


          * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
          *                                                       *
          *       CHAPTER 6: OPERATION COBRA AND BREAKOUT         *
          *                                                       *
          * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

          After establishing a bridgehead, allied forces bogged down.
          To the east, British and Canadian divisions were running
          into the strong forces Hitler had placed in their path near
          Caen. American units were finding it difficult to make
          progress in the hedgerow country. The allied high
          command searched for a way to break the stalemate.
          After examining various options, General Omar Bradley
          decided on Cobra. The name was appropriate, since, like
          the snake, this operation was deadly. The difficulty was
          that it killed Americans as well as Germans.
          
          Just as D-Day is etched in my memory, so are July 24
          and 25, 1944. I still shudder when recalling my
          experiences, particularly those where death barely passed
          me by.
          
          When going through my letters, I found only one related
          to Cobra. Perhaps this was just as well. My letters home
          must have worried my family enough without a graphic
          description of that event.
          
          Dear Folks, July 28, 1944, Somewhere in France
          
          C'est la guerre. Indeed, just now it is extremely difficult
          to find time to do anything I should like. I see by the
          radio that the First American army has achieved a
          breakthrough here in Normandy. Indeed things are
          looking up.
          
          It is strange. All the soldiers ask here, amid one of the
          greatest battles our armies have ever fought, is, "How are
          the Russians doing? How far are they from Warsaw?" I
          daresay that the Russians, amidst their great fight, are
          asking the same of us.
          
          Love, John
          
          The US Army history has this to say about the planning
          for Operation Cobra:
          
          "General Bradley presented the Cobra idea at a conference
          with his staff and his corps commanders on 12 July. He
          characterized the battle of the hedgerows as "tough and
          costly...a slugger's match...too slow a process," and spoke
          of his hope for a swift advance made possible by "three
          or four thousand tons of bombs" from the air. He stated
          that aggressive action and a readiness to take stiff losses
          if necessary were the keys to the success of Cobra. "If
          they [the Germans] get set [again]," he warned, "we go
          right back to the hedge fighting and you can't make any
          speed." He insisted, "This thing [Cobra] must be bold."
          (Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, pages
          213-214.)
          
          Perhaps because of his close personal relations with Lt.
          Gen. J. Lawton Collins, General Bradley again chose the
          VII Corps to make the main effort. As a result, the 4th
          Division, flanked by the 9th and 30th, was again in the
          front line.
          
          Having been employed for the British Operation
          Goodwood near Caen on July 18, Operation Cobra was
          the second time a large number of bombers were used in
          a tactical role. The plan was for the front line forces to
          draw back from the St. L-Priers road. The Army
          proposed 800 yards and the air commanders 3,000. They
          compromised on 1,500. Thousands of aircraft would use
          the road as a bomb line for a rectangle about five miles
          wide and one mile deep. After that, the artillery would
          bombard the target area. The infantry would then attack
          any Germans who remained alive and able to fight. Once
          the breakthrough was established, armored units would
          exploit it.
          
          This was a bold plan. There was, however, one important
          detail which was left dangling. When conferring with Air
          Chief Marshall Leigh-Mallory and other air commanders,
          Bradley expressed a preference for the aircraft to attack
          parallel to the road. Thus, he maintained, any bombs
          which fell short would not drop on American forces. He
          failed, however, to pin the air commanders down on this,
          and those commanding the heavy and medium bombers
          decided to bomb perpendicular to the road. According to
          US Air Force documents, the air planners had understood
          that General Bradley expected heavy casualties and was
          prepared to accept them no matter how the bombing took
          place.                                               


          A NARROW ESCAPE

          During the morning of July 24, I entered a farm yard. I
          do not remember why I was there, since the First
          Battalion to which I was attached was in reserve. I do
          remember clearly, however, what happened.
          
