 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

UNITED STATES v. THOMPSON/CENTER ARMS CO.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the federal circuit
No. 91-164.   Argued January 13, 1992-Decided June 8, 1992

Respondent manufactures the ``Contender'' pistol and, for a short time,
 also manufactured a kit that could be used to convert the Contender
 into a rifle with either a 21-inch or a 10-inch barrel.  The Bureau of
 Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms advised respondent that when the kit
 was possessed or distributed with the Contender, the unit constituted
 a ``firearm'' under the National Firearms Act (NFA or Act),
 26 U.S.C. 5845(a)(3), which defines that term to include a rifle
 with a barrel less than 16 inches long, known as a short-barreled
 rifle, but not a pistol or a rifle having a barrel 16 inches or more in
 length.  Respondent paid the $200 tax levied by 5821 upon anyone
 ``making'' a ``firearm'' and filed a claim for a refund.  When its refund
 claim proved fruitless, respondent brought this suit under the Tucker
 Act.  The Claims Court entered summary judgment for the Govern-
 ment, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a short-bar-
 reled rifle ``actually must be assembled'' in ordered to be ``made''
 within the NFA's meaning.
Held:The judgment is affirmed.
924 F.2d 1041, affirmed.
   Justice Souter, joined by The Chief Justice and Justice
 O'Connor, concluded that the Contender and conversion kit when
 packaged together have not been ``made'' into a short-barreled rifle
 for NFA purposes.  Pp.3-13.
   (a)The language of 5845(i)-which provides that ``[t]he term
 `make', and [its] various derivatives . . . , shall include manufacturing
 . . . , putting together . . . , or otherwise producing a fire-
 arm''-clearly demonstrates that the aggregation of separate parts
 that can be assembled only into a firearm, and the aggregation of a
 gun other than a firearm and parts that would have no use in
 association with the gun except to convert it into a firearm, consti-
 tute the ``making'' of a firearm.  If, as the Court of Appeals held, a
 firearm were only made at the time of final assembly (the moment
 the firearm was ``put together''), the statutory ``manufacturing . . . or
 otherwise producing'' language would be redundant.  Thus, Congress
 must have understood ``making'' to cover more than final assembly,
 and some disassembled aggregation of parts must be included.
 Pp.4-7.
   (b)However, application of the ordinary rules of statutory construc-
 tion shows that the Act is ambiguous as to whether, given the fact
 that the Contender can be converted into either an NFA-regulated
 firearm or an unregulated rifle, the mere possibility of its use with
 the kit to assemble the former renders their combined packaging
 ``making.''  Pp.7-12.
   (c)The statutory ambiguity is properly resolved by applying the
 rule of lenity in respondent's favor.  See, e. g., Crandon v. United
 States, 474 U.S. 152, 168.  Although it is a tax statute that is here
 construed in a civil setting, the NFA has criminal applications that
 carry no additional requirement of willfulness.  Making a firearm
 without approval may be subject to criminal sanction, as is possession
 of, or failure to pay the tax on, an unregistered firearm.  P.12.
   Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, agreed that the rule
 of lenity prevents respondent's pistol and conversion kit from being
 covered by the NFA, but on the basis of different ambiguities:
 whether a firearm includes unassembled parts, and whether the
 requisite ``inten[t] to be fired from the shoulder'' existed as to the
 short barrel component.  Pp.1-5.

 Souter, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an
opinion in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, J., joined.  Scalia,
J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Thomas, J.,
joined.  White, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun,
Stevens, and Kennedy, JJ., joined.  Stevens, J., filed a dissenting
opinion.


NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.


SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
--------
No. 91-164
--------
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. THOMPSON/
CENTER ARMS COMPANY
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the federal circuit
[June 8, 1992]

  Justice Souter announced the judgment of the Court
and delivered an opinion in which The Chief Justice and
Justice O'Connor join.
