NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

                 Syllabus

McCARTHY v. MADIGAN et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the tenth circuit
No. 90-6861.   Argued December 9, 1991-Decided March 4, 1992

While a federal prisoner, petitioner McCarthy filed a damages action
 under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388,
 alleging that respondent prison officials had violated his Eighth
 Amendment rights by their deliberate indifference to his needs and
 medical condition resulting from a back operation and a history of
 psychiatric problems.  The District Court dismissed his complaint on
 the ground that he had failed to exhaust the Federal Bureau of
 Prisons' administrative remedy procedure, which, inter alia, includes
 rapid filing and response timetables to promote efficient dispute
 resolution but does not provide for any kind of hearing or for the
 granting of any particular type of relief.  The court then denied
 McCarthy's motion for reconsideration, rejecting his argument that
 exhaustion was not required because he sought only money damages,
 which the Bureau could not provide.  The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held:Exhaustion of the Bureau of Prisons' administrative procedure
 is not required before a federal prisoner can initiate a Bivens action
 solely for money damages.  Pp.4-16.
   (a)Exhaustion serves the twin purposes of protecting administra-
 tive agency authority and promoting judicial efficiency.  Where
 Congress specifically mandates, exhaustion is required.  Otherwise,
 the federal courts must exercise sound judicial discretion, determining
 whether to require exhaustion by balancing the individual's interest
 in retaining prompt access to a federal judicial forum against coun-
 tervailing institutional interests favoring exhaustion.  Individual
 interests have weighed heavily where resort to the administrative
 remedy would occasion undue prejudice to subsequent assertion of a
 court action, where there is some doubt as to whether the agency is
 empowered to grant effective relief, or where the administrative body
 is shown to be biased or has otherwise predetermined the issue
 before it.  Pp.4-8.
   (b)Congress has not required exhaustion of a federal prisoner's
 Bivens claim.  And, given the type of claim McCarthy raises and the
 particular characteristics of the Bureau's general grievance procedure,
 McCarthy's individual interests outweigh countervailing institutional
 interests favoring exhaustion.  The procedure's short, successive filing
 deadlines and the absence of any monetary remedy heavily burden
 a petitioning inmate's individual interests.  In contrast, while the
 Bureau has a substantial interest in encouraging internal resolution
 of grievances and in preventing the undermining of its authority by
 unnecessary resort of prisoners to the federal courts, other institu-
 tional concerns do not weigh heavily in favor of exhaustion.  The
 Bureau's alleged failure to render medical care implicates only
 tangentially its authority to carry out the control and management
 of the federal prisons, and the Bureau does not bring to bear any
 special expertise on the type of issue presented for resolution here.
 Nor are the interests of judicial economy advanced substantially by
 the grievance procedure, which does not create a formal factual
 record of the type that can be relied on conclusively by a court for
 disposition of a prisoner's claim on the pleadings or at summary
 judgment without the aid of affidavits.  Pp.8-16.
914 F.2d 1411, reversed.

 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White,
Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined.  Rehnquist,
C. J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Scalia and
Thomas, JJ., joined.
-------------------------------



NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
--------
No. 90-6861
--------
JOHN J. McCARTHY, PETITIONER v.
LARRY MADIGAN et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the tenth circuit
[March 4, 1992]

  Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court.
  The issue in this case is whether a federal prisoner must
resort to the internal grievance procedure promulgated by
the Federal Bureau of Prisons before he may initiate a suit,
pursuant to the authority of Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed.
Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), solely for money
damages.  The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled
that exhaustion of the grievance procedure was required.
McCarthy v. Maddigan, 914 F. 2d 1411 (1990).  We granted
certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Ap-
peals.  ___ U.S. ___ (1991).

                      I
  While he was a prisoner in the federal penitentiary at
Leavenworth, petitioner John J. McCarthy filed a pro se
complaint in the United States District Court for the
District of Kansas against four prison employees: the
hospital administrator, the chief psychologist, another
psychologist, and a physician.  McCarthy alleged that
respondents had violated his constitutional rights under the
Eighth Amendment by their deliberate indifference to his
needs and medical condition resulting from a back opera-
tion and a history of psychiatric problems.  On the first
page of his complaint, he wrote: ``This Complaint seeks
Money Damages Only.''  App. 7.
