NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
--------
No. 90-741
--------
ALETHA DEWSNUP, PETITIONER v. LOUIS L. TIMM
et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the tenth circuit
[January 15, 1992]

  Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court.
  We are confronted in this case with an issue concerning
506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U. S. C. 506(d).  May
a debtor ``strip down'' a creditor's lien on real property to
the value of the collateral, as judicially determined, when
that value is less than the amount of the claim secured by
the lien?
                     I
  On June 1, 1978, respondents loaned $119,000 to peti-
tioner Aletha Dewsnup and her husband, T. LaMar
Dewsnup, since deceased.  The loan was accompanied by a
Deed of Trust granting a lien on two parcels of Utah
farmland owned by the Dewsnups.
  Petitioner defaulted the following year.  Under the terms
of the Deed of Trust, respondents at that point could have
proceeded against the real property collateral by accelerat-
ing the maturity of the loan, issuing a notice of default, and
selling the land at a public foreclosure sale to satisfy the
debt.  See also Utah Code Ann. 57-1-20 to 57-1-37
(1990 and Supp. 1991).
  Respondents did issue a notice of default in 1981.  Before
the foreclosure sale took place, however, petitioner sought
reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code,
11 U. S. C. 1101 et seq.  That bankruptcy petition was
dismissed, as was a subsequent Chapter 11 petition.  In
June 1984, petitioner filed a petition seeking liquidation
under Chapter 7 of the Code, 11 U. S. C. 701 et seq.
Because of the pendency of these bankruptcy proceedings,
respondents were not able to proceed to the foreclosure sale.
See 11 U. S. C. 362.
  In 1987, petitioner filed the present adversary proceeding
in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah seeking,
pursuant to 506, to ``avoid'' a portion of respondents' lien.
App. 3.  Petitioner represented that the debt of approxi-
mately $120,000 then owed to respondents exceeded the fair
market value of the land and that, therefore, the Bankrupt-
cy Court should reduce the lien to that value.  According to
petitioner, this was compelled by the interrelationship of
the security-reducing provision of 506(a) and the lien-
voiding provision of 506(d).  Under 506(a) (``An allowed
claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which
the estate has an interest . . .. is a secured claim to the
extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's
interest in such property''), respondents would have an
``allowed secured claim'' only to the extent of the judicially
determined value of their collateral.  And under 506(d)
(``To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the
debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is
void''), the court would be required to void the lien as to the
remaining portion of respondents' claim, because the
remaining portion was not an ``allowed secured claim''
within the meaning of 506(a).
  The Bankruptcy Court refused to grant this relief.  In re
Dewsnup, 87 B. R. 676 (1988).  After a trial, it determined
that the then value of the land subject to the Deed of Trust
was $39,000.  It indulged in the assumption that the
property had been abandoned by the trustee pursuant to
554, and reasoned that once property was abandoned it no
longer fell within the reach of 506(a), which applies only
to ``property in which the estate has an interest,'' and
therefore was not covered by 506(d).
  The United States District Court, without a supporting
opinion, summarily affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's
judgment of dismissal with prejudice.  App. to Pet. for Cert.
12a.
  The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in its turn,
also affirmed.  In re Dewsnup, 908 F. 2d 588 (1990).
Starting from the ``fundamental premise'' of 506(a) that a
claim is subject to reduction in security only when the
estate has an interest in the property, the court reasoned
that because the estate had no interest in abandoned
property, 506(a) did not apply (nor, by implication, did
506(d)).  908 F. 2d, at 590-591.  The court then noted that
a contrary result would be inconsistent with 722 under
which a debtor has a limited right to redeem certain
personal property.  Id., at 592.
  Because the result reached by the Court of Appeals was
at odds with that reached by the Third Circuit in Gaglia v.
First Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 889 F. 2d 1304,
1306-1311 (1989), and was expressly recognized by the
Tenth Circuit as being in conflict, see 908 F. 2d, at 591, we
granted certiorari.  ___ U. S. ___ (1991).
                    II
  As we read their several submissions, the parties and
their amici are not in agreement in their respective
approaches to the problem of statutory interpretation that
confronts us.  Petitioner-debtor takes the position that
506(a) and 506(d) are complementary and to be read
together.  Because, under 506(a), a claim is secured only
to the extent of the judicially determined value of the real
property on which the lien is fixed, a debtor can void a lien
on the property pursuant to 506(d) to the extent the claim
is no longer secured and thus is not ``an allowed secured
claim.''  In other words, 506(a) bifurcates classes of claims
allowed under 502 into secured claims and unsecured
claims; any portion of an allowed claim deemed to be
unsecured under 506(a) is not an ``allowed secured claim''
within the lien-voiding scope of 506(d).  Petitioner argues
that there is no exception for unsecured property abandoned
by the trustee.
  Petitioner's amicus argues that the plain language of
506(d) dictates that the proper portion of an undersecured
lien on property in a Chapter 7 case is void whether or not
the property is abandoned by the trustee.  It further argues
that the rationale of the Court of Appeals would lead to
evisceration of the debtor's right of redemption and the
elimination of an undersecured creditor's ability to partici-
pate in the distribution of the estate's assets.
  Respondents primarily assert that 506(d) is not, as
petitioner would have it, ``rigidly tied'' to 506(a), Brief for
Respondents 7.  They argue that 506(a) performs the
function of classifying claims by true secured status at the
time of distribution of the estate to ensure fairness to
unsecured claimants.  In contrast, the lien-voiding 506(d)
is directed to the time at which foreclosure is to take place,
and, where the trustee has abandoned the property, no
bankruptcy distributional purpose is served by voiding the
lien.
  In the alternative, respondents, joined by the United
States as amicus curiae, argue more broadly that the words
``allowed secured claim'' in 506(d) need not be read as an
indivisible term of art defined by reference to 506(a),
which by its terms is not a definitional provision.  Rather,
the words should be read term-by-term to refer to any claim
that is, first, allowed, and, second, secured.  Because there
is no question that the claim at issue here has been
``allowed'' pursuant to 502 of the Code and is secured by
a lien with recourse to the underlying collateral, it does not
come within the scope of 506(d), which voids only liens
corresponding to claims that have not been allowed and
secured.  This reading of 506(d), according to respondents
and the United States, gives the provision the simple and
sensible function of voiding a lien whenever a claim secured
by the lien itself has not been allowed.  It ensures that the
Code's determination not to allow the underlying claim
against the debtor personally is given full effect by prevent-
ing its assertion against the debtor's property.