  Section 5821 of the National Firearms Act (NFA or Act),
see 26 U. S. C. 5849, levies a tax of $200 per unit upon
anyone -making- a -firearm- as that term is defined in the
Act.  5821.  Neither pistols nor rifles with barrels 16
inches long or longer are firearms within the NFA defini-
tion, but rifles with barrels less than 16 inches long, known
as short-barreled rifles, are.  5845(a)(3).  This case
presents the question whether a gun manufacturer -makes-
a short-barreled rifle when it packages as a unit a pistol
together with a kit containing a shoulder stock and a 21-
inch barrel, permitting the pistol's conversion into an
unregulated long-barreled rifle, or, if the pistol's barrel is
left on the gun, a short-barreled rifle that is regulated.  We
hold that the statutory language may not be construed to
require payment of the tax under these facts.
                            I
  The word -firearm- is used as a term of art in the NFA.
It means, among other things, -a rifle having a barrel or
barrels of less than 16 inches in length . . . .-  5845(a)(3).
-The term `rifle' means a weapon designed or redesigned,
made or remade, and intended to be fired from the shoulder
and designed or redesigned and made or remade to use the
energy of the explosive in a fixed cartridge to fire only a
single projectile through a rifled bore for each single pull of
the trigger, and shall include any such weapon which may
be readily restored to fire a fixed cartridge.-  5845(c).
  The consequence of being the maker of a firearm are
serious.  5821(a) imposes a tax of $200 -for each firearm
made,- which -shall be paid by the person making the
firearm,- 5821(b).  Before one may make a firearm, one
must obtain the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury,
5822, and 5841 requires that the -manufacturer, import-
er, and maker . . . register each firearm he manufactures,
imports, or makes- in a central registry maintained by the
Secretary of the Treasury.  A maker who fails to comply
with the NFA's provisions is subject to criminal penalties of
up to 10 years' imprisonment and a fine of up to $10,000, or
both, which may be imposed without proof of willfulness or
knowledge.  5871.
  Respondent Thompson/Center Arms Company manufac-
tures a single-shot pistol called the -Contender,- designed
so that its handle and barrel can be removed from its
-receiver,- the metal frame housing the trigger, hammer
and firing mechanism.  See 27 CFR 179.11 (1991) (defini-
tion of frame or receiver).  For a short time in 1985
Thompson/Center also manufactured a carbine-conversion
kit consisting of a 21-inch barrel, a rifle stock, and a
wooden fore-end.  If one joins the receiver with the conver-
sion kit's rifle stock, the 21-inch barrel, and the rifle fore-
end, the product is a carbine rifle with a 21-inch barrel.  If,
however, the shorter, pistol-length barrel is not removed
from the receiver when the rifle stock is added, one is left
with a 10-inch or -short-barreled- carbine rifle.  The entire
conversion, from pistol to long-barreled rifle takes only a
few minutes; conversion to a short-barreled rifle takes even
less time.
  In 1985, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
advised Thompson/Center that when its conversion kit was
possessed or distributed together with the Contender pistol,
the unit constituted a firearm subject to the NFA.  Thomp-
son/Center responded by paying the $200 tax for a single
such firearm, and submitting an application for permission
under 26 U. S. C.  5822 -to make, use, and segregate as a
single unit- a package consisting of a serially numbered
pistol, together with an attachable shoulder stock and a 21-
inch barrel.  Thompson/Center then filed a refund claim.
After more than six months had elapsed without action on
it, the company brought this suit in the United States
Claims Court under the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. 1491,
arguing that the unit registered was not a firearm within
the meaning of the NFA because Thompson/Center had not
assembled a short-barreled rifle from its components.  The
Claims Court entered summary judgment for the Govern-
ment, concluding that the Contender pistol together with its
conversion kit is a firearm within the meaning of the NFA.
19 Cl. Ct. 725 (1990).
  The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed,
holding that a short-barreled rifle -actually must be
assembled- in order to be -made- within the meaning of the
NFA.  924 F. 2d 1041, 1043 (1991).  The Court of Appeals
expressly declined to follow the decision of the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Drasen,
845 F. 2d 731, cert. denied, 488 U. S. 909 (1988), which had
held that an unassembled -complete parts kit- for a short-
barreled rifle was in fact a short-barreled rifle for purposes
of the NFA.  We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict.
