Subject: SALVE REGINA COLLEGE v. RUSSELL, Syllabus



 
    NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as
is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is
issued.  The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but
has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the
reader.  See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES



Syllabus



SALVE REGINA COLLEGE v. RUSSELL


certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the first circuit

No. 89-1629.  Argued November 27, 1990 -- Decided March 20, 1991

Respondent Russell filed a diversity action in the District Court,
alleging, inter alia, that petitioner college, located in Rhode Island, had
breached an implied agreement to educate her when it asked her to withdraw
from its nursing program for failing to meet certain weight loss
commitments.  The court denied petitioner's motion for a directed verdict,
concluding that the Rhode Island Supreme Court would apply the commercial
doctrine of substantial performance in an academic setting, such that
Russell could prevail even though she had not fully complied with the
contract's terms.  The jury returned a verdict for Russell, which the Court
of Appeals affirmed.  Applying the appellate deference that it customarily
accords to interpretations of state law made by federal judges of that
State, the Court of Appeals found that the District Court's state-law
determination did not constitute reversible error.

Held: Courts of appeals must review de novo district courts' state-law
determinations.  Pp. 6-14.

    (a) The general rule of independent appellate review of legal issues
best serves the dual goals of doctrinal coherence and economy of judicial
administration.  Courts of appeals are structurally suited to the
collaborative juridical process that promotes decisional accuracy.  They
are able to devote their primary attention to legal issues.  They have the
advantage of refined briefs which bring to bear on the legal issues more
information and more comprehensive analysis than was provided to the
district judge.  And they employ multi-judge panels that permit reflective
dialogue and collective judgment.  Pp. 6-7.

    (b) Departure from the rule of independent appellate review is not
warranted by the exercise of diversity jurisdiction.  Appellate deference
to the district court's state-law determination is inconsistent with the
aims of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, to discourage forum shopping
and to avoid inequitable administration of the laws, since it invites
divergent development of state law among the federal trial courts within a
single State and creates a dual system of enforcement of statecreated
rights, in which the substantive rule applied to a dispute may depend on
the choice of forum.  Such deference is also contrary to this Court's cases
decided after Erie.  See, e. g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 304 U.
S. 261.  Pp. 8-9.

    (c) Russell's argument that appellate courts professing adherence to
the deference rule actually are reviewing de novo the district court
statelaw determinations is rejected.  Courts of appeals that profess
deference are, in fact, deferring.  When de novo review is compelled, no
form of appellate deference is acceptable.  Russell's argument that
district judges are better arbiters of unsettled state law because they
have exposure to the judicial system of the State in which they sit is
based on overbroad generalizations and is foreclosed by this Court's
decision in Erie.  Pp. 10-14.

890 F. 2d 484, reversed and remanded.

Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Marshall,
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined.  Rehnquist, C. J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which White and Stevens, JJ., joined.

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Subject: 89-1629 -- OPINION, SALVE REGINA COLLEGE v. RUSSELL

 


NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in
the preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested
to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States,
Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in
order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to
press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


No. 89-1629



SALVE REGINA COLLEGE, PETITIONER v.
SHARON L. RUSSELL


on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the first
circuit

[March 20, 1991]



    Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court.

