          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
       
                         PRELUDE TO CRISIS: VIENNA
          
          Senator John F. Kennedy predicted in 1960 that the next
          President might be confronted with an ultimatum on Berlin.
          After taking office, however, he was not anxious to take up
          Eisenhower's debate with Khruschev. He made no reference to
          Berlin in his Inaugural Address. When this omission was
          noted with apprehension by the Germans, he made the barest
          reference to the city in his State of the Union message.
          
          For a while it looked as though the mood of optimism with
          which the New Frontier arrived in Washington might be
          warranted. Khruschev sent Kennedy a warm message on his
          Inaugural. A short time later, he released two American
          flyers who had been shot down in 1960 by Soviet planes. In a
          note in February to Adenauer, Khruschev referred to the new
          President as an improvement over the old. A few sprouts
          pushing through the earth during a warm February, however,
          do not mean that winter is over.
          
          MANEUVERING BEFORE VIENNA  Even before Kennedy took his oath
          of office, Khruschev delivered his January 6 teeth-clenching
          speech on wars of national liberation. In it, he declared
          that the time had about arrived to conclude a peace treaty
          and settle the Berlin question. He returned to this theme a
          month later in his February 17 note to Chancellor Adenauer.
          The West, he complained, was always seeking excuses to avoid
          the issue. If it were not American elections, it was German.
          (German elections were scheduled for September.) If it were
          not elections, it was the need for a period of quiet while a
          new administration settled in. This could not go on. In
          March, US Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson pursued Khruschev to
          Siberia to give him a letter from the President. In this, 
          Kennedy proposed that he and the Soviet leader meet and talk
          things over. This letter and the Bay of Pigs diverted
          Khruschev from Berlin for a few months. In May, however, he
          returned to the attack when the Warsaw Pact issued a
          statement backing Khruschev's demands for a peace treaty and
          a "free demilitarized West Berlin."
          
          While it may have seemed to the West unnecessary for
          Khruschev to renew the Berlin crisis, it should be
          remembered that he had been deeply committed since November
          1958 to the signature of a peace treaty and the creation of
          a "free city" in West Berlin. Not to have renewed the crisis,
          which he postponed after the abortive summit meeting in 1960
          on the grounds it was impossible to do business with
          Eisenhower, would have been an admission of defeat on a
          major aspect of his foreign policy. Mao Tse-tung was also
          becoming increasingly obstreperous, and Khruschev may have
          felt obliged to prove that he had not turned soft.
          
          In addition, in his contest with the US, Khruschev was
          perpetuating a gigantic bluff over his missile arsenal. The
          Americans had begun to suspect early in 1961 that their
          estimates on Soviet missile strength were exaggerated.
          Although Defense Under Secretary Gilpatric did not confirm
          this until late in the year, Khruschev may have realized
          that it was only a question of time until he was found out.
          
          Khruschev outlined his policy in a speech early in the year.
          Although he wanted to avoid nuclear war, he promised to
          continue the struggle with the capitalists by other means.
          While exploiting any advantages in the developed world, he
          would assist the struggles against imperialism in the former
          colonial areas. Behind this verbiage lay a specific program.
          Mao was launching on a dangerous course in southeast Asia,
          and Khruschev wanted no part of it. He decided, therefore,
          to extricate himself from Laos. At the same time, he pushed
          Soviet activities in Africa, partly to compete with the
          Chinese. To provide a bargaining counter in dealing with
          Kennedy, Khruschev increased Soviet assistance to Cuba. His
          main blow, however, was directed against the target on which
          he set his sights in 1958, Berlin. He calculated that
          success there would radiate out like a tidal wave, shaking
          Kennedy's position in Germany, NATO, and around the world.
          
          While, therefore, Khruschev arrived in Vienna with some
          flexibility on details and timing, he was firmly committed
          to make a fuss over Berlin.
          
          Although Kennedy had held out an olive branch to Khruschev,
          he had made up his mind on Berlin before entering the White
          House. In July 1960, he said, "We should make it very clear
          that we are not going to concede our position on Berlin...."
          