  The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground
that petitioner had failed to exhaust prison administrative
remedies.  Id., at 12.  Under 28 CFR Part 542 (1991),
setting forth the general ``Administrative Remedy Procedure
for Inmates'' at federal correctional institutions, a prisoner
may ``seek formal review of a complaint which relates to
any aspect of his imprisonment.''  542.10.  When an
inmate files a complaint or appeal, the responsible officials
are directed to acknowledge the filing with a ``signed
receipt'' which is returned to the inmate, to ``[c]onduct an
investigation,'' and to ``[r]espond to and sign all complaints
or appeals.''  542.11(a)(2) to (4).  The general grievance
regulations do not provide for any kind of hearing or for the
granting of any particular type of relief.
  To promote efficient dispute resolution, the procedure
includes rapid filing and response timetables.  An inmate
first seeks informal resolution of his claim by consulting
prison personnel.  542.13(a).  If this informal effort fails,
the prisoner ``may file a formal written complaint on the
appropriate form, within 15 calendar days of the date on
which the basis of the complaint occurred.''  542.13(b).
Should the warden fail to respond to the inmate's satisfac-
tion within 15 days, the inmate has 20 days to appeal to the
Bureau's Regional Director, who has 30 days to respond.  If
the inmate still remains unsatisfied, he has 30 days to
make a final appeal to the Bureau's General Counsel, who
has another 30 days to respond.  542.14 and .15.  If the
inmate can demonstrate a ``valid reason for delay,'' he ``shall
be allowed'' an extension of any of these time periods for
filing.  542.13(b).
  Petitioner McCarthy filed with the District Court a
motion for reconsideration under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 60(b),
arguing that he was not required to exhaust his administra-
tive remedies, because he sought only money damages
which, he claimed, the Bureau could not provide.  Record
(Exh. 7).  The court denied the motion.  App. 14.
  The Court of Appeals, in affirming, observed that because
Bivens actions are a creation of the judiciary, the courts
may impose reasonable conditions upon their filing.  914
F.2d, at 1412.  The exhaustion rule, the court reasoned, ``is
not keyed to the type of relief sought, but to the need for
preliminary fact-finding'' to determine ``whether there is a
possible Bivens cause of action.''  Ibid.  Accordingly,
```[a]lthough the administrative apparatus could not award
money damages . . ., administrative consideration of the
possibility of corrective action and a record would have
aided a court in measuring liability and determining the
extent of the damages.''' Ibid., quoting Goar v. Civiletti, 688
F.2d 27, 29 (CA6 1982) (emphasis in original).  Exhaustion
of the general grievance procedure was required notwith-
standing the fact that McCarthy's request was solely for
money damages.
                     II
  The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
one among related doctrines-including abstention, finality,
and ripeness-that govern the timing of federal court
decisionmaking.  Of ``paramount importance'' to any
exhaustion inquiry is congressional intent.  Patsy v. Board
of Regents of Florida, 457 U.S. 496, 501 (1982).  Where
Congress specifically mandates, exhaustion is required.
Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 489 U.S. 561,
579 (1989); Patsy, 457 U.S., at 502, n. 4.  But where
Congress has not clearly required exhaustion, sound judicial
discretion governs.  McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479,
483, n. 6 (1971).  See also Patsy, 457 U.S., at 518 (White,
J., concurring in part) (``[E]xhaustion is `a rule of judicial
administration,' . . . and unless Congress directs otherwise,
rightfubject to crafting by judges.'').  Nevertheless,
even in this field of judicial discretion, appropriate defer-
ence to Congress' power to prescribe the basic procedural
scheme under which a claim may be heard in a federal
court requires fashioning of exhaustion principles in a
manner consistent with congressional intent and any
applicable statutory scheme.  Id., at 501-502, and n. 4.

                      A
  This Court long has acknowledged the general rule that
parties exhaust prescribed administrative remedies before
seeking relief from the federal courts.  See, e.g., Myers v.
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51, and n.