    The concept of a federal general common law, lurking (to use Justice
Holmes' phrase) as a "brooding omnipresence in the sky," was questioned for
some time before being firmly rejected in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.
S. 64 (1938).  See Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 222
(1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v.
Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U. S. 518, 533 (1928)
(dissenting opinion).  Erie mandates that a federal court sitting in
diversity apply the substantive law of the forum State, absent a federal
statutory or constitutional directive to the contrary.  304 U. S., at 78.
See also 28 U. S. C. MDRV 1652 ("The laws of the several states, except
where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress
otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in
civil actions in the courts of the United States in cases where they
apply").  In decisions after Erie, this Court made clear that state law is
to be determined in the same manner as a federal court resolves an evolving
issue of federal law: "with the aid of such light as [is] afforded by the
materials for decision at hand, and in accordance with the applicable
principles for determining state law."  Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U. S.
228, 238 (1943).  See also Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U. S. 202,
208-209 (1938) ("Application of the `State law' to the present case . . .
does not present the disputants with duties difficult or strange").
    In this case, we must decide specifically whether a federal court of
appeals may review a district court's determination of state law under a
standard less probing than that applied to a determination of federal law.
I
    The issue presented arises out of a contract dispute between a college
and one of its students.  Petitioner Salve Regina College is an institution
of higher education located in Newport, R. I.  Respondent Sharon L. Russell
was admitted to the college and began her studies as a freshman in 1982.
The following year, respondent sought admission to the college's nursing
department in order to pursue a bachelor of science degree in nursing.  She
was accepted by the department and began her nursing studies in the fall of
1983.
    Respondent, who was 56 tall, weighed in excess of 300 pounds when she
was accepted in the nursing program.  Immediately after the 1983 school
year began, respondent's weight became a topic of commentary and concern by
officials of the nursing program.  Respondent's first year in the program
was marked by a series of confrontations and negotiations concerning her
obesity and its effect upon her ability to complete the clinical
requirements safely and satisfactorily.  During her junior year, respondent
signed a document that was designated as a "contract" and conditioned her
further participation in the nursing program upon weekly attendance at a
weight-loss seminar and a realized average loss of two pounds per week.
When respondent failed to meet these commitments, she was asked to withdraw
from the program and did so.  She transferred to a nursing program at
another college, but had to repeat her junior year in order to satisfy the
transferee institution's 2-year residency requirement.  As a consequence,
respondent's nursing education took five years rather than four.  She also
underwent surgery for her obesity.  In 1987, respondent successfully
completed her nursing education and she is now a registered nurse.
    Soon after leaving Salve Regina College, respondent filed this civil
action in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode
Island.  She asserted, among others, claims based on (1) intentional
infliction of emotional distress, (2) invasion of privacy, and (3)
nonperformance by the college of its implied agreement to educate
respondent. {1}  Subjectmatter jurisdiction in the District Court was based
on diversity of citizenship.  See 28 U. S. C. MDRV 1332.  The parties agree
that the law of Rhode Island applies to all substantive aspects of the
action.  See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, supra.
    At the close of plaintiff-respondent's case-in-chief, the District
Court directed a verdict for the individual defendants on all three of the
remaining claims, and for the college on the claims for intentional
infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy.  App. 82.  The
court, however, denied the college's motion for a directed verdict on the
breach-of-contract claim, reasoning that "a legitimate factual issue"
remained concerning whether "there was substantial performance by the
plaintiff in her overall contractual relationship at Salve Regina."  Id.,
at 88.
    At the close of all the evidence, the college renewed its motion for a
directed verdict.  It argued that under Rhode Island law the strict
commercial doctrine of substantial performance did not apply in the general
academic context.  Therefore, according to petitioner, because respondent
admitted she had not fulfilled the terms of the contract, the college was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
    The District Court denied petitioner's motion.  Id., at 92.
Acknowledging that the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, to that point, had
limited the application of the substantialperformance doctrine to
construction contracts, the District Court nonetheless concluded, as a
matter of law, that the Supreme Court of Rhode Island would apply that
doctrine to the facts of respondent's case.  Id., at 90-91.  The Federal
District Judge based this conclusion, in part, on his observation that "I
was a state trial judge for 18 and 12 years, and I have a feel for what the
Rhode Island Supreme Court will or won't do."  Id., at 91.  Accordingly,
the District Court submitted the breach-of-contract claim to the jury.  The
court instructed the jury:

    "The law provides that substantial and not exact performance
accompanied by good faith is what is required in a case of a contract of
this type.  It is not necessary that the plaintiff have fully and
completely performed every item specified in the contract between the
parties.  It is sufficient if there has been substantial performance, not
necessarily full performance, so long as the substantial performance was in
good faith and in compliance with the contract, except for some minor and
relatively unimportant deviation or omission."  Id., at 97.


