------------------------------ From: Dark Adept (Ripco BBS) Subject: In-House Security Problems Date: Thu, 1 Nov 90 01:37 CST ******************************************************************** *** CuD #2.10: File 9 of 9: In-House Security Problems *** ******************************************************************** Crossing the barriers of the Underground.... In-House Security Problems by The Dark Adept While the current anti-hacker fervor causes many people to think that hackers are the number one intruders into computer systems, this isn't the case. The foremost security problem is with employees. Many companies overlook what the possible consequences are for giving an employee computer access. Often times employees are given too much trust. This leads to problems in the long run. This article will attempt to entreat the common mistakes made by companies when dealing with their employees. Employee Carelessness and Laziness -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Most people are lax when it comes to protecting something that is not their own. The system operator assumes that an employee will diligently memorize his ID and password and throw the paper away. This is usually not the case. Most people, being too lazy to memorize the password (or, after changing it, to memorize the new one), will keep a written copy of their password somewhere. If a fellow employee finds it, he is given the opportunity to cause untraceable havoc. Since the owner of the password knows nothing about these actions, the system operator will often assume that it's a hacker causing the trouble when it's not. Another problem that employees create is not disposing of garbage properly. A hacker who goes trashing (digging through your garbage to find items of value) can find many printouts, manuals, and even passwords that employees have indiscriminately thrown away without censoring. The best practice is to shred all documents relating to computer transactions and send the shreddings to a recycling center. This helps the community and secures the information. Locked trash receptacles may be picked and/or broken into, and hackers have been known to go to the dump/processing center to grab trash. Even the most innocent printout should be destroyed. For example, a core dump off of an IBM 360/370 architecture mainframe will give a hacker the following information: System name Type of Operating System Node name Various file/dataset names User ID Printer ID's JCL version etc., etc., etc. Volume names Unit names Type of system That's a lot of information to hand out free to the "enemy"! Of course, a core dump is an extreme example, but any information regarding your system may be used by a hacker to his benefit. If he knows that you are running Unix (Tm AT&T), he can tailor his tactics to fit that type of system. If you are running MUSIC (Tm McGraw-Hill) he can adjust to that. Some operators require employees to change their passwords at least every six months or so. This effort should be applauded. But what they don't realize is that many employees change them for a couple of days, and then they change them back because they are too lazy to memorize a new one. A hacker, if he has access to an account and the password changes, will almost always wait for the password to change back, and it usually does. System operators should have a utility to check and see if the password is changed and remains changed. B Systems Operators -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- While a system operator has many responsibilities, the most important is account maintainance. When an employee is terminated, his account should be revoked IMMEDIATELY! Whether his termination was voluntary, requested, or involuntary, the account should be done away with instantaneously. If you don't, the results could be catastrophic. It would be comparable to firing someone but letting him keep a key to the store. He could walk in at any time and destroy files. If the system operator himself is terminated, the new system operator should go through the system with a fine-toothed comb. He must look for any method the ex-operator has of getting into his old account. Often times system operators either let the account self-destruct from lack of use, or they allow the termination notices to pile up in anticipation of doing one large purge at the end of the month. Obviously 30 days is more than enough time to destroy and/or copy a large portion of files. For any employee, all his programs and files must be searched for trap doors, viruses, etc. Anything that could be used to gain entrance to the system must be destroyed. And, again, if he has a fellow employee's password, then there will be much trouble. The system operator should also keep an eye on the log files and note attempts at unauthorized access by employees. Once on the inside, an unscrupulous person can cause more trouble than a run-of-the-mill hacker. Having access to any account is more than halfway to gaining access to the operator level. Most of the time employees are just poking around to see what's on the system (not much different from what hackers do!), and they won't cause any harm. But when there is a pattern of attempts to access something by a single employee, you can bet your bottom dollar that he is up to no good. Social Engineering -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- One term that often appears in hacking papers is "social engineering". What this is, basically, is bullshipping your way into a computer system. It is easier done than explained. All one has to do is find someone who loves his work. Pretend there is a business called BusinessCoInc. It hires a system operator whose life is computers. The SysOp lives, eats, sleeps, breathes computers (gee, sounds like a hacker so far!). Well, say he goes to a computer conference. Now this chump is sitting at a conference, and some guy next to him starts talking about security. WOW! This idiot gets all excited and starts blabbing "Yeah! That's cool, but I have a Shayes callback modem hooked up to a Eunichs system running Try2HackMe security software. The only problem we had was...." The pinhead in question just told the guy how to get into his system. What's really funny is that the SysOp was just talking about something he loved. He got all excited to find someone else that shared the same interests that he lost his head and blabbed. One of my buddies whom I've known since grade school currently attends Notre Dame University and is a business major. During summer break, he related to me a bit of advice one of his finance professors gave the class. He said, "Boys, the most important thing you'll learn in college is how to drink. More business deals have been made and more idiots taken advantage of over drinks than on the 18th hole. If you can't hold your liquor, sooner or later someone will take advantage of you." Now some people don't even need alcohol to get talking, but this is another aspect of social engineering. Basically, all social engineering is can be summed up as "Loose lips sink ships". And most businesses are half-submerged if this is true. Another problem that relates to social engineering involves choosing passwords. Employees often choose passwords such as their wife's maiden name. A friend of an employee who does this has a greater chance of figuring out their password since they know something about the employee. Even if a word is chosen at random, a hacker can write a program that tries every word in his word processor's dictionary file until it finds the proper one. There is a greater chance of picking out "battle" using this type of program than "98^Y&$" using a sequential test program (one that tries every possible permutation of, say, a 10 character or less field from 512 possible characters). To sum up, the most dangerous chinks in system security armor do not exist in the security system itself, but in the people who use the system. Laziness and carelessness of employees cause most security breeches, and most system breeches are inside jobs. The myth of the evil hacker sitting there destroying files is just that: a myth. The real problem is not the hackers; the real problem is the people who use the system. Written 10/31/90 in Chicago, IL -- The Dark Adept ------------------------------ **END OF CuD #2.10** ******************************************************************** Downloaded From P-80 International Information Systems 304-744-2253 12yrs+