  Respondents point out that pre-Code bankruptcy law
preserved liens like respondents' and that there is nothing
in the Code's legislative history that reflects any intent to
alter that lawreover, according to respondents, the
``fresh-start'' policy cannot justify an impairment of respon-
dents' property rights, for the fresh start does not extend to
an in rem claim against property but is limited to a
discharge of personal liability.
                    III
  The foregoing recital of the contrasting positions of the
respective parties and their amici demonstrates that 506
of the Bankruptcy Code and its relationship to other
provisions of that Code do embrace some ambiguities.  See
3 Collier on Bankruptcy, ch. 506 and, in particular, 506.07
(15th ed. 1990).  Hypothetical applications that come to
mind and those advanced at oral argument illustrate the
difficulty of interpreting the statute in a single opinion that
would apply to all possible fact situations.  We therefore
focus upon the case before us and allow other facts to await
their legal resolution on another day.
  We conclude that respondents' alternative position,
espoused also by the United States, although not without
its difficulty, generally is the better of the several approach-
es.  Therefore, we hold that 506(d) does not allow petition-
er to ``strip down'' respondents' lien, because respondents'
claim is secured by a lien and has been fully allowed
pursuant to 502.  Were we writing on a clean slate, we
might be inclined to agree with petitioner that the words
``allowed secured claim'' must take the same meaning in
506(d) as in 506(a).  But, given the ambiguity in the
text, we are not convinced that Congress intended to depart
from the pre-Code rule that liens pass through bankruptcy
unaffected.
  1.  The practical effect of petitioner's argument is to
freeze the creditor's secured interest at the judicially
determined valuation.  By this approach, the creditor would
lose the benefit of any increase in the value of the property
by the time of the foreclosure sale.  The increase would
accrue to the benefit of the debtor, a result some of the
parties describe as a ``windfall.''
  We think, however, that the creditor's lien stays with the
real property until the foreclosure.  That is what was
bargained for by the mortgagor and the mortgagee.  The
voidness language sensibly applies only to the security
aspect of the lien and then only to the real deficiency in the
security.  Any increase over the judicially determined
valuation during bankruptcy rightly accrues to the benefit
of the creditor, not to the benefit of the debtor and not to
the benefit of other unsecured creditors whose claims have
been allowed and who had nothing to do with the mortgag-
or-mortgagee bargain.
  Such surely would be the result had the lienholder stayed
aloof from the bankruptcy proceeding (subject, of course, to
the power of other persons or entities to pull him into the
proceeding pursuant to 501), and we see no reason why
his acquiescence in that proceeding should cause him to
experience a forfeiture of the kind the debtor proposes.  It
is true that his participation in the bankruptcy results in
his having the benefit of an allowed unsecured claim as
well as his allowed secured claim, but that does not strike
us as proper recompense for what petitioner proposes by
way of the elimination of the remainder of the lien.
  2.  This result appears to have been clearly established
before the passage of the 1978 Act.  Under the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898, a lien on real property passed through bank-
ruptcy unaffected.  This Court recently acknowledged that
this was so.  See Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U. S. ___, ___
(1991) (slip op. 6) (``Ordinarily, liens and other secured
interests survive bankruptcy''); Johnson v. Home State
Bank, 501 U. S. ___, ___ (1991) (slip op. 5) (``Rather, a
bankruptcy discharge extinguishes only one mode of
enforcing a claim-namely, an action against the debtor in
personam-while leaving intact another-namely, an action
against the debtor in rem.'').
  3.  Apart from reorganization proceedings, see 11 U. S. C.
616(1) and (10) (1976 ed.), no provision of the pre-Code
statute permitted involuntary reduction of the amount of a
creditor's lien for any reason other than payment on the
debt.  Our cases reveal the Court's concern about this.  In
Long v. Bullard, 117 U. S. 617, 620-621 (1886), the Court
held that a discharge in bankruptcy does not release real
estate of the debtor from the lien of a mortgage created by
him before the bankruptcy.  And in Louisville Joint Stock
Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555 (1935), the Court
considered additions to the Bankruptcy Act effected by the
Frazier-Lemke Act, 48 Stat. 1289 (1934).  There the Court
noted that the latter Act's ``avowed object is to take from
the mortgagee rights in the specific property held as
security; and to that end `to scale down the indebtedness' to
the present value of the property.''  Id., at 594.  The Court
invalidated that statute under the Takings Clause.  It
further observed: ``No instance has been found, except under
the Frazier-Lemke Act, of either a statute or decision
compelling the mortgagee to relinquish the property to the
mortgagor free of the lien unless the debt was paid in full.''
Id., at 579.
  Congress must have enacted the Code with a full under-
standing of this practice.  See H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 357
(1977) (``Subsection (d) permits liens to pass through the
bankruptcy case unaffected'').
  4.  When Congress amends the bankruptcy laws, it does
not write ``on a clean slate.''  See Emil v. Hanley, 318 U. S.
515, 521 (1943).  Furthermore, this Court has been reluc-
tant to accept arguments that would interpret the Code,
however vague the particular language under consideration
might be, to effect a major change in pre-Code practice that
is not the subject of at least some discussion in the legisla-
tive history.  See United Savings Assn. of Texas v. Timbers
of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U. S. 365, 380 (1988).
See also Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Welfare v. Davenport,
495 U. S. 552, ___ (1990) (slip op. 9); United States  v. Ron
Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U. S. 235, 244-245 (1989).  Of
course, where the language is unambiguous, silence in the
legislative history cannot be controlling.  But, given the
ambiguity here, to attribute to Congress the intention to
grant a debtor the broad new remedy against allowed
claims to the extent that they become ``unsecured'' for
purposes of 506(a) without the new remedy's being
mentioned somewhere in the Code itself or in the annals of
Congress is not plausible, in our view, and is contrary to
basic bankruptcy principles.
  The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
                         It is so ordered.

  Justice Thomas took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
-------------------------------

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
--------
No. 90-741
------
ALETHA DEWSNUP, PETITIONER v. LOUIS L. TIMM
et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the tenth circuit
[January 15, 1992]

  Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Souter joins,
dissenting.