    The jury returned a verdict for respondent, and determined that the
damages were $30,513.40.  Id., at 113.  Judgment was entered.  Id., at 115.
Both respondent and petitioner appealed.
    The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.  890
F. 2d 484 (1989).  It first upheld the District Court's directed verdict
dismissing respondent's claims for intentional infliction of emotional
distress and invasion of privacy.  Id., at 487-488.  It then turned to
petitioner's argument that the District Court erred in submitting the
breach-of-contract claim to the jury.  Rejecting petitioner's argument
that, under Rhode Island law, the doctrine of substantial performance does
not apply in the college-student context, the court stated:

    "In this case of first impression, the district court held that the
Rhode Island Supreme Court would apply the substantial performance standard
to the contract in question.  In view of the customary appellate deference
accorded to interpretations of state law made by federal judges of that
state, Dennis v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Nat'l Bank, 744 F. 2d 893, 896
(1st Cir. 1984); O'Rourke v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 730 F. 2d 842, 847
(2d Cir. 1984), we hold that the district court's determination that the
Rhode Island Supreme Court would apply standard contract principles is not
reversible error."  Id., at 489.


    Petitioner college sought a writ of certiorari from this Court.  It
alleged that the Court of Appeals erred in deferring to the District
Court's determination of state law. {2}  A majority of the Courts of
Appeals, although varying in their phraseology, embrace a rule of deference
similar to that articulated by the Court of Appeals in this case.  See, e.
g., Norton v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 902 F. 2d 1355, 1357 (CA8
1990) ("In general, we accord substantial deference to a district court's
interpretation of the law of the state in which it sits"), and Self v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 885 F. 2d 336, 339 (CA6 1989) ("[W]e should give
`considerable weight' to the trial court's views on such questions of local
law").  Two Courts of Appeals, however, have broken ranks recently with
their sister Circuits.  They have concluded that a district-court
determination of state law is subject to plenary review by the appellate
court.  See Craig v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd., 843 F. 2d 145, 148 (CA3
1988), and In re McLinn, 739 F. 2d 1395 (CA9 1984) (en banc, with a divided
vote).  We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.  --- U. S. ---
(1990).

II
    We conclude that a court of appeals should review de novo a district
court's determination of state law.  As a general matter, of course, the
courts of appeals are vested with plenary appellate authority over final
decisions of district courts.  See 28 U. S. C. MDRV 1291.  The obligation
of responsible appellate jurisdiction implies the requisite authority to
review independently a lower court's determinations.
    Independent appellate review of legal issues best serves the dual goals
of doctrinal coherence and economy of judicial administration.  District
judges preside alone over fastpaced trials: of necessity they devote much
of their energy and resources to hearing witnesses and reviewing evidence.
Similarly, the logistical burdens of trial advocacy limit the extent to
which trial counsel is able to supplement the district judge's legal
research with memoranda and briefs.  Thus, trial judges often must resolve
complicated legal questions without benefit of "extended reflection [or]
extensive information."  Coenen, To Defer or Not to Defer: a Study of
Federal Circuit Court Deference to District Court Rulings on State Law, 73
Minn. L. Rev. 899, 923 (1989).
    Courts of appeals, on the other hand, are structurally suited to the
collaborative juridical process that promotes decisional accuracy.  With
the record having been constructed below and settled for purposes of the
appeal, appellate judges are able to devote their primary attention to
legal issues.  As questions of law become the focus of appellate review, it
can be expected that the parties' briefs will be refined to bring to bear
on the legal issues more information and more comprehensive analysis than
was provided for the district judge.  Perhaps most important, courts of
appeals employ multi-judge panels, see 28 U. S. C. 15 46(b) and (c), that
permit reflective dialogue and collective judgment.  Over 40 years ago,
Justice Frankfurter accurately observed:

"Without adequate study there cannot be adequate reflection; without
adequate reflection there cannot be adequate discussion; without adequate
discussion there cannot be that fruitful interchange of minds which is
indispensable to thoughtful, unhurried decision and its formulation in
learned and impressive opinions."  Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.
S. 437, 458-459 (1959) (dissenting opinion).