502 U. S. ___ (1991).
                           II
  The NFA provides that -[t]he term `make', and the
various derivatives of such word, shall include manufactur-
ing (other than by one qualified to engage in such business
under this chapter), putting together, altering, any combi-
nation of these, or otherwise producing a firearm.-  26
U. S. C. 5845(i).  But the provision does not expressly
address the question whether a short-barreled rifle can be
-made- by the aggregation of finished parts that can readily
be assembled into one.  The Government contends that
assembly is not necessary; Thompson/Center argues that it
is.
                            A
  The Government urges us to view the shipment of the
pistol with the kit just as we would the shipment of a
bicycle that requires some home assembly.  -The fact that
a short-barrel rifle, or any other `firearm,' is possessed or
sold in a partially unassembled state does not remove it
from regulation under the Act.-  Brief for United States 6.
  The Government's analogy of the partially assembled
bicycle to the packaged pistol and conversion kit is not, of
course, exact.  While each example includes some unassem-
bled parts, the crated bicycle parts can be assembled into
nothing but a bicycle, whereas the contents of Thomp-
son/Center's package can constitute a pistol, a long-barreled
rifle, or a short-barreled version.  These distinctions,
however, do define the issues raised by the Government's
argument, the first of which is whether the aggregation and
segregation of separate parts that can be assembled only
into a short-barreled rifle and are sufficient for that
purpose amount to -making- that firearm, or whether the
firearm is not -made- until the moment of final assembly.
This is the issue on which the Federal and Seventh Circuits
are divided.
  We think the language of the statute provides a clear
answer on this point.  The definition of -make- includes not
only -putting together,- but also -manufacturing . . . or
otherwise producing a firearm.-  If as Thompson/Center
submits, a firearm were only made at the time of final
assembly (the moment the firearm was -put together-), the
additional language would be redundant.  Congress must,
then, have understood -making- to cover more than final
assembly, and some disassembled aggregation of parts must
be included.  Since the narrowest example of a combination
of parts that might be included is a set of parts that could
be used to make nothing but a short-barreled rifle, the
aggregation of such a set of parts, at the very least, must
fall within the definition of -making- such a rifle.
  This is consistent with the holdings of every Court
of Appeals, except the court below, to consider a combi-
nation of parts that could only be assembled into an NFA-
regulated firearm, either under the definition of rifle at
issue here or under similar statutory language.  See United
States v. Drasen, supra; United States v. Endicott, 803 F. 2d
506, 508-509 (CA9 1986) (unassembled silencer is a
silencer); United States v. Luce, 726 F. 2d 47, 48-49 (CA1
1984) (same); United States v. Lauchli, 371 F. 2d 303,
311-313 (CA7 1966) (unassembled machineguns are
machineguns).  We thus reject the broad language of the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to the extent that
it would mean that a disassembled complete short-barreled
rifle kit must be assembled before it has been -made- into
a short-barreled rifle.  The fact that the statute would serve
almost no purpose if this were the rule only confirms the
reading we have given it.
  We also think that a firearm is -made- on facts one step
removed from the paradigm of the aggregated parts that
can be used for nothing except assembling a firearm.  Two
courts to our knowledge have dealt in some way with claims
that when a gun other than a firearm was placed together
with a further part or parts that would have had no use in
association with the gun except to convert it into a firearm,
a firearm was produced.  See United States v. Kokin, 365 F.
2d 595, 596 (CA3 1966) (carbine together with all parts
necessary to convert it into a machinegun is a machinegun),
cert. denied, 385 U. S. 987 (1966); see also United States v.
Zeidman, 444 F. 2d 1051, 1053 (CA7 1971) (pistol and
attachable shoulder stock found -in different drawers of the
same dresser- constitute a short-barreled rifle).  Here it is
true, of course, that some of the parts could be used without
ever assembling a firearm, but the likelihood of that is
belied by the utter uselessness of placing the converting
parts with the others except for just such a conversion.
Where the evidence in a given case supports a finding of
such uselessness, the case falls within the fair intendment
of -otherwise producing a firearm.-  See 26 U. S. C.
5845(i).