          After Khruschev sent his February 17 note to Adenauer,
          Kennedy ordered a review of Berlin policy. Ambassador-at-
          Large Harriman gave the first hint of its results in a
          speech in Berlin in March. He said that any talks with the
          Soviets would start from scratch. The State Department
          subsequently explained that this meant the withdrawal of the
          final proposals made by the Allies at Geneva in 1959.
          Although the texts of these proposals were never published,
          they were summarized by Secretary Herter in a statement to
          the Ministerial Conference on August 5. While these
          preserved the essentials of the Allied position, including
          the Allied presence in Berlin and rights of access, they
          also dangled several concessions. Kennedy only wanted to
          renew these if he could get something for them.
          
          Prior to a visit by British Prime Minister Macmillan to
          Washington in April 1961, Kennedy asked Dean Acheson to take
          a look at Berlin. During his talk with Macmillan, Kennedy
          asked Acheson to outline his views. While these have yet to
          be published in any detail, they clearly did not call for
          tolerating any Soviet interference with access.
          
          In May, Secretary Rusk reaffirmed the Truman and Eisenhower
          commitments to Berlin in his address to the NATO meeting in
          Oslo. In their communique, the Ministers reiterated their
          determination...to maintain the freedom of West Berlin and
          its people.
          
          Kennedy, therefore, arrived in Vienna committed to defend
          Berlin but with some flexibility regarding access
          arrangements and cold war activities in West Berlin. If he
          had any idea of playing these cards, however, the
          opportunity did not arise. As Kennedy walked in the door,
          Khruschev hit him with a large bucket of cold water.
          
          Although he may have been bargaining, Khruschev's
          presentation was brutal. No other word adequately describes
          his performance. He made it clear from the outset that he
          still wanted the Allies out of Berlin. The first step in
          this direction would be the signature of a peace treaty,
          with both Germanies. If the West balked, the Soviets would
          sign a separate treaty with the East German regime. West
          Berlin would then become a "demilitarized free city."
          
          If the West wished, token Allied troops or neutral troops
          under UN auspices could remain, with a slight catch. If
          Allied troops were left in the city, they would include
          Soviet contingents. If neutral troops took over, they would
          presumably include some friendly to the Soviets. This
          proposal was referred to by Kennedy as, "What's mine is mine.
          What's yours is negotiable." Khruschev offered to postpone
          the treaty for six months, while the East and West Germans
          tried to get together. This would, however, have given
          Khruschev his immediate tactical aim in Germany, acceptance
          of the Ulbricht regime, which was unacceptable to the Allies.
          
          In several long conversations, Kennedy tried to shake his
          opponent's determination. He stressed that Khruschev was
          challenging one of America's vital interests. It could not
          possibly give way, even if this meant risking war. Finally,
          he saw that Khruschev would not budge an inch. At the end of
          the discussion, he summarized the prospect very graphically:
          "It will be a cold winter."
          
          There has been some debate regarding the effect of
          Khruschev's presentation on Kennedy. New York Times
          columnist James Reston saw him shortly after he emerged from
          the conference room and later described him as "shaken and
          angry." Theodore Sorensen maintains that this was an
          exaggeration. Be that as it may, the nation saw on its
          television screens after his return a man who had been
          deeply impressed. The President spoke of "a very somber two
          days." Nor would it be surprising if Kennedy felt drained
          after his talks. He had gone to Vienna hopeful that he could
          avoid a crisis. By the time Khruschev had let him out of the
          ring, this hope had been swept down the Danube. To be sure
          there was no misunderstanding, Khruschev had handed Kennedy
          an aide memoir just before he left Vienna, which reiterated
          the Soviet position in unambiguous terms.
          
          THE AFTERMATH OF VIENNA  As soon as Kennedy returned to
          Washington, he plunged into the Berlin problem. While there
          had been considerable Allied planning after 1958, this was
          addressed mostly to the problem of access. Kennedy asked
          that a larger canvas be used. To do this, he called on Dean
          Acheson again.
          