    Independent appellate review necessarily entails a careful
consideration of the district court's legal analysis, and an ef ficient and
sensitive appellate court at least will naturally consider this analysis in
undertaking its review.  Petitioner readily acknowledges the importance of
a district court's reasoning to the appellate court's review.  See Tr. of
Oral Arg. 11, 19-22.  Any expertise possessed by the district court will
inform the structure and content of its conclusions of law and thereby
become evident to the reviewing court.  If the court of appeals finds that
the district court's analytical sophistication and research have exhausted
the state-law inquiry, little more need be said in the appellate opinion.
Independent review, however, does not admit of unreflective reliance on a
lower court's inarticulable intuitions.  Thus, an appropriately respectful
application of de novo review should encourage a district court to
explicate with care the basis for its legal conclusions.  See Fed. Rule
Civ. Proc. 52(a) (requiring the district court "to state separately its
conclusions of law").
    Those circumstances in which Congress or this Court has articulated a
standard of deference for appellate review of district court determinations
reflect an accommodation of the respective institutional advantages of
trial and appellate courts.  In deference to the unchallenged superiority
of the district court's factfinding ability, Civil Rule 52(a) commands that
a trial court's findings of fact "shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial
court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses."  In addition, it is
"especially common" for issues involving supervision of litigation to be
reviewed for abuse of discretion.  See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U. S. 552,
558, n. 1 (1988).  Finally, we have held that deferential review of mixed
questions of law and fact is warranted when it appears that the district
court is "better positioned" than the appellate court to decide the issue
in question or that probing appellate scrutiny will not contribute to the
clarity of legal doctrine.  Miller v. Fenton, 474 U. S. 104, 114 (1985);
see also Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., --- U. S. ---, --- (1990) ("[T]he
district court is better situated than the court of appeals to marshall the
pertinent facts and apply the factdependent legal standard mandated by Rule
11"); Pierce, 487 U. S., at 562 ("[T]he question whether the Government's
litigating position has been `substantially justified' is . . . a
multifarious and novel question, little susceptible, for the time being at
least, of useful generalization").
    Nothing about the exercise of diversity jurisdiction alters these
functional components of decisionmaking or otherwise warrants departure
from a rule of independent appellate review.  Actually, appellate deference
to the district court's determination of state law is inconsistent with the
principles underlying this Court's decision in Erie.  The twin aims of the
Erie doctrine -- "discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of
inequitable administration of the laws," Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U. S. 460,
468 (1965), -- are components of the goal of doctrinal coherence advanced
by independent appellate review.  As respondent has conceded, deferential
appellate review invites divergent development of state law among the
federal trial courts even within a single State.  Tr. of Oral Arg. 34-36.
Moreover, by denying a litigant access to meaningful review of state-law
claims, appellate courts that defer to the district courts' state-law
determinations create a dual system of enforcement of state-created rights,
in which the substantive rule applied to a dispute may depend on the choice
of forum.  Cf. Erie, 304 U. S., at 74-75 ("[The rule of Swift v. Tyson, 16
Pet. 1 (1842)] made rights enjoyed under the unwritten `general law' vary
according to whether enforcement was sought in the state or in the federal
court").  Neither of these results, unavoidable in the absence of
independent appellate review, can be reconciled with the commands of Erie.
    Although some might say that this Court has not spoken with a uniformly
clear voice on the issue of deference to a district judge's determination
of state law, a careful con sideration of our cases makes apparent the duty
of appellate courts to provide meaningful review of such a determination.
