Subject:  GOZLON-PERETZ v. UNITED STATES, Syllabus



    NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as
    is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is
    issued.  The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court
    but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience
    of the reader.  See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.9S. 321,
    337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


Syllabus


AGOZLON-PERETZ v. UNITED STATES


Bcertiorari to the united states court of appeals for the third circuit

CNo.989-7370.  Argued October 30, 1990--Decided February 19, 1991

DThe Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (Reform Act) eliminated special parole,
supervised by the United States Parole Commission, for drug offenders after
incarceration and established conditions for a new system of supervised
release to be overseen by the sentencing court.  However, the supervised
release provisions' effective date was delayed until November 1, 1987.  In
October 1986, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (ADAA) was enacted, which, in
91002, sets minimum and maximum sentences and mandates terms of supervised
release for certain drug offenses.  Some ADAA sections, but not 91002,
specified a November 1, 1987, effective date.  Petitioner was convicted of,
inter alia, offenses to which 91002 applies that occurred after the ADAA's
enactment but before the effective date of the Reform Act's supervised
release provisions.  The District Court sentenced him to concurrent prison
terms and imposed concurrent 5-year terms of special parole for each
offense, ruling that Congress intended that parole be imposed in cases
where the offenses were committed in the interim between the ADAA's
enactment and November 1, 1987, and rejecting petitioner's argument that no
post confinement supervision was appropriate for offenses committed during
that time.  The Court of Appeals vacated the sentence, holding that 91002's
plain language required that petitioner be sentenced to terms of supervised
release rather than special parole.

EHeld: Supervised release applies for all drug offenses in the categories
specified by ADAA 91002 that were committed after the ADAA was enacted but
before November 1, 1987.  Pp.98-14.

    F(a) Section 1002 contains no provision for its effective date and
    therefore took effect on its date of enactment.  There is no clear
    direction to the contrary by Congress, whose silence here contrasts
    with its expression of effective dates for other ADAA sections.
    Nothing about Congress' apparent purpose in enacting 91002--to rectify
    an error in the Controlled Substances Act that would have required
    supervised release for small- but not big-time drug offenders--rebuts
    this presumption.  In arguing that Congress must have intended to
    postpone all of 91002's penalty provisions in order to avoid creating a
    conflict with 91007(a) and 1009(a)--which, effective November 1, 1987,
    authorize shorter sentences for certain offenders who cooperate with
    the Government--since 91002's mandatory minimum sentence requirements
    otherwise would eliminate the possibility of such shorter sentences for
    offenses committed during the interim period, petitioner is mistaken.
    Congress corrected these problems in December 1987 by permitting
    departures from mandatory minimum sentences for cooperating defendants
    whose offenses were committed before November 1, 1987, a move that can
    be explained only if Congress believed that the mandatory penalties had
    gone into effect as of the ADAA's date of enactment.  Also rejected is
    petitioner's argument that the delayed implementation of 91004, which
    provides that all references to "special parole" in the Controlled
    Substances Act were to be changed to "supervised release," delayed the
    effect of 91002's supervised release provisions.  Since a specific
    provision controls over one of a more general application and 91002
    made the change from special parole to supervised release independent
    of 91004, 91004's general changeover provision does not apply.
    Moreover, it is unlikely that Congress intended to delay some, but not
    all, of 91002's provisions.  Pp.98-11.

    (b) That the term "supervised release" was defined in the enacted, but
    not yet effective, Reform Act rather than in the ADAA, does not mean
    that the term as used in the ADAA had no significance before November
    1, 1987.  It is not uncommon to refer to other, related legislative
    enactments when interpreting specialized statutory terms, a device
    whose utility is not defeated by the fact that the Act referred to is
    not yet effective.  At the time the ADAA was enacted, the Reform Act
    had all of the weight and dignity of a deliberate, considered enactment
    of Congress, presented to and approved by the President; and it is
    reasonable to assume that Congress, when it passed the ADAA, knew that
    the full definition of supervised release existed in the Reform Act and
    legislated with reference to it.  It is also possible that Congress,
    knowing that it was unlikely that anyone committing a drug offense
    during the interim period would be released from custody before
    November 1, 1987, concluded that in all such cases the Reform Act would
    be effective at the time a district court began its duties under the
    supervised release program.  Section 1002's plain language also
    forecloses the possibility that the rules governing special parole
    should apply to crimes committed in the interim period.  Pp.911-14.