                            B
  Here, however, we are not dealing with an aggregation of
parts that can serve no useful purpose except the assembly
of a firearm, or with an aggregation having no ostensible
utility except to convert a gun into such a weapon.  There
is, to be sure, one resemblance to the latter example in the
sale of the Contender with the converter kit, for packaging
the two has no apparent object except to convert the pistol
into something else at some point.  But the resemblance
ends with the fact that the unregulated Contender pistol
can be converted not only into a short-barreled rifle, which
is a regulated firearm, but also into a long-barreled rifle,
which is not.  The packaging of pistol and kit has an
obvious utility for those who want both a pistol and a
regular rifle, and the question is whether the mere possibil-
ity of their use to assemble a regulated firearm is enough
to place their combined packaging within the scope of
-making- one.
                            1
  Neither the statute's language nor its structure provides
any definitive guidance.  Thompson/Center suggests guid-
ance may be found in some subsections of the statute
governing other types of weapons by language that express-
ly covers combinations of parts.  The definition of
-machinegun,- for example, was amended by the Gun
Control Act of 1968 to read that -[t]he term shall also
include . . . any combination of parts from which a
machinegun can be assembled if such parts are in the
possession or under the control of a person.-  26
U. S. C. 5845(b).  In 1986, the definition of -silencer- was
amended by the Firearm Owners' Protection Act to -in-
clud[e] any combination of parts, designed or redesigned,
and intended for use in assembling or fabricating a firearm
silencer . . . .''  See 26 U. S. C. 5845(a)(7); 18
U. S. C. 921(a)(24).
  Thompson/Center stresses the contrast between these
references to -any combination of parts- and the silence
about parts in the definition of rifle, in arguing that no
aggregation of parts can suffice to make the regulated rifle.
This argument is subject to a number of answers, however.
First, it sweeps so broadly as to conflict with the statutory
definition of -make,- applicable to all firearms, which
implies that a firearm may be -made- even where not fully
-put together.-  If this were all, of course, the conflict might
well be resolved in Thompson/Center's favor.  We do not,
however, read the machinegun and silencer definitions as
contrasting with the definition of rifle in such a way as to
raise a conflict with the broad concept of -making.-
The definition of -silencer- is now included in the NFA
only by reference, see 26 U. S. C. 5845(a)(7), whereas its
text appears only at 18 U. S. C. 921(a)(24), in a statute
that itself contains no definition of -make.-  Prior to 1986,
the definition of -firearm- in the NFA included -a muffler
or a silencer for any firearm whether or not such firearm is
included within this definition.-  26 U. S. C. 5845(a)(7)
(1982 ed.).  Two Courts of Appeals held this language to
include unassembled silencers that could be readily and
easily assembled.  See United States v. Endicott, 803 F. 2d,
at 508-509; United States v. Luce, 726 F. 2d, at 48-49.
In 1986, Congress replaced that language with -any
silencer (as defined in Section 921 of title 18, United States
Code).-  Pub. L. 99-308,  109(b), 100 Stat. 460.  The
language defining silencer that was added to 18 U. S. C.
921 at that same time reads: -The terms `firearm silencer'
and `firearm muffler' mean any device for silencing,
muffling, or diminishing the report of a portable firearm,
including any combination of parts, designed or redesigned,
and intended for use in assembling or fabricating a firearm
silencer or firearm muffler, and any part intended only for
use in such assembly or fabrication.-  Pub. L. 99-308, 101,
100 Stat. 451.
Thompson/Center argues that if, even before the amend-
ment, a combination of parts was already -made- into a
firearm, the -any combination of parts- language would be
redundant.  While such a conclusion of redundancy could
suggest that Congress assumed that -make- in the NFA did
not cover unassembled parts, the suggestion (and the
implied conflict with our reading of -make-) is proven false
by evidence that Congress actually understood redundancy
to result from its new silencer definition.  Congress appar-
ently assumed that the statute reached complete parts kits
even without the -combination- language, and understood
the net effect of the new definition as expanding the
coverage of the Act beyond complete parts kits.  -The
definition of silencer is amended to include any part
designed or redesigned and intended to be used as a
silencer for a firearm.  This will help to control the sale of
incomplete silencer kits that now circumvent the prohibi-
tion on selling complete kits.-  H. R. Rep. No. 99-495, p. 21
(1986).  Because the addition of the -combination of parts-
language to the definition of silencer does not, therefore,
bear the implication Thompson/Center would put on it, that
definition cannot give us much guidance in answering the
question before us.
