden imposed by the chal-
lenged regulation, the Court inquires whether the
regulation's  purpose or effect is to place a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion before the fetus attains
viability.  Ante, at 35 (emphasis added).  The
Court reaffirms:  The proper focus of constitu-
tional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a
restriction, not the group for whom the law is
irrelevant.  Ante, at 53-54.  Looking at this
group, the Court inquires, based on expert testi-
mony, empirical studies, and common sense, wheth-
er  in a large fraction of the cases in which [the
restriction] is relevant, it will operate as a
substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to
undergo an abortion.  Id., at 54.   A statute with
this purpose is invalid because the means chosen
by the State to further the interest in potential
life must be calculated to inform the woman's free
choice, not hinder it.  Ante, at 35.  And in apply-
ing its test, the Court remains sensitive to the
unique role of women in the decision-making
process.  Whatever may have been the practice
when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, the
Court observes,  [w]omen do not lose their con-
stitutionally protected liberty when they marry.
The Constitution protects all individuals, male or
female, married or unmarried, from the abuse of
governmental power, even where that power is
employed for the supposed benefit of a member of
the individual's family.  Ante, at 57-58.
  Lastly, while I believe that the joint opinion
errs in failing to invalidate the other regula-
tions, I am pleased that the joint opinion has not
ruled out the possibility that these regulations
may be shown to impose an unconstitutional
burden.  The joint opinion makes clear that its
specific holdings are based on the insufficiency
of the record before it.  See, e.g., id., at 43.  I am
confident that in the future evidence will be
produced to show that  in a large fraction of the
cases in which [these regulations are] relevant,
[they] will operate as a substantial obstacle to
a woman's choice to undergo an abortion.  Ante, at
54.
                      II
  Today, no less than yesterday, the Constitution
and decisions of this Court require that a State's
abortion restrictions be subjected to the strict-
est of judicial scrutiny.  Our precedents and the
joint opinion's principles require us to subject
all non-de minimis abortion regulations to strict
scrutiny.  Under this standard, the Pennsylvania
statute's provisions requiring content-based
counseling, a 24-hour delay, informed parental
consent, and reporting of abortion-related
information must be invalidated.
                       A
  The Court today reaffirms the long recognized
rights of privacy and bodily integrity.  As early
as 1891, the Court held,  [n]o right is held more
sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the
commonlaw, than the right of every individual to
the possession and control of his own person,
free from all restraint or interference of oth-
ers . . . .  Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U. S.
250, 251 (1891).  Throughout this century, this
Court also has held that the fundamental right of
privacy protects citizens against governmental
intrusion in such intimate family matters as
procreation, childrearing, marriage, and contra-
ceptive choice.  See ante, at 5-6.  These cases
embody the principle that personal decisions that
profoundly affect bodily integrity, identity, and
destiny should be largely beyond the reach of
government.  Eisenstadt, 405 U.S., at 453.  In Roe v.
Wade, this Court correctly applied these princi-
ples to a woman's right to choose abortion.
  State restrictions on abortion violate a woma-
n's right of privacy in two ways.  First, compelled
continuation of a pregnancy infringes upon a
woman's right to bodily integrity by imposing
substantial physical intrusions and significant
risks of physical harm.  During pregnancy, women
experience dramatic physical changes and a wide
range of health consequences.  Labor and delivery
pose additional health risks and physical demands.
In short, restrictive abortion laws force women to
endure physical invasions far more substantial
than those this Court has held to violate the
constitutional principle of bodily integrity in
other contexts.  See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S.
753 (1985) (invalidating surgical removal of bullet
from murder suspect); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165 (1952) (invalidating stomach-pumping).
  Further, when the State restricts a woman's
right to terminate her pregnancy, it deprives a
woman of the right to make her own decision about
reproduction and family planning"critical life
choices that this Court long has deemed central
to the right to privacy.  The decision to terminate
or continue a pregnancy has no less an impact on
a woman's life than decisions about contraception
or marriage.  410 U.S., at 153.  Because motherhood
has a dramatic impact on a woman's educational
prospects, employment opportunities, and self-
determination, restrictive abortion laws deprive
her of basic control over her life.  For these
reasons,  the decision whether or not to beget or
bear a child lies at  the very heart of this
cluster of constitutionally protected choices.
Carey v. Population Services, Int'l, 431 U.S. 678
(1977).
  A State's restrictions on a woman's right to
terminate her pregnancy also implicate constitu-
tional guarantees of gender equality.  State
restrictions on abortion compel women to continue
pregnancies they otherwise might terminate.  By
restricting the right to terminate pregnancies,
the State conscripts women's bodies into its
service, forcing women to continue their pregnan-
cies, suffer the pains of childbirth, and in most
instances, provide years of maternal care.  The
State does not compensate women for their ser-
vices; instead, it assumes that they owe this duty
as a matter of course.  This assumption"that
women can simply be forced to accept the  natu-
ral status and incidents of motherhood"appears
to rest upon a conception of women's role that has
triggered the protection of the Equal Protection
Clause.  See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U. S. 718, 724-726 (1982); Craig v. Boren,
429 U. S. 190, 198-199 (1976).  The joint opinion
recognizes that these assumptions about women's
place in society  are no longer consistent with
our understanding of the family, the individual, or
the Constitution.  Ante, at 55.
                       B
  The Court has held that limitations on the right
of privacy are permissible only if they survive
 strict constitutional scrutiny"that is, only if
the governmental entity imposing the restriction
can demonstrate that the limitation is both
necessary and narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling governmental interest.  Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).  We have
applied this principle specifically in the context
of abortion regulations.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at
155.
  Roe implemented these principles through a
framework that was designed  to insure that the
woman's right to choose not become so subordinate
to the State's interest in promoting fetal life
that her choice exists in theory but not in fact,
ante, at 30.  Roe identified two relevant State
interests:  an interest in preserving and pro-
tecting the health of the pregnant woman and an
interest in  protecting the potentiality of human
life.  410 U. S., at 162.  With respect to the
State's interest in the health of the mother,  the
`compelling' point . . . is at approximately the end
of the first trimester, because it is at that
point that the mortality rate in abortion ap-
proaches that in childbirth.  Roe, 410 U. S., at 163.
With respect to the State's interest in potential
life,  the `compelling' point is at viability,
because it is at that point that the fetus  pre-
sumably has the capability of meaningful life
outside the mother's womb.  Ibid.  In order to
fulfill the requirement of narrow tailoring,  the
State is obligated to make a reasonable effort to
limit the effect of its regulations to the period
in the trimester during which its health interest
will be furthered.  Akron, 462 U. S., at 434.
  In my view, application of this analytical frame-
work is no less warranted than when it was ap-
proved by seven Members of this Court in Roe.
Strict scrutiny of state limitations on reproduc-
tive choice still offers the most secure protec-
tion of the woman's right to make her own repro-
ductive decisions, free from state coercion.  No
majority of this Court has ever agreed upon an
alternative approach.  The factual premises of
the trimester framework have not been under-
mined, see Webster, 492 U.S., at 553 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting), and the Roe framework is far more
administrable, and far less manipulable, than the
 undue burden standard adopted by the joint
opinion.
  Nonetheless, three criticisms of the trimester
framework continue to be uttered.  First, the
trimester framework is attacked because its key
elements do not appear in the text of the Consti-
tution.  My response to this attack remains the
same as it was in Webster:
 Were this a true concern, we would have to
abandon most of our constitutional jurispru-
dence.  [T]he `critical elements' of countless
constitutional doctrines nowhere appear in
the Constitution's text . . . .  The Constitution
makes no mention, for example, of the First
Amendment's `actual malice' standard for
proving certain libels, see New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). . . .  Similarly,
the Constitution makes no mention of the
rational-basis test, or the specific verbal
formulations of intermediate and strict scru-
tiny by which this Court evaluates claims
under the Equal Protection Clause.  The rea-
son is simple.  Like the Roe framework, these
tests or standards are not, and do not pur-
port to be, rights protected by the Constitu-
tion.  Rather, they are judge-made methods for
evaluating and measuring the strength and
scope of constitutional rights or for balanc-
ing the constitutional rights of individuals
against the competing interests of
government.  492 U.S., at 548.

  The second criticism is that the framework more
closely resembles a regulatory code than a body
of constitutional doctrine.  Again, my answer
remains the same as in Webster.
 [I]f this were a true and genuine concern, we
would have to abandon vast areas of our
constitutional jurisprudence. . . .  Are [the
distinctions entailed in the trimester frame-
work] any finer, or more `regulatory,' than the
distinctions we have often drawn in our First
Amendment jurisprudence, where, for example,
we have held that a `release time' program
permitting public-school students to leave
school grounds during school hours receive
religious instruction does not violate the
Establishment Clause, even though a release-
time program permitting religious instruction
on school grounds does violate the Clause?
Compare Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952),
with Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of
Education of School Dist. No. 71, Champaign
County, 333 U.S. 203 (1948). . . .  Similarly, in a
Sixth Amendment case, the Court held that
although an overnight ban on attorney-client
communication violated the constitutionally
guaranteed right to counsel, Geders v. United
States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976), that right was not
violated when a trial judge separated a defen-
dant from his lawyer during a 15-minute recess
after the defendant's direct testimony.  Perry
v. Leake, 488 U.S. 272 (1989).  That numerous
constitutional doctrines result in narrow
differentiations between similar circumstanc-
es does not mean that this Court has aban-
doned adjudication in favor of regulation.
Id., at 549-550.

  The final, and more genuine, criticism of the
trimester framework is that it fails to find the
State's interest in potential human life compelling
throughout pregnancy.  No member of this
Court"nor for that matter, the Solicitor General,
Tr. of Oral Arg. 42"has ever questioned our
holding in Roe that an abortion is not  the termi-
nation of life entitled to Fourteenth Amendment
protection.  410 U.S., at 159.  Accordingly, a
State's interest in protecting fetal life is not
grounded in the Constitution.  Nor, consistent
with our Establishment Clause, can it be a theo-
logical or sectarian interest.  See Thornburgh,
476 U.S., at 778 (Stevens, J., concurring).  It is,
instead, a legitimate interest grounded in humani-
tarian or pragmatic concerns.  See ante, at 4-5
(opinion of Stevens, J.).
  But while a State has  legitimate interests from
the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the
health of the woman and the life of the fetus that
may become a child, ante, at 4, legitimate inter-
ests are not enough.  To overcome the burden of
strict scrutiny, the interests must be compelling.
The question then is how best to accommodate the
State's interest in potential human life with the
constitutional liberties of pregnant women.
Again, I stand by the views I expressed in Webster:
 I remain convinced, as six other Members of
this Court 16 years ago were convinced, that
the Roe framework, and the viability standard
in particular, fairly, sensibly, and effectively
functions to safeguard the constitutional
liberties of pregnant women while recognizing
and accommodating the State's interest in
potential human life.  The viability line re-
flects the biological facts and truths of fetal
development; it marks that threshold moment
prior to which a fetus cannot survive sepa-
rate from the woman and cannot reasonably and
objectively be regarded as a subject of rights
or interests distinct from, or paramount to,
those of the pregnant woman.  At the same
time, the viability standard takes account of
the undeniable fact that as the fetus evolves
into its postnatal form, and as it loses its
dependence on the uterine environment, the
State's interest in the fetus' potential human
life, and in fostering a regard for human life
in general, becomes compelling.  As a practical
matter, because viability follows
`quickening'"the point at which a woman feels
movement in her womb"and because viability
occurs no earlier than 23 weeks gestational
age, it establishes an easily applicable stan-
dard for regulating abortion while providing a
pregnant woman ample time to exercise her
fundamental right with her responsible physi-
cian to terminate her pregnancy.  492 U.S., at
553-554.

    Roe's trimester framework does not ignore the
State's interest in prenatal life.  Like Justice
Stevens, I agree  that the State may take steps
to ensure that a woman's choice  is thoughtful
and informed, ante, at 29, and that  States are
free to enact laws to provide a reasonable frame-
work for a woman to make a decision that has such
profound and lasting meaning.  Ante, at 30.  But
 [s]erious questions arise when a State
attempts to `persuade the woman to choose
childbirth over abortion.'  Ante, at 36.  Deci-
sional autonomy must limit the State's power
to inject into a woman's most personal delib-
erations its own views of what is best.  The
State may promote its preferences by funding
childbirth, by creating and maintaining alter-
natives to abortion, and by espousing the
virtues of family, but it must respect the
individual's freedom to make such judgments.
Ante, at 6 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
As the joint opinion recognizes,  the means
chosen by the State to further the interest in
potential life must be calculated to inform the
woman's free choice, not hinder it.  Ante, at 35.
  In sum, Roe's requirement of strict scrutiny as
implemented through a trimester framework should
not be disturbed.  No other approach has gained a
majority, and  no other is more protective of the
woman's fundamental right.  Lastly, no other
approach properly accommodates the woman's
constitutional right with the State's legitimate
interests.
                       C
  Application of the strict scrutiny standard
results in the invalidation of all the challenged
provisions.  Indeed, as this Court has invalidated
virtually identical provisions in prior cases,
stare decisis requires that we again strike them
down.
  This Court has upheld informed and written
consent requirements only where the State has
demonstrated that they genuinely further impor-
tant health-related state concerns.  See Danfor-
th, 428 U. S., at 65-67.  A State may not, under the
guise of securing informed consent,  require the
delivery of information `designed to influence the
woman's informed choice between abortion or childbirth.'
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 U. S. 747, 760 (1986), (quoting
Akron, 462 U. S., at 443-444).  Rigid requirements
that a specific body of information be imparted to
a woman in all cases, regardless of the needs of
the patient, improperly intrude upon the discre-
tion of the pregnant woman's physician and there-
by impose an  `undesired and uncomfortable straitjacket.'
Thornburgh, 476 U. S., at 762 (quoting Danforth, 428
U. S., at 67, n. 8).
  Measured against these principles, some as-
pects of the Pennsylvania informed-consent
scheme are unconstitutional.  While it is
unobjectionable for the Commonwealth to require
that the patient be informed
of the nature of the procedure, the health risks
of the abortion and of childbirth, and the probable
gestational age of the unborn child, compare
3205(a)(i)-(iii) with Akron, 462 U. S., at 446, n.
37, I remain unconvinced that there is a vital
state need for insisting that the information be
provided by a physician rather than a counselor.
Id., at 448.  The District Court found that the
physician-only requirement necessarily would
increase costs to the plaintiff-clinics, costs
that undoubtedly would be passed on to patients.
And because trained women counselors are often
more understanding than physicians, and generally
have more time to spend with patients, see App.
366a-387a, the physician-only disclosure re-
quirement is not narrowly tailored to serve the
Commonwealth's interest in protecting maternal
health.