In a series of cases decided soon after Erie, the Court noted that the
appellate courts had applied general federal law instead of the law of the
respective States, and remanded to the Courts of Appeals for consideration
of the applicable principles of state law.  See, e. g., New York Life Ins.
Co. v. Jackson, 304 U. S. 261 (1938), and Rosenthal v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 304 U. S. 263 (1938).  It is true that in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic
Co., 350 U. S. 198 (1956), this Court remanded the case to the District
Court for application of state law.  The Court noted, however, that the law
of the State was firmly settled, and emphasized: "Were the question in
doubt or deserving of further canvass, we would of course remand the case
to the Court of Appeals to pass on this question of [state] law."  Id., at
205. {3}
III
    In urging this Court to adopt the deferential standard embraced by the
majority of the Courts of Appeals, respondent offers two arguments.  First,
respondent suggests that the appellate courts professing adherence to the
rule of deference actually are reviewing de novo the district court
determinations of state law.  Second, respondent presses the familiar
contention that district judges are better arbiters of unsettled state law
because they have exposure to the judicial system of the State in which
they sit.  We reject each of these arguments.
A
    Respondent primarily contends that the Courts of Appeals that claim to
accord special consideration to the District Court's state-law expertise
actually undertake plenary review of a determination of state law.
According to respondent, this is simply de novo review "cloth[ed] in
`deferential' robes."  Brief for Respondent 15.  In support of this con
tention, respondent refers to several decisions in which the appellate
court has announced that it is bound to review deferentially a district
court's determination of state law, yet nonetheless has found that
determination to constitute reversible error.  Afram Export Corp. v.
Metallurgiki Halyps, S. A., 772 F. 2d 1358, 1370 (CA7 1985); Norton v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 902 F. 2d 1355 (CA8 1990).  Respondent also
relies on cases in which the Courts of Appeals, while articulating a rule
of deference, acknowledge their obligation to scrutinize closely the
District Court's legal conclusions.  See Foster v. National Union Fire Ins.
Co., 902 F. 2d 1316 (CA8 1990).  See also In re McLinn, 739 F. 2d, at 1405
(dissenting opinion) ("The majority overreacts to a problem that is
basically one of terminology").
    We decline the invitation to assume that courts of appeals craft their
opinions disingenuously.  The fact that an appellate court overturns an
erroneous determination of state law in no way indicates that the appellate
court is not applying the rule of deference articulated in the opinion.
The cases cited by respondent confirm this.  In Foster, for example, the
Court of Appeals articulated a rule of deference, yet cautioned: "We have
not, however, failed to closely examine the matter ourselves."  Id., at
1318.  Respondent would have us interpret this caveat as an acknowledgment
of the appellate court's obligation to review the state-law question de
novo.  See Brief for Respondent 17-18, and n. 23.  The Court of Appeals,
however, expressly acknowledged that it would not reverse the District
Court's determination "unless its analysis is `fundamentally deficient . .
. , without a reasonable basis, or contrary to a reported state-court
opinion.' "  902 F. 2d, at 1318 (citations omitted).  After reviewing the
applicable law in some detail, the Court of Appeals concluded: "[T]he
district court's interpretation of the applicable Arkansas law is certainly
not deficient in analysis and is reasonable."  Id., at 1320.  This neither
purports to be, nor is, a conclusion following from de novo review.
    Nor does it suffice to recognize that little substantive difference may
separate the form of deference articulated and applied by the several
courts of appeals and the independent appellate review urged by petitioner.
Respondent argues that the subtle differences between these standards are
insufficient to warrant intrusion into the manner in which appellate courts
review state-law determinations.  A variation of this argument forms the
framework upon which the dissent in McLinn rests.  See 739 F. 2d, at 1404
