SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
In re JAMES BLODGETT, SUPERINTENDENT, WASH-
INGTON STATE PENITENTIARY, et al.
on petition for writ of mandamus
No. 91-716.  Decided January 13, 1992

  Per Curiam.
  The Court has before it a petition from the State of Wash-
ington for a writ of mandamus to the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit.  The petition seeks an order directing the
Court of Appeals to issue its decision on an appeal from the
District Court's denial of a second federal habeas petition
in a capital case.  The appeal was argued and submitted to
the Court of Appeals on June 27, 1989, and no decision has
been forthcoming.
  Charles Rodman Campbell was convicted of multiple
murders in 1982 in the State of Washington and sentenced
to death.  After his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal
and we denied certiorari, Campbell v. Washington, 471 U.S.
1094 (1985), his first federal habeas petition was filed in
July 1985 in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington.  Proceedings in that
matter were completed when we denied certiorari in
November 1988.  Campbell v. Kincheloe, 488 U.S. 948.  No
relief was granted.
  In March 1989 Campbell filed a second federal habeas
petition in the same District Court.  The court acted with
commendable dispatch, holding a hearing and issuing a
written opinion denying a stay or other relief within days
after the second petition was filed.  On March 28, 1989,
Campbell appealed to the Ninth Circuit.  The Court of
Appeals granted an indefinite stay of execution and set a
briefing schedule.  The case was argued and submitted in
June 1989, but no decision was announced and the stay of
execution remains in effect.  The Washington Attorney
General sent letters to the panel in April and October of
1990 inquiring about the status of the case, but neither
letter was answered.
  In January 1990 Campbell filed a motion to withdraw
certain issues from consideration by the Ninth Circuit
panel, and he renewed this motion in April.  The panel took
no action.  In July 1990 Campbell filed his third state
action for collateral relief, a personal restraint petition,
with the Washington Supreme Court.  In September,
Campbell again moved the Court of Appeals to withdraw
three issues from consideration in the case that it was still
holding under submission, lg eight others to be
decided.  The panel did not respond until by order of
February 21, 1991, it noted Campbell's motion to withdraw
the issues, requested a report on the status of the state
court proceedings, and vacated its own submission of the
case.  Both Washington and Campbell responded that all of
the issues pending before the Ninth Circuit had been
exhausted.  The State requested that the case be resubmit-
ted, but the panel did not do so.
  The Washington Supreme Court denied Campbell's third
personal restraint petition on its merits on March 21, 1991.
On June 10, 1991, Campbell filed a document advising the
Court of Appeals panel that he desired to discharge his
attorneys and proceed pro se and that he would file a third
federal habeas petition in the District Court.  At that point
more than two years had passed since the Ninth Circuit
had heard oral argument in the case.  Almost two months
later, on August 7, 1991, the panel granted the motion to
relieve counsel, directed Campbell to file his third federal
habeas petition by August 30, and announced its intention
to wait for the District Court's ruling before taking further
action.  The District Court has set a briefing schedule for
the third petition.
  On October 25, 1991, the Washington Attorney General
filed the mandamus petition now before us and on Novem-
ber 22 the Court of Appeals and the members of the panel
filed a response.  Neither the response nor the record
reveals any plausible explanation or reason for the panel's
delay in resolving the case from June 1989 until July 1990.
The response addresses the events after Campbell's third
personal restraint petition was filed in the Washington
Supreme Court.  The response indicates that the panel
vacated submission in February 1991 because if the
Washington Supreme Court had granted the state petition,
the appeal before the Ninth Circuit would have become
moot.  It further stated that the panel desired to avoid
piecemeal appeals by awaiting the decision of the District
Court on the third federal habeas petition.  The response
noted that the Ninth Circuit has formed a Death Penalty
Task Force with the objective of eliminating successive
habeas petitions and that the consolidation of the last two
petitions is consistent with that objective.
  The delay of over a year before the third personal
restraint was filed in Washington state court remains
unexplained, and was in fact compounded by the events
that followed.  The orders by the Ninth Circuit to vacate
submission of the case until completion of the state collater-
al proceeding and then to hold the case in abeyance pending
filing and resolution of the third federal habeas proceeding
in the District Court raise the very concerns regarding
delay that were part of the rationale for this Court's
decisions in Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982) and
McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. ___ (1991).  Adherence to those
decisions, and their prompt enforcement by the district
courts and courts of appeals, will obviate in many cases
what the Court of Appeals here seems to perceive to be the
necessity for accommodating multiple filings.
  As to the Death Penalty Task Force, reports of joint
committees of the bench and bar should be of urgent
concern to all persons with the responsibility for the
administration of justice in the Ninth Circuit, but the
ordinary course of legal proceedings and the constant duty
of all judges to discharge their duties with diligence and
precision cannot be suspended to await its recommenda-
tions.
  None of the reasons offered in the response dispels our
concern that the State of Washington has sustained severe
prejudice by the two-and-a-half year stay of execution.  The
stay has prevented Washington from exercising its sover-
eign power to enforce the criminal law, an interest we found
of great weight in McCleskey when discussing the impor-
tance of finality in the context of federal habeas corpus
proceedings.  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 22-23).  Given the
potential for prejudice to the State of Washington, the
Ninth Circuit was under a duty to consider Cambell's claim
for relief without delay.  Our case law suggests that
expedited review of this second habeas petition would have
been proper.  Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 895 (1983)
(``Even where it cannot be concluded that a [successive
habeas] petition should be dismissed under Rule 9(b), it
would be proper for the district court to expedite consider-
ation of the petition'').  The delay in this case demonstrates
the necessity for the rule that we now make explicit.  In a
capital case the grant of a stay of execution directed to a
State by a federal court imposes on that court the concomi-
tant duty to take all steps necessary to ensure a prompt
resolution of the matter, consistent with its duty to give full
and fair consideration to all of the issues presented in the
case.
  Despite our continuing concerns, we decline to issue
mandamus to the Court of Appeals at this time.  While
there are grounds to question both the necessity and the
propriety of the Ninth Circuit's order of August 7, 1991,
Campbell v. Blodgett, 940 F.2d 549, the State did not file
any objection to it.  The State should have lodged its
objection with the Court of Appeals, citing the cases it now
cites to us.  True, the State had taken some action.  It
wrote twice in 1990 to inquire about the status of the case.
And after the panel's order vacating submission, the State
objected and asked that the case be resubmitted for
decision.  The argument could be made that further
requests for an expedited decision on the merits had little
chance of success.  But as a predicate for extraordinary
relief, the State should have asked the Court of Appeals to
vacate or modify its order of August 7, 1991, before coming
here.  This Court's Rule 20.1 (``To justify the granting of
any writ under that provision, it must be shown . . . that
adequate relief cannot be obtained in any other form or
from any other court'').
  As we do not now issue a writ of mandamus, the Court of
Appeals should determine how best to expedite the appeal,
given the present posture of the case.  Denial of the writ is
without prejudice to the right of the State to again seek
mandamus relief or to request any other extraordinary
relief by motion or petition if unnecessary delays or
unwarranted stays occur in the panel's disposition of the
matter.  In view of the delay that has already occurred any
further postponements or extensions of time will be subject
to a most rigorous scrutiny in this Court if the State of
Washington files a further and meritorious petition for
relief.
  The motion of respondent Charles R. Campbell for leave
to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.  The petition for
writ of mandamus is
                                  Denied.
-------------------------------
Subject: No. 91-716 - JAMES BLODGETT, et al. on petition for writ of mandamus