  Sections 3205(a)(2)(i)-(iii) of the Act further
requires that the physician or a qualified non-
physician inform the woman that printed materials
are available from the Commonwealth that describe
the fetus and provide information about medical
assistance for childbirth, information about child
support from the father, and a list of agencies
offering that provide adoption and other services
as alternatives to abortion.  Thornburgh invali-
dated biased patient-counseling requirements
virtually identical to the one at issue here.  What
we said of those requirements fully applies in
this case:
 the listing of agencies in the printed Penn-
sylvania form presents serious problems; it
contains names of agencies that well may be
out of step with the needs of the particular
woman and thus places the physician in an
awkward position and infringes upon his or her
professional responsibilities.  Forcing the
physician or counselor to present the materi-
als and the list to the woman makes him or her
in effect an agent of the State in treating the
woman and places his or her imprimatur upon
both the materials and the list.  All this is, or
comes close to being, state medicine imposed
upon the woman, not the professional medical
guidance she seeks, and it officially struc-
tures"as it obviously was intended to do"the
dialogue between the woman and her physician.
   The requirements . . . that the woman be
advised that medical assistance benefits may
be available, and that the father is responsi-
ble for financial assistance in the support of
the child similarly are poorly disguised ele-
ments of discouragement for the abortion
decision.  Much of this . . ., for many patients,
would be irrelevant and inappropriate.  For a
patient with a life-threatening pregnancy, the
`information' in its very rendition may be cruel
as well as destructive of the physician-pa-
tient relationship.  As any experienced social
worker or other counselor knows, theoretical
financial responsibility often does not equate
with fulfillment . . . .  Under the guise of
informed consent, the Act requires the dis-
semination of information that is not relevant
to such consent, and, thus, it advances no
legitimate state interest.  476 U. S., at 763.

   This type of compelled information is the
antithesis of informed consent, id., at 764, and
goes far beyond merely describing the general
subject matter relevant to the woman's decision.
 That the Commonwealth does not, and surely
would not, compel similar disclosure of every
possible peril of necessary surgery or of simple
vaccination, reveals the anti-abortion character
of the statute and its real purpose.  Ibid.
  The 24-hour waiting period following the provi-
sion of the foregoing information is also clearly
unconstitutional.  The District Court found that
the mandatory 24-hour delay could lead to delays
in excess of 24 hours, thus increasing health
risks, and that it would require two visits to the
abortion provider, thereby increasing travel time,
exposure to further harassment, and financial
cost.  Finally, the District Court found that the
requirement would pose especially significant
burdens on women living in rural areas and those
women that have difficulty explaining their where-
abouts.  App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 91-902, pp.
380a-382a (hereinafter App.).  In Akron this Court
invalidated a similarly arbitrary or inflexible
waiting period because, as here, it furthered no
legitimate state interest.
  As Justice Stevens insightfully concludes, the
mandatory delay rests either on outmoded or
unacceptable assumptions about the decisionmak-
ing capacity of women or the belief that the
decision to terminate the pregnancy is presump-
tively wrong.  Ante, at 8.  The requirement that
women consider this obvious and slanted informa-
tion for an additional 24 hours contained in these
provisions will only influence the woman's decision
in improper ways.  The vast majority of women will
know this information"of the few that do not, it is
less likely that their minds will be changed by this
information than it will be either by the realiza-
tion that the State opposes their choice or the
need once again to endure abuse and harassment
on return to the clinic.
  Except in the case of a medical emergency,
3206 requires a physician to obtain the informed
consent of a parent or guardian before performing
an abortion on an unemancipated minor or an
incompetent woman.  Based on evidence in the
record, the District Court concluded that, in
order to fulfill the informed-consent require-
ment, generally accepted medical principles would
require an in-person visit by the parent to the
facility.  App. 399a.  Although the Court  has
recognized that the State has somewhat broader
authority to regulate the activities of children
than of adults, the State nevertheless must
demonstrate that there is a  significant state
interest in conditioning an abortion . . . that is
not present in the case of an adult.  Danforth,
428 U. S., at 74-75 (emphasis added).  The require-
ment of an in-person visit would carry with it the
risk of a delay of several days or possibly weeks,
even where the parent is willing to consent.  While
the State has an interest in encouraging parental
involvement in the minor's abortion decision,
3206 is not narrowly drawn to serve that inter-
est.
        Finally, the Pennsylvania statute requires
every facility performing abortions to report its
activities to the Commonwealth.  Pennsylvania
contends that this requirement is valid under
Danforth, in which this Court held that recordkee-
ping and reporting requirements that are reason-
ably directed to the preservation of maternal
health and that properly respect a patient's
confidentiality are permissible.  428 U. S., at
79-81.  The Commonwealth attempts to justify its
required reports on the ground that the public
has a right to know how its tax dollars are spent.
A regulation designed to inform the public about
public expenditures does not further the Common-
wealth's interest in protecting maternal health.
Accordingly, such a regulation cannot justify a
legally significant burden on a woman's right to
obtain an abortion.
  The confidential reports concerning the identi-
ties and medical judgment of physicians involved
in abortions at first glance may seem valid, given
the State's interest in maternal health and
enforcement of the Act.  The District Court found,
however, that, notwithstanding the confidenti-
ality protections, many physicians, particularly
those who have previously discontinued perform-
ing abortions because of harassment, would
refuse to refer patients to abortion clinics if
their names were to appear on these reports.  App.
447a-448a. The Commonwealth has failed to show
that the name of the referring physician either
adds to the pool of scientific knowledge concern-
ing abortion or is reasonably related to the
Commonwealth's interest in maternal health.  I
therefore agree with the District Court's conclu-
sion that the confidential reporting requirements
are unconstitutional insofar as they require the
name of the referring physician and the basis for
his or her medical judgment.
  In sum, I would affirm the judgment in No. 91-902
and reverse the judgment in No. 91-744 and remand
the cases for further proceedings.
                      III
  At long last, The Chief Justice admits it.  Gone
are the contentions that the issue need not be (or
has not been) considered.  There, on the first
page, for all to see, is what was expected:  We
believe that Roe was wrongly decided, and that it
can and should be overruled consistently with our
traditional approach to stare decisis in
constitutional cases.  Post, at 1.  If there is
much reason to applaud the advances made by the
joint opinion today, there is far more to fear from
The Chief Justice's opinion.
  The Chief Justice's criticism of Roe follows
from his stunted conception of individual liberty.
While recognizing that the Due Process Clause
protects more than simple physical liberty, he
then goes on to construe this Court's personal-
liberty cases as establishing only a laundry list
of particular rights, rather than a principled
account of how these particular rights are groun-
ded in a more general right of privacy.  Post, at 9.
This constricted view is reinforced by The Chief
Justice's exclusive reliance on tradition as a
source of fundamental rights.  He argues that the
record in favor of a right to abortion is no
stronger than the record in Michael H. v. Gerald D.,
491 U. S. 110 (1989), where the plurality found no
fundamental right to visitation privileges by an
adulterous father, or in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U. S. 186 (1986), where the Court found no funda-
mental right to engage in homosexual sodomy, or in
a case involving the  firing of a gun . . . into
another person's body.  Post, at 9-10.  In The
Chief Justice's world, a woman considering wheth-
er to terminate a pregnancy is entitled to no more
protection than adulterers, murderers, and so-
called  sexual deviates.  Given The Chief
Justice's exclusive reliance on tradition, people
using contraceptives seem the next likely candi-
date for his list of outcasts.
  Even more shocking than The Chief Justice's
cramped notion of individual liberty is his com-
plete omission of any discussion of the effects
that compelled childbirth and motherhood have on
women's lives.  The only expression of concern
with women's health is purely instrumental"for
The Chief Justice, only women's psychological
health is a concern, and only to the extent that he
assumes that every woman who decides to have an
abortion does so without serious consideration of
the moral implications of their decision.  Post, at
25-26.  In short, The Chief Justice's view of the
State's compelling interest in maternal health has
less to do with health than it does with compelling
women to be maternal.
  Nor does The Chief Justice give any serious
consideration to the doctrine of stare decisis.
For The Chief Justice, the facts that gave rise
to Roe are surprisingly simple:  women become
pregnant, there is a point somewhere, depending
on medical technology, where a fetus becomes
viable, and women give birth to children.  Ante, at
13.  This characterization of the issue thus allows
The Chief Justice quickly to discard the joint
opinion's reliance argument by asserting that
 reproductive planning could take . . . virtually
immediate account of a decision overruling Roe.
Id., at 14 (internal quotations omitted).
  The Chief Justice's narrow conception of indi-
vidual liberty and stare decisis leads him to
propose the same standard of review proposed by
the plurality in Webster.   States may regulate
abortion procedures in ways rationally related to
a legitimate state interest.  Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 491 (1955); cf. Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 651-653 (1972).  Post, at
24.  The Chief Justice then further weakens the
test by providing an insurmountable requirement
for facial challenges:  petitioners must  `show
that no set of circumstances exists under which
the [provision] would be valid.'  Post, at 30,
quoting Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, 497 U. S., at 514.  In short, in his view,
petitioners must prove that the statute cannot
constitutionally be applied to anyone.  Finally, in
applying his standard to the spousal-notification
provision, The Chief Justice contends that the
record lacks any  hard evidence to support the
joint opinion's contention that a  large fraction
of women who prefer not to notify their husbands
involve situations of battered women and unre-
ported spousal assault.  Post, at 31, n. 2.  Yet
throughout the explication of his standard, The
Chief Justice never explains what hard evidence
is, how large a fraction is required, or how a
battered women is supposed to pursue an as-
applied challenge.
  Under his standard, States can ban abortion if
that ban is rationally related to a legitimate
state interest"a standard which the United
States calls  deferential, but not toothless.
Yet when pressed at oral argument to describe the
teeth, the best protection that the Solicitor
General could offer to women was that a prohibi-
tion, enforced by criminal penalties, with no
exception for the life of the mother,  could raise
very serious questions.  Tr. of Oral Arg. 49.
Perhaps, the Solicitor General offered, the
failure to include an exemption for the life of the
mother would be  arbitrary and capricious.  Id.,
at 49.  If, as The Chief Justice contends, the
undue burden test is made out of whole cloth, the
so-called  arbitrary and capricious limit is the
Solicitor General's  new clothes.
  Even if it is somehow  irrational for a State
to require a woman to risk her life for her child,
what protection is offered for women who become
pregnant through rape or incest?  Is there any-
thing arbitrary or capricious about a State's
prohibiting the sins of the father from being
visited upon his offspring?
       But, we are reassured, there is always the
protection of the democratic process.  While there
is much to be praised about our democracy, our
country since its founding has recognized that
there are certain fundamental liberties that are
not to be left to the whims of an election.  A
woman's right to reproductive choice is one of
those fundamental liberties.  Accordingly, that
liberty need not seek refuge at the ballot box.
                      IV
  In one sense, the Court's approach is worlds
apart from that of The Chief Justice and Justice
Scalia.  And yet, in another sense, the distance
between the two approaches is short"the distance
is but a single vote.
  I am 83 years old.  I cannot remain on this Court
forever, and when I do step down, the confirmation
process for my successor well may focus on the
issue before us today.  That, I regret, may be
exactly where the choice between the two worlds
will be made.
Concur/dissent 3
      SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES--------
       Nos. 91-744 and 91-902
              --------
       PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF SOUTHEASTERN
       PENNSYLVANIA, et al., PETITIONERS
91-744                v.
         ROBERT P. CASEY, et al., etc.

        ROBERT P. CASEY, et al., etc.,
                  PETITIONERS
91-902                v.
      PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF SOUTHEASTERN
              PENNSYLVANIA et al.
  on writs of certiorari to the united states
court of
         appeals for the third circuit
                [June 29, 1992]

  Chief Justice Rehnquist, with whom Justice
White, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas join, -
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part.
  The joint opinion, following its newly-minted
variation on stare decisis, retains the outer
shell of Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), but beats
a wholesale retreat from the substance of that
case.  We believe that Roe was wrongly decided,
and that it can and should be overruled consist-
ently with our traditional approach to stare
decisis in constitutional cases.  We would adopt
the approach of the plurality in Webster v. Repro-
ductive Health Services, 492 U. S. 490 (1989), and
uphold the challenged provisions of the Pennsyl-
vania statute in their entirety.
                       I
  In ruling on this case below, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit first observed that
 this appeal does not directly implicate Roe; this
case involves the regulation of abortions rather
than their outright prohibition.  947 F. 2d 682,
687 (1991).  Accordingly, the court directed its
attention to the question of the standard of
review for abortion regulations.  In attempting to
settle on the correct standard, however, the
court confronted the confused state of this
Court's abortion jurisprudence.  After considering
the several opinions in Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services, supra, and Hodgson v. Minnesota,
497 U. S. 417 (1990), the Court of Appeals concluded
that Justice O'Connor's  undue burden test was
controlling, as that was the narrowest ground on
which we had upheld recent abortion regulations.
947 F. 2d, at 693-697 ( `When a fragmented court
decides a case and no single rationale explaining
the result enjoys the assent of five Justices,
the holding of the Court may be viewed as that
position taken by those Members who concurred in
the judgments on the narrowest grounds' (quoting
Marks v. United States, 430 U. S. 188, 193 (1977)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  Applying this
standard, the Court of Appeals upheld all of the
challenged regulations except the one requiring a
woman to notify her spouse of an intended abor-
tion.
  In arguing that this Court should invalidate
each of the provisions at issue, petitioners
insist that we reaffirm our decision in Roe v.
Wade, supra, in which we held unconstitutional a
Texas statute making it a crime to procure an
abortion except to save the life of the moth-
er.  We agree with the Court of Appeals that
our decision in Roe is not directly implicated by
the Pennsylvania statute, which does not prohibit,
but simply regulates, abortion.  But, as the Court
of Appeals found, the state of our post-Roe
decisional law dealing with the regulation of
abortion is confusing and uncertain, indicating
that a reexamination of that line of cases is in
order.  Unfortunately for those who must apply
this Court's decisions, the reexamination under-
taken today leaves the Court no less divided than
beforehand.  Although they reject the trimester
framework that formed the underpinning of Roe,
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter adopt a
revised undue burden standard to analyze the
challenged regulations.  We conclude, however,
that such an outcome is an unjustified constitu-
tional compromise, one which leaves the Court in
a position to closely scrutinize all types of
abortion regulations despite the fact that it
lacks the power to do so under the Constitution.

  In Roe, the Court opined that the State  does
have an important and legitimate interest in
preserving and protecting the health of the
pregnant woman, . . . and that it has still another
important and legitimate interest in protecting
the potentiality of human life.  410 U. S., at 162
(emphasis omitted).  In the companion case of Doe
v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179 (1973), the Court referred
to its conclusion in Roe  that a pregnant woman
does not have an absolute constitutional right to
an abortion on her demand.  410 U. S., at 189.  But
while the language and holdings of these cases
appeared to leave States free to regulate abor-
tion procedures in a variety of ways, later
decisions based on them have found considerably
less latitude for such regulations than might
have been expected.