  With exceptions not pertinent here, 506(d) of the
Bankruptcy Code provides: -To the extent that a lien
secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed
secured claim, such lien is void . . . .-  Read naturally and
in accordance with other provisions of the statute, this
automatically voids a lien to the extent the claim it secures
is not both an -allowed claim- and a -secured claim- under
the Code.  In holding otherwise, the Court replaces what
Congress said with what it thinks Congress ought to have
said-and in the process disregards, and hence impairs for
future use, well-established principles of statutory construc-
tion.  I respectfully dissent.
                      I
  This case turns solely on the meaning of a single phrase
found throughout the Bankruptcy Code: -allowed secured
claim.-  Section 506(d) unambiguously provides that to the
extent a lien does not secure such a claim it is (with certain
exceptions) rendered void.  See 11 U. S. C. 506(d) (empha-
sis added).  Congress did not leave the meaning of -allowed
secured claim- to speculation.  Section 506(a) says that an
-allowed claim- (the meaning of which is obvious) is also a
-secured claim- -to the extent of the value of [the] creditor's
interest in the estate's interest in [the securing] property.-
(This means, generally speaking, that an allowed claim -is
secured only to the extent of the value of the property on
which the lien is fixed; the remainder of that claim is
considered unsecured.-  United States v. Ron Pair Enter-
prises, Inc., 489 U. S. 235, 239 (1989).)  When 506(d) refers
to an -allowed secured claim,- it can only be referring to
that allowed -secured claim- so carefully described two brief
subsections earlier.
  The phrase obviously bears the meaning set forth in
506(a) when it is used in the subsections of 506 other
than 506(d)-for example, in 506(b), which addresses
-allowed secured claim[s]- that are oversecured.  Indeed, as
respondents apparently concede, see Brief for Respondents
40; Tr. of Oral Arg. 29-30, even when the phrase appears
outside of 506, it invariably means what 506(a) describes:
the portion of a creditor's allowed claim that is secured
after the calculations required by that provision have been
performed.  See, e. g., 11 U. S. C. 722 (permitting a
Chapter 7 debtor to redeem certain tangible personal
property from certain liens -by paying the holder of such
lien the amount of the allowed secured claim of such holder
that is secured by such lien-); 1225(a)(5) (prescribing
treatment of -allowed secured claim[s]- in family farmer's
reorganization plan); 1325(a)(5) (same with respect to
-allowed secured claim[s]- in individual reorganizations)
(emphases added).  The statute is similarly consistent in its
use of the companion phrase -allowed unsecured claim- to
describe (with respect to a claim supported by a lien) that
portion of the claim that is treated as -unsecured- under
506(a).  See, e. g., 11 U. S. C. 507(a)(7) (fixing priority of
-allowed unsecured claims of governmental units-);
726(a)(2) (providing for payment of -allowed unsecured
claim[s]- in Chapter 7 liquidation); 1225(a)(4) (setting
standard for treatment of -allowed unsecured claim[s]- in
Chapter 12 plan); 1325(a)(4) (setting standard for treat-
ment of -allowed unsecured claim[s]- in Chapter 13 plan)
(emphases added).  When, on the other hand, the Bankrupt-
cy Code means to refer to a secured party's entire allowed
claim, i.e., to both the -secured- and -unsecured- portions
under 506(a), it uses the term -allowed claim--as in 11
U. S. C. 363(k), which refers to -a lien that secures an
allowed claim.-  Given this clear and unmistakable pattern
of usage, it seems to me impossible to hold, as the Court
does, that -the words `allowed secured claim' in 506(d)
need not be read as an indivisible term of art defined by
reference to 506(a).-  Ante, at 5; see ante, at 6.  We have
often invoked the - `normal rule of statutory construction
that - `identical words used in different parts of the same
act are intended to have the same meaning.' - ' -  Sullivan
v. Stroop, 496 U. S. ___, ___ (slip op. 6) (1990) (quoting
Sorenson v. Secretary of Treasury, 475 U. S. 851, 860 (1986)
(quoting Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U. S.
84, 87 (1934) (quoting Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v.
United States, 286 U. S. 427, 433 (1932)).  That rule must
surely apply, a fortiori, to use of identical words in the same
section of the same enactment.
  The Court makes no attempt to establish a textual or
structural basis for overriding the plain meaning of 506(d),
but rests its decision upon policy intuitions of a legislative
character, and upon the principle that a text which is
-ambiguous- (a status apparently achieved by being the
subject of disagreement between self-interested litigants)
cannot change pre-Code law without the imprimatur of
-legislative history.-  Thus abandoning the normal and
sensible principle that a term (and especially an artfully
defined term such as -allowed secured claim-) bears the
same meaning throughout the statute, the Court adopts
instead what might be called the one-subsection-at-a-time
approach to statutory exegesis.  -[W]e express no opinion,-
the Court amazingly says, -as to whether the words
`allowed secured claim' have different meaning in other
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.-  Ante, at 7, n. 3.  -We
. . . focus upon the case before us and allow other facts to
await their legal resolution on another day.-  Ante, at 6.
                     II
  As to the meaning of this single subsection (considered,
of course, in a vacuum), the Court claims to be embracing
-respondents' alternative position,- ante, at 6, which is -that
the words `allowed secured claim' in 506(d) need not be
read as an indivisible term of art defined by reference to
506(a),- ante, at 5; and that -secured claim- (for purposes
of 506(d) alone) simply connotes an allowed claim that is
-secured- in the ordinary sense, i.e., that is backed up by a
security interest in property, whether or not the value of
the property suffices to cover the claim.  The Court attrib-
utes this position to the United States as well, ante, at 6,
but the Government's position is in fact different-and
significantly so, since it does (as proper statutory interpre-
tation ought to do) give the phrase -allowed secured claim-
a uniform meaning.  I must describe the Government's
theory, and explain why it does not work.
  The distinctive feature of the United States' approach is
that it seeks to avoid invalidation of the so-called -underwa-
ter- portion of the lien by focusing, not upon the phrase
-allowed secured claim- in 506(d), but upon the prior
phrase -secures a claim.-  (-To the extent that a lien secures
a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed secured
claim, such lien is void- (Emphasis added.))  Under the
Government's textual theory, this phrase can be read to
refer not merely to the object of the security, but to its
adequacy.  That is to say, a lien only -secures- the claim in
question up to the value of the security that is the object of
the lien-and only up to that value is the lien subject to
avoidance under 506(d).  This interpretation succeeds in
giving the phrase -allowed secured claim,- which appears
later in 506(d), a meaning compatible with that compelled
by 506(a).  But that is its only virtue.