          While Acheson toiled in his offices on the seventh floor of
          the State Department, Washington charged into an intense  
          and confused   debate. Senator Mansfield suggested that all
          of Berlin be made a free city under international control.
          After talking with Khruschev, Walter Lippman suggested the
          US say, "We don't like Berlin the way it is. We want to
          improve it, and, if you can negotiate with us an improvement,
          we'll be very interested." The New York Times insisted, "The
          first and most immediate response of the free world must be
          a military strengthening of NATO...." Richard Nixon
          maintained that Berlin was not a bone in Khruschev's throat.
          It was "actually the morsel he would bite off in order to
          chew at the vitals of the West." Marquis Childs explained
          that, with thirty different contingency plans before him,
          President Kennedy was still in the sorting stage. The
          Washington Post's Chalmers Roberts reported the general
          belief in Washington that nothing was negotiable but that
          negotiations were inevitable later in the year.
          
          After meeting with the President, Secretary McNamara told
          reporters, "We have no plans for increasing our forces in
          Europe, but I don't say we won't." Newsweek published what
          purported to be the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In
          the next issue, the magazine reported  Kennedy had ordered
          the FBI to investigate the leak in the Pentagon. Kennedy 
          told a press conference, "There is peace in Germany and
          Berlin. If it is disturbed, it will be a direct Soviet
          responsibility." Rusk declared in a TV interview the US
          would stand by Berlin but would explore all possibilities
          for a "tolerable peace."
          
          The first round of debate ended on June 29, when the
          President called a meeting of the National Security Council
          to consider Acheson's report. This focused on the problem of
          the Allied response. Should the Soviets carry out their
          threat to sign a treaty, Acheson recommended that the US
          respond vigorously to any challenge to Allied access. In
          order to back his hand, Acheson recommended that the
          President take major military preparedness measures. After
          the discussion, Kennedy was still not satisfied that he had
          all the information he needed. He turned to his Secretaries
          of State and Defense and asked them to prepare their
          recommendations. Meanwhile, he asked Acheson to study the
          other part of the equation, negotiations.
          
          Under the direction of Rusk and McNamara, the State-Defense
          study was undertaken by an experienced team of officers.
          European Assistant Secretary Foy Kohler headed the State
          contingent. His right-hand man was Martin Hillenbrand who
          had served in Berlin before heading the German desk since
          1958. The desk was augmented by a number of Berlin hands.
          Assistant Secretary Paul Nitze headed the Defense Department
          contingent.
          
          This group plunged into three weeks of frenzied activity,
          during which they prepared two basic reports. They worked
          far into the night and often around the clock to meet their
          deadlines. There was, however, a certain amount of discord.
          This was partly due to policy differences, but it was also
          caused by the fact that many of the people involved in State
          and Defense were getting acquainted under intense pressure.
          
          Contrary to the impression given by the press, Kennedy was
          not always dissatisfied with the bureaucracy's work on
          Berlin. Much has been made of the July 17 Allied reply to
          Khruschev's June 4 aide memoir. Kennedy thought it too
          legalistic (which, along with much diplomatic correspondence,
          it was). He made, therefore, his own reply in a statement to
          the press. He also felt the note had an intolerably long
          gestation period   43 days. While the State Department was
          by no means responsible for all the delay, this was too long,
          and thereafter notes on Berlin were prepared with more
          dispatch. To give credit where it is due, however, Kennedy
          commended in writing the officers who prepared the key
          State-Defense study during that hectic July.
          
          While the Berlin team scrambled, the public debate continued.
          Lippman urged the President to take a positive line, which
          took into account the division of Germany. Two days after he
          retired, Air Force Chief of Staff Thomas D. White warned
          that there was a fair chance of war. Isaac Deutscher linked
          the Berlin crisis to the Sino-Soviet quarrel. NATO's General
          Lauris Norstad warned against reliance on the threat of
          nuclear retaliation. The West, he said, must be able to
          bridge the gap between nothing and nuclear war. Following an
          announcement of an increase in the Soviet military budget,
          McNamara forecast a review of American military strength.
          Eisenhower urged that the US stand firm on Berlin.
          
          In a spirited discussion at a Washington party, Soviet
          Ambassador Menshikov predicted that "when the chips are down,
          the American people won't fight for Berlin." The London
          Daily Telegraph called for an end to Kennedy's interminable
          reviews and task force reports and a beginning of sober
          joint western planning.
          