  For example, after Roe, many States have sought
to protect their young citizens by requiring that
a minor seeking an abortion involve her parents in
the decision.  Some States have simply required
notification of the parents, while others have
required a minor to obtain the consent of her
parents.  In a number of decisions, however, the
Court has substantially limited the States in
their ability to impose such requirements.  With
regard to parental notice requirements, we ini-
tially held that a State could require a minor to
notify her parents before proceeding with an
abortion.  H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S. 398, 407-410
(1981).  Recently, however, we indicated that a
State's ability to impose a notice requirement
actually depends on whether it requires notice of
one or both parents.  We concluded that although
the Constitution might allow a State to demand
that notice be given to one parent prior to an
abortion, it may not require that similar notice be
given to two parents, unless the State incorpo-
rates a judicial bypass procedure in that two-
parent requirement.  Hodgson v. Minnesota, supra.
  We have treated parental consent provisions
even more harshly.  Three years after Roe, we
invalidated a Missouri regulation requiring that
an unmarried woman under the age of 18 obtain the
consent of one her parents before proceeding with
an abortion.  We held that our abortion jurispru-
dence prohibited the State from imposing such a
 blanket provision . . . requiring the consent of a
parent.  Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v.
Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 74 (1976).  In Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U. S. 622 (1979), the Court struck down
a similar Massachusetts parental consent stat-
ute.  A majority of the Court indicated, however,
that a State could constitutionally require
parental consent, if it alternatively allowed a
pregnant minor to obtain an abortion without
parental consent by showing either that she was
mature enough to make her own decision, or that
the abortion would be in her best interests.  See
id., at 643-644 (plurality opinion); id., at 656-657
(White, J., dissenting).  In light of Bellotti, we
have upheld one parental consent regulation which
incorporated a judicial bypass option we viewed
as sufficient, see Planned Parenthood Assn. of
Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U. S. 476
(1983), but have invalidated another because of
our belief that the judicial procedure did not
satisfy the dictates of Bellotti.  See Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462
U. S. 416, 439-442 (1983).  We have never had
occasion, as we have in the parental notice
context, to further parse our parental consent
jurisprudence into one-parent and two-parent
components.
  In Roe, the Court observed that certain States
recognized the right of the father to participate
in the abortion decision in certain circumstances.
Because neither Roe nor Doe involved the asser-
tion of any paternal right, the Court expressly
stated that the case did not disturb the validity
of regulations that protected such a right.  Roe v.
Wade, 410 U. S., at 165, n. 67.  But three years
later, in Danforth, the Court extended its abor-
tion jurisprudence and held that a State could not
require that a woman obtain the consent of her
spouse before proceeding with an abortion.
Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428
U. S., at 69-71.
  States have also regularly tried to ensure that
a woman's decision to have an abortion is an
informed and well-considered one.  In Danforth, we
upheld a requirement that a woman sign a consent
form prior to her abortion, and observed that  it
is desirable and imperative that [the decision] be
made with full knowledge of its nature and conse-
quences.  Id., at 67.  Since that case, however,
we have twice invalidated state statutes de-
signed to impart such knowledge to a woman seek-
ing an abortion.  In Akron, we held unconstitution-
al a regulation requiring a physician to inform a
woman seeking an abortion of the status of her
pregnancy, the development of her fetus, the date
of possible viability, the complications that could
result from an abortion, and the availability of
agencies providing assistance and information
with respect to adoption and childbirth.  Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, supra, at
442-445.  More recently, in Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476
U. S. 747 (1986), we struck down a more limited
Pennsylvania regulation requiring that a woman be
informed of the risks associated with the abor-
tion procedure and the assistance available to
her if she decided to proceed with her pregnancy,
because we saw the compelled information as  the
antithesis of informed consent.  Id., at 764.
Even when a State has sought only to provide
information that, in our view, was consistent with
the Roe framework, we concluded that the State
could not require that a physician furnish the
information, but instead had to alternatively
allow nonphysician counselors to provide it.
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462
U. S., at 448-449.  In Akron as well, we went fur-
ther and held that a State may not require a
physician to wait 24 hours to perform an abortion
after receiving the consent of a woman.  Although
the State sought to ensure that the woman's
decision was carefully considered, the Court
concluded that the Constitution forbade the
State from imposing any sort of delay.  Id., at
449-451.
  We have not allowed States much leeway to
regulate even the actual abortion procedure.
Although a State can require that second-trimes-
ter abortions be performed in outpatient clinics,
see Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U. S. 506 (1983), we
concluded in Akron and Ashcroft that a State could
not require that such abortions be performed only
in hospitals.  See Akron v. Akron Center for Repro-
ductive Health, supra, at 437-439; Planned Parent-
hood Assn. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft,
supra, at 481-482.  Despite the fact that Roe
expressly allowed regulation after the first
trimester in furtherance of maternal health,
 `present medical knowledge,' in our view, could
not justify such a hospitalization requirement
under the trimester framework.  Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, supra, at 437
(quoting Roe v. Wade, supra, at 163).  And in Danfor-
th, the Court held that Missouri could not outlaw
the saline amniocentesis method of abortion,
concluding that the Missouri Legislature had
 failed to appreciate and to consider several
significant facts in making its decision.  428
U. S., at 77.
  Although Roe allowed state regulation after the
point of viability to protect the potential life of
the fetus, the Court subsequently rejected
attempts to regulate in this manner.  In Colautti
v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379 (1979), the Court struck
down a statute that governed the determination
of viability.  Id., at 390-397.  In the process, we
made clear that the trimester framework incorpo-
rated only one definition of viability"ours"as we
forbade States from deciding that a certain
objective indicator"``be it weeks of gestation or
fetal weight or any other single factor"should
govern the definition of viability.  Id., at 389.  In
that same case, we also invalidated a regulation
requiring a physician to use the abortion tech-
nique offering the best chance for fetal survival
when performing postviability abortions.  See id.,
at 397-401; see also Thornburgh v. American Col-
lege of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, supra, at
768-769 (invalidating a similar regulation).  In
Thornburgh, the Court struck down Pennsylvania's
requirement that a second physician be present at
postviability abortions to help preserve the
health of the unborn child, on the ground that it
did not incorporate a sufficient medical emergen-
cy exception.  Id., at 769-771.  Regulations gov-
erning the treatment of aborted fetuses have met
a similar fate.  In Akron, we invalidated a provi-
sion requiring physicians performing abortions to
 insure that the remains of the unborn child are
disposed of in a humane and sanitary manner.  462
U. S., at 451 (internal quotation marks omitted).
  Dissents in these cases expressed the view that
the Court was expanding upon Roe in imposing ever
greater restrictions on the States.  See Thornbu-
rgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gyne-
cologists, 476 U. S., at 783 (Burger, C. J., dissent-
ing) ( The extent to which the Court has departed
from the limitations expressed in Roe is readily
apparent); id., at 814 (White, J., dissenting)
( [T]he majority indiscriminately strikes down
statutory provisions that in no way contravene
the right recognized in Roe).  And, when confront-
ed with State regulations of this type in past
years, the Court has become increasingly more
divided: the three most recent abortion cases
have not commanded a Court opinion.  See Ohio v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U. S. 502
(1990); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U. S. 417 (1990);
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U. S.
490 (1989).
  The task of the Court of Appeals in the present
case was obviously complicated by this confusion
and uncertainty.  Following Marks v. United States,
430 U. S. 188 (1977), it concluded that in light of
Webster and Hodgson, the strict scrutiny standard
enunciated in Roe was no longer applicable, and
that the  undue burden standard adopted by
Justice O'Connor was the governing principle.
This state of confusion and disagreement war-
rants reexamination of the  fundamental right
accorded to a woman's decision to abort a fetus in
Roe, with its concomitant requirement that any
state regulation of abortion survive  strict
scrutiny.  See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. ---,
------- (1991) (slip op., at 17-20) (observing that
reexamination of constitutional decisions is
appropriate when those decisions have generated
uncertainty and failed to provide clear guidance,
because  correction through legislative action is
practically impossible (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Tran-
sit Authority, 469 U. S. 528, 546-547, 557 (1985).
  We have held that a liberty interest protected
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment will be deemed fundamental if it is
 implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325 (1937).
Three years earlier, in Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U. S. 97 (1934), we referred to a  principle of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscie-
nce of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.
Id., at 105; see also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491
U. S. 110, 122 (1989) (plurality opinion) (citing the
language from Snyder).  These expressions are
admittedly not precise, but our decisions imple-
menting this notion of  fundamental rights do not
afford any more elaborate basis on which to base
such a classification.
  In construing the phrase  liberty incorporated
in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, we have recognized that its meaning
extends beyond freedom from physical restraint.
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925),
we held that it included a parent's right to send a
child to private school; in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U. S. 390 (1923), we held that it included a right to
teach a foreign language in a parochial school.
Building on these cases, we have held that that
the term  liberty includes a right to marry,
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967); a right to
procreate, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,
316 U. S. 535 (1942); and a right to use contracep-
tives.  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972).  But a
reading of these opinions makes clear that they
do not endorse any all-encompassing  right of
privacy.
  In Roe v. Wade, the Court recognized a  guaran-
tee of personal privacy which  is broad enough
to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy.  410 U. S., at 152-153.
We are now of the view that, in terming this right
fundamental, the Court in Roe read the earlier
opinions upon which it based its decision much too
broadly.  Unlike marriage, procreation and contra-
ception, abortion  involves the purposeful termi-
nation of potential life. Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S.
297, 325 (1980).  The abortion decision must
therefore  be recognized as sui generis, different
in kind from the others that the Court has pro-
tected under the rubric of personal or family
privacy and autonomy.  Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, supra,
at 792 (White, J., dissenting).  One cannot ignore
the fact that a woman is not isolated in her
pregnancy, and that the decision to abort neces-
sarily involves the destruction of a fetus.  See
Michael H. v. Gerald D., supra, at 124, n. 4 (To look
 at the act which is assertedly the subject of a
liberty interest in isolation from its effect upon
other people [is] like inquiring whether there is a
liberty interest in firing a gun where the case at
hand happens to involve its discharge into anoth-
er person's body).
  Nor do the historical traditions of the American
people support the view that the right to termi-
nate one's pregnancy is  fundamental.  The
common law which we inherited from England made
abortion after  quickening an offense.  At the
time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,
statutory prohibitions or restrictions on abor-
tion were commonplace; in 1868, at least 28 of the
then-37 States and 8 Territories had statutes
banning or limiting abortion.  J. Mohr, Abortion in
America 200 (1978).  By the turn of the century
virtually every State had a law prohibiting or
restricting abortion on its books.  By the middle
of the present century, a liberalization trend had
set in.  But 21 of the restrictive abortion laws in
effect in1868 were still in effect in 1973 when Roe was
decided,and an overwhelming majority of the States pro-
hibited abortion unless necessary to preserve
the life or healthof the mother.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at 139-140;
id.,at 176-177, n. 2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  On
this record, it can scarcely be said that any
deeply rooted tradition of relatively unrestrict-
ed abortion in our history supported the classifi-
cation of the right to abortion as  fundamental
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
  We think, therefore, both in view of this history
and of our decided cases dealing with substantive
liberty under the Due Process Clause, that the
Court was mistaken in Roe when it classified a
woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy as a
 fundamental right that could be abridged only in
a manner which withstood  strict scrutiny.  In so
concluding, we repeat the observation made in
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U. S. 186 (1986):
      Nor are we inclined to take a more expan-
sive view of our authority to discover new
fundamental rights imbedded in the Due Pro-
cess Clause.  The Court is most vulnerable and
comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals
with judge-made constitutional law having
little or no cognizable roots in the language
or design of the Constitution.  Id., at 194.
We believe that the sort of constitutionally
imposed abortion code of the type illustrated by
our decisions following Roe is inconsistent  with
the notion of a Constitution cast in general
terms, as ours is, and usually speaking in general
principles, as ours does.  Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services, 492 U. S., at 518 (plurality opin-
ion).  The Court in Roe reached too far when it
analogized the right to abort a fetus to the
rights involved in Pierce, Meyer, Loving, and
Griswold, and thereby deemed the right to abor-
tion fundamental.
                      II
  The joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy,
and Souter cannot bring itself to say that Roe
was correct as an original matter, but the au-
thors are of the view that  the immediate ques-
tion is not the soundness of Roe's resolution of
the issue, but the precedential force that must
be accorded to its holding.  Ante, at 29.  Instead
of claiming that Roe was correct as a matter of
original constitutional interpretation, the
opinion therefore contains an elaborate discus-
sion of stare decisis.  This discussion of the
principle of stare decisis appears to be almost
entirely dicta, because the joint opinion does not
apply that principle in dealing with Roe.  Roe
decided that a woman had a fundamental right to an
abortion.  The joint opinion rejects that view.
Roe decided that abortion regulations were to be
subjected to  strict scrutiny and could be
justified only in the light of  compelling state
interests.  The joint opinion rejects that view.
Ante, at 29-30; see Roe v. Wade, supra, at 162-164.
Roe analyzed abortion regulation under a rigid
trimester framework, a framework which has guided
this Court's decisionmaking for 19 years.  The
joint opinion rejects that framework.  Ante, at 31.
  Stare decisis is defined in Black's Law Dictio-
nary as meaning  to abide by, or adhere to, decid-
ed cases.  Black's Law Dictionary 1406 (6th ed.
1990).  Whatever the  central holding of Roe that
is left after the joint opinion finishes dissecting
it is surely not the result of that principle.
While purporting to adhere to precedent, the joint
opinion instead revises it.  Roe continues to
exist, but only in the way a storefront on a
western movie set exists: a mere facade to give
the illusion of reality.  Decisions following Roe,
such as Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, Inc., 462 U. S. 416 (1983), and Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecolo-
gists, 476 U. S. 747 (1986), are frankly overruled
in part under the  undue burden standard ex-
pounded in the joint opinion.  Ante, at 39-42.
  In our view, authentic principles of stare deci-
sis do not require that any portion of the reason-
ing in Roe be kept intact.   Stare decisis is not . . .
a universal, inexorable command, especially in
cases involving the interpretation of the Federal
Constitution.  Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285
U. S. 393, 405 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Erroneous decisions in such constitutional cases
are uniquely durable, because correction through
legislative action, save for constitutional
amendment, is impossible.  It is therefore our duty
to reconsider constitutional interpretations
that  depar[t] from a proper understanding of
the Constitution.  Garcia v. San Antonio Metropoli-
tan Transit Authority, 469 U. S., at 557; see United
States v. Scott, 437 U. S. 82, 101 (1978) ( `[I]n cases
involving the Federal Constitution, . . . [t]he
Court bows to the lessons of experience and the
force of better reasoning, recognizing that the
process of trial and error, so fruitful in the
physical sciences, is appropriate also in the
judicial function.' (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil
& Gas Co., supra, at 406-408 (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting))); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649, 665
(1944).  Our constitutional watch does not cease
merely because we have spoken before on an issue;
when it becomes clear that a prior constitutional
interpretation is unsound we are obliged to
reexamine the question.  See, e.g., West Virginia
State Bd. of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624,
642 (1943); Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64,
74-78 (1938).
