Chaos Digest Lundi 12 Avril 1993 Volume 1 : Numero 18 Editeur: Jean-Bernard Condat (jbcondat@attmail.com) Archiviste: Yves-Marie Crabbe Co-Redacteurs: Arnaud Bigare, Stephane Briere TABLE DES MATIERES, #1.18 (12 Avril 1993) File 1--Cryptographie a clef publique: PGP Chaos Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are available at no cost by sending a message to: linux-activists-request@niksula.hut.fi with a mail header or first line containing the following informations: X-Mn-Admin: join CHAOS_DIGEST The editors may be contacted by voice (+33 1 47874083), fax (+33 1 47877070) or S-mail at: Jean-Bernard Condat, Chaos Computer Club France [CCCF], B.P. 155, 93404 St-Ouen Cedex, France. Issues of ChaosD can also be found on some French BBS. Back issues of ChaosD can be found on the Internet as part of the Computer underground Digest archives. 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Please avoid quoting previous posts unless absolutely necessary. DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent the views of the moderators. Chaos Digest contributors assume all responsibility for ensuring that articles submitted do not violate copyright protections. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Wed Mar 24 15:03:59 CDT 1993 From: celma_s@epita.fr (Samuel Celma ) Subject: File 1--Cryptographie a clef publique: PGP Phil Zimmerman's PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) Public Key Encryption for the Masses [ PGP Documentation extracts ] What is PGP? Pretty Good(tm) Privacy (PGP), from Phil's Pretty Good Software, is a high security cryptographic software application for MSDOS, Unix, VAX/VMS, and other computers. PGP allows people to exchange files or messages with privacy, authentication, and convenience. Privacy means that only those intended to receive a message can read it. Authentication means that messages that appear to be from a particular person can only have originated from that person. Convenience means that privacy and authentication are provided without the hassles of managing keys associated with conventional cryptographic software. No secure channels are needed to exchange keys between users, which makes PGP much easier to use. This is because PGP is based on a powerful new technology called "public key" cryptography. PGP combines the convenience of the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) public key cryptosystem with the speed of conventional cryptography, message digests for digital signatures, data compression before encryption, good ergonomic design, and sophisticated key management. And PGP performs the public-key functions faster than most other software implementations. PGP is public key cryptography for the masses. PGP does not provide any built-in modem communications capability. You must use a separate software product for that. Why Do You Need PGP? It's personal. It's private. And it's no one's business but yours. You may be planning a political campaign, discussing your taxes, or having an illicit affair. Or you may be doing something that you feel shouldn't be illegal, but is. Whatever it is, you don't want your private electronic mail (E-mail) or confidential documents read by anyone else. There's nothing wrong with asserting your privacy. Privacy is as apple-pie as the Constitution. Perhaps you think your E-mail is legitimate enough that encryption is unwarranted. If you really are a law-abiding citizen with nothing to hide, then why don't you always send your paper mail on postcards? Why not submit to drug testing on demand? Why require a warrant for police searches of your house? Are you trying to hide something? You must be a subversive or a drug dealer if you hide your mail inside envelopes. Or maybe a paranoid nut. Do law-abiding citizens have any need to encrypt their E-mail? What if everyone believed that law-abiding citizens should use postcards for their mail? If some brave soul tried to assert his privacy by using an envelope for his mail, it would draw suspicion. Perhaps the authorities would open his mail to see what he's hiding. Fortunately, we don't live in that kind of world, because everyone protects most of their mail with envelopes. So no one draws suspicion by asserting their privacy with an envelope. There's safety in numbers. Analogously, it would be nice if everyone routinely used encryption for all their E-mail, innocent or not, so that no one drew suspicion by asserting their E-mail privacy with encryption. Think of it as a form of solidarity. Today, if the Government wants to violate the privacy of ordinary citizens, it has to expend a certain amount of expense and labor to intercept and steam open and read paper mail, and listen to and possibly transcribe spoken telephone conversation. This kind of labor-intensive monitoring is not practical on a large scale. This is only done in important cases when it seems worthwhile. More and more of our private communications are being routed through electronic channels. Electronic mail will gradually replace conventional paper mail. E-mail messages are just too easy to intercept and scan for interesting