  To begin with, the interpretation renders some of the
language in 506(d) surplusage.  If the phrase -[t]o the
extent that a lien secures a claim- describes only that
portion of a claim that is secured by actual economic value,
then the later phrase -is not an allowed secured claim-
should instead have read simply -is not allowed.-  For the
phrase -allowed secured claim- itself describes a claim that
is actually secured in light of 506(a)'s calculations.
Another reading of 506(d)'s opening passage is available,
one that does not assume such clumsy draftsmanship-and
that employs, to boot, a much more natural reading of the
phrase -lien secures a claim.-  The latter ordinarily de-
scribes the relationship between a lien and a claim, not the
relationship between the value of the property subject to
the lien and the amount of the claim.  One would say that
a -mortgage secures the claim- for the purchase price of a
house, even if the value of the house was inadequate to
satisfy the full amount of the claim.  In other words, -[t]o
the extent that a lien secures a claim- means in 506(d)
what it ordinarily means: -to the extent a lien provides its
holder with a right to retain property in full or partial satis-
faction of a claim.-  It means that in 506(d) just as it
means that in 506(a), see 11 U. S. C. 506(a) (-An allowed
claim of a creditor secured by a lien . . . is a secured claim
to the extent . . .-) (emphasis added), and just as it means
that elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Code, see, e. g., 362(a)(5)
(-to the extent that such lien secures a claim-); 11 U. S. C.
363(k) (-lien that secures an allowed claim-).  An unnatu-
ral meaning should be disfavored at any time, but particu-
larly when it produces a redundancy.  See Montclair v.
Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 147, 152 (1883).
  Of course respondents' interpretation also creates a
redundancy in 506(d).  If a -secured claim- means only a
claim for which a lien has been given as security (whether
or not the security is adequate), then the prologue of
506(d) can be reformulated as follows: -To the extent that
a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an
allowed claim secured by a lien, such lien is void . . . .-
Quite obviously, the phrase -secured by a lien- in that
reformulation is utterly redundant and absurd-as is (on
respondents' interpretation) the word -secured,- which
bears the same meaning.  In other words, both the United
States' interpretation and respondents' interpretation create
a redundancy: the former by making both parts of the
506(d) prologue refer to adequate security, and the latter
by making both parts refer to security plain-and-simple.
Only when one gives the words in the first part of the
prologue (-[t]o the extent that a lien secures a claim-) their
natural meaning (as the Government does not) and gives
the words in the second part of the prologue (-allowed
secured claim-) their previously established statutory
meaning (as the respondents do not) does the provision
make a point instead of a redundancy.
   Moreover, the practical consequences of the United
States' interpretation would be absurd.  A secured creditor
holding a lien on property that is completely worthless
would not face lien avoidance under 506(d), even if the
claim secured by that lien were disallowed entirely.  The
same would be true of a lien on property that has some
value but is obviously inadequate to cover all of the disal-
lowed claim: the lien would be voided only to the extent of
the property's value at the time of the bankruptcy court's
evaluation, and could be asserted against any increase in
the value of the property that might later occur, in order to
satisfy the disallowed claim.  Unavoided liens (or more
accurately, potentials of unavoided liens, since no one
knows whether or when future evaluations of the relevant
property will exceed that of the bankruptcy court) would
impede the trustee's management and settlement of the es-
tate.  It would be difficult, for example, to sell overen-
cumbered property subject to outstanding liens pursuant to
11 U. S. C. 363(b) or (c), since any post-sale appreciation
in the property could be levied upon by holders of disal-
lowed secured claims.  And in a sale of debtor property -free
and clear- of the liens attached to it, see 11 U. S. C. 363-
(f)(3), the undisturbed portion of the disallowed claimant's
lien might attach to the proceeds of that sale to the extent
of the collateral's post-petition appreciation, preventing the
trustee from distributing some or all of the sale proceeds to
creditors holding allowed claims.  If possible, we should
avoid construing the statute in a way that produces such
absurd results.
                     III
  Although the Court makes no effort to explain why
petitioner's straightforward reading of 506(d) is textually
or structurally incompatible with other portions of the
statute, respondents and the United States do so.  They
point out, to begin with, that the two exceptions to 506(d)'s
nullifying effect both pertain to the disallowance of claims,
and not to the inadequacy of security, see 11 U. S. C. 506-
(d)(1) and (2)-from which they cde that the applicabil-
ity of 506(d) turns only on the allowability of the underly-
ing claim, and not on the extent to which the claim is a
-secured claim- within the meaning of 506(a).  But the fact
that the statute makes no exceptions to invalidation by
reason of inadequate security in no way establishes that
such (plainly expressed) invalidation does not exist.  The
premise of the argument-that if a statute qualifies a noun
with two adjectives (-allowed- and -secured-), and provides
exceptions with respect to only one of the adjectives, then
the other can be disregarded-is simply false.  The most
that can be said is that the two exceptions in 506(d) do not
contradict the United States' and respondents' interpreta-
tion; but they in no way suggest or support it.
  Respondents and the United States also identify supposed
inconsistencies between petitioner's construction of 506(d)
and other sections of the Bankruptcy Code; they are largely
illusory.  The principal source of concern is 722, which en-
ables a Chapter 7 debtor to -redeem- narrow classes of
exempt or abandoned personal property from -a lien
securing a dischargeable consumer debt.-  The price of
redemption is fixed as -the amount of the allowed secured
claim of [the lienholder] that is secured by such lien-
(emphasis added).  This provision, we are told, would be
largely superfluous if 506(d) automatically stripped liens
securing undersecured claims to the value of the collateral,
i.e., to the value of the allowed secured claims.
  This argument is greatly overstated.  Section 722 is
necessary, and not superfluous, because 506(d) is not a
redemption provision.  It reduces the value of a lienholder's
equitable interest in a debtor's property to the property's
liquidation value, but it does not insure the debtor an
opportunity to -redeem- the property at that price, i.e., to
-free [the] property . . . from [the] mortgage or pledge by
paying the debt for which it stood as security.-  Black's Law
Dictionary 1278 (6th ed. 1990).  Congress had good reason
to be solicitous of the debtor's right to redeem personal
property (the exclusive subject of 722), since state redemp-
tion laws are typically less generous for personalty than for
real property.  Compare, e. g., Utah Code Ann. 57-1-31
(1990) with Uniform Commercial Code 9-506, 3A U. L. A.