  The joint opinion discusses several stare
decisis factors which, it asserts, point toward
retaining a portion of Roe.  Two of these factors
are that the main  factual underpinning of Roe
has remained the same, and that its doctrinal
foundation is no weaker now than it was in 1973.
Ante, at 14-18.  Of course, what might be called the
basic facts which gave rise to Roe have remained
the same"women become pregnant, there is a point
somewhere, depending on medical technology, where
a fetus becomes viable, and women give birth to
children.  But this is only to say that the same
facts which gave rise to Roe will continue to give
rise to similar cases.  It is not a reason, in and of
itself, why those cases must be decided in the
same incorrect manner as was the first case to
deal with the question.  And surely there is no
requirement, in considering whether to depart
from stare decisis in a constitutional case, that
a decision be more wrong now than it was at the
time it was rendered.  If that were true, the most
outlandish constitutional decision could survive
forever, based simply on the fact that it was no
more outlandish later than it was when originally
rendered.
  Nor does the joint opinion faithfully follow this
alleged requirement.  The opinion frankly conclu-
des that Roe and its progeny were wrong in failing
to recognize that the State's interests in mater-
nal health and in the protection of unborn human
life exist throughout pregnancy.  Ante, 29-31.  But
there is no indication that these components of
Roe are any more incorrect at this juncture than
they were at its inception.
  The joint opinion also points to the reliance
interests involved in this context in its effort to
explain why precedent must be followed for prece-
dent's sake.  Certainly it is true that where
reliance is truly at issue, as in the case of
judicial decisions that have formed the basis for
private decisions,  [c]onsiderations in favor of
stare decisis are at their acme.  Payne v. Tennes-
see, 501 U. S., at "" (slip op., at 18).  But, as the
joint opinion apparently agrees, ante, at 13-14,
any traditional notion of reliance is not applica-
ble here.  The Court today cuts back on the pro-
tection afforded by Roe, and no one claims that
this action defeats any reliance interest in the
disavowed trimester framework.  Similarly, reli-
ance interests would not be diminished were the
Court to go further and acknowledge the full
error of Roe, as  reproductive planning could take
virtually immediate account of this action.  Ante,
at 14.
  The joint opinion thus turns to what can only be
described as an unconventional"and unconvinc-
ing"notion of reliance, a view based on the sur-
mise that the availability of abortion since Roe
has led to  two decades of economic and social
developments that would be undercut if the error
of Roe were recognized.  Ibid.  The joint opinion's
assertion of this fact is undeveloped and totally
conclusory.  In fact, one can not be sure to what
economic and social developments the opinion is
referring.  Surely it is dubious to suggest that
women have reached their  places in society in
reliance upon Roe, rather than as a result of
their determination to obtain higher education
and compete with men in the job market, and of
society's increasing recognition of their ability
to fill positions that were previously thought to
be reserved only for men.  Ibid.
  In the end, having failed to put forth any evi-
dence to prove any true reliance, the joint
opinion's argument is based solely on generalized
assertions about the national psyche, on a belief
that the people of this country have grown accus-
tomed to the Roe decision over the last 19 years
and have  ordered their thinking and living
around it.  Ibid.  As an initial matter, one might
inquire how the joint opinion can view the  cen-
tral holding of Roe as so deeply rooted in our
constitutional culture, when it so casually
uproots and disposes of that same decision's
trimester framework.  Furthermore, at various
points in the past, the same could have been said
about this Court's erroneous decisions that the
Constitution allowed  separate but equal treat-
ment of minorities, see Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U. S. 537 (1896), or that  liberty under the Due
Process Clause protected  freedom of contract.
See Adkins v. Children's Hospital of D. C., 261 U. S.
525 (1923); Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905).
The  separate but equal doctrine lasted 58
years after Plessy, and Lochner's protection of
contractual freedom lasted 32 years.  However,
the simple fact that a generation or more had
grown used to these major decisions did not
prevent the Court from correcting its errors in
those cases, nor should it prevent us from cor-
rectly interpreting the Constitution here.  See
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954)
(rejecting the  separate but equal doctrine);
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937)
(overruling Adkins v. Children's Hospital, supra, in
upholding Washington's minimum wage law).
        Apparently realizing that conventional stare
decisis principles do not support its position, the
joint opinion advances a belief that retaining a
portion of Roe is necessary to protect the  le-
gitimacy of this Court.  Ante, at 19-27.  Because
the Court must take care to render decisions
 grounded truly in principle, and not simply as
political and social compromises, ante, at 23, the
joint opinion properly declares it to be this
Court's duty to ignore the public criticism and
protest that may arise as a result of a decision.
Few would quarrel with this statement, although it
may be doubted that Members of this Court, hold-
ing their tenure as they do during constitutional
 good behavior, are at all likely to be intimidat-
ed by such public protests.
  But the joint opinion goes on to state that when
the Court  resolve[s] the sort of intensely
divisive controversy reflected in Roe and those
rare, comparable cases, its decision is exempt
from reconsideration under established principles
of stare decisis in constitutional cases.  Ante, at
24.  This is so, the joint opinion contends, be-
cause in those  intensely divisive cases the
Court has  call[ed] the contending sides of a
national controversy to end their national divi-
sion by accepting a common mandate rooted in the
Constitution, and must therefore take special
care not to be perceived as  surrender[ing] to
political pressure and continued opposition.
Ante, at 24-25.  This is a truly novel principle,
one which is contrary to both the Court's histori-
cal practice and to the Court's traditional will-
ingness to tolerate criticism of its opinions.
Under this principle, when the Court has ruled on
a divisive issue, it is apparently prevented from
overruling that decision for the sole reason that
it was incorrect, unless opposition to the original
decision has died away.
     The first difficulty with this principle lies in
its assumption that cases which are  intensely
divisive can be readily distinguished from those
that are not.  The question of whether a particu-
lar issue is  intensely divisive enough to
qualify for special protection is entirely subjec-
tive and dependent on the individual assumptions
of the members of this Court.  In addition, because
the Court's duty is to ignore public opinion and
criticism on issues that come before it, its
members are in perhaps the worst position to
judge whether a decision divides the Nation deeply
enough to justify such uncommon protection.
Although many of the Court's decisions divide the
populace to a large degree, we have not previous-
ly on that account shied away from applying normal
rules of stare decisis when urged to reconsider
earlier decisions.  Over the past 21 years, for
example, the Court has overruled in whole or in
part 34 of its previous constitutional decisions.
See Payne v. Tennessee, supra, at "", and n. 1 (slip
op., at 18-19, and n. 1) (listing cases).
  The joint opinion picks out and discusses two
prior Court rulings that it believes are of the
 intensely divisive variety, and concludes that
they are of comparable dimension to Roe.  Ante, at
19-22 (discussing Lochner v. New York, supra, and
Plessy v. Ferguson, supra).  It appears to us very
odd indeed that the joint opinion chooses as
benchmarks two cases in which the Court chose not
to adhere to erroneous constitutional precedent,
but instead enhanced its stature by acknowledging
and correcting its error, apparently in violation
of the joint opinion's  legitimacy principle.  See
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, supra; Brown v.
Board of Education, supra.  One might also wonder
how it is that the joint opinion puts these, and
not others, in the  intensely divisive category,
and how it assumes that these are the only two
lines of cases of comparable dimension to Roe.
There is no reason to think that either Plessy or
Lochner produced the sort of public protest when
they were decided that Roe did.  There were
undoubtedly large segments of the bench and bar
who agreed with the dissenting views in those
cases, but surely that cannot be what the Court
means when it uses the term  intensely divisive,
or many other cases would have to be added to the
list.  In terms of public protest, however, Roe, so
far as we know, was unique.  But just as the Court
should not respond to that sort of protest by
retreating from the decision simply to allay the
concerns of the protesters, it should likewise not
respond by determining to adhere to the decision
at all costs lest it seem to be retreating under
fire.  Public protests should not alter the normal
application of stare decisis, lest perfectly lawful
protest activity be penalized by the Court itself.
  Taking the joint opinion on its own terms, we
doubt that its distinction between Roe, on the one
hand, and Plessy and Lochner, on the other, with-
stands analysis.  The joint opinion acknowledges
that the Court improved its stature by overruling
Plessy in Brown on a deeply divisive issue.  And
our decision in West Coast Hotel, which overruled
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, supra, and Lochner,
was rendered at a time when Congress was consid-
ering President Franklin Roosevelt's proposal to
 reorganize this Court and enable him to name six
additional Justices in the event that any member
of the Court over the age of 70 did not elect to
retire.  It is difficult to imagine a situation in
which the Court would face more intense opposi-
tion to a prior ruling than it did at that time, and,
under the general principle proclaimed in the joint
opinion, the Court seemingly should have respond-
ed to this opposition by stubbornly refusing to
reexamine the Lochner rationale, lest it lose
legitimacy by appearing to  overrule under fire.
Ante, at 25.
   The joint opinion agrees that the Court's stat-
ure would have been seriously damaged if in Brown
and West Coast Hotel it had dug in its heels and
refused to apply normal principles of stare deci-
sis to the earlier decisions.  But the opinion
contends that the Court was entitled to overrule
Plessy and Lochner in those cases, despite the
existence of opposition to the original decisions,
only because both the Nation and the Court had
learned new lessons in the interim.  This is at
best a feebly supported, post hoc rationalization
for those decisions.
  For example, the opinion asserts that the Court
could justifiably overrule its decision in Lochner
only because the Depression had convinced  most
people that constitutional protection of con-
tractual freedom contributed to an economy that
failed to protect the welfare of all.  Ante, at 19.
Surely the joint opinion does not mean to suggest
that people saw this Court's failure to uphold
minimum wage statutes as the cause of the Great
Depression-  In any event, the Lochner Court did
not base its rule upon the policy judgment that an
unregulated market was fundamental to a stable
economy; it simple believed, erroneously, that
 liberty under the Due Process Clause protected
the  right to make a contract.  Lochner v. New
York, 198 U. S., at 53.  Nor is it the case that the
people of this Nation only discovered the dangers
of extreme laissez faire economics because of the
Depression.  State laws regulating maximum hours
and minimum wages were in existence well before
that time.  A Utah statute of that sort enacted in
1896 was involved in our decision in Holden v.
Hardy, 169 U. S. 366 (1898), and other states
followed suit shortly afterwards.  See, e.g., Muller
v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Bunting v. Oregon, 243
U. S. 426 (1917).  These statutes were indeed
enacted because of a belief on the part of their
sponsors that  freedom of contract did not
protect the welfare of workers, demonstrating
that that belief manifested itself more than a
generation before the Great Depression.  Whether
 most people had come to share it in the hard
times of the 1930's is, insofar as anything the
joint opinion advances, entirely speculative.  The
crucial failing at that time was not that workers
were not paid a fair wage, but that there was no
work available at any wage.
  When the Court finally recognized its error in
West Coast Hotel, it did not engage in the post hoc
rationalization that the joint opinion attributes
to it today; it did not state that Lochner had been
based on an economic view that had fallen into
disfavor, and that it therefore should be over-
ruled.  Chief Justice Hughes in his opinion for the
Court simply recognized what Justice Holmes had
previously recognized in his Lochner dissent, that
 [t]he Constitution does not speak of freedom of
contract.  West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300
U. S., at 391; Lochner v. New York, supra, at 75
(Holmes, J., dissenting) ( [A] Constitution is not
intended to embody a particular economic theory,
whether of paternalism and the organic relation
of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire).
Although the Court did acknowledge in the last
paragraph of its opinion the state of affairs
during the then-current Depression, the theme of
the opinion is that the Court had been mistaken as
a matter of constitutional law when it embraced
 freedom of contract 32 years previously.
  The joint opinion also agrees that the Court
acted properly in rejecting the doctrine of
 separate but equal in Brown.  In fact, the
opinion lauds Brown in comparing it to Roe.  Ante,
at 25.  This is strange, in that under the opinion's
 legitimacy principle the Court would seemingly
have been forced to adhere to its erroneous
decision in Plessy because of its  intensely
divisive character.  To us, adherence to Roe
today under the guise of  legitimacy would seem
to resemble more closely adherence to Plessy on
the same ground.  Fortunately, the Court did not
choose that option in Brown, and instead frankly
repudiated Plessy.  The joint opinion concludes
that such repudiation was justified only because
of newly discovered evidence that segregation
had the effect of treating one race as inferior to
another.  But it can hardly be argued that this
was not urged upon those who decided Plessy, as
Justice Harlan observed in his dissent that the
law at issue  puts the brand of servitude and
degradation upon a large class of our fellow-
citizens, our equals before the law.  Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U. S., at 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
It is clear that the same arguments made before
the Court in Brown were made in Plessy as well.
The Court in Brown simply recognized, as Justice
Harlan had recognized beforehand, that the Four-
teenth Amendment does not permit racial segrega-
tion.  The rule of Brown is not tied to popular
opinion about the evils of segregation; it is a
judgment that the Equal Protection Clause does
not permit racial segregation, no matter whether
the public might come to believe that it is benefi-
cial.  On that ground it stands, and on that ground
alone the Court was justified in properly conclud-
ing that the Plessy Court had erred.
  There is also a suggestion in the joint opinion
that the propriety of overruling a  divisive
decision depends in part on whether  most people
would now agree that it should be overruled.
Either the demise of opposition or its progres-
sion to substantial popular agreement apparently
is required to allow the Court to reconsider a
divisive decision.  How such agreement would be
ascertained, short of a public opinion poll, the
joint opinion does not say.  But surely even the
suggestion is totally at war with the idea of
 legitimacy in whose name it is invoked.  The
Judicial Branch derives its legitimacy, not from
following public opinion, but from deciding by its
best lights whether legislative enactments of the
popular branches of Government comport with the
Constitution.  The doctrine of stare decisis is an
adjunct of this duty, and should be no more sub-
ject to the vagaries of public opinion than is the
basic judicial task.
  There are other reasons why the joint opinion's
discussion of legitimacy is unconvincing as well.