keywords. This can be done easily, routinely, automatically, and undetectably on a grand scale. International cablegrams are already scanned this way on a large scale by the NSA. We are moving toward a future when the nation will be crisscrossed with high capacity fiber optic data networks linking together all our increasingly ubiquitous personal computers. E-mail will be the norm for everyone, not the novelty it is today. Perhaps the Government will protect our E-mail with Government-designed encryption protocols. Probably most people will trust that. But perhaps some people will prefer their own protective measures. Senate Bill 266, a 1991 omnibus anti-crime bill, had an unsettling measure buried in it. If this non binding resolution had become real law, it would have forced manufacturers of secure communications equipment to insert special "trap doors" in their products, so that the Government can read anyone's encrypted messages. It reads: "It is the sense of Congress that providers of electronic communications services and manufacturers of electronic communications service equipment shall insure that communications systems permit the Government to obtain the plain text contents of voice, data, and other communications when appropriately authorized by law." This measure was defeated after rigorous protest from civil libertarians and industry groups. But the Government has since introduced other disturbing legislation to work toward similar objectives. If privacy is outlawed, only outlaws will have privacy. Intelligence agencies have access to good cryptographic technology. So do the big arms and drug traffickers. So do defense contractors, oil companies, and other corporate giants. But ordinary people and grassroots political organizations mostly have not had access to affordable "military grade" public-key cryptographic technology. Until now. PGP empowers people to take their privacy into their own hands. There's a growing social need for it. That's why I wrote it. Legal Issues Trademarks, Copyrights, and Warranties -------------------------------------- "Pretty Good Privacy", "Phil's Pretty Good Software", and the "Pretty Good" label for computer software and hardware products are all trademarks of Philip Zimmermann and Phil's Pretty Good Software. PGP is (c) Copyright Philip R. Zimmermann, 1990-1993. Philip Zimmermann also holds the copyright for the PGP User's Manual, as well as any foreign language translations of the manual or the software. The author assumes no liability for damages resulting from the use of this software, even if the damage results from defects in this software, and makes no representations concerning the merchantability of this software or its suitability for any specific purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied warranty of any kind. Patent Rights on the Algorithms ------------------------------- When I first released PGP, I half-expected to encounter some form of legal harassment from the Government. Indeed, there has been legal harassment, but it hasn't come from the Government-- it has come from a private corporation. The RSA public key cryptosystem was developed at MIT with Federal funding from grants from the National Science Foundation and the Navy. It is patented by MIT (U.S. patent #4,405,829, issued 20 Sep 1983). A company in California called Public Key Partners (PKP) holds the exclusive commercial license to sell and sub-license the RSA public key cryptosystem: +++++ XRPX Acc No: N83-178106 Cryptographic communication system has encoding and decoding devices coupled to memory so that data words may be stored ensuring file integrity Patent Assignee: (MASI ) MASSACHUSETTS INST TECH Author (Inventor): RIVEST R L; SHAMIR A; ADLEMAN L M Number of Patents: 001 Patent Family: CC Number Kind Date Week US 4405829 A 830920 8340 (Basic) Priority Data (CC No Date): US 860586 (771214) Abstract (Basic): The system includes a communications channel coupled to at least one terminal having an encoding device and to at least one terminal having a decoding device. A message-to-be-transferred is enciphered to ciphertext at the encoding terminal by encoding the message as a number M in a predetermined set. That number is then raised to a first predetermined power (associated with the intended receiver) and finally computed. The remainder or residue, C, is computed when the exponentiated number is divided by the product of two predetermined prime numbers (associated with the intended receiver). The residue C is the ciphertext. The ciphertext is decipheres to the original message at the decoding terminal in a similar manner by raising the ciphertext to a second predetermined power (associated with the intended receiver). The residue, M', is computed when the exponentiated ciphertext is divided by the product of the two predetermined prime numbers associated with the intended receiver. The residue M' corresponds to the original encoded message M. (12pp.) Int Pat Class: H04K-001/00; H04L-009/04 +++++ The author of this software implementation of the RSA algorithm is providing this implementation for educational use only. Licensing this