We get no more help from analyzing the machinegun
definition's reference to parts.  It speaks of -any combina-
tion- of them in the possession or control of any one person.
Here the definition sweeps broader than the aggregation of
parts clearly covered by -making- a rifle.  The machinegun
parts need not even be in any particular proximity to each
other.  There is thus no conflict between definitions, but
neither is much light shed on the limits of -making- a
short-barreled rifle.  We can only say that the notion of an
unassembled machinegun is probably broader than that of
an unassembled rifle.  But just where the line is to be
drawn on short-barreled rifles is not demonstrated by
textual considerations.
                 2
Thompson/Center also looks for the answer in the
purpose and history of the NFA, arguing that the congres-
sional purpose behind the NFA, of regulating weapons
useful for criminal purposes, should caution against
drawing the line in such a way as to apply the Act to the
Contender pistol and carbine kit.  See H. R. Rep. No. 1337,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. A395 (1954) (the adoption of the
original definition of rifle was intended to preclude coverage
of antique guns held by collectors, -in pursuance of the
clearly indicated congressional intent to cover under the
National Firearms Act only such modern and lethal
weapons, except pistols and revolvers, as could be used
readily and efficiently by criminals or gangsters-).
It is of course clear from the face of the Act that the
NFA's object was to regulate certain weapons likely to be
used for criminal purposes, just as the regulation of short-
barreled rifles, for example, addresses a concealable weapon
likely to be so used.  But when Thompson/Center urges us
to recognize that -the Contender pistol and carbine kit is
not a criminal-type weapon,- Brief for Respondent 20, it
does not really address the issue of where the line should
be drawn in deciding what combinations of parts are
-made- into short-barreled rifles.  Its argument goes to the
quite different issue whether the single-shot Contender
should be treated as a firearm within the meaning of the
Act even when assembled with a rifle stock.
Since Thompson/Center's observations on this extraneous
issue shed no light on the limits of unassembled -making-
under the Act, we will say no more about congressional
purpose.  Nor are we helped by the NFA's legislative
history, in which we find nothing to support a conclusion
one way or the other about the narrow issue presented
here.
                III
After applying the ordinary rules of statutory construc-
tion, then, we are left with an ambiguous statute.  The key
to resolving the ambiguity lies in recognizing that although
it is a tax statute that we construe now in a civil setting,
the NFA has criminal applications that carry no additional
requirement of willfulness.  Cf. Cheek v. United States, 498
U. S. ____, ____ (1991) (slip op., at 7) (-Congress has . . .
softened the impact of the common-law presumption [that
ignorance of the law is no defense to criminal prosecution]
by making specific intent to violate the law an element of
certain federal criminal tax offenses-); 26 U. S. C. 7201,
7203 (criminalizing willful evasion of taxes and willful
failure to file a return).  Making a firearm without approval
may be subject to criminal sanction, as is possession of an
unregistered firearm and failure to pay the tax on one, 26
U. S. C. 5861, 5871.  It is proper, therefore, to apply the
rule of lenity and resolve the ambiguity in Thomp-
son/Center's favor.  See Crandon v. United States, 494 U. S.
152, 168 (1990) (applying lenity in interpreting a criminal
statute invoked in a civil action); Commissioner v. Acker,
361 U. S. 87, 91 (1959).  Accordingly, we conclude that the
Contender pistol and carbine kit when packaged together by
Thompson/Center have not been -made- into a short-
barreled rifle for purposes of the NFA.  The judgment of
the Court of Appeals is therefore
                               Affirmed.



SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
--------
No. 91-164
--------
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. THOMPSON/
CENTER ARMS COMPANY
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the federal circuit
[June 8, 1992]

  Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurring in
the judgment.