370 (1981).  The most that can be said regarding 722 is
that petitioner's construction of 506(d) would permit a
more concise formulation: Instead of describing the redemp-
tion price as -the amount of the allowed secured claim . . .
that is secured by such lien- it would have been possible to
say simply -the amount of the claim . . . that is secured by
such lien--since 506(d) would automatically have cut back
the lien to the amount of the allowed secured claim.  I
would hardly call the more expansive formulation a
redundancy-not when it is so far removed from the section
that did the -cutting back- that the reader has likely forgot-
ten it.
  Respondents and their amicus also make much of the
need to avoid giving Chapter 7 debtors a better deal than
they can receive under the other Chapters of the Bankrupt-
cy Code.  They assert that, by enabling a Chapter 7 debtor
to strip down a secured creditor's liens and pocket any post-
petition appreciation in the property, petitioner's construc-
tion of 506(d) will discourage debtors from using the
preferred mechanisms of reorganization under Chapters 11,
12, and 13.  This evaluation of the -finely reticulated-
incentives affecting a debtor's behavior rests upon criti-
cal-and perhaps erroneous-assumptions about the
meaning of provisions in the reorganization chapters.
Respondents assume, for example, that a debtor in Chapter
13 cannot strip down a mortgage placed on the debtor's
home; but that assumption may beg the very question the
Court answers today.  True, 1322(b)(2) provides that Chap-
ter 13 filers may not -modify the rights of holders of
secured claims- that are -secured only by a security interest
in real property that is the debtor's principal residence,- 11
U. S. C. 1322(b)(2) (emphasis added).  But this can be (and
has been) read, in light of 506(a), to prohibit modification
of the mortgagee's rights only with respect to the portion of
his claim that is deemed secured under the Code, see, e. g.,
In re Hart, 923 F. 2d 1410, 1415 (CA10 1991); Wilson v.
Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F. 2d 123, 127 (CA3
1990).  If petitioner's construction of 506(d) were applied
consistently in this fashion to the Code's various chapters,
see 11 U. S. C. 103(a) (providing that -chapters 1, 3, and
5 . . . [shall] apply in a case under chapter 7, 11, 12, or 13-),
Chapter 7 would not appear unduly attractive.  In any
event, reorganization contains other enticements to lure a
debtor away from Chapter 7.  It not only permits him to
maintain control over his personal and business assets, but
affords a broader discharge from prepetition in personam
liabilities.  Compare, e. g., 11 U. S. C. 523 (listing numer-
ous exceptions to Chapter 7 discharge) with 11 U. S. C.
1328(a) (listing two exceptions to Chapter 13 discharge).
Compare, e. g., Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U. S. 36, 50 (1986)
(restitution obligations imposed in criminal judgments
nondischargeable in Chapter 7) with Pennsylvania Dept. of
Public Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U. S. 552, 563-564 (1990)
(such restitution obligations dischargeable in Chapter 13).
  Finally, respondents and the United States find it
incongruous that Congress would so carefully protect
secured creditors in the context of reorganization while
allowing them to be fleeced in a Chapter 7 liquidation by
operation of 506(d).  This view mistakes the generosity of
treatment that creditors can count upon in reorganization.
There, no more than under Chapter 7, can they demand
the benefit of postevaluation increases in the value of
property given as security.  See 11 U. S. C. 1129(b)(2)(A)
and 1325(a)(5) (permitting -cram-down- of reorganization
plan over objections of secured creditors if creditors are to
receive payments equal in present value to the cash value
of the collateral, and if creditors retain liens securing such
payments).
                     IV
  I must also address the Tenth Circuit's basis for the
decision affirmed today (alluded to by the Court, ante, at 4,
but not discussed), that 506 does not apply to property
abandoned by the bankruptcy trustee under 554, see 11
U. S. C. 554.  Respondents' principal argument before us
was a modified (and less logical) version of the same basic
point-viz., that although 506(a) applies to abandoned
property, 506(d) does not.  I can address the point briefly,
since the plain-language obstacles to its validity are even
more pronounced than those raised by the Court's approach.
  The Court of Appeals' reasoning was as follows: 506(d)
effects lien-stripping only with respect to property subject
to 506(a); but by its terms 506(a) applies only to property
-in which the estate has an interest-; since -[t]he estate has
no interest in, and does not administer, abandoned proper-
ty,- 506(a), and hence 506(d), does not apply to it.  In re
Dewsnup, 908 F. 2d 588, 590-591 (CA10 1990).  The fallacy
in this is the assumption that the application of 506(a)
(and hence 506(d)) can be undone if and when the estate
ceases to -have an interest- in property in which it -had an
interest- at the outset of the bankruptcy proceeding.  The
text does not read that way.  Section 506 automatically
operates upon all property in which the estate has an
interest at the time the bankruptcy petition is filed.  Once
506(a)'s grant of secured-creditor rights, and 506(d)'s
elimination of the right to -underwater- liens and liens
securing unallowed claims have occurred, they cannot be
undone by later abandonment of the property.  Nothing in
the statute expressly permits such an unraveling, and it
would be absurd to imagine it.  If, upon the collateral's
abandonment, the claim bifurcation accomplished by
506(a) were nullified, the status of the creditor's allowed
claim-i.e., whether (and to what extent) it is -secured- or
-unsecured- for purposes of the bankruptcy distribu-
tion-would be impossible to determine.  Instead, the claim
would have to be treated as either completely -secured- or
completely -unsecured,- neither of which disposition would
accord with the Code's distribution principles.  The former
would deprive the secured claimant of a share in the
distribution to general creditors altogether.  See 11 U. S. C.
726 (providing for distribution of property of the estate to
unsecured claimants).  The latter (treating the claim as
completely unsecured) would permit the lienholder to share
in the pro rata distribution to general creditors to the full
amount of his allowed claim (rather than simply to the
amount of 506(a)-defined -unsecured claim-) while reserv-
ing his in rem claim against the security.  Respondents'
variation on the Tenth Circuit's holding avoids these
alternative absurdities only by embracing yet another
textual irrationality-asserting that, even though the
language that is the basis for the -abandonment- theory
(the phrase -in which the estate has an interest-) is
contained in 506(a), and only applies to 506(d) through
506(a), nonetheless only the effects of 506(d) and not the
effects of 506(a) are undone by abandonment.  This hardly
deserves the name of a theory.