In assuming that the Court is perceived as  sur-
render[ing] to political pressure when it over-
rules a controversial decision, ante, at 25, the
joint opinion forgets that there are two sides to
any controversy.  The joint opinion asserts that,
in order to protect its legitimacy, the Court must
refrain from overruling a controversial decision
lest it be viewed as favoring those who oppose
the decision.  But a decision to adhere to prior
precedent is subject to the same criticism, for in
such a case one can easily argue that the Court
is responding to those who have demonstrated in
favor of the original decision.  The decision in Roe
has engendered large demonstrations, including
repeated marches on this Court and on Congress,
both in opposition to and in support of that
opinion.  A decision either way on Roe can there-
fore be perceived as favoring one group or the
other.  But this perceived dilemma arises only if
one assumes, as the joint opinion does, that the
Court should make its decisions with a view toward
speculative public perceptions.  If one assumes
instead, as the Court surely did in both Brown and
West Coast Hotel, that the Court's legitimacy is
enhanced by faithful interpretion of the Consti-
tution irrespective of public opposition, such
self-engendered difficulties may be put to one
side.
  Roe is not this Court's only decision to gener-
ate conflict.  Our decisions in some recent capital
cases, and in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U. S. 186
(1986), have also engendered demonstrations in
opposition.  The joint opinion's message to such
protesters appears to be that they must cease
their activities in order to serve their cause,
because their protests will only cement in place
a decision which by normal standards of stare
decisis should be reconsidered.  Nearly a century
ago, Justice David J. Brewer of this Court, in an
article discussing criticism of its decisions,
observed that  many criticisms may be, like their
authors, devoid of good taste, but better all
sorts of criticism than no criticism at all.
Justice Brewer on  The Nation's Anchor, 57
Albany L.J. 166, 169 (1898).  This was good advice to
the Court then, as it is today.  Strong and often
misguided criticism of a decision should not
render the decision immune from reconsideration,
lest a fetish for legitimacy penalize freedom of
expression.
  The end result of the joint opinion's paeans of
praise for legitimacy is the enunciation of a
brand new standard for evaluating state regula-
tion of a woman's right to abortion"the  undue
burden standard.  As indicated above, Roe v. Wade
adopted a  fundamental right standard under
which state regulations could survive only if they
met the requirement of  strict scrutiny.  While
we disagree with that standard, it at least had a
recognized basis in constitutional law at the time
Roe was decided.  The same cannot be said for the
 undue burden standard, which is created largely
out of whole cloth by the authors of the joint
opinion.  It is a standard which even today does
not command the support of a majority of this
Court.  And it will not, we believe, result in the
sort of  simple limitation, easily applied, which
the joint opinion anticipates.  Ante, at 13.  In sum,
it is a standard which is not built to last.
      In evaluating abortion regulations under that
standard, judges will have to decide whether they
place a  substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion.  Ante, at 34.  In that
this standard is based even more on a judge's
subjective determinations than was the trimester
framework, the standard will do nothing to prevent
 judges from roaming at large in the constitu-
tional field guided only by their personal views.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S., at 502 (Harlan,
J., concurring in judgment).  Because the undue
burden standard is plucked from nowhere, the
question of what is a  substantial obstacle to
abortion will undoubtedly engender a variety of
conflicting views.  For example, in the very matter
before us now, the authors of the joint opinion
would uphold Pennsylvania's 24-hour waiting
period, concluding that a ``particular burden'' on
some women is not a substantial obstacle.  Ante,
at 44.  But the authors would at the same time
strike down Pennsylvania's spousal notice provi-
sion, after finding that in a  large fraction of
cases the provision will be a substantial obsta-
cle.  Ante, at 53.  And, while the authors conclude
that the informed consent provisions do not
constitute an  undue burden, Justice Stevens
would hold that they do.  Ante, at 9-11.
  Furthermore, while striking down the spousal
notice regulation, the joint opinion would uphold
a parental consent restriction that certainly
places very substantial obstacles in the path of
a minor's abortion choice.  The joint opinion is
forthright in admitting that it draws this distinc-
tion based on a policy judgment that parents will
have the best interests of their children at
heart, while the same is not necessarily true of
husbands as to their wives.  Ante, at 53.  This may
or may not be a correct judgment, but it is quint-
essentially a legislative one.  The  undue burden
inquiry does not in any way supply the distinction
between parental consent and spousal consent
which the joint opinion adopts.  Despite the
efforts of the joint opinion, the undue burden
standard presents nothing more workable than the
trimester framework which it discards today.
Under the guise of the Constitution, this Court
will still impart its own preferences on the
States in the form of a complex abortion code.
  The sum of the joint opinion's labors in the name
of stare decisis and  legitimacy is this: Roe v.
Wade stands as a sort of judicial Potemkin Village,
which may be pointed out to passers by as a
monument to the importance of adhering to prece-
dent.  But behind the facade, an entirely new
method of analysis, without any roots in consti-
tutional law, is imported to decide the constitu-
tionality of state laws regulating abortion.
Neither stare decisis nor  legitimacy are truly
served by such an effort.
  We have stated above our belief that the Con-
stitution does not subject state abortion regula-
tions to heightened scrutiny.  Accordingly, we
think that the correct analysis is that set forth
by the plurality opinion in Webster.  A woman's
interest in having an abortion is a form of liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause, but States
may regulate abortion procedures in ways ratio-
nally related to a legitimate state interest.
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U. S.
483, 491 (1955); cf. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S.
645, 651-653 (1972).  With this rule in mind, we
examine each of the challenged provisions.
                      III
                       A
  Section 3205 of the Act imposes certain re-
quirements related to the informed consent of a
woman seeking an abortion.  18 Pa. Cons. Stat.
3205 (1990).  Section 3205(a)(1) requires that the
referring or performing physician must inform a
woman contemplating an abortion of (i) the nature
of the procedure, and the risks and alternatives
that a reasonable patient would find material; (ii)
the fetus' probable gestational age; and (iii) the
medical risks involved in carrying her pregnancy
to term.  Section 3205(a)(2) requires a physician
or a nonphysician counselor to inform the woman
that (i) the state health department publishes
free materials describing the fetus at different
stages and listing abortion alternatives; (ii)
medical assistance benefits may be available for
prenatal, childbirth, and neonatal care; and (iii)
the child's father is liable for child support.  The
Act also imposes a 24-hour waiting period between
the time that the woman receives the required
information and the time that the physician is
allowed to perform the abortion.  See Appendix,
ante, at 61-63.
  This Court has held that it is certainly within
the province of the States to require a woman's
voluntary and informed consent to an abortion.
See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetri-
cians and Gynecologists, 476 U. S., at 760.  Here,
Pennsylvania seeks to further its legitimate
interest in obtaining informed consent by ensur-
ing that each woman  is aware not only of the
reasons for having an abortion, but also of the
risks associated with an abortion and the avail-
ability of assistance that might make the alterna-
tive of normal childbirth more attractive than it
might otherwise appear.  Id., at 798-799 (White,
J., dissenting).
  We conclude that this provision of the statute
is rationally related to the State's interest in
assuring thata woman's consent to an abortion be a fully infor-
meddecision.
 Section 3205(a)(1) requires a physician to dis-
close certain information about the abortion
procedure and its risks and alternatives.  This
requirement is certainly no large burden, as the
Court of Appeals found that  the record shows
that the clinics, without exception, insist on
providing this information to women before an
abortion is performed.  947 F. 2d, at 703.  We are
of the view that this information  clearly is
related to maternal health and to the State's
legitimate purpose in requiring informed consent.
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462
U. S., at 446.  An accurate description of the
gestational age of the fetus and of the risks
involved in carrying a child to term helps to
further both those interests and the State's
legitimate interest in unborn human life.  See id.,
at 445-446, n. 37 (required disclosure of gesta-
tional age of the fetus  certainly is not objec-
tionable).  Although petitioners contend that it
is unreasonable for the State to require that a
physician, as opposed to a nonphysician counsel-
or, disclose this information, we agree with the
Court of Appeals that a State  may rationally
decide that physicians are better qualified than
counselors to impart this information and answer
questions about the medical aspects of the
available alternatives.  947 F. 2d, at 704.
  Section 3205(a)(2) compels the disclosure, by a
physician or a counselor, of information concern-
ing the availability of paternal child support and
state-funded alternatives if the woman decides
to proceed with her pregnancy.  Here again, the
Court of Appeals observed that  the record
indicates that most clinics already require that
a counselor consult in person with the woman
about alternatives to abortion before the abor-
tion is performed.  Id., at 704-705.  And peti-
tioners do not claim that the information required
to be disclosed by statute is in any way false or
inaccurate; indeed, the Court of Appeals found it
to be  relevant, accurate, and non-inflammatory.
Id., at 705.  We conclude that this required pre-
sentation of  balanced information is rationally
related to the State's legitimate interest in
ensuring that the woman's consent is truly in-
formed, Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetri-
cians and Gynecologists, 476 U. S., at 830 (O'Conn-
or, J., dissenting), and in addition furthers the
State's interest in preserving unborn life.  That
the information might create some uncertainty and
persuade some women to forgo abortions does not
lead to the conclusion that the Constitution
forbids the provision of such information.  Indeed,
it only demonstrates that this information might
very well make a difference, and that it is there-
fore relevant to a woman's informed choice.  Cf.
id., at 801 (White, J., dissenting) ( [T]he ostensi-
ble objective of Roe v. Wade is not maximizing the
number of abortions, but maximizing choice).  We
acknowledge that in Thornburgh this Court struck
down informed consent requirements similar to the
ones at issue here.  See id., at 760-764.  It is
clear, however, that while the detailed framework
of Roe led to the Court's invalidation of those
informational requirements, they  would have been
sustained under any traditional standard of
judicial review, . . . or for any other surgical
procedure except abortion.  Webster v. Reproduc-
tive Health Services, 492 U. S., at 517 (plurality
opinion) (citing Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U. S., at 802
(White, J., dissenting); id., at 783 (Burger, C. J.,
dissenting)).  In light of our rejection of Roe's
 fundamental right approach to this subject, we
do not regard Thornburgh as controlling.
  For the same reason, we do not feel bound to
follow this Court's previous holding that a Stat-
e's 24-hour mandatory waiting period is unconsti-
tutional.  See Akron v. Akron Center for Reproduc-
tive Health, 462 U. S., at 449-451.  Petitioners are
correct that such a provision will result in
delays for some women that might not otherwise
exist, therefore placing a burden on their liberty.
But the provision in no way prohibits abortions,
and the informed consent and waiting period
requirements do not apply in the case of a medical
emergency.  See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 3205(a), (b)
(1990).  We are of the view that, in providing time
for reflection and reconsideration, the waiting
period helps ensure that a woman's decision to
abort is a well-considered one, and reasonably
furthers the State's legitimate interest in
maternal health and in the unborn life of the
fetus.  It  is surely a small cost to impose to
ensure that the woman's decision is well consid-
ered in light of its certain and irreparable
consequences on fetal life, and the possible
effects on her own.  Id., at 474 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
                       B
  In addition to providing her own informed con-
sent, before an unemancipated woman under the
age of 18 may obtain an abortion she must either
furnish the consent of one of her parents, or must
opt for the judicial procedure that allows her to
bypass the consent requirement.  Under the
judicial bypass option, a minor can obtain an
abortion if a state court finds that she is capa-
ble of giving her informed consent and has indeed
given such consent, or determines that an abor-
tion is in her best interests.  Records of these
court proceedings are kept confidential.  The Act
directs the state trial court to render a decision
within three days of the woman's application, and
the entire procedure, including appeal to Pennsyl-
vania Superior Court, is to last no longer than
eight business days.  The parental consent re-
quirement does not apply in the case of a medical
emergency.  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 3206 (1990).  See
Appendix, ante, at 64-65.
  This provision is entirely consistent with this
Court's previous decisions involving parental
consent requirements.  See Planned Parenthood
Association of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft,
462 U. S. 476 (1983) (upholding parental consent
requirement with a similar judicial bypass option);
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
supra, at 439-440 (approving of parental consent
statutes that include a judicial bypass option
allowing a pregnant minor to  demonstrate that
she is sufficiently mature to make the abortion
decision herself or that, despite her immaturity,
an abortion would be in her best interests);
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622 (1979).
  We think it beyond dispute that a State  has a
strong and legitimate interest in the welfare of
its young citizens, whose immaturity, inexperi-
ence, and lack of judgment may sometimes impair
their ability to exercise their rights wisely.
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U. S., at 444 (opinion of
Stevens, J.).  A requirement of parental consent
to abortion, like myriad other restrictions placed
upon minors in other contexts, is reasonably
designed to further this important and legitimate
state interest.  In our view, it is entirely  ratio-
nal and fair for the State to conclude that, in
most instances, the family will strive to give a
lonely or even terrified minor advice that is both
compassionate and mature.  Ohio v. Akron Center
for Reproductive Health, 497 U. S., at 520 (opinion
of Kennedy, J.); see also Planned Parenthood of
Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S., at 91 (Stewart,
J., concurring) ( There can be little doubt that
the State furthers a constitutionally permissible
end by encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to
seek the help and advice of her parents in making
the very important decision whether or not to
bear a child).  We thus conclude that Pennsylvan-
ia's parental consent requirement should be
upheld.
                       C
  Section 3209 of the Act contains the spousal
notification provision.  It requires that, before
a physician may perform an abortion on a married
woman, the woman must sign a statement indicating
that she has notified her husband of her planned
abortion.  A woman is not required to notify her
husband if (1) her husband is not the father, (2) her
husband, after diligent effort, cannot be located,
(3) the pregnancy is the result of a spousal sexual
assault that has been reported to the authori-
ties, or (4) the woman has reason to believe that
notifying her husband is likely to result in the
infliction of bodily injury upon her by him or by
another individual.  In addition, a woman is ex-
empted from the notification requirement in the
case of a medical emergency.  18 Pa. Cons. Stat.
3209 (1990).  See Appendix, ante, at 68-69.
  We first emphasize that Pennsylvania has not
imposed a spousal consent requirement of the type
the Court struck down in Planned Parenthood of
Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S., at 67-72.
Missouri's spousal consent provision was invali-
dated in that case because of the Court's view
that it unconstitutionally granted to the husband
 a veto power exercisable for any reason whatso-
ever or for no reason at all.  Id., at 71.  But this
case involves a much less intrusive requirement
of spousal notification, not consent.  Such a law
requiring only notice to the husband  does not
give any third party the legal right to make the
[woman's] decision for her, or to prevent her from
obtaining an abortion should she choose to have
one performed.  Hodgson v. Minnesota, supra, at
496 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part
and dissenting in part); see H. L. v. Matheson, 450
U. S., at 411, n. 17.  Danforth thus does not control
our analysis.  Petitioners contend that it should,
however; they argue that the real effect of such
a notice requirement is to give the power to
husbands to veto a woman's abortion choice.  The
District Court indeed found that the notification
provision created a risk that some woman who
would otherwise have an abortion will be pre-
vented from having one.  947 F. 2d, at 712.  For
example, petitioners argue, many notified hus-
bands will prevent abortions through physical
force, psychological coercion, and other types of
threats.  But Pennsylvania has incorporated
exceptions in the notice provision in an attempt
to deal with these problems.  For instance, a
woman need not notify her husband if the pregnan-
cy is result of a reported sexual assault, or if
she has reason to believe that she wouldsuffer bodily
injury as a result of the notifica-
tion.  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 3209(b) (1990).  Further-
more, because this is a facial challenge to the
Act, it is insufficient for petitioners to show
that the notification provision  might operate
unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of
circumstances.  United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S.