algorithm from PKP is the responsibility of you, the user, not Philip Zimmermann, the author of this software implementation. The author assumes no liability for any patent infringement that may result from the unlicensed use by the user of the underlying RSA algorithm used in this software. Unfortunately, PKP is not offering any licensing of their RSA patent to end users of PGP. This essentially makes PGP contraband in the USA. Jim Bidzos, president of PKP, threatened to take legal action against me unless I stop distributing PGP, until they can devise a licensing scheme for it. I agreed to this, since PGP is already in wide circulation and waiting a while for a licensing arrangement from PKP seemed reasonable. Mr. Bidzos assured me (he even used the word "promise") several times since the initial 5 June 91 release of PGP that they were working on a licensing scheme for PGP. Apparently, my release of PGP helped provide the impetus for them to offer some sort of a freeware-style license for noncommercial use of the RSA algorithm. However, in December 1991 Mr. Bidzos said he had no plans to ever license the RSA algorithm to PGP users, and denied ever implying that he would. Meanwhile, I have continued to refrain from distributing PGP, although I continue to update the PGP User's Guide, and have provided the design guidance for new revisions of PGP. Ironically, all this legal controversy from PKP has imparted a forbidden flavor to PGP that has only served to amplify its universal popularity. I wrote my PGP software from scratch, with my own implementation of the RSA algorithm. I didn't steal any software from PKP. Before publishing PGP, I got a formal written legal opinion from a patent attorney with extensive experience in software patents. I'm convinced that publishing PGP the way I did does not violate patent law. However, it is a well known axiom in the US legal system that regardless of the law, he with the most money and lawyers prevails, if not by actually winning then by crushing the little guy with legal expenses. Not only did PKP acquire the exclusive patent rights for the RSA cryptosystem, which was developed with your tax dollars, but they also somehow acquired the exclusive rights to three other patents covering rival public key schemes invented by others, also developed with your tax dollars. This essentially gives one company a legal lock in the USA on nearly all practical public key cryptosystems. They even appear to be claiming patent rights on the very concept of public key cryptography, regardless of what clever new original algorithms are independently invented by others. And you thought patent law was designed to encourage innovation! PKP does not actually develop any software-- they don't even have an engineering department-- they are essentially a litigation company. Public key cryptography is destined to become a crucial technology in the protection of our civil liberties and privacy in our increasingly connected society. Why should the Government try to limit access to this key technology, when a single monopoly can do it for them? It appears certain that there will be future releases of PGP, regardless of the outcome of licensing problems with Public Key Partners. If PKP does not license PGP, then future releases of PGP might not come from me. There are countless fans of PGP outside the US, and many of them are software engineers who want to improve PGP and promote it, regardless of what I do. The second release of PGP was a joint effort of an international team of software engineers, implementing enhancements to the original PGP with design guidance from me. It was released by Branko Lankester in The Netherlands and Peter Gutmann in New Zealand, out of reach of US patent law. Although released only in Europe and New Zealand, it spontaneously spread to the USA without help from me or the PGP development team. The IDEA(tm) conventional block cipher used by PGP is covered by a patent in Europe, held by ETH and a Swiss company called Ascom-Tech AG. The patent number is PCT/CH91/00117. International patents are pending. IDEA(tm) is a trademark of Ascom-Tech AG. There is no license fee required for noncommercial use of IDEA. Ascom Tech AG has granted permission for PGP to use the IDEA cipher, and places no restrictions on using PGP for any purpose, including commercial use. You may not extract the IDEA cipher from PGP and put it in another commercial product without a license. Commercial users of IDEA may obtain licensing details from Dieter Profos, Ascom Tech AG, Solothurn Lab, Postfach 151, 4502 Solothurn, Switzerland, Tel +41 65 242885, Fax +41 65 235761. The ZIP compression routines in PGP come from freeware source code, with the author's permission. I'm not aware of any patents on the ZIP algorithm, but you're welcome to check into that question yourself. If there are any obscure patent claims that apply to ZIP, then sorry, you'll have to take care of the patent licensing, not me. All this patent stuff reminds me of a Peanuts cartoon I saw in the newspaper where Lucy showed Charlie Brown a fallen autumn leaf and said "This is the first leaf