And in Conclusion.... Vol.2 Ver.1.0 First some answers to frequently asked questions. These answers are derived from comments and information found on registration cards from The Hacker Chronicles Volume I as well as the many phone calls we have recieved. Although about 99% of the cards and comments were positive in nature, we wish to address negative aspects regardless of the low percentage. Comment: This has some of the same material as another cd I have Answer : It does most definately contains much of the same material. However, Chronicles was released first. So this is a case of them having the same material as we do NOT the other way around. Please keep in mind that the Hacker Chronicles was and is the FIRST CD Rom Based product of its kind as related to the computer/high tech underground/security. Do not be fooled by imitations and wanna-bees. At one time another company made an illegal exact duplicate of THC Vol 1. Be warned that due to a small pathing change OUR front end software on this product will not function. We also do not provide technical support as this is not our product. Question: When will the next volume be out. (Not soon enough) Answer : Subsequent volumes of The Hacker Chronicles will be release every 1.5-2 years. Why so far apart? Well, this material isnt just lying around and produced by the ton on a daily basis as is the case with shareware. As a result we do not have quarterly or bi-annual release dates as do many shareware products. In order to find out what the release date is of the CD you may have now, simply look at the directories and see what dates they contain. Question: Why is some of the material so old. Answer : The Hacker Chronicles is an ongoing collection. While we do have thousands of new files on each volume, some older files are left in place for a reason. First The Hacker Chronicles is designed to reflect the entire history of the computer and technical underground. The New, The Old, and anything in between. Many security consultants and training facilities utilize this product and often need to provide examples of technical flaws in there (or anyone elses) systems. Whether its past or present a good example is a good example. Second, while the print/release date of a few of the files may be older. they still contain valid technical information. As long as even part of the material is valid or provides a good example (of a bad example) then it is still usefull. And of course there is the historical perspective. We will not release another volume until we feel that there is suffiucient NEW material to do so. In addition while there are hackers and fone phreaks who purchase this product we are not here to supply material the day it hits the street to the underground community. We would prefer to think of this product as a training facility for enthusiastes and professionals alike. Question: How many files are on this disk? Answer : Due to the frequency of this question, we have incorperated a function similer to chkdsk (C) that will tell you every thing you need to know about the total size and file count right on the menu of Volume II. Comment : The interface (front end) software is primative. Answer : Yes it is a little primative, thats why we have totally rewritten the front end software (as described in the welcome file at the top of the index). Nearing the release date for Vol. I we were under obligations to meet contract deadlines with our publisher and didnt get enough time to spruce things up both visual and functional. This is not the case with Volume II. We spent a lot of time attempting to bring you both the material and the atmosphere found on underground BBS systems. We prefer to think of it as simple yet fast and functional, and believe you the purchaser will be happy with the changes in both functionality and presentation. 컴컴컴컴컴컴컴컴컴컴컴컴컴컴컴컴컴컴컴컴컴컴컴컴컴컴컴컴컴컴컴컴컴컴컴컴컴컴컴 Words from the author:(Reprinted From Volume I) Over the last 13 years I have worn many hats. That of a Phone Phreak/Hacker, Sysop of one of the oldest BBS's in the world, and that of technical security consultant. To some there might seem a conflict of interest in the hats I have worn. But, my belief is that the material found in the underground computer sub-culture of Hackers & Phone Phreaks should be considered a form of educational service to systems designers/administrators, as well as programmers, law enforcement and others involved in the design, improvement, and policing of the electronic frontier. True, there will always be that certain percentage of people who would use this (or any other information) maliciously. It is also my belief that these people are in the minority. These people while usually teenagers with more ego than intellect can if desired find the majority of this information in any library, magazine, or newsletter already in print. Most of this style of material doesnt originate on underground BBS's, but rather ends up there as a compilation of like materials. However to some, such as law enforcement for example, a threat is perceived and derived from seeing the compilation of this style material all in one place and accessable via computer. Just the fact that it comes from a computer some how makes it more ominous than if read from some obscure techno underground newsletter. This is nothing more than a perception problem. A case in point is the Craig Neidorf case where he was raided and had all of his personal computer equipment taken and charged with tens of thousands of damage and losses, because of releaseing what was at the time 'perceived' as critical 911 services information. Only to have the case thrown out later and discovering the self same 911 material was available publicly (if you knew where to look) for $30 dollars. While I personally have no great love for Craig and was badly and unjustly chastised by him once, he still should not have been left with the loss of thousands in personal property/equipment, not to mention a hundred thousand (I think that was the figure I heard quoted) in attorney's fees. This doesnt include the hundreds of thousands in lost tax payer dollars that were needlessly squandered on that case. My point is that the first thing that needs done is to clean up the problem, not the person. For example, my first major systems consulting contract was for a long distance telco who was lossing $450,000 a month in New York City alone. When hired, the first words out of my mouth were 'I'm not a head hunter', as this practice