("By giving `substantial deference,' or . . . `great insight,' to the
decisions of the district courts, appellate courts do not suspend their own
thought processes").
    As a practical matter, respondent and the dissent in McLinn frequently
may be correct.  We do not doubt that in many cases the application of a
rule of deference in lieu of independent review will not affect the outcome
of an appeal.  In many diversity cases the controlling issues of state law
will have been squarely resolved by the state courts, and a district
court's adherence to the settled rule will be indisputably correct.  See e.
g., Bernhardt, 350 U. S., at 204-205.  In a case where the controlling
question of state law remains unsettled, it is not unreasonable to assume
that the considered judgment of the court of appeals frequently will
coincide with the reasoned determination of the district court.  Where the
state-law determinations of the two courts diverge, the choice between
these standards of review is of no significance if the appellate court
concludes that the district court was clearly wrong. {4}
    Thus, the mandate of independent review will alter the appellate
outcome only in those few cases where the appellate court would resolve an
unsettled issue of state law differently from the district court's
resolution, but cannot conclude that the district court's determination
constitutes clear error.  See e. g., In re McLinn, 739 F. 2d, at 1397 ("The
panel indicated that if the question of law were reviewed under the
deferential standard that we have applied in the past, which permits
reversal only for clear error, then they would affirm; but if they were to
review the determination under an independent de novo standard, they would
reverse").  These few instances, however, make firm our conviction that the
difference between a rule of deference and the duty to exercise independent
review is "much more than a mere matter of degree."  Bose Corp., 466 U. S.,
at 501.  When de novo review is compelled, no form of appellate deference
is acceptable.
B
    Respondent and her amicus also argue that de novo review is
inappropriate because, as a general matter, a district judge is better
positioned to determine an issue of state law than are the judges on the
court of appeals.  This superior capacity derives, it is said, from the
regularity with which a district judge tries a diversity case governed by
the law of the forum State, and from the extensive experience that the
district judge generally has had as practitioner or judge in the forum
State.  See Brief for Respondent 7-10; Brief for Ford Motor Co. as Amicus
Curiae 9-11.
    We are unpersuaded.  As an initial matter, this argument seems to us to
be founded fatally on overbroad generalizations.  Moreover, and more
important, the proposition that a district judge is better able to "intuit"
the answer to an unsettled question of state law is foreclosed by our
holding in Erie.  The very essence of the Erie doctrine is that the bases
of state law are presumed to be communicable by the parties to a federal
judge no less than to a state judge.  Almost 25 years ago, Professor
Kurland stated: "Certainly, if the law is not a brooding omnipresence in
the sky over the United States, neither is it a brooding omnipresence in
the sky of Vermont, or New York or California."  Kurland, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, the Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine in Diversity Cases, 67
Yale L. J. 187, 217 (1957).  See Southern Pacific Co., 244 U. S., at 222
(Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in
the sky but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that
can be identified").  Similarly, the bases of state law are as equally
communicable to the appellate judges as they are to the district judge.  To
the extent that the available state law on a controlling issue is so
unsettled as to admit of no reasoned divination, we can see no sense in
which a district judge's prior exposure or nonexposure to the state
judiciary can be said to facilitate the rule of reason. {5}
IV
    The obligation of responsible appellate review and the principles of a
cooperative judicial federalism underlying Erie require that courts of
appeals review the state-law determinations of district courts de novo.
The Court of Appeals in this case therefore erred in deferring to the local
expertise of the District Court.
    The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
 