                      V
  As I have said, the Court does not trouble to make or
evaluate the foregoing arguments.  Rather, in Part II of its
opinion it merely describes (uncritically) -the contrasting
positions of the respective parties and their amici- concern-
ing the meaning of 506(d), ante, at 6, and concludes,
because the positions are contrasting, that there is -ambigu-
ity in the text,- ante, at 7.  (This mode of analysis makes
every litigated statute ambiguous.)  Having thus estab-
lished -ambiguity,- the Court is able to summon down its
deus ex machina: -the pre-Code rule that liens pass through
bankruptcy unaffected--which cannot be eliminated by an
ambiguous provision, at least where the -legislative history-
does not mention its demise.  Ante, at 7, 8.
  We have, of course, often consulted pre-Code behavior in
the course of interpreting gaps in the express coverage of
the Code, or genuinely ambiguous provisions.  And we have
often said in such cases that, absent a textual footing, we
will not presume a departure from longstanding pre-Code
practice.  See, e. g., Midlantic Natl. Bank v. New Jersey
Dept. of Environmental Protection, 474 U. S. 494, 501
(1986); Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U. S. 36, 46-47 (1986).  But
we have never held pre-Code practice to be determinative in
the face of what we have here: contradictory statutory text.
To the contrary, where -the statutory language plainly
reveals Congress' intent- to alter pre-Code regimes, Penn-
sylvania Dept. of Public Welfare v. Davenport, supra, at 563,
we have simply enforced the new Code according to its
terms, without insisting upon -at least some discussion [of
the change from prior law] in the legislative history,- ante,
at 9.
  For an illustration of just how plainly today's opinion is
at odds with our jurisprudence, one need only examine our
most recent bankruptcy decision, Union Bank v. Wolas, 502
U. S. ___ (1991).  There also the parties took -contrasting
positions- as to the meaning of the statutory text, but we
did not shrink from finding, on the basis of our own
analysis, that no ambiguity existed.  There also it was
urged upon us that the interpretation we adopted would
overturn pre-Code practice with -no evidence in the legisla-
tive history that Congress intended to make- such a change,
Wolas, supra, at ___. (slip op. 6).  We found it unnecessary
to -dispute the accuracy of [that] description of the legisla-
tive history . . . in order to reject [the] conclusion- that no
change had been effected.  -The fact,- we said, -that
Congress may not have foreseen all of the consequences of
a statutory enactment is not a sufficient reason for refusing
to give effect to its plain meaning.-  Id., at ___, ___.  (slip
op. 6, 7).  And -the fact that Congress carefully reexamined
and entirely rewrote the preference provision in 1978
supports the conclusion that the text of 547(c)(2) as
enacted reflects the deliberate choice of Congress.-  Id., at
___.  (slip op. 9).  What was true of the preference provision
in Wolas is also true of the secured claims provisions at
issue in the present case: Congress's careful reexamination
and entire rewriting of those provisions supports the
conclusion that, regardless of whether pre-Code practice is
retained or abandoned, the text means precisely what it
says.  Indeed, the rewriting here is so complete that, no
matter how deeply one admires and venerates -pre-Code
law,- it is impossible to interpret 506(d) in a manner that
entirely preserves it-and the Court itself, for all its
protestation of fealty, does not do so.  No provision of the
former Bankruptcy Act, nor any pre-Code doctrine, purpor-
ted to invalidate-across the board-liens securing claims
disallowed in bankruptcy, see 11 U. S. C. 107 (1976 ed.);
see also 4 Collier on Bankruptcy 67 (14th ed. 1978), yet
that is precisely what 506(d), as interpreted by the Court
today, accomplishes.
  It is even more instructive to compare today's opinion
with our decision a few years ago in United States v. Ron
Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U. S. 235 (1989), which involved
another subsection of 506 itself.  The issue was whether
506(b) made post-petition interest available even to those
oversecured creditors whose liens were nonconsensual.  The
Court of Appeals had held that it did not, because such a
disposition would alter the pre-Code rule and there was no
-legislative history- to support the change.  We disagreed.
The opinion for the Court began -where all such inquiries
must begin: with the language of the statute itself.-  Id., at
241.  We did not recite the contentions of the parties and
declare -ambiguity,- but entered into our own careful
consideration of -[t]he natural reading of the [relevant]
phrase,- the -gramm structure of the statute,- and the
-terminology used throughout the Code.-  Id., at 241 and
242, n.5.  Having found a -natural interpretation of the
statutory language [that] does not conflict with any signifi-
cant state or federal interest, nor with any other aspect of
the Code,- id., at 245, we deemed the pre-Code practice to
be irrelevant.  And whereas today's opinion announces the
policy judgment that -[a]ny increase over the judicially
determined valuation during bankruptcy rightly accrues to
the benefit of the creditor,- ante, at 7, in Ron Pair we were
undeterred by the fact that our result was -arguably some-
what in tension with the desirability of paying all creditors
as uniformly as practicable,- 489 U. S., at 245-246.  -Con-
gress,- we said, -expressly chose to create that alleged ten-
sion.-  Id., at 246.  Almost point for point, today's opinion
is the methodological antithesis of Ron Pair-and I have
the greatest sympathy for the Courts of Appeals who must
predict which manner of statutory construction we shall use
for the next Bankruptcy Code case.

                  *   *   *
  The principal harm caused by today's decision is not the
misinterpretation of 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code.  The
disposition that misinterpretation produces brings the Code
closer to prior practice and is, as the Court irrelevantly
observes, probably fairer from the standpoint of natural
justice.  (I say irrelevantly, because a bankruptcy law has
little to do with natural justice.)  The greater and more
enduring damage of today's opinion consists in its destruc-
tion of predictability, in the Bankruptcy Code and else-
where.  By disregarding well-established and oft-repeated
principles of statutory construction, it renders those
principles less secure and the certainty they are designed
to achieve less attainable.  When a seemingly clear provi-
sion can be pronounced -ambiguous- sans textual and
structural analysis, and when the assumption of uniform
meaning is replaced by -one-subsection-at-a-time- interpre-
tation, innumerable statutory texts become worth litigating.