    (c) The absence of an effective date provision in 91002 does not create
    an ambiguity calling for the invocation of the rule of lenity.  While
    91002 may have created some minor inconsistencies with other statutory
    provisions, its postconfinement supervision provisions are not
    ambiguous.  Pp.914.

G894 F. 2d 1402, affirmed.

HKennedy, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------




Subject: X, 89-7370--OPINION



GOZLON-PERETZ v. UNITED STATES
 


NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in
the preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested
to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States,
Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in
order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to
press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


No. 89-7370



AMOSHE GOZLON-PERETZ, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES

Bon writ of certiorari to the united states court ofappeals for the Third
circuit

C[February 19, 1991]



A Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.
B This case presents a problem in the interpretation of the federal drug
enforcement laws and their reference to the method of postconfinement
monitoring known as "supervised release."  Before 1984, drug offenders
sentenced to prison were required to serve terms of special parole
following their incarceration.  The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
eliminated special parole and, in its place, established conditions for the
new system of supervised release.  To ensure the orderly implementation of
this change, Congress delayed the effective date of the Sentencing Reform
Act's supervised release provisions until November 1, 1987.  A year before
that date, however, Congress enacted the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986
(ADAA), which mandates terms of supervised release for certain drug
offenses.  In this case we consider whether the ADAA's supervised release
requirements apply to offenses committed during the interim period after
the ADAA was enacted but before the Sentencing Reform Act's provisions for
supervised release became effective.

CI
D Petitioner Moshe Gozlon-Peretz was convicted under 21 U.9S.9C. 9846 on
one count of participation in a conspiracy to distribute in excess of a
kilogram of heroin, and under 21 U.9S.9C. 9841(a)(1) and 18 U.9S.9C. 92 on
counts of distributing 240 grams of heroin and of possession with intent to
distribute in excess of one kilogram of heroin.  The substantive offenses
occurred on February 26, 1987, nearly four months after the ADAA's
enactment but eight months before the November 1, 1987, effective date of
the Sentencing Reform Act's provisions for supervised release.  Following a
remand by the Third Circuit for reasons not at issue here, see United
States v. Levy, 865 F. 2d 551, 559-560 (1989) (en banc), the District Court
sentenced petitioner to 20 years on the conspiracy count, and to concurrent
15-year sentences for the substantive offenses.
    At the sentencing hearing, the Government and petitioner disagreed as
to whether some form of postconfinement supervision was required for
petitioner's substantive offenses.  At issue then, and at issue in the case
before us, was the interpretation of 91002 of the ADAA, codified at 21
U.9S.9C. 9841(b)(1)(A) (1982 ed., Supp. IV).  Although ADAA 91002 specifies
a term of "supervised release," the Government argued in the District Court
that a term of special parole was required.  According to the Government,
because 91002 directs that drug offenders receive postconfinement
supervision, and because drug offenders were sentenced to special parole
before the ADAA was enacted, Congress intended that special parole be
imposed during the interim before the effective date of the Sentencing
Reform Act, November 1, 1987.  Petitioner, contending that Congress
intended to delay the effective date of the ADAA's supervised release
provisions, argued that no form of postconfinement supervision was
appropriate under the ADAA for offenses committed prior to November 1,
1987.  The District Court accepted the Government's position and imposed
concurrent 5-year terms of special parole for each of petitioner's
substantive offenses.
    The Third Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded, holding that,
under the plain language of 91002, petitioner should have been sentenced to
two 5-year terms of supervised release rather than special parole.  894 F.
2d 1402 (CA3 1990).  According to the Third Circuit, the supervised release
provisions in 91002 became effective on the ADAA's date of enactment,
October 27, 1986, and apply to all offenses committed after that date.
Because of a split among the Courts of Appeals as to the appropriate form
of postcon finement supervision for the interim period in question, we
granted certiorari.  496 U.9S. Z (1990).  We now affirm.