  I agree with the plurality that the application of the
National Firearms Act (NFA) to Thompson/Center's pistol
and conversion kit is sufficiently ambiguous to trigger the
rule of lenity, leading to the conclusion that the kit is not
covered.  I disagree with the plurality, however, over where
the ambiguity lies-a point that makes no difference to the
outcome here, but will make considerable difference in
future cases.  The plurality thinks the ambiguity pertains
to whether the making of a regulated firearm includes (i)
the manufacture of parts kits that can possibly be used to
assemble a regulated firearm, or rather includes only (ii)
the manufacture of parts kits that serve no useful purpose
except assembly of a regulated firearm.  Ante, at 7-8, 12.
I think the ambiguity pertains to the much more fundamen-
tal point of whether the making of a regulated firearm
includes the manufacture, without assembly, of component
parts where the definition of the particular firearm does not
so indicate.
  As Justice White points out, the choice the plurality
worries about is nowhere suggested by the language of the
statute: 5845 simply makes no reference to the -utility- of
aggregable parts. Post, at 2 (White, J., dissenting).  It does,
however, conspicuously combine references to -combination
of parts- in the definitions of regulated silencers, machine-
guns, and destructive devices with the absence of any such
reference in the definition of regulated rifles.  This, rather
than the utility or not of a given part in a given parts
assemblage, convinces me that the provision does not
encompass Thompson/Center's pistol and conversion kit, or
at least does not do so unambiguously.
  The plurality reaches its textually uncharted destination
by determining that the statutory definition of -make,- the
derivative of which appears as an operative word in 26
U. S. C. 5821 (-There shall be levied, collected, and paid
upon the making of a firearm a tax at the rate of $200 for
each firearm made-), covers the making of parts that,
assembled, are firearms.  Noting that the -definition of
`make' includes not only `putting together,' but also `manu-
facturing . . . or otherwise producing a firearm,'- the
plurality reasons that if -a firearm were only made at the
time of final assembly (the moment the firearm was `put
together'), the additional language would be redundant.-
Ante, at 5.
  This reasoning seems to me mistaken.  I do not think
that if -making- requires -putting together,- other language
of the definition section (-manufacturing- and -otherwise
producing-) becomes redundant.  -Manufacturing- is
qualified by the parenthetical phrase -(other than by one
qualified to engage in such business under this chapter),-
whereas -putting together- is not.  Thus, one who assembles
a firearm and also engages in the prior activity of producing
the component parts can be immunized from being consid-
ered to be making firearms by demonstrating the relevant
qualification, whereas one who merely assembles parts
manufactured by others cannot.  Recognition of this
distinction is alone enough to explain the separate inclusion
of -putting together,- even though -manufacturing- itself
includes assembly.  As for the phrase -otherwise producing,-
that may well be redundant, but such residual provisions
often are.  They are often meant for insurance, to cover
anything the draftsman might inadvertently have omitted
in the antecedent catalog; and if the draftsman is good
enough, he will have omitted nothing at all.  They are a
prime example of provisions in which -iteration is obviously
afoot,- Moskal v. United States, 498 U. S. ___, ___ (1990)
(slip op., at 3) (Scalia, J., dissenting), and for which an
inflexible rule of avoiding redundancy will produce disaster.
In any event, the plurality's own interpretation (whereby
-manufacturing- a firearm does not require assembling it,
and -putting together- is an entirely separate category of
-making-) renders it not a bit easier to conceive of a
nonredundant application for -otherwise producing.-
  The plurality struggles to explain why its interpretation
(-making- does not require assembly of component parts)
does not itself render redundant the -combination of parts-
language found elsewhere in 26 U. S. C. 5845, in the
definitions of machinegun and destructive device, 5845(b)
and (f), and in the incorporated-by-reference definition of
silencer, 5845(a)(7) (referring to 18 U. S. C. 921).  See
ante, at 8-11.  I do not find its explanations persuasive,
particularly that with respect to silencer, which resorts to
that last hope of lost interpretive causes, that St. Jude of
the hagiology of statutory construction, legislative history.