739, 745 (1987).  Thus, it is not enough for peti-
tioners to show that, in some  worst-case
circumstances, the notice provision will operate
as a grant of veto power to husbands.  Ohio v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U. S., at
514.  Because they are making a facial challenge to
the provision, they must  show that no set of
circumstances exists under which the [provision]
would be valid.  Ibid. (internal quotation marks
omitted).  This they have failed to do.
   The question before us is therefore whether the
spousal notification requirement rationally
furthers any legitimate state interests.  We
conclude that it does.  First, a husband's inter-
ests in procreation within marriage and in the
potential life of his unborn child are certainly
substantial ones.  See Planned Parenthood of
Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S., at 69 ( We are
not unaware of the deep and proper concern and
interest that a devoted and protective husband
has in his wife's pregnancy and in the growth and
development of the fetus she is carrying); id., at
93 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316
U. S., at 541.  The State itself has legitimate
interests both in protecting these interests of
the father and in protecting the potential life of
the fetus, and the spousal notification require-
ment is reasonably related to advancing those
state interests.  By providing that a husband will
usually know of his spouse's intent to have an
abortion, the provision makes it more likely that
the husband will participate in deciding the fate
of his unborn child, a possibility that might
otherwise have been denied him.  This participa-
tion might in some cases result in a decision to
proceed with the pregnancy.  As Judge Alito
observed in his dissent below,  [t]he Pennsylvania
legislature could have rationally believed that
some married women are initially inclined to
obtain an abortion without their husbands' knowl-
edge because of perceived problems"such as
economic constraints, future plans, or the husba-
nds' previously expressed opposition"that may be
obviated by discussion prior to the abortion.
947 F. 2d, at 726 (Alito, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
  The State also has a legitimate interest in
promoting  the integrity of the marital relation-
ship.  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 3209(a) (1990).  This
Court has previously recognized  the importance
of the marital relationship in our society.
Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth,
supra, at 69.  In our view, the spousal notice
requirement is a rational attempt by the State to
improve truthful communication between spouses
and encourage collaborative decisionmaking, and
thereby fosters marital integrity.  See Labine v.
Vincent, 401 U. S. 532, 538 (1971) ( [T]he power to
make rules to establish, protect, and strengthen
family life is committed to the state legisla-
tures).  Petitioners argue that the notification
requirement does not further any such interest;
they assert that the majority of wives already
notify their husbands of their abortion decisions,
and the remainder have excellent reasons for
keeping their decisions a secret.  In the first
case, they argue, the law is unnecessary, and in
the second case it will only serve to foster
marital discord and threats of harm.  Thus, peti-
tioners see the law as a totally irrational means
of furthering whatever legitimate interest the
State might have.  But, in our view, it is unrealis-
tic to assume that every husband-wife relation-
ship is either (1) so perfect that this type of
truthful and important communication will take
place as a matter of course, or (2) so imperfect
that, upon notice, the husband will react selfish-
ly, violently, or contrary to the best interests
of his wife.  See Planned Parenthood of Central Mo.
v. Danforth, supra, at 103-104 (Stevens, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (making a
similar point in the context of a parental consent
statute).  The spousal notice provision will admit-
tedly be unnecessary in some circumstances, and
possibly harmful in others, but  the existence of
particular cases in which a feature of a statute
performs no function (or is even counterproduc-
tive) ordinarily does not render the statute
unconstitutional or even constitutionally sus-
pect.  Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetri-
cians and Gynecologists, 476 U. S., at 800 (White,
J., dissenting).  The Pennsylvania Legislature was
in a position to weigh the likely benefits of the
provi-sion against its likely adverse effects, and
presumably concluded, on balance, that the provi-
sion would be beneficial.  Whether this was a wise
decision or not, we cannot say that it was irra-
tional.  We therefore conclude that the spousal
notice provision comports with the Constitution.
See Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S., at 325-326 ( It is
not the mission of this Court or any other to
decide whether the balance of competing interests
. . . is wise social policy).
                       D
  The Act also imposes various reporting require-
ments.  Section 3214(a) requires that abortion
facilities file a report on each abortion per-
formed.  The reports do not include the identity of
the women on whom abortions are performed, but
they do contain a variety of information about
the abortions.  For example, each report must
include the identities of the performing and
referring physicians, the gestational age of the
fetus at the time of abortion, and the basis for
any medical judgment that a medical emergency
existed.  See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 3214(a)(1), (5), (10)
(1990).  See Appendix, ante, at 69-71.  The District
Court found that these reports are kept com-
pletely confidential.  947 F. 2d, at 716.  We further
conclude that these reporting requirements
rationally further the State's legitimate inter-
ests in advancing the state of medical knowledge
concerning maternal health and prenatal life, in
gathering statistical information with respect to
patients, and in ensuring compliance with other
provisions of the Act.
  Section 3207 of the Act requires each abortion
facility to file a report with its name and ad-
dress, as well as the names and addresses of any
parent, subsidiary or affiliated organizations.  18
Pa. Cons. Stat. 3207(b) (1990).  Section 3214(f)
further requires each facility to file quarterly
reports stating the total number of abortions
performed, broken down by trimester.  Both of
these reports are available to the public only if
the facility received state funds within the
preceding 12 months.  See Appendix, ante, at 65-66,
71.  Petitioners do not challenge the requirement
that facilities provide this information.  They
contend, however, that the forced public disclo-
sure of the information given by facilities re-
ceiving public funds serves no legitimate state
interest.  We disagree.  Records relating to the
expenditure of public funds are generally avail-
able to the public under Pennsylvania law.  See Pa.
Stat. Ann., Tit. 65, 66.1, 66.2 (Purdon 1959 and
Supp. 1991-1992).  As the Court of Appeals ob-
served,  [w]hen a state provides money to a
private commercial enterprise, there is a legiti-
mate public interest in informing taxpayers who
the funds are benefiting and what services the
funds are supporting.  947 F. 2d, at 718.  These
reporting requirements rationally further this
legitimate state interest.
                       E
  Finally, petitioners challenge the medical
emergency exception provided for by the Act.  The
existence of a medical emergency exempts compli-
ance with the Act's informed consent, parental
consent, and spousal notice requirements.  See 18
Pa. Cons. Stat. 3205(a), 3206(a), 3209(c) (1990).
The Act defines a  medical emergency as
 [t]hat condition which, on the basis of the
physician's good faith clinical judgment, so
complicates the medical condition of a preg-
nant woman as to necessitate the immediate
abortion of her pregnancy to avert her death
or for which a delay will create serious risk
of substantial and irreversible impairment of
major bodily function.  3203.
Petitioners argued before the District Court
that the statutory definition was inadequate
because it did not cover three serious conditions
that pregnant women can suffer"preeclampsia,
inevitable abortion, and prematurely ruptured
membrane.  The District Court agreed with peti-
tioners that the medical emergency exception was
inadequate, but the Court of Appeals reversed
this holding.  In construing the medical emergency
provision, the Court of Appeals first observed
that all three conditions do indeed present the
risk of serious injury or death when an abortion
is not performed, and noted that the medical
profession's uniformly prescribed treatment for
each of the three conditions is an immediate
abortion.  See 947 F. 2d, at 700-701.  Finding that
 [t]he Pennsylvania legislature did not choose
the wording of its medical emergency exception in
a vacuum, the court read the exception as in-
tended  to assure that compliance with its abor-
tion regulations would not in any way pose a
significant threat to the life or health of a
woman.  Id., at 701.  It thus concluded that the
exception encompassed each of the three danger-
ous conditions pointed to by petitioners.
  We observe that Pennsylvania's present defini-
tion of medical emergency is almost an exact copy
of that State's definition at the time of this
Court's ruling in Thornburgh, one which the Court
made reference to with apparent approval.  476
U. S., at 771 ( It is clear that the Pennsylvania
Legislature knows how to provide a medical-
emergency exception when it chooses to do
so).  We find that the interpretation of the
Court of Appeals in this case is eminently reason-
able, and that the provision thus should be up-
held.  When a woman is faced with any condition
that poses a  significant threat to [her] life or
health, she is exempted from the Act's consent
and notice requirements and may proceed immedi-
ately with her abortion.
                      IV
  For the reasons stated, we therefore would hold
that each of the challenged provisions of the
Pennsylvania statute is consistent with the
Constitution.  It bears emphasis that our conclu-
sion in this regard does not carry with it any
necessary approval of these regulations.  Our
task is, as always, to decide only whether the
challenged provisions of a law comport with the
United States Constitution.  If, as we believe,
these do, their wisdom as a matter of public policy
is for the people of Pennsylvania to decide.
Concur/dissent 4
      SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES--------
       Nos. 91-744 and 91-902
              --------
 PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF SOUTHEASTERN
       PENNSYLVANIA, et al., PETITIONERS
91-744                v.
         ROBERT P. CASEY, et al., etc.

        ROBERT P. CASEY, et al., etc.,
                  PETITIONERS
91-902                v.
      PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF SOUTHEASTERN
              PENNSYLVANIA et al.
  on writs of certiorari to the united states
court of
         appeals for the third circuit
                                       [June 29, 1992]

  Justice Scalia, with whom the Chief Justice,
Justice White, and Justice Thomas join, concur-
ring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.
  My views on this matter are unchanged from
those I set forth in my separate opinions in
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U. S.
490, 532 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment), and Ohio v. Akron Center
for Reproductive Health, 497 U. S. 502, 520 (1990)
(Akron II) (Scalia, J., concurring).  The States may,
if they wish, permit abortion-on-demand, but the
Constitution does not require them to do so.  The
permissibility of abortion, and the limitations
upon it, are to be resolved like most important
questions in our democracy: by citizens trying to
persuade one another and then voting.  As the
Court acknowledges,  where reasonable people
disagree the government can adopt one position or
the other.  Ante, at 8.  The Court is correct in
adding the qualification that this  assumes a
state of affairs in which the
choice does not intrude upon a protected liber-
ty, ante, at 9"but the crucial part of that
qualification is the penultimate word.  A State's
choice between two positions on which reasonable
people can disagree is constitutional even when
(as is often the case) it intrudes upon a  liberty
in the absolute sense.  Laws against bigamy, for
example"which entire societies of reasonable
people disagree with"intrude upon men and women's
liberty to marry and live with one another.  But
bigamy happens not to be a liberty specially
 protected by the Constitution.
  That is, quite simply, the issue in this case: not
whether the power of a woman to abort her unborn
child is a  liberty in the absolute sense; or even
whether it is a liberty of great importance to
many women.  Of course it is both.  The issue is
whether it is a liberty protected by the Constitu-
tion of the United States.  I am sure it is not.  I
reach that conclusion not because of anything so
exalted as my views concerning the  concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life.  Ibid.  Rather, I reach it
for the same reason I reach the conclusion that
bigamy is not constitutionally protected"because
of two simple facts: (1) the Constitution says
absolutely nothing about it, and (2) the longstand-
ing traditions of American society have permitted
it to be legally proscribed.  Akron II, supra,
at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring).
  The Court destroys the proposition, evidently
meant to represent my position, that  liberty
includes  only those practices, defined at the
most specific level, that were protected against
government interference by other rules of law
when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified,
ante, at 5 (citing Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U. S.
110, 127, n. 6 (1989) (opinion of Scalia, J.).  That is
not, however, what Michael H. says; it merely
observes that, in defining  lib-erty, we may not
disregard a specific,  relevant tradition pro-
tecting, or denying protection to, the asserted
right, 491 U. S., at 127, n. 6.  But the Court does
not wish to be fettered by any such limitations on
its preferences.  The Court's statement that it is
 tempting to acknowledge the authoritativeness
of tradition in order to  cur[b] the discretion of
federal judges, ante, at 5, is of course rhetoric
rather than reality; no government official is
 tempted to place restraints upon his own
freedom of action, which is why Lord Acton did not
say  Power tends to purify.  The Court's tempta-
tion is in the quite opposite and more natural
direction"towards systematically eliminating
checks upon its own power; and it succumbs.
  Beyond that brief summary of the essence of my
position, I will not swell the United States Re-
ports with repetition of what I have said before;
and applying the rational basis test, I would
uphold the Pennsylvania statute in its entirety.
I must, however, respond to a few of the more
outrageous arguments in today's opinion, which it
is beyond human nature to leave unanswered.  I
shall discuss each of them under a quotation from
the Court's opinion to which they pertain.

   The inescapable fact is that adjudication of
substantive due process claims may call upon the
Court in interpreting the Constitution to exer-
cise that same capacity which by tradition courts
always have exercised: reasoned judgment.
                                   Ante, at 7.
  Assuming that the question before us is to be
resolved at such a level of philosophical abstrac-
tion, in such isolation from the traditions of
American society, as by simply applying  reasoned
judgment, I do not see how that could possibly
have produced the answer the Court arrived at in
Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973).  Today's opinion
describes the methodology of Roe, quite accurate-
ly, as weighing against the woman's interest the
State's  `important and legitimate interest in
protecting the potentiality of human life.'  Ante,
at 28-29 (quoting Roe, supra, at 162).  But  rea-
soned judgment does not begin by begging the
question, as Roe and subsequent cases unques-
tionably did by assuming that what the State is
protecting is the mere  potentiality of human
life.  See, e.g., Roe, supra, at 162; Planned Parent-
hood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 61
(1976); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379, 386
(1979); Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, Inc., 462 U. S. 416, 428 (1983) (Akron I);
Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc.
v. Ashcroft, 462 U. S. 476, 482 (1983).  The whole
argument of abortion opponents is that what the
Court calls the fetus and what others call the
unborn child is a human life.  Thus, whatever
answer Roe came up with after conducting its
 balancing is bound to be wrong, unless it is
correct that the human fetus is in some critical
sense merely potentially human.  There is of
course no way to determine that as a legal matter;
it is in fact a value judgment.  Some societies
have considered newborn children not yet human,
or the incompetent elderly no longer so.