CII


A
D We first trace in more detail the relevant statutory history of the
federal drug enforcement penalty scheme and of federal sentencing in
general.  We begin with the Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. 91-513, Tit.
II, 9401(b), 84 Stat. 1260, codified at 21 U.9S.9C. 9841(b).  When first
enacted, 9841(b) subjected offenders involved in the manufacture or
distribution of schedule I and II narcotic substances, including heroin, to
a maximum of 15 years' imprisonment and, if a prison sentence was imposed,
to a mandatory 3-year term of special parole.  21 U.9S.9C. 9841(b)(1)(A)
(1982 ed.). {1}  Special parole was "a period of supervision served upon
completion of a prison term" and administered by the United States Parole
Commission.  Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.9S. 381, 388 (1980).  See 21
U.9S.9C. 9841(c) (1982 ed.), repealed, Pub. L. 98-473, Tit. II, 9224(a)(6),
98 Stat. 2030.  In 1984, as part of a larger bill, Congress enacted two
statutes that altered the penalty schemes for federal drug offenders: the
Controlled Substances Penalties Amendments Act, Pub. L. 98-473, Tit. II,
ch. V, 98 Stat. 2068, and the Sentencing Reform Act, Pub. L. 98-473, Tit.
II, ch. II, 98 Stat. 1987. {2}  The Controlled Substances Penalties
Amendments Act increased the maximum prison terms available under the
Controlled Substances Act for offenses involving large quantities of
narcotic substances to 20 years, but did not provide any term of special
parole for such offenses.  21 U.9S.9C. 9841(b)(1)(A) (1982 ed., Supp. II).
{3}  Persons convicted of crimes involving lesser amounts of narcotic and
nonnarcotic substances remained subject to the penalties applicable to
offenses committed before the 1984 amendments, including special parole.
21 U.9S.9C. 9841(b)(1)(B) and (C) (1982 ed., Supp. II).  Thus, while
increasing the maximum terms of imprisonment for large-scale narcotics
offenses, the 1984 amendments created a peculiar situation in which
small-time offenders were subject to special parole, while big-time
offenders were not.
    Concurrent with the increases in maximum penalties for large-scale
narcotics offenses, the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 modified the penalty
scheme for federal drug offenders by deleting all remaining references to
special parole in the pre-1984 version of the Controlled Substances Act,
but this modification did not become effective until November 1, 1987. {4}
The change reflected Congress' desire to eliminate most forms of parole,
and to replace them with the new system of supervised release.  Under the
Sentencing Reform Act's provisions for supervised release, the sentencing
court, rather than the Parole Commission, would oversee the defendant's
postconfinement monitoring.  See 18 U.9S.9C. 93583, 3601.  The court could
terminate, extend, or alter the conditions of the term of supervised
release prior to its expiration.  18 U.9S.9C. 93583(e).  In the event of a
violation of the supervised release order, the court could hold a defendant
in contempt.  18 U.9S.9C. 93583(e)(3).
    Having decided upon supervised release as its preferred means of
postconfinement monitoring, Congress nevertheless decided to defer its
application to drug offenses.  Although the Sentencing Reform Act
established conditions for supervised release, and although the Act took
the further step of eliminating references to special parole for most drug
offenses, Congress did not take the final step of requiring supervised
release for persons sentenced under the Controlled Substances Act.  That
step was taken two years later, when Congress enacted the ADAA Pub. L.
99-570, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-2 to 3207-4.
    The ADAA again redefined and expanded the offense categories codified
in 21 U.9S.9C. 9841(b) and, in so doing, increased the maximum penalties
and set minimum penalties for many offenders.  ADAA 91002 created a new
drug penalty classification for large-scale offenses involving certain
narcotics, such as petitioner's trafficking in more than one kilogram of
heroin.  For first-time offenders in these highvolume narcotics crimes,
Congress authorized sentences of 10 years to life imprisonment.  21
U.9S.9C. 9841(b)(1)(A) (1982 ed., Supp. IV). {5}  For mid-range violations,
such as those involving between 100 grams and one kilogram of heroin,
Congress authorized sentences of between 5 and 40 years' imprisonment.
Id., 9841(b)(1)(B). {6}  Other violations involving schedule I or II
substances were subject to a maximum of 20 years' imprisonment.  Id.,
9841(b)(1)(C).  The penalties for other drug offenses remained mostly
unchanged, including mandatory special parole for offenses involving
relatively small amounts of marijuana and hashish.  See id., 9841(b)(1)(D),
(b)(2) and (b)(3).
    The House and Senate versions of the ADAA, in their original forms,
also required that special parole terms be imposed as part of the package
of penalties for major narcotics offenses under 21 U.9S.9C. 9841(b)(1)(A),
(B) and (C).  See H.9R. 5484, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); S. 2878, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).  Under both bills, the special parole provisions
were to become effective immediately and to apply until the effective date
of the new federal sentencing system, November 1, 1987.  As of that date,
the House bill provided for the repeal of the special parole provisions,
while the Senate bill provided that all references to special parole be
changed to supervised release.  See H.9R. Rep. No.999-845, p.920 (1986);
132 Cong. Rec. H6630 (Sept. 11, 1986) (9608(b) of House bill); id., at
26101 (91007 of Senate bill).  Neither of these alternatives was adopted,
however.  Instead, in the final stages of the legislative process, and
without explanation, Congress substituted the words "supervised release"
for the words "special parole" whenever the latter term appeared in 91002.
See id., at 32728-32745.  As enacted by Congress, 91002 of the ADAA, 21
U.9S.9C. 9841(b)(1)(A), provides in relevant part:

E"Any sentence under this subparagraph shall, in the absence of .9.9. a
prior conviction, impose a term of supervised release of at least 5 years
in addition to such term of imprisonment and shall, if there was .9.9. a
prior conviction, impose a term of supervised release of at least 10 years
in addition to such term of imprisonment. .9.9. No person sentenced under
this subparagraph shall be eligible for parole during the term of
imprisonment imposed therein".
F

In similarly worded passages, Congress also required sentencing courts to
impose supervised release terms of at least four and three years for
first-time offenders sentenced under 9841(b)(1)(B) and (C), respectively,
and to double those terms for repeat offenders.  In contrast to other
sections in the ADAA for which Congress specified November 1, 1987, as the
effective date, ADAA 91002 gave no such direction.

CB
D The absence of an express deferral of ADAA 91002's effective date,
coupled with the delayed effective date of the Sentencing Reform Act's
provisions governing supervised release, has created a conflict of
interpretation among the courts of appeals.  The persons affected by the
interpretive problem are those whose offenses occurred between October 27,
1986, the date on which ADAA was signed into law, and November 1, 1987, the
effective date of the Sentencing Reform Act's provisions for supervised
release.  A majority of the courts of appeals hold, as did the District
Court in this case, that sentencing courts may not impose supervised
release for crimes committed before November 1, 1987, and instead require
imposition of terms of special parole. {7}  The Third Circuit, in reversing
the District Court below, held that supervised release applies to offenses
that occurred after October 27, 1986, and four other circuits accept its
position, at least in part. {8}  In this Court, the Government now supports
the Third Circuit's view, while petitioner still insists that Congress
intended no form of postconfinement supervision for offenses committed
before November 1, 1987.  We now consider which of these interpretations
accords with congressional intent.