          As I approached the farm, an infantryman warned me
          that the Germans had it under observation and had been
          firing artillery shells when anyone entered the yard. I
          crossed the open space, therefore, quickly and went into
          a barn. A young officer was lying on his back on a table.
          At first, I thought he was asleep. Then I noticed the
          ashen color a face takes on after a person dies. I looked
          at him for awhile, trying to discover any signs that he
          had been hit. There were none.
          
          Leaving this building, I ducked into a nearby shed, where
          I found Capt. Claude Mercer, liaison officer to the Second
          Battalion, lying on a stretcher. I said, "Mercer, what in
          the hell happened to you?" Fortunately, rather than
          replying to my question, he said, "Get out of that door,
          you dumb bastard!" Just as I took a step forward to
          where I was protected by the shed's stone wall, an
          artillery shell exploded in the farmyard. Shell fragments
          flew through the door where I had been and hit the wall
          beyond.
          
          All this happened so quickly that I was not sure later
          whether I had thanked Claude. This was on my mind for
          many years, and I was glad to see him in 1980 at a 4th
          Division reunion. This gave me a chance to express my
          appreciation for his saving my life.
          
          Meanwhile, there was great confusion both at higher
          headquarters and on the ground. The official US Army
          history puts it this way:
          
          "Air Chief Marshall Leigh-Mallory had set the Cobra
          H-Hour at 1300, 24 July and on the morning of 24 July
          he went to Normandy to observe the operation. He found
          the sky overcast, the clouds thick. Deciding the visibility
          was inadequate for the attack, he ordered a
          postponement. Unfortunately, he was too late. The
          message announcing the decision reached England only
          a few minutes before the actual bombing was to
          commence in France. Although the planes were ordered
          to return without making their bombing runs, it was
          impossible to get them all back." (Blumenson, Breakout
          and Pursuit, p. 228.)
          
          Before word reached General Collins that the ground
          attack had been postponed, he ordered the divisions to
          move forward. The 30th, however, was unable to do this,
          because bombs which fell short killed and wounded a
          number of men in the assault units. Even when he got
          word the ground attack had been put off, Collins decided
          that the corps had to move back to the road, in order to
          prevent the Germans from moving forward.
          
          With Claude Mercer out of action, I reported to the
          commander of the Second Battalion and told him I would
          take over as liaison officer. At that point, the battalion
          staff had taken shelter in a stone shed on the side of
          the farmhouse away from the German artillery. Every
          once in a while, a shell would hit the top of the house,
          and tiles would thunder down onto the roof of the shed.
          Although not terribly dangerous, it was unnerving.
          
          Having no telephone communications with the forward
          observers who were with the infantry companies, I told
          Orville Schroeder, my communications sergeant, to lay
          lines to them. Understandably, he protested, saying,
          "Those Germans have us under observation. It will be
          suicide to go out there." I insisted, however, that he do
          it, since it was essential to have communications. He
          looked at me and said, "All right. I'll do it. But, if I am
          killed, it will be on your conscience."
          
          The most difficult thing in battle is to order men to do
          things which could cost their lives. There is, however,
          often little choice. This was one of those times. I was,
          nevertheless, greatly relieved when Sgt. Schroeder
          reappeared, having laid the telephone lines. Partly to cope
          with my feelings of guilt, I later recommended him for an
          award.
          
          Since my crew included only three enlisted men, my
          responsibilities were limited, when compared with infantry
          commanders. I am glad to say, however, that none of
          them were killed and only one was slightly wounded
          during my time as a liaison officer.
          
          When General Bradley discovered on July 24 that his
          proposal for the direction of the bombing had not been
          followed, he was furious, for he was confronted with a
          terrible dilemma. To change the plans at that point would
          have meant delaying several days. Higher headquarters
          were pressing for action, and there was the danger the
          Germans would rush additional forces into the
          breakthrough area. General Bradley decided, therefore, to
          go ahead the next day, July 25.                      