to fall this year." Charlie Brown said, "How do you know that? Leaves have been falling for weeks." Lucy replied, "I had this one notarized." Licensing and Distribution -------------------------- In the USA PKP controls, through US patent law, the licensing of the RSA algorithm. But I have no objection to anyone freely using or distributing my PGP software, without payment of fees to me. You must keep the copyright notices on PGP and keep this documentation with it. However, if you live in the USA, this may not satisfy any legal obligations you may have to PKP for using the RSA algorithm as mentioned above. In fact, if you live in the USA, and you are not a Federal agency, you shouldn't actually run PGP on your computer, because Public Key Partners wants to forbid you from running my software. PGP is contraband. PGP is not shareware, it's freeware. Forbidden freeware. Published as a community service. If I sold PGP for money, then I would get sued by PKP for using their RSA algorithm. More importantly, giving PGP away for free will encourage far more people to use it, which hopefully will have a greater social impact. This could lead to widespread awareness and use of the RSA public key cryptosystem, which will probably make more money for PKP in the long run. If only they could see that. All the source code for PGP is available for free under the "Copyleft" General Public License from the Free Software Foundation (FSF). A copy of the FSF General Public License is included in the source release package of PGP. The PGP version 2.2 executable object release package for MSDOS contains the PGP executable software, documentation, sample key rings including my own public key, and signatures for the software and this manual, all in one PKZIP compressed file called PGP22.ZIP. The PGP source release package for MSDOS contains all the C source files in one PKZIP compressed file called PGP22SRC.ZIP. You may obtain free copies or updates to PGP from thousands of BBS's worldwide or from other public sources such as Internet FTP sites. Don't ask me for a copy directly from me, since I'd rather avoid further legal problems with PKP at this time. I might be able to tell you where you can get it, however. If you have access to the Internet, watch for announcements of new releases of PGP on the Internet newsgroups "sci.crypt" and PGP's own newsgroup, "alt.security.pgp". There is also an interest group mailing list called info-pgp, which is intended for users without access to the "alt.security.pgp" newsgroup. Info-pgp is moderated by Hugh Miller, and you may subscribe to it by writing him a letter at info-pgp-request@lucpul.it.luc.edu. Include your name and Internet address. If you want to know where to get PGP, Hugh can send you a list of Internet FTP sites and BBS phone numbers. Hugh may also be reached at hmiller@lucpul.it.luc.edu. Export Controls --------------- The Government has made it illegal in many cases to export good cryptographic technology, and that may include PGP. They regard this kind of software as munitions. This is determined by volatile State Department policies, not fixed laws. I will not export this software out of the US or Canada in cases when it is illegal to do so under US State Department policies, and I assume no responsibility for other people exporting it on their own. If you live outside the US or Canada, I advise you not to violate US State Department policies by getting PGP from a US source. Since thousands of domestic users got it after its initial publication, it somehow leaked out of the US and spread itself widely abroad, like dandelion seeds blowing in the wind. If PGP has already found its way into your country, then I don't think you're violating US export law if you pick it up from a source outside of the US. It seems to some legal observers I've talked with, that the framers of the US export controls never envisioned that they would ever apply to cryptographic freeware that has been published and scattered to the winds. It's hard to imagine a US attorney trying to build a real case against someone for the "export" of software published freely in the US. As far as anyone I've talked to knows, it's never been done, despite numerous examples of export violations. I'm not a lawyer and I'm not giving you legal advice-- I'm just trying to point out what seems like common sense. Starting with PGP version 2.0, the release point of the software has been outside the US, on publicly-accessible computers in Europe. Each release is electronically sent back into the US and posted on publicly-accessible computers in the US by PGP privacy activists in foreign countries. There are some restrictions in the US regarding the import of munitions, but I'm not aware of any cases where this was ever enforced for importing cryptographic software into the US. I imagine that a legal action of that type would be quite a spectacle of controversy. Some foreign governments impose serious penalties on anyone inside their country for merely using encrypted communications. In some countries they might even shoot you for that. But if you live in that kind of country, perhaps you need PGP even more. Computer-Related Political Groups PGP is a very political piece of software. It seems appropriate to mention here some computer-related activist groups. Full details on these groups, and how to join them, is provided in a separate document file in the PGP release package. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) was founded in July, 1990, to assure freedom of expression in digital media, with a particular emphasis on applying the principles embodied in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights to computer-based communication. They can be reached at: Electronic Frontier Foundation, 238 Main Street, Cambridge, MA 02142, USA. The League for Programming Freedom (LPF) is a grass-roots organization of professors, students, businessmen, programmers and users dedicated to bringing back the freedom to write programs. They regard patents on computer algorithms as harmful to the US software industry. They can be reached at (617) 433-7071, or send Internet mail to lpf@uunet.uu.net Computer Professionals For Social Responsibility (CPSR) empowers computer professionals and computer users to advocate for the responsible use of information technology and empowers all who use computer technology to participate in public policy debates on the impacts of computers on society. They can be reached at: 415-322-3778 in Palo Alto, E-mail address cpsr@csli.stanford.edu. For more details on these groups, see the accompanying document in the PGP release package. Recommended Introductory Readings 1. Dorothy Denning, "Cryptography and Data Security", Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA 1982 2. Dorothy Denning, "Protecting Public Keys and Signature Keys", IEEE Computer, Feb 1983 3. Martin E. Hellman, "The Mathematics of Public-Key Cryptography," Scientific American, Aug 1979 Other Readings 4. Ronald Rivest, "The MD5 Message Digest Algorithm", MIT Laboratory for Computer Science, 1991 5. Xuejia Lai, "On the Design and Security of Block Ciphers", Institute for Signal and Information Processing, ETH-Zentrum, Zurich, Switzerland, 1992 6. Xuejia Lai, James L. Massey, Sean Murphy, "Markov Ciphers and Differential Cryptanalysis", Advances in Cryptology- EUROCRYPT'91 7. Philip Zimmermann, "A Proposed Standard Format for RSA Cryptosystems", Advances in Computer Security, Vol III, edited by Rein Turn, Artech House, 1988 8. Paul Wallich, "Electronic Envelopes", Scientific American, Feb 1993, pages 30-32. (This is an article on PGP) About the Author Philip Zimmermann is a software engineer consultant with 18 years experience, specializing in embedded real-time systems, cryptography, authentication, and data communications. Experience includes design and implementation of authentication systems for financial information networks, network data security, key management protocols, embedded real-time multitasking executives, operating systems, and local area networks. Custom versions of cryptography and authentication products and public key implementations such as the NIST DSS are available from Zimmermann, as well as custom product development services. His consulting firm's address is: Mr. Philip Zimmermann Boulder Software Engineering 3021 Eleventh Street Boulder, Colorado 80304 USA Phone 303-541-0140 (voice or FAX) (10:00am - 7:00pm Mountain Time) Internet: prz@sage.cgd.ucar.edu Where to Get PGP Finland: nic.funet.fi (128.214.6.100) Directory: /pub/unix/security/crypt/ Italy: ghost.dsi.unimi.it (149.132.2.1) Directory: /pub/security/ UK: src.doc.ic.ac.uk Directory: /computing/security/software/PGP For those lacking FTP connectivity to the net, nic.funet.fi also offers the files via email. Send the following mail message to mailserv@nic.funet.fi: ENCODER uuencode SEND pub/unix/security/crypt/pgp22src.zip SEND pub/unix/security/crypt/pgp22.zip This will deposit the two zipfiles, as (about) 15 batched messages in your mailbox within about 24 hours. Save and uudecode. PGP is also widely available on Fidonet, a large informal network of PC-based bulletin board systems interconnected via modems. Check your local bulletin board systems. It is available on many foreign and domestic Fidonet BBS sites. For information on PGP implementations on the Apple Macintosh, Commodore Amiga, or Atari ST, or any other questions about where to get PGP for any other platform, contact Hugh Miller at hmiller@lucpul.it.luc.edu. Here are a few people and their email addresses or phone numbers you can contact in some countries to get information on local PGP availability: Peter Gutmann Hugh Kennedy pgut1@cs.aukuni.ac.nz 70042.710@compuserve.com New Zealand Germany Branko Lankester Miguel Angel Gallardo lankeste@fwi.uva.nl gallardo@batman.fi.upm.es +31 2159 42242 (341) 474 38 09 The Netherlands Spain Hugh Miller Colin Plumb hmiller@lucpul.it.luc.edu colin@nyx.cs.du.edu (312) 508-2727 Toronto, Ontario, Canada USA Jean-loup Gailly (21 av. mary, 92500 Rueil Malmaison, Tel.: 1-47518065) jloup@chorus.fr France ------------------------------ End of Chaos Digest #1.18 ************************************ Downloaded From P-80 International Information Systems 304-744-2253