NIII


A
D It is well established that, absent a clear direction by Congress to the
contrary, a law takes effect on the date of its enactment.  See Robertson
v. Bradbury, 132 U.9S. 491, 493 (1889); Arnold v. United States, 9 Cranch
104, 119-120 (1815); see also 2 N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory
Construction 933.06, p.912 (C. Sands 4th rev. ed. 1986).  We find no such
contrary direction in the language of 91002, or in its evident purpose.
Turning first to the text of the statute, we note that 91002, like many
other congressional enactments, contains no provision for its effective
date.  Nor is there an effective date specified for the ADAA as a whole.
Congress' silence in this regard contrasts with the express effective date
provisions for other discrete sections of the ADAA.  See Pub. L. 99-570,
91004(b), 1006(a)(4), 1007(b) and 1009(b).  "[W]here Congress includes
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another
section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion."
Russello v. United States, 464 U.9S. 16, 23 (1983) (internal quotations
omitted); see General Motors Corp. v. United States, 496 U.9S. Z, Z (1990)
(slip op., at 9-10).  Nor does anything we can discern about Congress'
purpose in enacting 91002 rebut the presumption that it became effective at
once.  As discussed above, the Controlled Substances Penalties Amendments
Act of 1984 inexplicably mandated postconfinement supervision for many
small-time drug offenders, but exempted big-time narcotics offenders.  See
supra, at 5.  Section 1002 removed that disparity and mandated
postconfinement supervision for all Schedule I and II drug offenders.
Given the apparent purpose of the legislation to rectify an earlier
mistake, it seems unlikely that Congress intended the effective date to be
any time other than the date of enactment.
    Petitioner asks us to look to other provisions in the ADAA to find
Congress' intent.  He first contends that Congress must have intended to
postpone all the penalty provisions of 91002--not just its supervised
release provisions--until November 1, 1987, because to have done otherwise
would have created anomalies with 91007(a) and 1009(a).  These sections,
each specifying an effective date of November 1, 1987, authorize shorter
sentences for certain offenders who cooperate with the Government.
According to petitioner, if 91002 became effective upon enactment, there
would have been no possibility of sentences below the mandatory minimum for
offenses committed during the period between October 27, 1986, and November
1, 1987, even though a defendant otherwise would have been qualified for
the exception.
    Petitioner's argument has been rejected by every Court of Appeals to
consider it, {9} and we likewise reject it here.  While petitioner is
correct that 91002 created minor anomalies with 91007 and 1009, Congress
recognized these potential problems and fixed them.  In December 1987,
Congress enacted legislation ensuring that the provisions permitting
departures from mandatory minimum sentences for cooperating defendants
would apply to offenses committed before November 1, 1987.  See Sentencing
Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100182, 924, 101 Stat. 1271.  This corrective statute
can be explained only if Congress believed that the mandatory minimum
penalties had gone into effect as of the ADAA's date of enactment, October
27, 1986.  "Of course, the view of a later Congress does not establish
definitively the meaning of an earlier enactment, but it does have
persuasive value."  Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.9S. 773, 784 (1983).  We
believe that Congress' later enactment weighs against petitioner's favored
reading of the statute.
    Petitioner next argues that, even if ADAA 91002 generally became
effective on its date of enactment, we should read the delayed effective
date provision in ADAA 91004 as delaying the effective date of the
supervised release provisions in ADAA 91002 as well.  ADAA 91004(b)
provides that all remaining references to "special parole" in the
Controlled Substances Act were to be changed to "supervised release," but
that the amendments made by "this section" were not to take effect until
November 1, 1987.  By its plain meaning, "this section" refers not to the
entire ADAA, nor even to one title or chapter in that enactment.  Rather,
it refers only to the general change-over provision in 91004, which was
intended to amend those provisions in the Controlled Substances Act that
retained the term "special parole" as of November 1, 1987. {10}  Because
91002 made the change from special parole to supervised release independent
of 91004, the ADAA's general change-over provision, including that
section's delayed effective date, does not apply here.  A specific
provision controls over one of more general application.  Crawford Fitting
Co. v. J.9T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.9S. 437, 445 (1987).
    We doubt, moreover, that Congress would intend to delay 91002's
provisions for supervised release and make its other provisions effective
at once.  "In determining the meaning of the statute, we look not only to
the particular statutory language, but to the design of the statute as a
whole and to its object and policy."  Crandon v. United States, 494 U.9S.
Z, Z (1990) (slip op., at 5).  Section 1002 grouped the ADAA's penalty
provisions--imprisonment, fines, and supervised release--into a single
paragraph for each of the new offense levels established in 21 U.9S.9C.
9841(b)(1).  It is unlikely that the third part of the three-part penalty
scheme was postponed for a year while the first two took effect at once.
Based on our review of the ADAA, we cannot say that Congress gave a clear
direction to delay the effective date of 91002's supervised release
provisions.

