Subject:  GROVES v. RING SCREW WORKS, FERNDALE DIV., Syllabus



 
    NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as
is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is
issued.  The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but
has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the
reader.  See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


Syllabus


GROVES et al. v. RING SCREW WORKS, FERNDALE FASTENER DIVISION

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit

No. 89-1166.  Argued October 10, 1990 -- Decided December 10, 1990

After petitioner employees were discharged from their jobs, they and
petitioner union invoked the grievance procedures in the
collective-bargaining agreements between the union and respondent company.
Those agreements provide for voluntary grievance procedures, including
arbitration, and reserve the parties' respective rights to resort to
economic weapons when the procedures fail to resolve a dispute, but are
silent as to judicial remedies.  Upon failure of the grievance procedures,
petitioners filed an action under MDRV 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA), which provides a judicial remedy for the breach
of a collective-bargaining agreement.  The District Court granted the
company's motion for summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed,
holding that the agreements brought about an inference that a strike or
other job action was the perceived remedy for failure of successful
resolution of a grievance absent agreed arbitration, such that recourse to
the courts under MDRV 301 was barred.

Held: Petitioners may seek a judicial remedy under MDRV 301.  While MDRV
301's strong presumption favoring judicial enforcement of
collective-bargaining agreements may be overcome whenever the parties
expressly agree to a different method for adjustment of their disputes,
Congress, in passing the LMRA, envisaged peaceful methods of dispute
resolution.  Thus, the statute does not favor an agreement to resort to
economic warfare rather than to mediation, arbitration, or judicial review.
A contract provision reserving the union's right to resort to economic
weapons cannot be construed as an agreement to divest the courts of
jurisdiction to resolve disputes.  Such an agreement would have to be
written much more clearly.  Pp. 4-8.

882 F. 2d 1081, reversed and remanded.

    Stevens, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

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Subject: 89-1166 -- OPINION, GROVES v. RING SCREW WORKS, FERNDALE DIV.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in
the preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested
to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States,
Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in
order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to
press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


No. 89-1166



ARTHUR GROVES, BOBBY J. EVANS and LOCAL
771, INTERNATIONAL UNION UAW, PETITION-
ERS v. RING SCREW WORKS, FERNDALE
FASTENER DIVISION


on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth
circuit

[December 10, 1990]



    Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.
    The collective-bargaining agreements between the parties provide for
voluntary grievance procedures and reserve the

parties' respective rights to resort to economic weapons when the
procedures fail to resolve a dispute.  The collectivebargaining agreements
are silent as to judicial remedies.  The question presented is whether,
upon failure of the grievance procedures, such contracts should be
construed to bar recourse to the courts under MDRV 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA), 61 Stat. 156, 29 U. S. C. MDRV 185.
We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in the Circuits, {1} 494 U. S.
--- (1990), and we now conclude that the judicial remedy under MDRV 301 is
available to petitioners.
I
    Two almost identical collective-bargaining agreements (CBAs) between
respondent Ring Screw Works (company) and the union  {2} prohibit
discharges except for "just cause."  Petitioners Groves and Evans contend
that they were discharged in violation of this provision.
    Both CBAs provide that the parties will make "an earnest effort" to
settle every dispute that may arise under the agreement.  App. 16.  Both
CBAs also contain a voluntary multistep grievance procedure, but neither
includes a requirement that the parties submit disputes to binding
arbitration. {3}  The CBAs prohibit strikes or lockouts until the grievance
machinery has been exhausted.  The no-strike clause provides:


"The Union will not cause or permit its members to cause, nor will any
member of the Union take part in any strike, either sit-down, stay-in or
any other kind of strike, or other interference, or any other stoppage,
total or partial, of production at the Company's plant during the terms of
this agreement until all negotiations have failed through the grievance
procedure set forth herein.  Neither will the Company engage in any lockout
until the same grievance procedure has been carried out."  Id., at 34
(emphasis added); see id., at 69. {4}


    The dispute in this case arose out of the company's decision to
discharge petitioners. {5}  With the assistance of the union, petitioners
invoked the grievance procedures, but without success. {6}  At the end of
the procedures, the company decided not to call for arbitration and the
union decided not to exercise its right to strike. {7}  Instead,
petitioners filed this action invoking federal jurisdiction under MDRV 301,
29 U. S. C. MDRV 185.
    Following the Sixth Circuit's decision in Fortune v. National Twist
Drill & Tool Division, Lear Siegler, Inc., 684 F. 2d 374 (1982), the
District Court granted the company's motion for summary judgment and the
Court of Appeals affirmed.  882 F. 2d 1081 (1989).  The Sixth Circuit
explained:


"We believe that the CBAs in question do bring about an inference that a
strike, or other job action, is the perceived remedy for failure of
successful resolution of a grievance absent agreed arbitration.  Such
resolution, by work `stoppage or other interference' is not a happy
solution from a societal standpoint of an industrial dispute, particularly
as it relates to the claim of a single employee that he has been wrongfully
discharged.  Were we deciding the issue with a clean slate, we might be
disposed to adopt the rationale of Dickeson [v. DAW Forest Products Co.],
827 F. 2d 627 [(CA9 1987)]."  882 F. 2d, at 1086. {8}


II
    Section 301(a) of the LMRA provides a federal remedy for breach of a
collective-bargaining agreement. {9}  We have squarely held that MDRV 301
authorizes "suits by and against individual employees as well as between
unions and employers," including actions against an employer for wrongful
discharge.  Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U. S. 554, 562 (1976).
Our opinion in Hines described the strong federal policy favoring judicial
enforcement of collective-bargaining agreements.  We wrote:


    "Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act . . . reflects the
interest of Congress in promoting `a higher degree of responsibility upon
the parties to such agreements . . . . '  S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess., 17 (1947).  The strong policy favoring judicial enforcement of
collective-bargaining contracts was sufficiently powerful to sustain the
jurisdiction of the district courts over enforcement suits even though the
conduct involved was arguably or would amount to an unfair labor practice
within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board.  Smith v.
Evening News Assn., 371 U. S. 195 (1962); Atkinson v. Sinclair Rfg. Co.,
370 U. S. 238 (1962); Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U. S. 95 (1962);
Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U. S. 502 (1962).  Section 301
contemplates suits by and against individual employees as well as between
unions and employers; and contrary to earlier indications MDRV 301 suits
encompass those seeking to vindicate `uniquely personal' rights of
employees such as wages, hours, overtime pay, and wrongful discharge.
Smith v. Evening News Assn., supra, at 198-200.  Petitioners' present suit
against the employer was for wrongful discharge and is the kind of case
Congress provided for in MDRV 301."  Id., at 561-562.


Thus, under MDRV 301, as in other areas of the law, there is a strong
presumption that favors access to a neutral forum for the peaceful
resolution of disputes.
    Respondent correctly points out, however, that a presumption favoring
access to a judicial forum is overcome whenever the parties have agreed
upon a different method for the adjustment of their disputes. {10}  The
company argues that the union has agreed that if the voluntary mediation
process is unsuccessful, then the exclusive remedy that remains is either a
strike or a lockout, depending on which party asserts the breach of
contract.  According to this view, the dispute is not whether there was
"just cause" for the discharge of Groves and Evans, but whether the union
has enough muscle to compel the company to rehire them even if there was
just cause for their discharge.
    In our view, the statute's reference to "the desirable method for
settlement of grievance disputes," see n. 10, supra, refers to the peaceful
resolution of disputes over the application or meaning of the
collective-bargaining agreement. {11}  Of course, the parties may expressly
agree to resort to economic warfare rather than to mediation, arbitration,
or judicial review, but the statute surely does not favor such an
agreement.  For in most situations a strike or a lockout, though it may be
a method of ending the impasse, is not a method of resolving the merits of
the dispute over the application or meaning of the contract.  Rather, it is
simply a method by which one party imposes its will upon its adversary.
Such a method is the antithesis of the peaceful methods of dispute
resolution envisaged by Congress when it passed the Taft-Hartley Act. {12}
    In Associated General Contractors of Illinois v. Illinois Conference of
Teamsters, 486 F. 2d 972 (1973), the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit was confronted with the same issue presented by this case,
albeit with the union, rather than the employer, claiming that the
contractual provision foreclosed judicial relief.  The Seventh Circuit, in
response to the union's argument that the CBA's terms provided that
deadlocked grievances would be resolved by economic sanctions without
resort to the courts, wrote:


    "Unquestionably `the means chosen by the parties for settlement of
their differences under a collective bargaining agreement [must be] given
full play.'  See United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363
U. S. 564, 566 . . . .  But it is one thing to hold that an arbitration
clause in a contract agreed to by the parties is enforceable.  It is quite
a different matter to construe a contract provision reserving the Union's
right to resort to `economic recourse' as an agreement to divest the courts
of jurisdiction to resolve whatever dispute may arise.  This we decline to
do.
    "In our first opinion in this case we noted that the parties had not
agreed to compulsory arbitration and that the Union had expressly reserved
the right to `economic recourse' in the event of a deadlock.  We therefore
held that the . . . right to strike was protected by the NorrisLaGuardia
Act.  However, we did not, and do not now, construe the agreement as
requiring economic warfare as the exclusive or even as a desirable method
for settling deadlocked grievances.  The plain language of the statute
protects the right to strike, but there is no plain language in the
contract compelling the parties to use force instead of reason in resolving
their differences.  In our view, an agreement to forbid any judicial
participation in the resolution of important disputes would have to be
written much more clearly than this."  Id., at 976 (footnote omitted).