          COBRA STRIKES AGAIN

          There was bitterness among the troops about the events
          of July 24, particularly when we learned that there had
          been no emergency communications with the bombers.
          Nevertheless, we had little choice but to put this behind
          us, since the attack was rescheduled for 11:00 the next
          day. While not perfect, the weather was better. The
          bombers dropped over 4000 tons of bombs. Although the
          fighter bombers flew parallel to the road, the medium and
          heavy bombers again flew a perpendicular path, and
          bombs again fell short.
          
          I have seen various figures on casualties, but the total for
          the two days was over a hundred killed and nearly five
          hundred wounded. Among those killed was Lt. Gen. Leslie
          J. McNair. Since the Germans had been led to believe
          McNair was in England, he was buried secretly with only
          senior officers present.
          
          In the midst of the bombing, I was walking down a lane
          which had hedgerows on each side. While I was well
          aware of the explosions, I was preoccupied with looking
          for Sgt. Schroeder, again in connection with telephone
          lines. I only learned later, therefore, how far in back of
          me bombs had fallen.
          
          After that day, my memory becomes fuzzy. I recall that
          the battalion advanced into the bombing rectangle and
          that the destruction stunned me. I recollect talking to a
          German prisoner, who was shaking like a leaf. When I
          asked him why he had continued fighting, he replied,
          "Because I was ordered to." I also reluctantly remember
          seeing a young girl who was killed by our artillery while
          milking a cow, a scene that haunted my dreams for many
          years. Other than that, my mind is a total blank about
          a period of days, during which we were in intensive
          combat.
          
          Lt. Gen. Fritz Bayerlein commanded the Panzer Lehr
          Division, which took the brunt of the bombing. After the
          war he said the bombing was a surprise and devastated
          his forces. "The whole place looked like a moonscape," he
          said, adding, "The survivors were like madmen and could
          not be used for anything." Although there was resistance
          in the bombed area, Bayerlein's statement was
          substantially correct.                               


          AFTERTOUGHTS ON COBRA

          It is not easy to convey what happens when a rifle
          company attacks, let alone what happened after the July
          25 bombing and artillery barrage. Fortunately, a historian
          attached to the 4th Division interviewed the commanders
          of C Company of the First Battalion shortly after the
          battle. These were Lt. Joseph L. Gude and Lt. William
          Woodruff, who took over the company after Gude stepped
          on a nail when hopping over a fence. This is a summary
          of their account.
          
          The company moved into the line of departure shortly
          before the bombing. Fortunately, the troops which had
          been there had been well dug in, and C Company had
          dug more. Although a few of the men had to be dug out
          after the bombing, only one man was injured. As a result,
          the company was able to move forward when the artillery
          barrage ended.
          
          In the first thousand yards, the company ran into little
          resistance. The rifle and machine gun fire they received
          was disorganized and did not last long.
          
          When the company reached the St. L-Priers highway,
          they saw a German lying under a vehicle. It would have
          been easy to shoot him, but Sgt. Blake decided to
          capture him. As he advanced, the German shot and killed
          him. A few seconds later the German was also dead.
          
          With the help of tanks, the company overcame resistance
          from houses near the crossroad. At that point, the tank
          dozer was damaged. Since the tanks depended on it to
          knock down hedgerows, they were unable to continue
          until the dozer was repaired. C Company, therefore,
          crossed the highway and advanced without the tanks.
          
          About seven hundred yards further south, a bazooka
          team had to knock out a tank before the company could
          continue its advance. By that time, Company B had come
          abreast of C, accompanied by tanks. These fired on
          houses from which Germans were firing, and the shooting
          ceased.
          
          Continuing their advance toward la Chapelle en Juger,
          the company made contact with the 9th Division, which
          was on the 4th Division's right, but in an unwanted way.
          It began to receive what is now called friendly fire in the
          form of artillery. As the interview said, "The shells were
          bursting right over our heads. We hugged the ditches
          along the hedgerows which was the only cover we had.
          We were very fortunate and had only one casualty, a first
          platoon man who was hit in the shoulder."
          