CB
D Having reviewed the language and structure of the ADAA itself, we now
consider the effect of the Sentencing Reform Act's provisions for imposing
and revoking supervised release.  Petitioner argues that because these
provisions did not become effective until November 1, 1987, the term
"supervised release" as used in the ADAA had no significance before that
date, and courts had no power to impose it.  We do not agree.  Supervised
release is a unique method of post confinement supervision invented by the
Congress for a series of sentencing reforms, including those for drug
offenders.  The power, and the duty, to impose supervised release is
explicit in the ADAA itself as enacted in 1986.  While the definition of
the term "supervised release" is not set forth in the ADAA, it was set
forth in the enacted, though not yet effective, Sentencing Reform Act as
early as 1984.  It is not uncommon to refer to other, related legislative
enactments when interpreting specialized statutory terms.  See, e.9g.,
Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.9S. 750, 756 (1979); Kozoszka v. Belford,
417 U.9S. 642, 650 (1974); Northcross v. Memphis Bd. of Education, 412
U.9S. 427, 428 (1973).  That the Act referred to has its own, later
effective date does not defeat the utility of this interpretational device.
Courts may refer to enacted but not yet effective legislation to interpret
statutory terms if the legislature intends the reference.  At the time the
ADAA was enacted, the Sentencing Reform Act, though its own scheme was not
yet operational, had all the weight and dignity of a deliberate, considered
enactment of the Congress, presented to, and approved by, the President.
The Sentencing Reform Act was the origin of the specialized term
"supervised release," and the ADAA used the term in legislating upon the
same subject matter.  The reasonable assumption is that when Congress
adopted the ADAA and used the term "supervised release" it knew of the full
definition in the existing Sentencing Reform Act and legislated with
reference to it.  See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.9S. 246, 263
(1952).
    Further there is a plausible explanation for the disjunction in the
statutes.  The class of defendants here involved are those who committed
drug offenses between October 27, 1986 and November 1, 1987.  In the great
majority of those cases, including the case now under review, it was not
likely that an offender would be released from custody before the
Novemeber 1, 1987 date.  The draftsman might well have concluded that in
all such cases the Sentencing Reform Act would be effective at the time the
district court would begin to exercise its duties under the supervised
release procedures.  See Slawsky, Looking at the Law, 52 Fed. Probation 86
(June 1988).
    In reaching this conclusion, we also reject the holdings of the
District Court and some courts of appeals that, because the statutory
provision for imposing and revoking supervised release did not go into
effect until November 1, 1987, the rules governing special parole should
apply to crimes committed in the interim period before that date.  The
plain language of 91002 forecloses such a result.  See Hallstrom v.
Tillamook County, 493 U.9S. Z, Z (1990).  Admittedly, the statutory scheme
might have appeared more logical had Congress not made the last minute
switch from special parole to supervised release. {11}  That, however, does
not justify ignoring Congress' mandate.  The term "supervised release" has
specific meaning, and we have no reason to doubt that Congress used the
term knowing that it differs from the term "special parole," and with the
intent that sentencing courts follow the direction of the statute.  We hold
that for offenses committed in the interim period between October 27, 1986,
and November 1, 1987, supervised release applies for all drug offenses in
the categories specified by ADAA 91002.

NC
D Finally, petitioner invokes the "rule of lenity", contending that the
absence of an effective date provision in ADAA 91002 creates an ambiguity
that must be construed in his favor.  See Bifulco v. United States, 447
U.9S., at 387; Lewis v. United States, 445 U.9S. 55, 65 (1980)).  We do not
believe, however, that the rule of lenity applies here.  "The rule comes
into operation at the end of the process of construing what Congress has
expressed, not at the beginning as an overriding consideration of being
lenient to wrongdoers."  Callanan v. United States, 364 U.9S. 587, 596
(1961).  Applying well-established principles of statutory construction, we
have concluded that Congress, through its use of plain language, intended
narcotics offenders to receive supervised release for crimes committed
between October 27, 1986, and November 1, 1987.  While 91002 may have
created some minor inconsistencies with other statutory provisions, its
provisions for postconfinement supervision are not ambiguous.  This case
involves no ambiguity for the rule of lenity to resolve.
    For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the Court of Appeals
is affirmed.
It is so ordered.


T
 
 
 
 
 

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1
    9The Controlled Substances Act established five "schedules" of narcotic
and nonnarcotic substances subject to federal drug laws, codified at 21
U.9S.9C. 9812.  Prior to 1984, 21 U.9S.9C. 9841(b)(1)(A) applied to
offenses involving narcotics listed in schedules I and II, those considered
by Congress to present the highest potential for abuse.  See 21 U.9S.9C.
9812(b)(1) and (b)(2) (1982 ed.).  Persons convicted of offenses involving
other illicit drugs were subject to various, lesser penalties.  See 21
U.9S.9C. 9841(b)(1)(B), (b)(2) and (b)(3) (1982 ed.).

2
    9Both statutes were enacted as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control
Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, Tit. II, 98 Stat. 1976, a lengthy piece of
legislation that brought about significant revisions to many other aspects
of the federal criminal justice system including forfeiture, bail, and
procedures for the treatment of juvenile and mentally ill defendants.

3
    9Large-scale drug offenses under the Controlled Substances Penalties
Amendments Act included those involving 100 grams or more of heroin, one
kilogram or more of cocaine, and 5 grams or more of LSD.  See 21 U.9S.9C.
9841(b)(1)(A) (1982 ed., Supp. II).