This reasoning applies equally to cases in which the union, an employee, or
the employer is the party invoking judicial relief.
    The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
 
 
 
 
 
 

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1
    Compare Fortune v. National Twist Drill & Tool Division, Lear Siegler,
Inc., 684 F. 2d 374 (CA6 1982), and Haynes v. United States Pipe and
Foundry Co., 362 F. 2d 414 (CA5 1966), with Associated General Contractors
of Illinois v. Illinois Conference of Teamsters, 486 F. 2d 972 (CA7 1973);
Dickeson v. DAW Forest Products Co., 827 F. 2d 627 (CA9 1987); United
Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America v. Hensel Phelps
Construction Co., 376 F. 2d 731 (CA10), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 952 (1967),
and Breish v. Ring Screw Works, 397 Mich. 586, 248 N. W. 2d 526 (1976).
2
    International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural
Implement Workers of America (UAW) Local #771 is one of the three
petitioners and serves as collective-bargaining agent for the two employee
petitioners, Arthur Groves and Bobby J. Evans.

3
    Thus, one CBA provides, in part:

"Section 1. Should a difference arise between the Company and the Union or
its members employed by the Company, as to the meaning and application of
the provisions of the agreement, an earnest effort will be made to settle
it as follows:
    "Step 1. Between the employee, his steward and the foreman of his
department.  If a satisfactory settlement is not reached, then
    "Step 2. Between the Shop Committee, with or without the employee, and
the Company management.  If a satisfactory settlement is not reached, then
    "Step 3. The Shop Committee and/or the Company may call the local Union
president and/or the International representative to arrange a meeting in
an attempt to resolve the grievance.  If a satisfactory settlement is not
reached, then
    "Step 4. The Shop Committee and the Company may call in an outside
representative to assist in settling the difficulty.  This may include
arbitration by mutual agreement in discharge cases only."  App. 16-17.

4
    One of the CBAs contained the following provision:

"Unresolved grievance (except arbitration decisions) shall be handled as
set forth in Article XVI, Section 7."  Id., at 53.

The referenced provision is the no-strike clause.  There has been no claim
at any stage of this litigation that this provision justifies a different
interpretation of the two otherwise almost identical CBAs.

5
    The company terminated petitioner Groves for allegedly excessive,
unexcused absences and dismissed petitioner Evans for allegedly falsifying
company records.

6
    There is no dispute that the grievance procedures were properly
followed and that the union fairly represented petitioners.

7
    In Evans' case, a strike vote was taken by the unit members at the
plant at which he worked, but the issue did not receive the required
twothirds majority; in Groves' case, a strike vote was never taken.

8
    The Sixth Circuit relied on its reasoning in Fortune, as restated in
subsequent opinions:

" `This circuit has concluded, in essence that regardless of whether the
contractual dispute resolution mechanism results in a `final and binding'
decision, the existence of that mechanism will foreclose judicial review
provided we find that it was intended to be exclusive. . . .

" `While we may question the wisdom of foreclosing judicial review of
contracts which fail to provide for either `final' or `binding' peaceful
resolution via arbitration, since the absence of such a provision cannot be
taken to infer that the union (and thereby its employees) gained anything
in its contract negotiations as a result, it is nevertheless well
established in this circuit that a panel of this court is bound by the
prior decisions of another panel of the same issues.'

"Mochko v. Acme-Cleveland Corp., 826 F. 2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1987)
(unpublished per curiam)."  882 F. 2d, at 1086.

Given the panel's expressed doubt about the correctness of the Circuit
precedent that it was following, together with the fact that there was a
square conflict in the Circuits, it might have been appropriate for the
panel to request a rehearing en banc.

9
    Section 301(a) of the LMRA, 61 Stat. 156, provides:

"(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as
defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be
brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of
the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard
to the citizenship of the parties."  29 U. S. C. MDRV 185(a).

10
    Section 203(d) of the Taft-Hartley Act provides:

"Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be
the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the
application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining
agreement."  29 U. S. C. MDRV 173(d).

11
    As we explained in Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U. S. 574 (1960):

"The processing of disputes through the grievance machinery is actually a
vehicle by which meaning and content are given to the collective bargaining
agreement."  Id., at 581.

Here, the parties' dispute centers on the question whether there was just
cause for the discharges.

12
    "If unions can break agreements with relative impunity, then such
agreements do not tend to stabilize industrial relations.  The execution of
an agreement does not by itself promote industrial peace.  The chief
advantage which an employer can reasonably expect from a collective labor
agreement is assurance of uninterrupted operation during the term of the
agreement.  Without some effective method of assuring freedom from economic
warfare for the term of the agreement, there is little reason why an
employer would desire to sign such a contract."  S. Rep. No. 105, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess., p. 16 (1947).