 
 
 
 
 

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1
    The amended complaint named the college and five faculty members as
defendants, and alleged discrimination in violation of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 355, 29 U. S. C. MDRV 701 et seq.; denial of due
process and unconstitutional interference with her liberty and property
interests; negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress;
invasion of privacy; wrongful dismissal; violation of express and implied
covenants of good faith and fair dealing; and breach of contract.  The
District Court entered summary judgment for the defendants except as to the
three statelaw claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress,
invasion of privacy, and breach of contract.  649 F. Supp. 391, 407 (1986).
It determined that it need not consider "the plausibility of federal
question jurisdiction."  Id., at 393, n. 1.

2
    See Coenen, To Defer or Not to Defer: A Study of Federal Court
Deference to District Court Rulings on State Law, 73 Minn. L. Rev. 899
(1989), and the many cases cited therein.  See also Note, What is the
Proper Standard for Reviewing a District Court's Interpretation of State
Substantive Law?, 54 U. Cin. L. Rev. 215 (1985), and Note, A Nondeferential
Standard for Appellate Review of State Law Decisions by Federal District
Courts, 42 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1311 (1985).  See, however, Note, The Erie
Enigma: Appellate Review of Conclusions of Law, 26 Ariz. L. Rev. 755
(1984), and Note, The Law/Fact Distinction and Unsettled State Law in the
Federal Courts, 64 Tex. L. Rev. 157 (1985).

3
    The dissent inexplicably relies on several cases in which this Court
declined to review de novo questions of state law to support the dissent's
contention that it is "quite natural" for appellate judges to rely on the
"experience" of district judges.  See post, at 2-3.  We are not persuaded
that the manner in which this Court chooses to expend its limited resources
in the exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction has any relevance to the
obligation of courts of appeals to review de novo those legal issues
properly before them.

4
    Of course, a question of state law usually can be resolved definitively
if the litigation is instituted in state court and is not finally removed
to federal court, or if a certification procedure is available and is
successfully utilized.  Rhode Island provides a certification procedure.
See Rhode Island Supreme Court Rule 6 (1989).
    See, however, Lehman Brothers v. Schein, 416 U. S. 386, 390-391 (1974)
("We do not suggest that where there is doubt as to local law and where the
certification procedure is available, resort to it is obligatory.  It does,
of course, in the long run save time, energy, and resources and helps build
a cooperative judicial federalism.  Its use in a given case rests in the
sound discretion of the federal court") (footnote omitted).

5
    "As a general proposition, a federal court judge who sits in a
particular state, especially one who has practiced before its courts, may
be better able to resolve complex questions as to the law of that state
than is a federal judge who has no such personal acquaintance with the law
of the state.  For this reason federal appellate courts frequently have
voiced reluctance to substitute their own view of the state law for that of
the district judge.  As a matter of judicial administration, this seems
defensible.  But there is some tendency to go beyond that proposition and
to say that if the trial court has reached a permissible conclusion under
state law, the appellate court cannot reverse even if it thinks the state
law to be otherwise, thereby treating the question of state law much as if
it were a question of fact.  The determination of state law, however, is a
legal question, and although the considered decision of a district judge
experienced in the law of a state naturally commands the respect of an
appellate court, a party is entitled to meaningful review of that decision
just as he is of any other legal question in the case, and just as he would
have been if the case had been tried in a state court."  19 C. Wright, A.
Miller, and E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, MDRV 4507, pp.
106-110 (1982).





Subject: 89-1629 -- DISSENT, SALVE REGINA COLLEGE v. RUSSELL

 


    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


No. 89-1629



SALVE REGINA COLLEGE, PETITIONER v.
SHARON L. RUSSELL


on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the first
circuit

[March 20, 1991]



    Chief Justice Rehnquist, with whom Justice White and Justice Stevens
join, dissenting.

    I do not believe we need to delve into such abstractions as
"deferential" review, on the one hand, as opposed to what the Court's
opinion calls, at various places, "plenary," "independent," and "de novo"
review, on the other, in order to decide this case.  The critical language
used by the Court of Appeals, and quoted in this Court's opinion, is this:

"In view of the customary appellate deference accorded to interpretations
of state law made by federal judges of that state, Dennis v. Rhode Island
Hospital Trust Nat'l Bank, 744 F. 2d 893, 896 (1st Cir. 1984); O'Rourke v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 730 F. 2d 842, 847 (2d Cir. 1984), we hold that
the district court's determination that the Rhode Island Supreme Court
would apply standard contract principles is not reversible error."  890 F.
2d 484, 489 (CA1 1989).