9 (1938) (discussing cases as far back as 1898).  Exhaustion
is required because it serves the twin purposes of protecting
administrative agency authority and promoting judicial
efficiency.
  As to the first of these purposes, the exhaustion doctrine
recognizes the notion, grounded in deference to Congress'
delegation of authority to coordinate branches of govern-
ment, that agencies, not the courts, ought to have primary
responsibility for the programs that Congress has charged
them to administer.  Exhaustion concerns apply with
particular force when the action under review involves
exercise of the agency's discretionary power or when the
agency proceedings in question allow the agency to apply its
special expertise.  McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185,
194 (1969).  See also Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S.
467, 484 (1986).  The exhaustion doctrine also acknowledges
the commonsense notion of dispute resolution that an
agency ought to have an opportunity to correct its own
mistakes with respect to the programs it administers before
it is haled into federal court.  Correlatively, exhaustion
principles apply with special force when ``frequent and
deliberate flouting of administrative processes'' could
weaken an agency's effectiveness by encouraging disregard
of its procedures.  McKart v. United States, 395 U.S., at
195.
  As to the second of the purposes, exhaustion promotes
judicial efficiency in at least two ways.  When an agency
has the opportunity to correct its own errors, a judicial
controversy may well be mooted, or at least piecemeal
appeals may be avoided.  See, e.g., Parisi v. Donaldson, 405
U.S. 34, 37 (1972); McKart v. United States, 395 U.S., at
195.  And even where a controversy survives administrative
review, exhaustion of the administrative procedure may
produce a useful record for subsequent judicial consider-
ation, especially in a complex or technical factual context.
See, e.g., Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765 (1975)
(exhaustion may allow agency ``to compile a record which is
adequate for judicial review'').

                      B
  Notwithstanding these substantial institutional interests,
federal courts are vested with a ``virtually unflagging
obligation'' to exercise the jurisdiction given them.  Colora-
do River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.
800, 817-818 (1976).  ``We have no more right to decline the
exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that
which is not given.''  Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404
(1821).  Accordingly, this Court has declined to require
exhaustion in some circumstances even where administra-
tive and judicial interests would counsel otherwise.  In
determining whether exhaustion is required, federal courts
must balance the interest of the individual in retaining
prompt access to a federal judicial forum against counter-
vailing institutional interests favoring exhaustion.  ``[A]d-
ministrative remedies need not be pursued if the litigant's
interests in immediate judicial review outweigh the
government's interests in the efficiency or administrative
autonomy that the exhaustion doctrine is designed to
further.''  West v. Bergland, 611 F. 2d 710, 715 (CA8 1979),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 821 (1980).  Application of this
balancing principle is ``intensely practical,''  Bowen v. City
of New York, 476 U.S., at 484, citing Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 331, n. 11 (1976), because attention is
directed to both the nature of the claim presented and the
characteristics of the particular administrative procedure
provided.
                      C
  This Court's precedents have recognized at least three
broad sets of circumstances in which the interests of the
individual weigh heavily against requiring administrative
exhaustion.  First, requiring resort to the administrative
remedy may occasion undue prejudice to subsequent
assertion of a court action.  Such prejudice may result, for
example, from an unreasonable or indefinite timeframe for
administrative action.  See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S.
564, 575, n. 14 (1973) (administrative remedy deemed
inadequate ``[m]ost often . . . because of delay by the
agency'').  See also Coit Independence Joint Venture v.
FSLIC, 489 U.S., at 587 (``Because the Bank Board's
regulations do not place a reasonable time limit on FSLIC's
consideration of claims, Coit cannot be required to exhaust
those procedures''); Walker v. Southern R. Co., 385 U.S. 196,
198 (1966) (possible delay of 10 years in administrative
proceedings makes exhaustion unnecessary); Smith v.
Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 270 U.S. 587, 591-592 (1926)
(claimant ``is not required indefinitely to await a decision of
the rate-making tribunal before applying to a federal court
for equitable relief'').  Even where the administrative
decisionmaking schedule is otherwise reasonable and
definite, a particular plaintiff may suffer irreparable harm
if unable to secure immediate judicial consideration of his
claim.  Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S., at 483 (disabil-
ity-benefit claimants ``would be irreparably injured were the
exhaustion requirement now enforced against them'');
Aircraft & Diesel Equipment Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752,
773 (1947) (``impending irreparable injury flowing from
delay incident to following the prescribed procedure'' may
contribute to finding that exhaustion is not required).  By
the same token, exhaustion principles apply with less force
when an individual's failure to exhaust may preclude a
defense to criminal liability.  Moore v. East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 497, n. 5 (1977) (plurality opinion); McKart v.
United States, 395 U.S., at 197.
  Second, an administrative remedy may be inadequate
``because of some doubt as to whether the agency was
empowered to grant effective relief.''  Gibson v. Berryhill,
411 U.S., at 575, n. 14.  For example, an agency, as a
preliminary matter, may be unable to consider whether to
grant relief because it lacks institutional competence to
resolve the particular type of issue presented, such as the
constitutionality of a statute.  See, e.g., Moore v. East
Cleveland, 431 U.S., at 497, n. 5; Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S.
67, 76 (1976).  In a similar vein, exhaustion has not been
required where the challenge is to the adequacy of the
agency procedure itself, such that ```the question of the
adequacy of the administrative remedy . . . [is] for all
practical purposes identical with the merits of [the plain-
tiff's] lawsuit.'''  Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 63, n. 10
(1979) (quoting Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S., at 575).
Alternatively, an agency may be competent to adjudicate
the issue presented, but still lack authority to grant the
type of relief requested.  McNeese v. Board of Education,
373 U.S. 668, 675 (1963) (students seeking to integrate
public school need not file complaint with school superin-
tendent because the ``Superintendent himself apparently
has no power to order corrective action'' except to request
the Attorney General to bring suit); Montana Bank v.
Yellowstone County, 276 U.S. 499, 505 (1928) (taxpayer
seeking refund not required to exhaust where ``any such
application [would have been] utterly futile since the county
board of equalization was powerless to grant any appropri-
ate relief'' in face of prior controlling court decision).
  Third, an administrative remedy may be inadequate
where the administrative body is shown to be biased or has
otherwise predetermined the issue before it.  Gibson v.
Berryhill, 411 U.S., at 575, n. 14; Houghton v. Shafer, 392
U.S. 639, 640 (1968) (in view of Attorney General's submis-
sion that the challenged rules of the prison were ``validly
and correctly applied to petitioner,'' requiring administra-
tive review through a process culminating with the Attor-
ney General ``would be to demand a futile act''); Association
of National Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 201 U.S. App. D.C.
165, 170-171, 627 F. 2d 1151, 1156-1157  (1979) (bias of
Federal Trade Commission chairman), cert. denied, 447
U.S. 921 (1980).  See also Patsy v. Florida International
University, 634 F. 2d 900, 912-913 (CA5 1981) (en banc)
(administrative procedures must ``not be used to harass or
otherwise discourage those with legitimate claims''), rev'd
on other grounds, Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida, 457
U.S. 496 (1982).
                     III
  In light of these general principles, we conclude that
petitioner McCarthy need not have exhausted his constitu-
tional claim for money damages.  As a preliminary matter,
we find that Congress has not meaningfully addressed the
appropriateness of requiring exhaustion in this context.
Although respondents' interests are significant, we are left
with a firm conviction that, given the type of claim McCar-
thy raises and the particular characteristics of the Bureau's
general grievance procedure, McCarthy's individual inter-
ests outweigh countervailing institutional interests favoring
exhaustion.
                      A
  Turning first to congressional intent, we note that the
general grievance procedure was neither enacted nor
mandated by Congress.  Respondents, however, urge that
Congress, in effect, has acted to require exhaustion by
delegating power to the Attorney General and the Bureau
of Prisons to control and manage the federal prison system.
See 18 U.S.C. 4001(b) and 4042.  Brief for Respondents
3, 16; Tr. of Oral Arg. 41-42.  We think respondents confuse
what Congress could be claimed to allow by implication
with what Congress affirmatively has requested or re-
quired.  By delegating authority, in the most general of
terms, to the Bureau to administer the federal prison
system, Congress cannot be said to have spoken to the
particular issue whether prisoners in the custody of the
Bureau should have direct access to the federal courts.