          While Washington was in the throes of making a decision,
          Khruschev and Ulbricht continued to beat the drums. In a
          series of speeches, Khruschev repeated his demands   and
          added a specific deadline, December 31. On June 15, Ulbricht
          spelled out what he meant by a "demilitarized free city." He
          would close the radio stations beamed to East Germany, the
          refugee reception centers, and the "agent" centers. He would
          control all traffic to West Berlin, whether by surface or
          air. He would end the application of West German laws to
          Berlin. Yet, he would do all this without changing the life
          of the West Berliners!
          
          Kennedy and Rusk replied in a series of statements, which
          sought to place on Khruschev responsibility for the drama
          about to unfold.
          
          The debate on US policy ended on July 25, when the President
          spoke to the nation and the world. Placing Berlin in the
          world context, he noted that the nation also faced a
          challenge in Southeast Asia and the Western Hemisphere. West
          Berlin, however, had now become "the great testing place of
          western courage and will, a focal point where our solemn
          commitments...and Soviet ambition now meet in basic
          confrontation." "Today the endangered frontier of freedom
          runs through divided Berlin." Kennedy went on to outline to
          the nation the measures it would take to meet the challenge.
          While rejecting pressures to declare a national emergency,
          he endorsed a series of major steps recommended in the
          State-Defense studies. The regular forces would be increased
          through larger draft calls and extensions of terms of
          service. Selected reserve units and individuals would be
          called up. Ships and planes headed for the scrap heap would
          be retained. Others would be removed from moth balls. The
          President also called for a new start on a civil defense
          program. In order to meet the costs, he asked Congress for
          $3.5 billion.
          
          At the same time, Kennedy declared that, as it was girding
          itself for trouble, the United States would continue to
          pursue the path of reason. To this end, he offered to remove
          "any actual irritants in West Berlin." He also expressed
          willingness to submit our rights in Berlin to international
          adjudication. If anyone doubted the desires of the Berliners,
          this could be submitted to a free vote.
          
          Kennedy ended his talk with a personal word about his main
          preoccupation, the terrible catastrophe of nuclear war. "Now,
          in the nuclear age, any misjudgment on either side about the
          intentions of the other could rain more devastation in
          several hours than has been wrought by all wars of human
          history." This specter continued to haunt him throughout the
          weeks and months ahead and weighed heavily in every decision
          he made.
          
          While Congress and the nation supported the President's
          summons wholeheartedly, his reference to "irritants" caused
          some uneasiness in Foggy Bottom and alarm in Germany. The
          main concern was that he might sacrifice RIAS, the American
          run radio station in West Berlin which had become a symbol
          of the city's freedom. Kennedy never defined, however, what
          he meant, and the issue gradually faded into the background.
          A more lasting mark was made by the call-up of the reserves.
          This was handled in such a way as to leave a bad taste,
          which is still a factor in discussions of calling reserves,
          even after the passage of years.
          
          The most notorious misfire was the civil defense program.
          While some useful work was done, it caused a great deal of
          confusion. This experience makes it more difficult even
          today to get an adequate civil defense, even though it might
          save tens of millions of lives. Perhaps most important,
          Kennedy may have made a mistake in giving the impression he
          was drawing the line firmly through Berlin. Khruschev may
          have gotten the impression that Kennedy was ready to write
          East Berlin off completely. Events proved this not to be the
          case. Although Kennedy was prepared to take greater risks
          for the West Berliners, he recognized that the Allies had
          rights in all of Berlin which they should try to preserve.
          
          CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ALLIES  While the debate went on in
          America during June and July, a parallel discussion went on
          across the Atlantic, which confronted the Soviets with
          anything but a united front. In London, the British were
          indignant about charges of softness in the American press.
          Foreign Secretary Home laid out three principles for
          negotiations: the right of the Berliners to choose their own
          way of life, the right of the western allies to be in the
          city, and the rights of guaranteed access. The New York
          Times reported that the British government was worried over
          public apathy. The paper also reported that the British felt
          that negotiations would be required to avoid a crisis and
          that negotiations would involve concessions. The Washington
          Post reported that the French were opposed to "saber
          rattling." They stressed de Gaulle's strong stand on Berlin
          but cautioned against intensive military preparations. De
          Gaulle warned Khruschev against "offstage thunder."
          