As I have said before, reliance on that source is particularly
inappropriate in determining the meaning of a statute with
criminal application.  United States v. R.L.C., 503 U. S. ___,
___ (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
  There is another reason why the plurality's interpretation
is incorrect: it determines what constitutes a regulated
-firearm- via an operative provision of the National Fire-
arms Act (here 5821, the making tax) rather than by way
of 5845, which defines firearms covered by the chapter.
With respect to the definitions of machineguns, destructive
devices, and silencers, for instance, the reference to -combi-
nation of parts- causes parts aggregations to be firearms
whenever those nouns are used, and not just when they are
used in conjunction with the verb -make- and its deriva-
tives.  Thus, the restrictions of 5844, which regulate the
importation of -firearm[s]- (a term defined to include
-machinegun[s],- see 5845(a)(6)) apply to a -combination
of parts from which a machinegun can be assembled-
(because that is part of the definition of machinegun) even
though the word -make- and its derivatives do not appear
in 5844.  This demonstrates, I say, the error of the
plurality's interpretation, because it makes no sense to have
the firearms regulated by the National Firearms Act bear
one identity (which includes components of rifles and
shotguns) when they are the object of the verb -make,- and
a different identity (excluding such components) when they
are not.  Subsection 5842(a), for example, requires anyone
-making- a firearm to identify it with a serial number that
may not be readily removed; subsection 5842(b) requires
any person who -possesses- a firearm lacking the requisite
serial number to identify it with one assigned by the
Secretary of the Treasury.  Under the plurality's interpreta-
tion, all the firearms covered by (a) are not covered by (b),
since a person who -possesses- the components for a rifle or
shotgun does not possess a firearm, even though a person
who -makes- the components for a rifle or shotgun makes
a firearm.  For similar reasons, the tax imposed on -the
making of a firearm- by 5821 would apply to the making
of components for rifles and shotguns, but the tax imposed
on -firearms transferred- by 5811 would not apply to the
transfer of such components.  This cannot possibly be right.
  Finally, even if it were the case that unassembled parts
could constitute a rifle, I do not think it was established in
this case that respondent manufactured (assembled or not)
a rifle -having a barrel or barrels of less than 16 inches in
length,- which is what the definition of -firearm- requires,
5845(a)(3).  For the definition of -rifle- requires that it be
-intended to be fired from the shoulder,- 5845(c), and the
only combination of parts so intended, as far as respondent
is concerned (and the record contains no indication of
anyone else's intent), is the combination that forms a rifle
with a 21-inch barrel.  The kit's instructions emphasized
that legal sanctions attached to the unauthorized making
of a short-barreled rifle, and there was even carved into the
shoulder stock itself the following: -WARNING. FEDERAL
LAW PROHIBITS USE WITH BARREL LESS THAN 16
INCHES.-
  Since I agree (for a different reason) that the rule of
lenity prevents these kits from being considered firearms
within the meaning of the NFA, I concur in the judgment
of the Court.



SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
--------
No. 91-164
--------
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. THOMPSON/
CENTER ARMS COMPANY
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the federal circuit
[June 8, 1992]

  Justice White, joined by Justice Blackmun, Justice
Stevens, and Justice Kennedy, dissenting.
  The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded
that, to meet the definition of -firearm- under the National
Firearms Act (NFA), 26 U. S. C. 5845(a)(3), -a short-
barreled rifle actually must be assembled.-  924 F. 2d 1041,
1043 (1991) (footnote omitted).  I agree with the majority
that this pinched interpretation of the statute would fail to
accord the term -make- its full meaning as that term is
defined, 5845(i), and used in the definition of the term
-rifle,- 5845(c).  Because one -makes- a firearm not only in
the actual -putting together- of the parts, but also by
-manufacturing . . . or otherwise producing a firearm,-
Congress clearly intended that the -making- include a
-disassembled aggregation of parts,- ante, at 5, where the
assemblage of such parts results in a firearm.  In short,
when the components necessary to assemble a rifle are
produced and held in conjunction with one another, a -rifle-
is, not surprisingly, the result.