  Respondents next argue that Congress, by enactment of
7 of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub.
L. 96-247, 94 Stat. 352, 42 U.S.C. 1997e, has articulated
a policy favoring exhaustion of the prison grievance
procedure prior to the filing of a constitutional claim
against prison officials.  Section 1997e imposes a limited
exhaustion requirement for a claim brought by a state
prisoner under 42 U.S.C. 1983, provided that the underly-
ing state prison administrative remedy meets specified
standards.  See Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida, 457
U.S., at 507-512.  Section 1997e has no direct application
in this case, because at issue here is a Bivens claim by a
federal prisoner against federal prison officials.  We find it
significant that Congress, in enacting 1997e, stopped short
of imposing a parallel requirement in the federal prison
context.
  Section 1997e is not only inapplicable to Bivens claims,
but-by its own terms-cuts against respondents' claim that
the particular procedure now at issue need be exhausted.
First, unlike the rule of exhaustion proposed here, 1997e
does not authorize dismissal of an action for failure to
exhaust.  Instead, it provides that the action is to be stayed
for a maximum of 90 days.  See 1997e(a)(1).  Second,
1997(e) does not mechanically require exhaustion in every
case where an acceptable state procedure is in place.
Rather, it directs federal courts to abstain ``if the court
believes that such a [waiting] requirement would be
appropriate and in the interests of justice.''  1997e(a)(1).
In other words, if an inmate fails to meet filing deadlines
under an administrative scheme, a court has ample
discretion to determine that exhaustion nonetheless should
be forgone.  Third, in contrast to the absence of any
provision for the award of money damages under the
Bureau's general grievance procedure, the statute condi-
tions exhaustion on the existence of ``effective administra-
tive remedies.''  It is difficult to see why a stricter rule of
exhaustion than Congress itself has required in the state
prison context should apply in the federal prison context.
  Respondents also argue that requiring exhaustion is
appropriate because Bivens relief gives way when necessary
to accommodate either the effective functioning of govern-
ment or an articulated congressional policy.  Brief for
Respondents 15.  We have recognized that a Bivens remedy
does not lie in two situations: (1) where Congress has
provided an equally effective alternative remedy and
declared it to be a substitute for recovery under the
Constitution, and (2) where, in the absence of affirmative
action by Congress, special factors counsel hesitation.
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1980).  As to the first
exception, Congress did not create the remedial scheme at
issue here and that scheme, in any case, as noted above,
cannot be considered to be equally effective with respect to
a claim for money damages.  As to the second exception,
respondents appear to confuse the presence of special
factors with any factors counseling hesitation.  In Carlson,
the Court held that ``special factors'' do not free prison
officials from Bivens liability, because prison officials do not
enjoy an independent status in our constitutional scheme
nor are they likely to be unduly inhibited in the perfor-
mance of their duties by the assertion of a Bivens claim.
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S., at 19.
  Interpreting the ``special factors'' exception in Schweiker
v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988), and in Bush v. Lucas, 462
U.S. 367 (1983), the Court found the Bivens remedy
displaced because Congress had legislated an elaborate and
comprehensive remedial scheme.  Sch, 487 U.S., at
425; Bush, 462 U.S., at 388.  ``When the design of a Govern-
ment program suggests that Congress has provided what it
considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional
violations that may occur in the course of its administra-
tion, we have not created additional Bivens remedies.''
Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S., at 423.  Here Congress has
enacted nothing.
                      B
  Because Congress has not required exhaustion of a
federal prisoner's Bivens claim, we turn to an evaluation of
the individual and institutional interests at stake in this
case.  The general grievance procedure heavily burdens the
individual interests of the petitioning inmate in two ways.
First, the procedure imposes short, successive filing
deadlines that create a high risk of forfeiture of a claim for
failure to comply.  Second, the administrative ``remedy''
does not authorize an award of monetary damages-the
only relief requested by McCarthy in this action.  The
combination of these features means that the prisoner
seeking only money damages has everything to lose and
nothing to gain from being required to exhaust his claim
under the internal grievance procedure.
