




          PAUL H. NITZE'S FOREWORD TO KENNEDY, KHRUSHCHEV,
          AND THE BERLIN-CUBA CRISIS

          With the Berlin wall now history, it is probable
          that people who did not experience those perilous
          years will not recall how it came into being and
          how close the world came to nuclear war. John
          Ausland's book is, therefore, timely.

          Most accounts of the Berlin wall end not long
          after the division of the city on August 13, 1961.
          As a result, it is  not understood that this event
          only began a new phase of the crisis, which saw
          the Soviets challenging allied access to west
          Berlin both in the air and on land. Furthermore,
          little is generally known of the intricacies of
          President Kennedy's efforts to negotiate his way
          out of the Berlin problem.

          All this reached a climax when Nikita Khrushchev
          made the risky mistake of moving the contest to
          Cuba, which led to what has become known as the
          Cuban Missile Crisis.

          If the events are now a faded memory for most
          people, even less is known about how the United
          States government and its allies dealt with the
          crisis. At the allied level, there was the four
          power Ambassadorial Group, which met in Washington,
          DC. Under it were a number of sub-groups,
          including a Military Sub-group, which I chaired.
          Hence I saw a great deal of Mr. Ausland's work,
          which included the complex task of coordinating
          the views of various parts of the US government
          with those of the allies.

          President Kennedy took a keen personal interest in
          management of US policy regarding Berlin, and
          decisions of any importance were made by him.
          However, day to day planning and communication
          with the field were left to lower ranking
          officials. Their work was coordinated by the
          Berlin Task Force. It consisted of officials from
          various government departments and agencies, who
          met daily in the State Department Operations
          Center.

          As a member of the staff and later Deputy Director
          of the Berlin Task Force, John Ausland was in a
          good position to monitor what was going on.
          Fortunately, shortly after leaving the task force,
          he wrote an account of the crisis, while it was
          still fresh on his mind. This narrative makes up
          the first part of this book.

          Recently, a great many of the classified documents
          related to the crisis have been released to the
          public. From these, Mr. Ausland has selected a few
          which provide the flavor of key events. He has
          also included some documents which have not
          previously been published, including a briefing
          which he gave President Kennedy and senior
          officials on Berlin contingency planning.

          Anyone interested in the Berlin-Cuba crisis and
          how business was then conducted will profit from
          reading this book.

          Paul H. Nitze

          