  The authors of the joint opinion, of course, do
not squarely contend that Roe v. Wade was a
correct application of  reasoned judgment;
merely that it must be followed, because of stare
decisis.  Ante, at 11, 18-19, 29.  But in their ex-
haustive discussion of all the factors that go
into the determination of when stare decisis
should be observed and when disregarded, they
never mention  how wrong was the decision on its
face?  Surely, if  [t]he Court's power lies . . . in
its legitimacy, a product of substance and per-
ception, ante, at 23, the  substance part of the
equation demands that plain error be acknowledged
and eliminated.  Roe was plainly wrong"even on the
Court's methodology of  reasoned judgment, and
even more so (of course) if the proper criteria of
text and tradition are applied.
  The emptiness of the  reasoned judgment that
produced Roe is displayed in plain view by the fact
that, after more than 19 years of effort by some
of the brightest (and most determined) legal minds
in the country, after more than 10 cases upholding
abortion rights in this Court, and after dozens
upon dozens of amicus briefs submitted in this and
other cases, the best the Court can do to explain
how it is that the word  liberty must be thought
to include the right to destroy human fetuses is
to rattle off a collection of adjectives that
simply decorate a value judgment and conceal a
political choice.  The right to abort, we are told,
inheres in  liberty because it is among  a
person's most basic decisions, ante, at 7; it
involves a  most intimate and personal choic[e],
ante, at 9; it is  central to personal dignity and
autonomy, ibid.; it  originate[s] within the zone
of conscience and belief, ibid.; it is  too inti-
mate and personal for state interference, ante,
at 10; it reflects  intimate views of a  deep,
personal character, ante, at 11; it involves
 intimate relationships, and notions of  person-
al autonomy and bodily integrity, ante, at 15; and
it concerns a particularly  `important decisio[n],'
ante, at 16 (citation omitted).  But it is obvi-
ous to anyone applying  reasoned judgment that
the same adjectives can be applied to many forms
of conduct that this Court (including one of the
Justices in today's majority, see Bowers v. Hardw-
ick, 478 U. S. 186 (1986)) has held are not entitled
to constitutional protection"because, like abor-
tion, they are forms of conduct that have long
been criminalized in American society.  Those
adjectives might be applied, for example, to
homosexual sodomy, polygamy, adult incest, and
suicide, all of which are equally  intimate and
 deep[ly] personal decisions involving  personal
autonomy and bodily integrity, and all of which
can constitutionally be proscribed because it is
our unquestionable constitutional tradition that
they are proscribable.  It is not reasoned judg-
ment that supports the Court's decision; only
personal predilection.  Justice Curtis's warning is
as timely today as it was 135 years ago:
 [W]hen a strict interpretation of the Consti-
tution, according to the fixed rules which
govern the interpretation of laws, is aban-
doned, and the theoretical opinions of individ-
uals are allowed to control its meaning, we
have no longer a Constitution; we are under
the government of individual men, who for the
time being have power to declare what the
Constitution is, according to their own views
of what it ought to mean.  Dred Scott v. Sand-
ford, 19 How. 393, 621 (1857) (Curtis, J., dis-
senting).
 Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of
doubt.
                                   Ante, at 1.
  One might have feared to encounter this august
and sonorous phrase in an opinion defending the
real Roe v. Wade, rather than the revised version
fabricated today by the authors of the joint
opinion.  The shortcomings of Roe did not include
lack of clarity: Virtually all regulation of abor-
tion before the third trimester was invalid.  But
to come across this phrase in the joint opin-
ion"which calls upon federal district judges to
apply an  undue burden standard as doubtful in
application as it is unprincipled in origin"is
really more than one should have to bear.
  The joint opinion frankly concedes that the
amorphous concept of  undue burden has been
inconsistently applied by the Members of this
Court in the few brief years since that  test
was first explicitly propounded by Justice O'Con-
nor in her dissent in Akron I, supra.  See Ante,
at 34.  Because the three Justices now wish
to  set forth a standard of general application,
the joint opinion announces that  it is important
to clarify what is meant by an undue burden, ibid.
I certainly agree with that, but I do not agree
that the joint opinion succeeds in the announced
endeavor.  To the contrary, its efforts at clari-
fication make clear only that the standard is
inherently manipulable and will prove hopelessly
unworkable in practice.
  The joint opinion explains that a state regula-
tion imposes an  undue burden if it  has the
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obsta-
cle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of
a nonviable fetus.  Ibid.; see also ante, at 35-36.
An obstacle is  substantial, we are told, if it is
 calculated[,] [not] to inform the woman's free
choice, [but to] hinder it.  Ante, at 34.  This
latter statement cannot possibly mean what it
says.  Any regulation of abortion that is intended
to advance what the joint opinion concedes is the
State's  substantial interest in protecting
unborn life will be  calculated [to] hinder a
decision to have an abortion.  It thus seems more
accurate to say that the joint opinion would
uphold abortion regulations only if they do not
unduly hinder the woman's decision.  That, of
course, brings us right back to square one: Defin-
ing an  undue burden as an  undue hindrance (or
a  substantial obstacle) hardly  clarifies the
test.  Consciously or not, the joint opinion's
verbal shell game will conceal raw judicial policy
choices concerning what is  appropriate abortion
legislation.
  The ultimately standardless nature of the
 undue burden inquiry is a reflection of the
underlying fact that the concept has no principled
or coherent legal basis.  As The Chief Justice
points out, Roe's strict-scrutiny standard  at
least had a recognized basis in constitutional law
at the time Roe was decided, ante, at 22, while
 [t]he same cannot be said for the `undue burden'
standard, which is created largely out of whole
cloth by the authors of the joint opinion, ibid.
The joint opinion is flatly wrong in asserting that
 our jurisprudence relating to all liberties save
perhaps abortion has recognized the permissibil-
ity of laws that do not impose an  undue burden.
Ante, at 31.  It argues that the abortion right is
similar to other rights in that a law  not designed
to strike at the right itself, [but which] has the
incidental effect of making it more difficult or
more expensive to [exercise the right,] is not
invalid.  Ante, at 31-32.  I agree, indeed I have
forcefully urged, that a law of general applicabil-
ity which places only an incidental burden on a
fundamental right does not infringe that right,
see R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U. S. ___, ___ (1992)
(slip op., at 11); Employment Division, Dept. of Human
Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872, 878-882
(1990), but that principle does not establish the
quite different (and quite dangerous) proposition
that a law which directly regulates a fundamental
right will not be found to violate the Constitution
unless it imposes an  undue burden.  It is that,
of course, which is at issue here: Pennsylvania
has consciously and directly regulated conduct
that our cases have held is constitutionally
protected.  The appropriate analogy, therefore, is
that of a state law requiring purchasers of
religious books to endure a 24-hour waiting
period, or to pay a nominal additional tax of 1 cent.
The joint opinion cannot possibly be correct in
suggesting that we would uphold such legislation
on the ground that it does not impose a  substan-
tial obstacle to the exercise of First Amendment
rights.  The  undue burden standard is not at all
the generally applicable principle the joint
opinion pretends it to be; rather, it is a unique
concept created specially for this case, to
preserve some judicial foothold in this ill-gotten
territory.  In claiming otherwise, the three
Justices show their willingness to place all
constitutional rights at risk in an effort to
preserve what they deem the  central holding in
Roe, ante, at 31.
  The rootless nature of the  undue burden
standard, a phrase plucked out of context from
our earlier abortion decisions, see n. 3, supra, is
further reflected in the fact that the joint
opinion finds it necessary expressly to repudiate
the more narrow formulations used in Justice
O'Connor's earlier opinions.  Ante, at 35.  Those
opinions stated that a statute imposes an  undue
burden if it imposes  absolute obstacles or
severe limitations on the abortion decision,
Akron I, 462 U. S., at 464 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added); see also Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476
U. S. 747, 828 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Those strong adjectives are conspicuously
missing from the joint opinion, whose authors have
for some unexplained reason now determined that
a burden is  undue if it merely imposes a  sub-
stantial obstacle to abortion decisions.  See,
e.g., ante, at 53, 59.  Justice O'Connor has also
abandoned (again without explanation) the view she
expressed in Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas
City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U. S. 476 (1983)
(dissenting opinion), that a medical regulation
which imposes an  undue burden could neverthe-
less be upheld if it  reasonably relate[s] to the
preservation and protection of maternal health,
id., at 505 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).  In today's version, even health mea-
sures will be upheld only  if they do not consti-
tute an undue burden, ante, at 35 (emphasis added).
Gone too is Justice O'Connor's statement that
 the State possesses compelling interests in the
protection of potential human life . . . throughout
pregnancy, Akron I, supra, at 461 (emphasis
added); see also Ashcroft, supra, at 505 (O'Connor,
J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part); Thornburgh, supra, at 828 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); instead, the State's interest in
unborn human life is stealthily downgraded to a
merely  substantial or  profound interest,
ante, at 34, 36.  (That had to be done, of course,
since designating the interest as  compelling
throughout pregnancy would have been, shall we
say, a  substantial obstacle to the joint opinio-
n's determined effort to reaffirm what it views as
the  central holding of Roe.  See Akron I, 462
U. S., at 420, n. 1.)  And  viability is no longer the
 arbitrary dividing line previously decried by
Justice O'Connor in Akron I, id., at 461; the Court
now announces that  the attainment of viability
may continue to serve as the critical fact, ante,
at 18.  It is difficult to maintain the illusion
that we are interpreting a Constitution rather
than inventing one, when we amend its provisions
so breezily.
   Because the portion of the joint opinion adopt-
ing and describing the undue-burden test provides
no more useful guidance than the empty phrases
discussed above, one must turn to the 23 pages
applying that standard to the present facts for
further guidance.  In evaluating Pennsylvania's
abortion law, the joint opinion relies extensively
on the factual findings of the District Court, and
repeatedly qualifies its conclusions by noting
that they are contingent upon the record devel-
oped in this case.  Thus, the joint opinion would
uphold the 24-hour waiting period contained in the
Pennsylvania statute's informed consent provi-
sion, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 3205 (1990), because  the
record evidence shows that in the vast majority
of cases, a 24-hour delay does not create any
appreciable health risk, ante, at 43.  The three
Justices therefore conclude that  on the record
before us, . . . we are not convinced that the
24-hour waiting period constitutes an undue
burden.  Ante, at 44-45.  The requirement that a
doctor provide the information pertinent to
informed consent would also be upheld because
 there is no evidence on this record that [this
requirement] would amount in practical terms to a
substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abor-
tion, ante, at 42.  Similarly, the joint opinion
would uphold the reporting requirements of the
Act, 3207, 3214, because  there is no . . .
showing on the record before us that these
requirements constitute a  substantial obstacle
to abortion decisions.  Ante, at 59.  But at the
same time the opinion pointedly observes that
these reporting requirements may increase the
costs of abortions and that  at some point [that
fact] could become a substantial obstacle, ibid.
Most significantly, the joint opinion's conclusion
that the spousal notice requirement of the Act,
see 3209, imposes an  undue burden is based in
large measure on the District Court's  detailed
findings of fact, which the joint opinion sets out
at great length.  Ante, at 45-49.
  I do not, of course, have any objection to the
notion that, in applying legal principles, one
should rely only upon the facts that are con-
tained in the record or that are properly subject
to judicial notice.  But what is remarkable
about the joint opinion's fact-intensive analysis
is that it does not result in any measurable
clarification of the  undue burden standard.
Rather, the approach of the joint opinion is, for
the most part, simply to highlight certain facts in
the record that apparently strike the three
Justices as particularly significant in establish-
ing (or refuting) the existence of an undue burden;
after describing these facts, the opinion then
simply announces that the provision either does
or does not impose a  substantial obstacle or an
 undue burden.  See, e.g., ante, at 38, 42, 44-45,
45, 52, 53, 59.  We do not know whether the same
conclusions could have been reached on a differ-
ent record, or in what respects the record would
have had to differ before an opposite conclusion
would have been appropriate.  The inherently
standardless nature of this inquiry invites the
district judge to give effect to his personal
preferences about abortion.  By finding and
relying upon the right facts, he can invalidate, it
would seem, almost any abortion restriction that
strikes him as  undue"subject, of course, to the
possibility of being reversed by a Circuit Court
or Supreme Court that is as unconstrained in
reviewing his decision as he was in making it.
  To the extent I can discern any meaningful
content in the  undue burden standard as applied
in the joint opinion, it appears to be that a State
may not regulate abortion in such a way as to
reduce significantly its incidence.  The joint
opinion repeatedly emphasizes that an important
factor in the  undue burden analysis is whether
the regulation  prevent[s] a significant number of
women from obtaining an abortion, ante, at 52;
whether a  significant number of women . . . are
likely to be deterred from procuring an abortion,
ibid.; and whether the regulation often  deters
women from seeking abortions, ante, at 55-56.  We
are not told, however, what forms of  deterrence
are impermissible or what degree of success in
deterrence is too much to be tolerated.  If, for
example, a State required a woman to read a
pamphlet describing, with illustrations, the facts
of fetal development before she could obtain an
abortion, the effect of such legislation might be
to  deter a  significant number of women from
procuring abortions, thereby seemingly allowing a
district judge to invalidate it as an undue burden.
Thus, despite flowery rhetoric about the State's
 substantial and  profound interest in  poten-
tial human life, and criticism of Roe for under-
valuing that interest, the joint opinion permits
the State to pursue that interest only so long as
it is not too successful.  As Justice Blackmun
recognizes (with evident hope), ante, at 5, the
 undue burden standard may ultimately require
the invalidation of each provision upheld today if
it can be shown, on a better record, that the
State is too effectively  express[ing] a prefer-
ence for childbirth over abortion, ante, at 41.
Reason finds no refuge in this jurisprudence of
confusion.

   While we appreciate the weight of the argu-
ments . . . that Roe should be overruled, the
reservations any of us may have in reaffirming
the central holding of Roe are outweighed by the
explication of individual liberty we have given
combined with the force of stare decisis.
                                  Ante, at 11.
  The Court's reliance upon stare decisis can best
be described as contrived.  It insists upon the
necessity of adhering not to all of Roe, but only
to what it calls the  central holding.  It seems
to me that stare decisis ought to be applied even
to the doctrine of stare decisis, and I confess
never to have heard of this new, keep-what-you-
want-and-throw-away-the-rest version.  I wonder
whether, as applied to Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch
137 (1803), for example, the new version of stare
decisis would be satisfied if we allowed courts to
review the constitutionality of only those stat-
utes that (like the one in Marbury) pertain to the
jurisdiction of the courts.