  The filing deadlines for the grievance procedure require
an inmate, within 15 days of the precipitating incident, not
only to attempt to resolve his grievance informally but also
to file a formal written complaint with the prison warden.
28 CFR 542.13.  Then, he must successively hurdle 20-day
and 30-day deadlines to advance to the end of the grievance
process.  542.15.  Other than the Bureau's general and
quite proper interest in having early notice of any claim, we
have not been apprised of any urgency or exigency justify-
ing this timetable.  Cf. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S.
414, 435 (1944) (``The sixty days' period allowed for protest
of the Administrator's regulations cannot be said to be
unreasonably short in view of the urgency and exigencies of
wartime price regulation'').  As a practical matter, the filing
deadlines, of course, may pose little difficulty for the
knowledgeable inmate accustomed to grievances and court
actions.  But they are a likely trap for the inexperienced
and unwary inmate, ordinarily indigent and unrepresented
by counsel, with a substantial claim.
  Respondents argue that the deadlines are not jurisdic-
tional and may be extended for any ``valid'' reason.  See 28
CFR 542.13(b) and 542.15.  Yet the regulations do not
elaborate upon what a ``valid'' reason is.  Moreover, it
appears that prison officials-perhaps the very officials
subject to suit-are charged with determining what is a
``valid'' reason.
  All in all, these deadlines require a good deal of an
inmate at the peril of forfeiting his claim for money
damages.  The ``first'' of ``the principles that necessarily
frame our analysis of prisoners' constitutional claims'' is
that ``federal courts must take cognizance of the valid
constitutional claims of prison inmates.''  Turner v. Safley,
482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987).  Because a prisoner ordinarily is
divested of the privilege to vote, the right to file a court
action might be said to be his remaining most ``fundamental
political right, because preservative of all rights.''  Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).  The rapid filing
deadlines counsel strongly against exhaustion as a prereq-
uisite to the filing of a federal court action.
  As we have noted, the grievance procedure does not
include any mention of the award of monetary relief.
Respondents argue that this should not matter, because ``in
most cases there are other things that the inmate wants.''
Tr. of Oral Arg. 30.  This may be true in some instances.
But we cannot presume, as a general matter, that when a
litigant has deliberately forgone any claim for injunctive
relief and has singled out discrete past wrongs, specifically
requesting monetary compensation only, that he is likely
interested in ``other things.''  The Bureau, in any case, is
always free to offer an inmate administrative relief in
return for withdrawal of his lawsuit.  We conclude that the
absence of any monetary remedy in the grievance procedure
also weighs heavily against imposing an exhaustion
requirement.
  In the alternative, respondents argue that, despite the
absence of any provision in the general grievance procedure
for the award of money damages, such damages in fact are
available for most prisoners asserting Bivens claims.  As to
Bivens claims that could have been brought under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), respondents contend that
a grievance asking for money damages can be ``converted''
by prison officials to an FTCA claim for which prison
officials are authorized, under 28 CFR 543.30 (1991), to
award money damages.  This ``conversion'' authority does
not appear in the regulations having to do with the griev-
ance procedure, which raises substantial doubt that an
inmate would have sufficient notice as to how his claim
would be treated.  In any event, respondents have not
pointed to anything in the record showing that prison
officials have a practice of converting a claim filed under
the general grievance procedure to a claim under the FTCA
procedure.  We agree with petitioner that it is implausible
to think that they do.  The availability of a money damages
remedy is, at best, uncertain, and the uncertainty of the
administrative agency's authority to award relief counsels
against requiring exhaustion.  See Hillsborough v. Crom-
well, 326 U.S. 620, 626 (1946); Union Pacific R. Co. v.
Board of Comm'rs of Weld County, 247 U.S. 282, 287 (1918).
  We do not find the interests of the Bureau of Prisons to
weigh heavily in favor of exhaustion in view of the remedial
scheme and particular claim presented here.  To be sure,
the Bureau has a substantial interest in encouraging
internal resolution of grievances and in preventing the
undermining of its authority by unnecessary resort by
prisoners to the federal courts.  But other institutional
concerns relevant to exhaustion analysis appear to weigh in
hardly at all.  The Bureau's alleged failure to render
medical care implicates only tangentially its authority to
carry out the control and management of the federal
prisons.  Furthermore, the Bureau does not bring to bear
any special expertise on the type of issue presented for
resolution here.