    In order to determine the Court of Appeals' views as to "customary
appellate deference," it seems only fair to refer to the page in Dennis to
which the court cites.  There we find this language:

"[I]n a diversity case such as this one, involving a technical subject
matter primarily of state concern, we are reluctant to interfere with a
reasonable construction of state law made by a district judge, sitting in
the state, who is familiar with that state's law and practices."  Id., at
896 (citation omitted).


The court does not say that it always defers to a district court's
conclusions of law.  Rather, it states that it is reluctant to substitute
its own view of state law for that of a judge "who is familiar with that
state's law and practices."  In this case, the court concluded that the
opinion of a district judge with 1812 years of experience as a trial judge
was entitled to some appellate deference.
    This seems to me a rather sensible observation.  A district court's
insights are particularly valuable to an appellate court in a case such as
this where the state law is unsettled.  In such cases, the courts' task is
to try to predict how the highest court of that State would decide the
question.  A judge attempting to predict how a state court would rule must
use not only his legal reasoning skills, but also his experiences and
perceptions of judicial behavior in that state.  It therefore makes perfect
sense for an appellate court judge with no local experience to accord
special weight to a local judge's assessment of state court trends.
    If we must choose among Justice Holmes' aphorisms to help decide this
case, I would opt for his observation that "[t]he life of the law has not
been logic: it has been experience."  O. Holmes, The Common Law 1 (1881).
And it does no harm to recall that the members of this Court have no
monopoly on experience; judges of the courts of appeals and of the district
courts surely possess it just as we do.  That the experience of appellate
judges should lead them to rely, in appropriate situations, on the
experience of district judges who have practiced law in the State in which
they sit before taking the bench seems quite natural.
    For this very reason, this Court has traditionally given special
consideration or "weight" to the district judge's perspective on local law.
See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, Inc., 350 U. S. 198, 204
(1956) ("Since the federal judge making those findings is from the Vermont
bar, we give special weight to his statement of what the Vermont law is");
United States v. Hohri, 482 U. S. 64, 74, n. 6 (1987) ("[L]ocal federal
district judges . . . are likely to be familiar with the applicable state
law. . . .  Indeed, a district judge's determination of a state-law
question usually is reviewed with great deference."); Bishop v. Wood, 426
U. S. 341, 346, and n. 10 (1976) ("this Court has accepted the
interpretations of state law in which the District Court and the Court of
Appeals have concurred even if an examination of the state-law issue
without such guidance might have justified a different conclusion").
    But the Court today decides that this intuitively sensible deference is
available only to this Court, and not to the Courts of Appeals.  It then
proceeds to instruct the courts of appeals and the district courts on their
respective functions in the federal judicial system, and how they should go
about exercising them.  Questions of law are questions of law, they are
told, whether they be of state law or federal law, and must all be
processed through an identical decisional mold.
    I believe this analysis unduly compartmentalizes things which have up
to now been left to common sense and good judgment.  Federal courts of
appeals perform a different role when they decide questions of state law
than they do when they decide questions of federal law.  In the former
case, these courts are not sources of law but only reflections of the
jurisprudence of the courts of a state.  While in deciding novel federal
questions, courts of appeals are likely to ponder the policy implications
as well as the decisional law, only the latter need be considered in
deciding questions of state law.  To my mind, therefore, it not only
violates no positive law but also is a sensible allocation of resources to
recognize these differences by deferring to the views of the district court
where such deference is felt warranted.
    I think we run a serious risk that our reach will exceed our grasp when
we attempt to impose a rigid logical framework on the courts of appeals in
place of a less precise but tolerably well-functioning approach adopted by
those courts.  I agree with the Court that a court of appeals should not
"abdicate" its obligation to decide questions of state law presented in a
diversity case.  But according weight to the conclusion of a particular
district judge on the basis of his experience and special knowledge of
state law, an appellate court does not "suspend [its] own thought
processes."  In re McLinn, 739 F. 2d 1395, 1404 (1984) (Schroeder, J.,
dissenting).  I think the Court of Appeals did no more than that here, and
I therefore dissent from the reversal of its judgment.

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