would only cost them 3-5 more dollars in investigative and legal fees in order to aquire and prosecute for every dollar they lost in fraud. The solution I offered was to fix the problem at its source (their system). After reviewing their setup from top to bottom It didnt take long to discover their billing code/PIN structure was at the heart of the problem. They had given a secretary a pad and pencil and said, we need some codes, here's how many digits they need to be so write down some and turn them in for use. In addition they were only using 4 digit codes at the time. To make matters worse the codes were only spaced a few digits apart thanks to the secratary who had no idea the significance of what she was doing. All this by a branch of what was then the 4th largest long distance company in the country. Gross negligence at best. But, who is the first to cry foul when their ineptitude was taken advantage of. From someone such as myself who bore the title of Phone Phreak proudly, this entire situation was nothing short of hilarious. However it was quite simple to fix. I needed only apply basic and common knowledge I had aquired from my studies around the computer/telecomm subculture. A task that should be promoted by the security powers that be, inorder to educate themselves, instead of going out and hiring ex-FBI and Ex-Police officers with an investigative/rubber hose mentality who didnt even have a true understanding of the problem they were hired to fix, to run their security departments. Who often like the very people they were chasing were operating on ego rather than intellect (not to mention authority). As potentially dangerous a combination to individual rights enjoyed in this country as the dangers provided by the malicious types within the computer underground itself. The point here is that there are problems within both the law enforcement and underground. Let me now give a couple of examples of how I used underground experience to fix this monumental snafu. First the obvious. Myself and a programmer friend (The Researcher) sat down and designed and wrote software to generate a new code network which was not 4 but but 7 digits in length, and only permitted one 'possible' (if assigned) good code in every 10,000 possible combinations. Ironically this software was written and tested and run on the very BBS machine that ran what was at the time (and still is) the oldest underground BBS in the world (P-80 Systems). Next, knowing that computers were used to do the majority of the code hacking at this time, it made the task simple to fix the switching equipment. Before I tell you how this was accomplished, a little advance training is in order. When you are dialing a number through any phone company local or national when you do something wrong (or even right for that matter) you get whats called a 'treatment' such as a recording or a 'fast busy' signal. With this in mind I first had to deal with the problem of the existing older codes that had not been converted to my 7 digit system and were still highly open to to fraud (it takes awhile to assign thousands of customers new codes). This was done by adding 6 new treatment ports to the switching equipment. On the first two ports I put ring generators (the device that provides the sound of the phone ringing in your earpiece) to create a ring with no possible answer situation when a bad code was dialed. Since the fraudulent codes were being reassigned on a daily basis with new 7 digit codes it provided a lot confusion for people still in posession of the older 4 digit codes. they couldnt tell if it was a dead code or the person they were calling just wasnt home, while not hampering the legitimate customer who simply misdialed his code. On the next 2 treatment ports I placed Hayes modems, which were like the other two ports in so much as they were a two in 6 chance of being aquired as a treatment for a bad code being dialed. This action gave the most effective security of the time due to the fact that people hacking via computer relied on a modem carrier to distinguish when they had gotten a good code. SO I GAVE THEM ONE. This made it almost impossible to distinguish a good code from a false carrier I was sending out. Thus making it difficult and near (but not) impossible to hack codes from that network. It also provided nothing more than a 'hey I wonder what I did wrong' thought to a legit customer who just misdialed and simply dials again as they normally would. Also one of there big problems was New York City was so big, that a call to another part of town could be long distance. New York City alone had five area codes. This meant that by simply blocking any calls who's area code is 'local or local long distance' I.E. in the city but a long distance call, which they should have been doing anyway in order not to be trafficing local calls (a big nono in the long distance world) they could stop this problem and significantly reduce the impact of the of the old 4 digit codes already comprimised and being used specifically for the purpose of local calls at the same time. Within 6 months their losses went from $450,000 a month to zero. The net cost in equipment for switch changes, and the new code network was about $5,000. Pennies for an operation of this size. When compared against the hundreds of thousands in investigative and legal fee's as well as tax dollars and additional taxation of the court system, which is already overburdoned. How many people are not in jail and being supported by the american tax dollar. I guess the moral to the story is work smart not hard. Someone took the time to trust me and to take a look at themselves and make the decision to use the underground as a tool for solving the 'real' problem rather than using it to track and apprehend people (which in case no one caught on, doesnt fix the problem in the example above). At the risk of stating the obvious, many of these people could be of great benifit to society if properly utilized (as opposed to stigmatized). If the time was taken to invite them in the front door, your less likely to see them around at the back door. As a matter of fact they might be quite an appropriate individual to protect the back door. Most of these guys would jump at the chance..... In closing I would like to take time to repeat the warning voiced elsewhere on this disk, Please DO NOT attempt to use any material found on this disk unless you are certain it is both legal and safe. Scan Man