  The interests of judicial economy do not stand to be
advanced substantially by the general grievance procedure.
No formal factfindings are made.  The paperwork generated
by the grievance process might assist a court somewhat in
ascertaining the facts underlying a prisoner's claim more
quickly than if it has only a prisoner's complaint to review.
But the grievance procedure does not create a formal
factual record of the type that can be relied on conclusively
by a court for disposition of a prisoner's claim on the
pleadings or at summary judgment without the aid of
affidavits.
                      C
  In conclusion, we are struck by the absence of supporting
material in the regulations, the record, or the briefs that
the general grievance procedure here was crafted with any
thought toward the principles of exhaustion of claims for
money damages.  The Attorney General's professed concern
for internal dispute resolution has not translated itself into
a more effective grievance procedure that might encourage
the filing of an administrative complaint as opposed to a
court action.  Congress, of course, is free to design or
require an appropriate administrative procedure for a
prisoner to exhaust his claim for money damages.  Even
without further action by Congress, we do not foreclose the
possibility that the Bureau itself may adopt an appropriate
administrative procedure consistent with congressional
intent.
  The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

                            It is so ordered.
-------------------------------



SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
--------
No. 90-6861
--------
JOHN J. McCARTHY, PETITIONER v.
LARRY MADIGAN et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the tenth circuit
[March 4, 1992]

  The Chief Justice, with whom Justice Scalia and
Justice Thomas join, concurring in the judgment.
  I agree with the Court's holding that a federal prisoner
need not exhaust the procedures promulgated by the
Federal Bureau of Prisons.  My view, however, is based
entirely on the fact that the grievance procedure at issue
does not provide for any award of monetary damages.  As
a result, in cases such as this one where prisoners seek
monetary relief, the Bureau's administrative remedy
furnishes no effective remedy at all, and it is therefore
improper to impose an exhaustion requirement.  See
McNeese v. Board of Education for Community Unit School
Dist. 187, 373 U.S. 668, 675 (1963); Montana Bank v.
Yellowstone County, 276 U.S. 499, 505 (1928).
  Because I would base the decision on this ground, I do
not join the Court's extensive discussion of the general
principles of exhaustion, nor do I agree with the implication
that those general principles apply without modification in
the context of a Bivens claim.  In particular, I disagree with
the Court's reliance on the grievance procedure's filing
deadlines as a basis for excusing exhaustion.  As the
majority observes, ante, at 6-7, we have previously refused
to require exhaustion of administrative remedies where the
administrative process subjects plaintiffs to unreasonable
delay or to an indefinite timeframe for decision.  See Coit
Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 489 U. S. 561, 587
(1989); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 575, n. 14 (1973);
Walker v. Southern R. Co., 385 U. S. 196, 198 (1966); Smith
v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 270 U. S. 587, 591-592
(1926).  This principle rests on our belief that when a
plaintiff might have to wait seemingly forever for an agency
decision, agency procedures are ``inadequate'' and therefore
need not be exhausted.  Coit Independence Joint Venture v.
FSLIC, supra, at 587.
  But the Court makes strange use of this principle in
holding that filing deadlines imposed by agency procedures
may provide a basis for finding that those procedures need
not be exhausted.  Ante, at 12-13.  Whereas before we have
held that procedures without ``reasonable time limit[s]'' may
be inadequate because they make a plaintiff wait too long,
Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, supra, at 587,
today the majority concludes that strict filing deadlines
might also contribute to a finding of inadequacy because
they make a plaintiff move too quickly.  But surely the
second proposition does not follow from the first.  In fact,
short filing deadlines will almost always promote quick
decisionmaking by an agency, the very result that we have
advocated repeatedly in the cases cited above.  So long as
there is an escape clause, as there is here, and the time
limit is within a zone of reasonableness, as I believe it is
here, the length of the period should not be a factor in
deciding the adequacy of the remedy.
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