          French observers also warned the western allies against
          getting trapped in negotiations. The German Parliament on
          the other hand called for negotiations on the German problem.
          Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt, socialist candidate for
          Chancellor, proposed a western peace conference on Germany.
          Adenauer denounced the proposal.
          
          Kennedy reminded a press conference, "Napoleon once said
          that he won all his successes because he fought without
          allies." The President added, "If this alliance is going to
          move in concert, in my opinion we have to improve our
          consultation" and "come to decisions more quickly."
          
          Kennedy approached the crisis with a good idea of the
          attitudes of his major allies. He had talked with Adenauer
          in April, during the Chancellor's visit to Washington and
          found Adenauer opposed to giving an inch. Kennedy talked
          with de Gaulle in Paris on his way to Vienna. De Gaulle
          urged that the Allies simply huddle together until the storm
          had passed. While agreeing that the Allies should be ready
          to barricade the door, Macmillan urged that it be kept ajar
          for negotiations.
          
          Several days before Kennedy's July 25 speech, the State
          Department gave the British, French, and German Embassies a
          summary of the final State-Defense study. While Kennedy did
          not go into detail on what this study contained in his
          speech, he outlined his general program for the alliance. A
          first need is to hasten progress toward the military goals
          which the North Atlantic Allies have set for themselves. We
          will, he said, put even greater resources into fulfilling
          these goals, and we look to our allies to do the same."
          Kennedy did not have to explain. Early in his administration,
          he had begun to push for an increase in NATO's non-nuclear
          forces. For the most part, the Europeans declined   politely
          but firmly. This was mainly because they did not want to
          spend more. They had, however, also interpreted Kennedy's
          call for more conventional arms as a portent of an American
          reluctance to use nuclear weapons to defend Europe. They
          were, therefore, concerned lest Khruschev come to the
          conclusion he could run greater risks.
          
          The debate over the use of force by NATO in connection with
          Berlin   at the center of which was the question of the use
          of nuclear weapons   went on until the Cuban missile crisis.
          While Kennedy was prepared to risk war over Berlin, he
          thought that Khruschev would act in such a way as to
          minimize his risks. He insisted, therefore, that NATO should
          have a full range of options, from a small probe to nuclear
          war. The Allies reluctantly agreed to plan on this basis but
          insisted that the point at which nuclear weapons would be
          used be left undefined.
          
          Shortly after the July 25 speech, a team of US experts
          crossed the Atlantic to Paris. Foy Kohler headed the group,
          which also included his deputy Martin Hillenbrand and Frank
          Cash. There was also Paul Nitze from Defense and the Joint
          Chiefs of Staff representative Major General David Gray.
          Henry Fowler, Under Secretary of the Treasury, joined the
          group, to handle economic counter-measures. With the
          collaboration of their British, French, and German
          colleagues, this group did a really remarkable job of
          preparing recommendations for the Foreign Ministers.
          
          The results of Rusk's meetings with his three colleagues on
          August 4-5 were, however, mixed. On the positive side, Rusk,
          British Foreign Minister Home, and French Foreign Minister
          Couve de Murville informed their German colleague, von
          Brentano, that the Germans would be invited to join the
          three power Washington Ambassadorial Group.  However, the
          ministers then ran into a snag over negotiations. Rusk and
          Home insisted that Khruschev should be provided with an
          alternative to signing a peace treaty. Couve de Murville
          maintained there was nothing to talk about. All Khruschev
          had to do was leave Berlin alone, and there would be no
          crisis. The Ministers left Paris, therefore, with no
          agreement on a move to counter Khruschev's threat to sign a
          treaty by the end of the year.
          
          In the Kremlin, meanwhile, Khruschev and Ulbricht were
          working out a move to which none of this Allied planning and
          debate applied.  After that, Khruschev attempted to move the
          Berlin game to Cuba.