  This was the difficult issue presented by this case, and its
resolution, for me, is dispositive, as respondent Thomp-
son/Center concedes that it manufactures and distributes
together a collection of parts that may be readily assembled
into a short-barreled rifle.  Indeed, Thompson/Center's
argument concerning statutory construction, as well as its

appeal to the rule of lenity, does not suggest, nor does any
case brought to our attention, that one may escape the tax
and registration requirements the NFA imposes on those
who -make- regulated rifles simply by distributing as part
of the package other interchangeable pieces of sufficient
design to avoid the regulated definition.  The majority
nevertheless draws an artificial line between, on the one
hand, those parts that -can serve no useful purpose except
the assembly of a firearm- or that have -no ostensible
utility except to convert a gun into such a weapon,- and, on
the other hand, those parts that have -an obvious utility for
those who want both a pistol and a regular rifle.-  Ante, at
7.
  I cannot agree.  Certainly the statute makes no distinc-
tion based on the -utility- of the extra parts.  While the
majority prefers to view this silence as creating ambiguity,
I find it only to signal that such distinctions are irrelevant.
To conclude otherwise is to resort to -`ingenuity to create
ambiguity'- that simply does not exist in this statute.
United States v. James, 478 U. S. 597, 604 (1986), quoting
Rothschild v. United States, 179 U. S. 463, 465 (1900).  As
noted by the Government, when a weapon comes within the
scope of the -firearm- definition, the fact that it may also
have a nonregulated form provides no basis for failing to
comply with the requirements of the NFA.  Brief for United
States 13-14.
The Court today thus closes one loophole-one cannot
circumvent the NFA simply by offering an unassembled
collection of parts-only to open another of equal dimen-
sion-one can circumvent the NFA by offering a collection
of parts that can be made either into a -firearm- or an
unregulated rifle.  I respectfully dissent.


SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
--------
No. 91-164
--------
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. THOMPSON/
CENTER ARMS COMPANY
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the federal circuit
[June 8, 1992]

  Justice Stevens, dissenting.
  If this were a criminal case in which the defendant did
not have adequate notice of the Government's interpretation
of an ambiguous statute, then it would be entirely appropri-
ate to apply the rule of lenity.  I am persuaded, however,
that the Court has misapplied that rule to this quite
different case.
  I agree with Justice White, see ante, at 1, and also with
the Court, see ante, at 5, that respondent has made a
firearm even though it has not assembled its constituent
parts.  I also agree with Justice White that that should be
the end of the case, see ante, at 2, and therefore, I join his
opinion.  I add this comment, however, because I am
persuaded that the Government should prevail even if the
statute were ambiguous.
  The main function of the rule of lenity is to protect
citizens from the unfair application of ambiguous punitive
statutes.  Obviously, citizens should not be subject to
punishment without fair notice that their conduct is
prohibited by law.  The risk that this respondent would be
the victim of such unfairness, is, however, extremely
remote.  In 1985, the Government properly advised respon-
dent of its reading of the statute and gave it ample opportu-
nity to challenge that reading in litigation in which nothing
more than tax liability of $200 was at stake.  See 924 F. 2d
1041, 1042-1043 (CA Fed. 1991).  Moreover, a proper
construction of the statute in this case would entirely
remove the risk of criminal liability in the future.
  The Court, after acknowledging that this case involves -a
tax statute- and its construction -in a civil setting,- ante, at
12, nevertheless proceeds to treat the case as though it
were a criminal prosecution.  In my view, the Court should
approach this case like any other civil case testing the
Government's interpretation of an important regulatory
statute.  This statute serves the critical objective of regulat-
ing the manufacture and distribution of concealable
firearms-dangerous weapons that are a leading cause of
countless crimes that occur every day throughout the
Nation.  This is a field that has long been subject to
pervasive governmental regulation because of the danger-
ous nature of the product and the public interest in having
that danger controlled.  The public interest in carrying out
the purposes that motivated the enactment of this statute
is, in my judgment and on this record, far more compelling
than a mechanical application of the rule of lenity.
  Accordingly, for this reason, as well as for the reasons
stated by Justice White, I respectfully dissent.