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

In re JAMES BLODGETT, SUPERINTENDENT, WASH-
INGTON STATE PENITENTIARY, et al.
on petition for writ of mandamus
No. 91-716.  Decided January 13, 1992


  Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Blackmun joins,
concurring in the judgment.
  In recent years, the federal judiciary has done a magnifi-
cent job of handling a truly demanding appellate workload.
On a national basis, the average time between notice of
appeal and disposition is now less than 11 months.
Although delays that are not fully justified occasionally
occur, only in the most extraordinary circumstances would
it be appropriate for this Court to issue a writ of mandamus
to require a court of appeals to render its decision in a case
under advisement.
  In its petition for a writ of mandamus, the State criticizes
the Court of Appeals' failure to rule on the merits of
Campbell's second habeas corpus petition, which was
submitted in June 1989.  In their response, the judges on
the panel provide a completely satisfactory explanation for
their July 1990 decision to defer ruling on the merits of the
petition-namely, their desire to avoid piecemeal litig
and to address all of Campbell's claims in a single ruling.
Because that explanation alone is sufficient to mandate
denial of the State's petition, there was no occasion for the
panel to explain its pre-July 1990 delay.
  The panel's decision to defer its ruling on the second
habeas petition pending disposition of the third personal
restraint petition filed in the Washington Supreme Court in
July 1990 showed proper respect for that court.  Although
this Court expresses its concern about the State's interest
in expediting its execution of Campbell, the Court is notably
silent about the fact that the Washington Supreme Court
considered the claims Campbell raised in his third personal
restraint petition to be substantial.  Although the state
court, over the dissent of Justice Utter, denied Campbell's
petition, that court appointed counsel, scheduled briefing,
heard oral argument, and addressed the merits of Camp-
bell's several claims.  On these facts, the Ninth Circuit's
decision to delay its ruling on Campbell's second habeas
petition was sound, for it enables that court to consider the
entire case at one time and will not delay the ultimate
disposition of the matter.
  Although I am sure the Court did not intend to send such
a message, its opinion today may be read as an open
invitation to petitions for mandamus from every State in
which a federal court has stayed an execution.  This is
unfortunate because, as we noted in Kerr v. United States
District Court for Northern District of California, 426 U.S.
394, 403 (1976), ``particularly in an era of excessively
crowded lower court dockets, it is in the interest of the fair
and prompt administration of justice to discourage piece-
meal litigation.''
  Moreover, as we have so frequently recognized, manda-
mus is disfavored because it has ``the unfortunate conse-
quence of making the judge a litigant, obliged to obtain
personal counsel or to leave his defense to one of the
litigants [appearing] before him.''  Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S.
258, 260 (1947).  Mandamus is an ``extraordinary remed[y]
reserved for really extraordinary causes,'' ibid., precisely
because of the great respect we have for our fellow jurists.
This is not a situation in which the Ninth Circuit has
unduly delayed decision of a case, but rather a situation in
which that court has chosen to avoid repetitive and piece-
meal litigation by consolidating two appeals.  Respect for
our fellow judges means providing them latitude in the
handling of their burgeoning dockets, and granting due
deference to those whose dockets are less discretionary than
ours.
  For the foregoing reasons, and because the State has
failed to comply with this Court's Rule 20.1, I believe that
the State's petition should have been denied summarily.
-------------------------------