4
    9As enacted, the Sentencing Reform Act provided that the elimination of
special parole terms would take place on November 1, 1986.  The effective
date of these amendments, however, with many of the Sentencing Reform Act's
other key provisions, was delayed until November 1, 1987.  See Sentencing
Reform Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. 99-217, 94, 99 Stat. 1728.

5
    9ADAA 91002 prescribed equivalent thresholds for "mixture[s] or
substance[s] containing a detectable amount" of other illicit narcotics at
5 kilograms for cocaine, 50 grams for cocaine base, 100 grams for
phencyclidine (PCP), 10 grams for LSD, 400 grams for propanamide, and 1,000
kilograms for marijuana.  See 21 U.9S.9C. 9841(b)(1)(A) (1982 ed., Supp.
IV).

6
    9The equivalent thresholds under ADAA 91002 for other mixtures or
substances were 500 grams for cocaine, 5 grams for cocaine base, 100 grams
for PCP (10 grams if pure), 1 gram for LSD, 40 grams for propanamide, and
100 kilograms for marijuana.  See 21 U.9S.9C. 9841(b)(1)(B) (1982 ed.,
Supp. IV).

7
    9See, Mercado v. United States, 898 F. 2d 291 (CA2 1990) (per curiam);
United States v. Whitehead, 849 F. 2d 849, 860 (CA4), cert. denied, 488
U.9S. 983 (1988); United States v. Byrd, 837 F. 2d 179, 181, n.98 (CA5
1988); United States v. Paiz, 905 F. 2d 1014, 1031 (CA7 1990); United
States v. Portillo, 863 F. 2d 25, 26 (CA8 1988) (per curiam); United States
v. Levario, 877 F. 2d 1483, 1487-1489 (CA10 1989); United States v. Smith,
840 F. 2d 886, 889-890 (CA11), cert. denied, 488 U.9S. 859 (1988).

8
    9See United States v. Brundage, Z U.9S. App. D.9C. Z, Z, 903 F. 2d 837,
843 (1990); United States v. Figueroa, 898 F. 2d 825, 828 (CA1 1990);
United States v. Blackmon, 914 F. 2d 786, 789-790 (CA6 1990); United States
v. Torres, 880 F. 2d 113 (CA9 1989) (per curiam), cert. denied, 493 U.9S. Z
(1990); cf. United States v. Ferryman, 897 F. 2d 584 (CA1 1990) (persons
sentenced under 21 U.9S.9C. 9841(b)(1)(B) should receive special parole for
offenses committed prior to November 1, 1987).

9
    9See United States v. Brundage, supra, at Z, 903 F. 2d 841; United
States v. Charleus, 871 F. 2d 265, 269 (CA2 1989); United States v. Levy,
865 F. 2d 551, 559, n.94 (CA3 1989); United States v. Duprey, 895 F. 2d
303, 311 (CA7 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.9S. Z (1990); United States v.
Padilla, 869 F. 2d 372, 381-382 (CA8), cert. denied sub nom. Percheitte v.
United States, 497 U.9S. Z (1989); United States v. Meyers, 847 F. 2d 1408,
1415 (CA9 1988); United States v. Garcia, 879 F. 2d 803, 804 (CA10 1989).

10
    9These sections were 21 U.9S.9C. 9841(b)(1)(D), 841(b)(2), 845(a),
845(b), 845a(a), 960(b)(4), and 962(a) (1982 ed., Supp. IV).

11
    9For example, petitioner contends that Congress' last-minute switch
from special parole to supervised release created inconsistencies with
other penalty provisions in the Controlled Substances Act, specifically 21
U.9S.9C. 9845, which prohibits distribution of drugs to minors, and 21
U.9S.9C. 9845a, which prohibits the distribution of drugs within 1,000 feet
of a school.  For offenses committed prior to November 1, 1987, 9845(a) and
845a(a) provide special parole terms in multiples of those authorized by
Section 841(b)(1) for the same type and quantity of drug.  Petitioner notes
that if defendants charged with crimes committed between October 27, 1986,
and November 1, 1987, are to receive terms of supervised release, not
special parole, the enhancement provisions in sections 845(a) and 845a(a)
might not apply.  Assuming without deciding that petitioner is correct,
these minor inconsistencies nevertheless are not sufficient to overcome the
strong presumption in favor of October 27, 1986, being the effective date
for 91002.  Congress' possible lack of attention to some of the collateral
effects of the change from special parole to supervised release does not
justify our disregard of the change itself.