  I am certainly not in a good position to dispute
that the Court has saved the  central holding of
Roe, since to do that effectively I would have to
know what the Court has saved, which in turn would
require me to understand (as I do not) what the
 undue burden test means.  I must confess,
however, that I have always thought, and I think a
lot of other people have always thought, that the
arbitrary trimester framework, which the Court
today discards, was quite as central to Roe as the
arbitrary viability test, which the Court today
retains.  It seems particularly ungrateful to
carve the trimester framework out of the core of
Roe, since its very rigidity (in sharp contrast to
the utter indeterminability of the  undue burden
test) is probably the only reason the Court is
able to say, in urging stare decisis, that Roe  has
in no sense proven `unworkable,' ante, at 13.  I
suppose the Court is entitled to call a  cen-tral
holding whatever it wants to call a  central
holding"which is, come to think of it, perhaps one
of the difficulties with this modified version of
stare decisis.  I thought I might note, however,
that the following portions of Roe have not been
saved:
  *Under Roe, requiring that a woman seeking an
abortion be provided truthful information about
abortion before giving informed written consent
is unconstitutional, if the information is designed
to influence her choice, Thornburgh, 476 U. S., at
759-765; Akron I, 462 U. S., at 442-445.  Under the
joint opinion's  undue burden regime (as applied
today, at least) such a requirement is constitu-
tional, ante, at 38-42.
  *Under Roe, requiring that information be
provided by a doctor, rather than by nonphysician
counselors, is unconstitutional, Akron I, supra, at
446-449.  Under the  undue burden regime (as
applied today, at least) it is not, ante, at 42.
  *Under Roe, requiring a 24-hour waiting period
between the time the woman gives her informed
consent and the time of the abortion is unconsti-
tutional, Akron I, supra, at 449-451.  Under the
 undue burden regime (as applied today, at least)
it is not, ante, at 43-45.
  *Under Roe, requiring detailed reports that
include demographic data about each woman who
seeks an abortion and various information about
each abortion is unconstitutional, Thornburgh,
supra, at 765-768.  Under the  undue burden
regime (as applied today, at least) it generally is
not, ante, at 58-59.

   Where, in the performance of its judicial
duties, the Court decides a case in such a way as
to resolve the sort of intensely divisive contro-
versy reflected in Roe . . . , its decision has a
dimension that the resolution of the normal case
does not carry.  It is the dimension present
whenever the Court's interpretation of the
Constitution calls the contending sides of a
national controversy to end their national divi-
sion by accepting a common mandate rooted in the
Constitution.
                                  Ante, at 24.
  The Court's description of the place of Roe in
the social history of the United States is unrec-
ognizable.  Not only did Roe not, as the Court
suggests, resolve the deeply divisive issue of
abortion; it did more than anything else to nour-
ish it, by elevating it to the national level where
it is infinitely more difficult to resolve.  Nation-
al politics were not plagued by abortion protests,
national abortion lobbying, or abortion marches on
Congress, before Roe v. Wade was decided.  Pro-
found disagreement existed among our citizens
over the issue"as it does over other issues, such
as the death penalty"but that disagreement was
being worked out at the state level.  As with many
other issues, the division of sentiment within
each State was not as closely balanced as it was
among the population of the Nation as a whole,
meaning not only that more people would be satis-
fied with the results of state-by-state resolu-
tion, but also that those results would be more
stable.  Pre-Roe, moreover, political compromise
was possible.
  Roe's mandate for abortion-on-demand destroyed
the compromises of the past, rendered compromise
impossible for the future, and required the entire
issue to be resolved uniformly, at the national
level.  At the same time, Roe created a vast new
class of abortion consumers and abortion propo-
nents by eliminating the moral opprobrium that had
attached to the act.  ( If the Constitution guaran-
tees abor-tion, how can it be bad?"not an accu-
rate line of thought, but a natural one.)  Many
favor all of those developments, and it is not for
me to say that they are wrong.  But to portray Roe
as the statesmanlike  settlement of a divisive
issue, a jurisprudential Peace of Westphalia that
is worth preserving, is nothing less than Orwell-
ian.  Roe fanned into life an issue that has in-
flamed our national politics in general, and has
obscured with its smoke the selection of Justices
to this Court in particular, ever since.  And by
keeping us in the abortion-umpiring business, it is
the perpetuation of that disruption, rather than
of any pax Roeana, that the Court's new majority
decrees.

   [T]o overrule under fire . . . would subvert the
Court's legitimacy . . . .
   To all those who will be . . . tested by following,
the Court implicitly undertakes to remain stead-
fast . . . .  The promise of constancy, once given,
binds its maker for as long as the power to stand
by the decision survives and . . . the commitment
[is not] obsolete. . . .
   [The American people's] belief in themselves as
. . . a people [who aspire to live according to the
rule of law] is not readily separable from their
understanding of the Court invested with the
authority to decide their constitutional cases
and speak before all others for their constitu-
tional ideals.  If the Court's legitimacy should be
undermined, then, so would the country be in its
very ability to see itself through its constitu-
tional ideals.
                               Ante, at 25-26.
  The Imperial Judiciary lives.  It is instructive
to compare this Nietzschean vision of us unelect-
ed, life-tenured judges"leading a Volk who will be
 tested by following, and whose very  belief in
themselves is mystically bound up in their
 understanding of a Court that  speak[s] before
all others for their constitutional ideals"with
the somewhat more modest role envisioned for
these lawyers by the Founders.
 The judiciary . . . has . . . no direction either
of the strength or of the wealth of the soci-
ety, and can take no active resolution what-
ever.  It may truly be said to have neither
Force nor Will but merely judgment . . . .  The
Federalist No. 78, pp. 393-394 (G. Wills ed.
1982).
Or, again, to compare this ecstasy of a Supreme
Court in which there is, especially on controver-
sial matters, no shadow of change or hint of
alteration ( There is a limit to the amount of
error that can plausibly be imputed to prior
courts, ante, at 24), with the more democratic
views of a more humble man:
 [T]he candid citizen must confess that if the
policy of the Government upon vital questions
affecting the whole people is to be irrevoca-
bly fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court,
. . . the people will have ceased to be their own
rulers, having to that extent practically
resigned their Government into the hands of
that eminent tribunal.  A. Lincoln, First
Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), reprinted in
Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of the
United States, S. Doc. No. 101-10, p. 139 (1989).
It is particularly difficult, in the circumstances
of the present decision, to sit still for the
Court's lengthy lecture upon the virtues of
 constancy, ante, at 26, of  remain[ing] stead-
fast, id., at 25, of adhering to  principle, id.,
passim.  Among the five Justices who purportedly
adhere to Roe, at most three agree upon the
principle that constitutes adherence (the joint
opinion's  undue burden standard)"and that
principle is inconsistent with Roe, see 410 U. S., at
154-156.  To make matters worse, two of the
three, in order thus to remain steadfast, had to
abandon previously stated positions.  See n. 4
supra; see supra, at 11-12.  It is beyond me how the
Court expects these accommodations to be ac-
cepted  as grounded truly in principle, not as
compromises with social and political pressures
having, as such, no bearing on the principled
choices that the Court is obliged to make.  Ante,
at 23.  The only principle the Court  adheres to,
it seems to me, is the principle that the Court
must be seen as standing by Roe.  That is not a
principle of law (which is what I thought the Court
was talking about), but a principle of Realpoli-
tik"and a wrong one at that.
  I cannot agree with, indeed I am appalled by, the
Court's suggestion that the decision whether to
stand by an erroneous constitutional decision
must be strongly influenced"against overruling,
no less"by the substantial and continuing public
opposition the decision has generated.  The
Court's judgment that any other course would
 subvert the Court's legitimacy must be another
consequence of reading the error-filled history
book that described the deeply divided country
brought together by Roe.  In my history-book, the
Court was covered with dishonor and deprived of
legitimacy by Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393
(1857), an erroneous (and widely opposed) opinion
that it did not abandon, rather than by West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937), which
produced the famous  switch in time from the
Court's erroneous (and widely opposed) constitu-
tional opposition to the social measures of the
New Deal.  (Both Dred Scott and one line of the
cases resisting the New Deal rested upon the
concept of  substantive due process that the
Court praises and employs today.  Indeed, Dred
Scott was  very possibly the first application of
substantive due process in the Supreme Court,
the original precedent for Lochner v. New York and
Roe v. Wade.  D. Currie, The Constitution in the
Supreme Court 271 (1985) (footnotes omitted).)
  But whether it would  subvert the Court's
legitimacy or not, the notion that we would
decide a case differently from the way we other-
wise would have in order to show that we can stand
firm against public disapproval is frightening.  It
is a bad enough idea, even in the head of someone
like me, who believes that the text of the Consti-
tution, and our traditions, say what they say and
there is no fiddling with them.  But when it is in
the mind of a Court that believes the Constitution
has an evolving meaning, see ante, at 6; that the
Ninth Amendment's reference to  othe[r] rights
is not a disclaimer, but a charter for action,
ibid.; and that the function of this Court is to
 speak before all others for [the people's] con-
stitutional ideals unrestrained by meaningful
text or tradition"then the notion that the Court
must adhere to a decision for as long as the
decision faces  great opposition and the Court
is  under fire acquires a character of almost
czarist arrogance.  We are offended by these
marchers who descend upon us, every year on the
anniversary of Roe, to protest our saying that
the Constitution requires what our society has
never thought the Constitution requires.  These
people who refuse to be  tested by following
must be taught a lesson.  We have no Cossacks, but
at least we can stubbornly refuse to abandon an
erroneous opinion that we might otherwise
change"to show how little they intimidate us.
  Of course, as the Chief Justice points out, we
have been subjected to what the Court calls
 political pressure by both sides of this issue.
Ante, at 21.  Maybe today's decision not to over-
rule Roe will be seen as buckling to pressure from
that direction.  Instead of engaging in the hope-
less task of predicting public perception"a job
not for lawyers but for political campaign manag-
ers"the Justices should do what is legally right
by asking two questions: (1) Was Roe correctly
decided?  (2) Has Roe succeeded in producing a
settled body of law?  If the answer to both ques-
tions is no, Roe should undoubtedly be overruled.
  In truth, I am as distressed as the Court is"and
expressed my distress several years ago, see
Webster, 492 U. S., at 535"about the  political
pressure directed to the Court: the marches, the
mail, the protests aimed at inducing us to change
our opinions.  How upsetting it is, that so many of
our citizens (good people, not lawless ones, on
both sides of this abortion issue, and on various
sides of other issues as well) think that we
Justices should properly take into account their
views, as though we were engaged not in ascer-
taining an objective law but in determining some
kind of social consensus.  The Court would profit,
I think, from giving less attention to the fact of
this distressing phenomenon, and more attention
to the cause of it.  That cause permeates today's
opinion: a new mode of constitutional adjudication
that relies not upon text and traditional practice
to determine the law, but upon what the Court
calls  reasoned judgment, ante, at 7, which turns
out to be nothing but philosophical predilection
and moral intuition.  All manner of  liberties, the
Court tells us, inhere in the Constitution and are
enforceable by this Court"not just those men-
tioned in the text or established in the traditions
of our society.  Ante, at 5-6.  Why even the Ninth
Amendment"which says only that  [t]he enumera-
tion in the Constitution of certain rights shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people"is, despite our contrary
understanding for almost 200 years, a literally
boundless source of additional, unnamed, unhint-
ed-at  rights, definable and enforceable by us,
through  reasoned judgment.  Ante, at 6-7.
  What makes all this relevant to the bothersome
application of  political pressure against the
Court are the twin facts that the American people
love democracy and the American people are not
fools.  As long as this Court thought (and the
people thought) that we Justices were doing
essentially lawyers' work up here"reading text
and discerning our society's traditional under-
standing of that text"the public pretty much left
us alone.  Texts and traditions are facts to
study, not convictions to demonstrate about.  But
if in reality our process of constitutional adju-
dication consists primarily of making value judg-
ments; if we can ignore a long and clear tradition
clarifying an ambiguous text, as we did, for
example, five days ago in declaring unconstitu-
tional invocations and benedictions at public-
high-school graduation ceremonies, Lee v. Weisman,
505 U. S. ___ (1992); if, as I say, our pronounce-
ment of constitutional law rests primarily on
value judgments, then a free and intelligent
people's attitude towards us can be expected to
be (ought to be) quite different.  The people know
that their value judgments are quite as good as
those taught in any law school"maybe better.  If,
indeed, the  liberties protected by the Consti-
tution are, as the Court says, undefined and
unbounded, then the people should demonstrate, to
protest that we do not implement their values
instead of ours.  Not only that, but confirmation
hearings for new Justices should deteriorate into
question-and-answer sessions in which Senators
go through a list of their constituents' most
favored and most disfavored alleged constitu-
tional rights, and seek the nominee's commitment
to support or oppose them.  Value judgments,
after all, should be voted on, not dictated; and if
our Constitution has somehow accidently commit-
ted them to the Supreme Court, at least we can
have a sort of plebiscite each time a new nominee
to that body is put forward.  Justice Blackmun not
only regards this prospect with equanimity, he
solicits it, ante, at 22-23.
                 *     *     *
  There is a poignant aspect to today's opinion.
Its length, and what might be called its epic tone,
suggest that its authors believe they are bring-
ing to an end a troublesome era in the history of
our Nation and of our Court.   It is the dimension
of authority, they say, to  cal[l] the contending
sides of national controversy to end their na-
tional division by accepting a common mandate
rooted in the Constitution.  Ante, at 24.
  There comes vividly to mind a portrait by Eman-
uel Leutze that hangs in the Harvard Law School:
Roger Brooke Taney, painted in 1859, the 82d year
of his life, the 24th of his Chief Justiceship, the
second after his opinion in Dred Scott.  He is all in
black, sitting in a shadowed red armchair, left
hand resting upon a pad of paper in his lap, right
hand hanging limply, almost lifelessly, beside the
inner arm of the chair.  He sits facing the viewer,
and staring straight out.  There seems to be on
his face, and in his deep-set eyes, an expression
of profound sadness and disillusionment.  Perhaps
he always looked that way, even when dwelling upon
the happiest of thoughts.  But those of us who
know how the lustre of his great Chief Justiceship
came to be eclipsed by Dred Scott cannot help
believing that he had that case"its already
apparent consequences for the Court, and its
soon-to-be-played-out consequences for the
Nation"burning on his mind.  I expect that two
years earlier he, too, had thought himself
 call[ing] the contending sides of national con-
troversy to end their national division by ac-
cepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitu-
tion.
  It is no more realistic for us in this case, than
it was for him in that, to think that an issue of
the sort they both involved"an issue involving
life and death, freedom and subjugation"can be
 speedily and finally settled by the Supreme
Court, as President James Buchanan in his inaugu-
ral address said the issue of slavery in the
territories would be.  See Inaugural Addresses of
the Presidents of the United States, S. Doc. No.
101-10, p. 126 (1989).  Quite to the contrary, by
foreclosing all democratic outlet for the deep
passions this issue arouses, by banishing the
issue from the political forum that gives all
participants, even the losers, the satisfaction of
a fair hearing and an honest fight, by continuing
the imposition of a rigid national rule instead of
allowing for regional differences, the Court
merely prolongs and intensifies the anguish.
  We should get out of this area, where we have no
right to be, and where we do neither ourselves nor
the country any good by remaining.