In the bankruptcy field alone, for example, unfortunate
future litigants will have to pay the price for our expressed
neutrality -as to whether the words `allowed secured claim'
have different meaning in other provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Code.-  Ante, at 7, n. 3.  Having taken this case to
resolve uncertainty regarding one provision, we end by
spawning confusion regarding scores of others.  I respect-
fully dissent.
-------------------------------


NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
--------
No. 90-741
--------
ALETHA DEWSNUP, PETITIONER v. LOUIS L. TIMM
et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the tenth circuit
[January 15, 1992]

  Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court.
  We are confronted in this case with an issue concerning
506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U. S. C. 506(d).  May
a debtor ``strip down'' a creditor's lien on real property to
the value of the collateral, as judicially determined, when
that value is less than the amount of the claim secured by
the lien?
                     I
  On June 1, 1978, respondents loaned $119,000 to peti-
tioner Aletha Dewsnup and her husband, T. LaMar
Dewsnup, since deceased.  The loan was accompanied by a
Deed of Trust granting a lien on two parcels of Utah
farmland owned by the Dewsnups.
  Petitioner defaulted the following year.  Under the terms
of the Deed of Trust, respondents at that point could have
proceeded against the real property collateral by accelerat-
ing the maturity of the loan, issuing a notice of default, and
selling the land at a public foreclosure sale to satisfy the
debt.  See also Utah Code Ann. 57-1-20 to 57-1-37
(1990 and Supp. 1991).
  Respondents did issue a notice of default in 1981.  Before
the foreclosure sale took place, however, petitioner sought
reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code,
11 U. S. C. 1101 et seq.  That bankruptcy petition was
dismissed, as was a subsequent Chapter 11 petition.  In
June 1984, petitioner filed a petition seeking liquidation
under Chapter 7 of the Code, 11 U. S. C. 701 et seq.
Because of the pendency of these bankruptcy proceedings,
respondents were not able to proceed to the foreclosure sale.
See 11 U. S. C. 362.
  In 1987, petitioner filed the present adversary proceeding
in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah seeking,
pursuant to 506, to ``avoid'' a portion of respondents' lien.
App. 3.  Petitioner represented that the debt of approxi-
mately $120,000 then owed to respondents exceeded the fair
market value of the land and that, therefore, the Bankrupt-
cy Court should reduce the lien to that value.  According to
petitioner, this was compelled by the interrelationship of
the security-reducing provision of 506(a) and the lien-
voiding provision of 506(d).  Under 506(a) (``An allowed
claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which
the estate has an interest . . .. is a secured claim to the
extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's
interest in such property''), respondents would have an
``allowed secured claim'' only to the extent of the judicially
determined value of their collateral.  And under 506(d)
(``To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the
debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is
void''), the court would be required to void the lien as to the
remaining portion of respondents' claim, because the
remaining portion was not an ``allowed secured claim''
within the meaning of 506(a).
  The Bankruptcy Court refused to grant this relief.  In re
Dewsnup, 87 B. R. 676 (1988).  After a trial, it determined
that the then value of the land subject to the Deed of Trust
was $39,000.  It indulged in the assumption that the
property had been abandoned by the trustee pursuant to
554, and reasoned that once property was abandoned it no
longer fell within the reach of 506(a), which applies only
to ``property in which the estate has an interest,'' and
therefore was not covered by 506(d).
  The United States District Court, without a supporting
opinion, summarily affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's
judgment of dismissal with prejudice.  App. to Pet. for Cert.
12a.
  The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in its turn,
also affirmed.  In re Dewsnup, 908 F. 2d 588 (1990).
Starting from the ``fundamental premise'' of 506(a) that a
claim is subject to reduction in security only when the
estate has an interest in the property, the court reasoned
that because the estate had no interest in abandoned
property, 506(a) did not apply (nor, by implication, did
506(d)).  908 F. 2d, at 590-591.  The court then noted that
a contrary result would be inconsistent with 722 under
which a debtor has a limited right to redeem certain
personal property.  Id., at 592.
  Because the result reached by the Court of Appeals was
at odds with that reached by the Third Circuit in Gaglia v.
First Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 889 F. 2d 1304,
1306-1311 (1989), and was expressly recognized by the
Tenth Circuit as being in conflict, see 908 F. 2d, at 591, we
granted certiorari.  ___ U. S. ___ (1991).
                    II
  As we read their several submissions, the parties and
their amici are not in agreement in their respective
approaches to the problem of statutory interpretation that
confronts us.  Petitioner-debtor takes the position that
506(a) and 506(d) are complementary and to be read
together.  Because, under 506(a), a claim is secured only
to the extent of the judicially determined value of the real
property on which the lien is fixed, a debtor can void a lien
on the property pursuant to 506(d) to the extent the claim
is no longer secured and thus is not ``an allowed secured
claim.''  In other words, 506(a) bifurcates classes of claims
allowed under 502 into secured claims and unsecured
claims; any portion of an allowed claim deemed to be
unsecured under 506(a) is not an ``allowed secured claim''
within the lien-voiding scope of 506(d).  Petitioner argues
that there is no exception for unsecured property abandoned
by the trustee.
  Petitioner's amicus argues that the plain language of
506(d) dictates that the proper portion of an undersecured
lien on property in a Chapter 7 case is void whether or not
the property is abandoned by the trustee.  It further argues
that the rationale of the Court of Appeals would lead to
evisceration of the debtor's right of redemption and the
elimination of an undersecured creditor's ability to partici-
pate in the distribution of the estate's assets.
  Respondents primarily assert that 506(d) is not, as
petitioner would have it, ``rigidly tied'' to 506(a), Brief for
Respondents 7.  They argue that 506(a) performs the
function of classifying claims by true secured status at the
time of distribution of the estate to ensure fairness to
unsecured claimants.  In contrast, the lien-voiding 506(d)
is directed to the time at which foreclosure is to take place,
and, where the trustee has abandoned the property, no
bankruptcy distributional purpose is served by voiding the
lien.