          The following day, the company took la Chapelle en Juger
          without resistance, capturing a few prisoners. When the
          company received fire from a gun south of the town, it
          used its mortars and hit the German ammunition dump.
          "The explosion was something to see and it completely
          destroyed the gun."
          
          When the company reached the road running east from
          Marigny, it saw a number of Germans coming out of the
          town. It swung the tanks across the road to block them.
          After a short fire fight, the company captured fifteen
          prisoners.
          
          Crossing the St. L-Coutances highway, the company
          occupied an orchard a few hundred yards to its south.
          Being on the battalion objective, it paused. During those
          two days, the company had only two casualties, Sgt.
          Blake and the man wounded by the 9th Division artillery.
          
          Looking back on the experience, Gude said, "I believe
          every man in the company will agree that if we have such
          an attack again they would want the bombing just where
          it was, right up to our lines. We would rather take the
          ones that fall on us to get the effect on the Germans
          right in front of us. This bombing completely destroyed
          organized German resistance all the way thru their
          position. Such Germans as we found were relatively easy
          to handle."
          
          Despite our great victory, Operation Cobra caused
          considerable controversy. After the bombing, General
          Eisenhower was exasperated about the large number of
          American casualties. In his memoirs, A Soldier's Story,
          General Bradley declared the perpendicular approach an
          act of perfidy on the part of the air forces, "a serious
          breach of good faith in planning."
          
          I have read a number of accounts of the planning for
          Operation Cobra, and it is not easy to be sure just what
          happened. What is clear is that there was a great deal of
          tension among the senior commanders, because the
          landing seemed to have bogged down in the hedgerow
          country and at Caen. Furthermore, the air commanders
          did not welcome General Bradley telling them how to do
          their business. For one thing, it would not have been
          possible to fly so many bombers through a one mile wide
          rectangle in an hour, the time limit set by Bradley for the
          bombing. In addition, the air commanders decided the
          parallel route would expose their aircraft to more
          antiaircraft fire than the perpendicular. What is not clear
          is why this was not thrashed out at the planning meeting
          by the generals or later by their staffs.
          
          An even more serious question is why there was no
          emergency ground to air communications. Had there been
          communications with the aircraft from the ground, the
          casualties could at the very least have been reduced. 

                           ********************

          COMMENDATIONS FOR EVENTS DURING COBRA

          I received a Bronze Star and later a Silver Star for my
          performance during Cobra. The Bronze Star citation was
          so effusive that I would be embarrased for anyone to see
          it. Although, as usual, my Silver Star exaggerated, it
          came reasonably close to what happened.

          HEADQUARTERS
          4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
          APO 4, US ARMY
          
          Subject: Unexpurgated Citation to Award of Silver Star
          
          To: Captain John Ausland, 01167725, Field Artillery, 29th
          Field Artillery Battalion
          
          Citation:
          
          "JOHN AUSLAND, 01167725, Captain (then First Lieutenant)
          Field Artillery, 29th Field Artillery Battalion, for gallantry
          in action in the vicinity of La Mardell, France, 24 July
          1944. Captain AUSLAND was artillery liaison officer with
          the second of two infantry battalions attacking in column
          formation. An intense enemy artillery concentration
          registered on the leading unit, wounding its liaison officer
          and destroyed wire communications. The battalion in the
          rear was ordered to withdraw to an assembly area.
          Captain AUSLAND immediately left this element and
          advanced to the forward group. Although a large volume
          of hostile fire continued to fall throughout the area, he
          immediately reestablished wire communication between
          the forward observer and the fire direction center. As a
          result, effective counterfire was directed on the enemy's
          units. He then voluntarily reported to the battalion
          commander as liaison officer and, for several hours
          afterward, expertly directed and coordinated artillery fire
          upon hostile positions.  His initiative and enterprise in
          this instance were material factors in the seizure of the
          battalion objective. Captain AUSLAND's courage,
          enterprise and complete application to duty are in
          keeping with the finest traditions of the military service."
          
          H.W. BLAKELEY,
          Brigadier General, U.S. Army
          Commanding.                                                