  In the alternative, respondents, joined by the United
States as amicus curiae, argue more broadly that the words
``allowed secured claim'' in 506(d) need not be read as an
indivisible term of art defined by reference to 506(a),
which by its terms is not a definitional provision.  Rather,
the words should be read term-by-term to refer to any claim
that is, first, allowed, and, second, secured.  Because there
is no question that the claim at issue here has been
``allowed'' pursuant to 502 of the Code and is secured by
a lien with recourse to the underlying collateral, it does not
come within the scope of 506(d), which voids only liens
corresponding to claims that have not been allowed and
secured.  This reading of 506(d), according to respondents
and the United States, gives the provision the simple and
sensible function of voiding a lien whenever a claim secured
by the lien itself has not been allowed.  It ensures that the
Code's determination not to allow the underlying claim
against the debtor personally is given full effect by prevent-
ing its assertion against the debtor's property.
  Respondents point out that pre-Code bankruptcy law
preserved liens like respondents' and that there is nothing
in the Code's legislative history that reflects any intent to
alter that lawreover, according to respondents, the
``fresh-start'' policy cannot justify an impairment of respon-
dents' property rights, for the fresh start does not extend to
an in rem claim against property but is limited to a
discharge of personal liability.
                    III
  The foregoing recital of the contrasting positions of the
respective parties and their amici demonstrates that 506
of the Bankruptcy Code and its relationship to other
provisions of that Code do embrace some ambiguities.  See
3 Collier on Bankruptcy, ch. 506 and, in particular, 506.07
(15th ed. 1990).  Hypothetical applications that come to
mind and those advanced at oral argument illustrate the
difficulty of interpreting the statute in a single opinion that
would apply to all possible fact situations.  We therefore
focus upon the case before us and allow other facts to await
their legal resolution on another day.
  We conclude that respondents' alternative position,
espoused also by the United States, although not without
its difficulty, generally is the better of the several approach-
es.  Therefore, we hold that 506(d) does not allow petition-
er to ``strip down'' respondents' lien, because respondents'
claim is secured by a lien and has been fully allowed
pursuant to 502.  Were we writing on a clean slate, we
might be inclined to agree with petitioner that the words
``allowed secured claim'' must take the same meaning in
506(d) as in 506(a).  But, given the ambiguity in the
text, we are not convinced that Congress intended to depart
from the pre-Code rule that liens pass through bankruptcy
unaffected.
  1.  The practical effect of petitioner's argument is to
freeze the creditor's secured interest at the judicially
determined valuation.  By this approach, the creditor would
lose the benefit of any increase in the value of the property
by the time of the foreclosure sale.  The increase would
accrue to the benefit of the debtor, a result some of the
parties describe as a ``windfall.''
  We think, however, that the creditor's lien stays with the
real property until the foreclosure.  That is what was
bargained for by the mortgagor and the mortgagee.  The
voidness language sensibly applies only to the security
aspect of the lien and then only to the real deficiency in the
security.  Any increase over the judicially determined
valuation during bankruptcy rightly accrues to the benefit
of the creditor, not to the benefit of the debtor and not to
the benefit of other unsecured creditors whose claims have
been allowed and who had nothing to do with the mortgag-
or-mortgagee bargain.
  Such surely would be the result had the lienholder stayed
aloof from the bankruptcy proceeding (subject, of course, to
the power of other persons or entities to pull him into the
proceeding pursuant to 501), and we see no reason why
his acquiescence in that proceeding should cause him to
experience a forfeiture of the kind the debtor proposes.  It
is true that his participation in the bankruptcy results in
his having the benefit of an allowed unsecured claim as
well as his allowed secured claim, but that does not strike
us as proper recompense for what petitioner proposes by
way of the elimination of the remainder of the lien.
  2.  This result appears to have been clearly established
before the passage of the 1978 Act.  Under the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898, a lien on real property passed through bank-
ruptcy unaffected.  This Court recently acknowledged that
this was so.  See Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U. S. ___, ___
(1991) (slip op. 6) (``Ordinarily, liens and other secured
interests survive bankruptcy''); Johnson v. Home State
Bank, 501 U. S. ___, ___ (1991) (slip op. 5) (``Rather, a
bankruptcy discharge extinguishes only one mode of
enforcing a claim-namely, an action against the debtor in
personam-while leaving intact another-namely, an action
against the debtor in rem.'').
  3.  Apart from reorganization proceedings, see 11 U. S. C.
616(1) and (10) (1976 ed.), no provision of the pre-Code
statute permitted involuntary reduction of the amount of a
creditor's lien for any reason other than payment on the
debt.  Our cases reveal the Court's concern about this.  In
Long v. Bullard, 117 U. S. 617, 620-621 (1886), the Court
held that a discharge in bankruptcy does not release real
estate of the debtor from the lien of a mortgage created by
him before the bankruptcy.  And in Louisville Joint Stock
Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555 (1935), the Court
considered additions to the Bankruptcy Act effected by the
Frazier-Lemke Act, 48 Stat. 1289 (1934).  There the Court
noted that the latter Act's ``avowed object is to take from
the mortgagee rights in the specific property held as
security; and to that end `to scale down the indebtedness' to
the present value of the property.''  Id., at 594.  The Court
invalidated that statute under the Takings Clause.  It
further observed: ``No instance has been found, except under
the Frazier-Lemke Act, of either a statute or decision
compelling the mortgagee to relinquish the property to the
mortgagor free of the lien unless the debt was paid in full.''
Id., at 579.
  Congress must have enacted the Code with a full under-
standing of this practice.  See H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 357
(1977) (``Subsection (d) permits liens to pass through the
bankruptcy case unaffected'').
  4.  When Congress amends the bankruptcy laws, it does
not write ``on a clean slate.''  See Emil v. Hanley, 318 U. S.
515, 521 (1943).  Furthermore, this Court has been reluc-
tant to accept arguments that would interpret the Code,
however vague the particular language under consideration
might be, to effect a major change in pre-Code practice that
is not the subject of at least some discussion in the legisla-
tive history.  See United Savings Assn. of Texas v. Timbers
of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U. S. 365, 380 (1988).
See also Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Welfare v. Davenport,
495 U. S. 552, ___ (1990) (slip op. 9); United States  v. Ron
Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U. S. 235, 244-245 (1989).  Of
course, where the language is unambiguous, silence in the
legislative history cannot be controlling.  But, given the
ambiguity here, to attribute to Congress the intention to
grant a debtor the broad new remedy against allowed
claims to the extent that they become ``unsecured'' for
purposes of 506(a) without the new remedy's being
mentioned somewhere in the Code itself or in the annals of
Congress is not plausible, in our view, and is contrary to
basic bankruptcy principles.
  The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
                         It is so ordered.

  Justice Thomas took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
-------------------------------
