From: smoliar@iss.nus.sg (stephen smoliar)
Subject: Re: Classic (was CR v. VR) (LONG)
Date: Tue, 6 Aug 91 07:30:44 SST



In article <1991Aug5.061832.6804@milton.u.washington.edu>
b645zaw@utarlg.uta.edu (Stephen Tice) writes:

>In article <1991Aug4.005546.3543@milton.u.washington.edu>,
> smoliar@hilbert.iss.nus.sg (stephen smoliar) writes...
>
>>Poetry is nice, but a bit of physiology is more informative.  The latest word
>>seems to be that the mind can neither develop nor function without the body.
>>Gerald Edelman summarizes some interesting evidence along this front in his
>>book NEURAL DARWINISM;  and in a later book, THE REMEMBERED PRESENT, he
>>projects the implications of this evidence into questions of consciousness.
>>Now go back to enjoying your Milton.
>> 
>{To Stephen S.- The books sound interesting.

Well I suppose a wee bit of self-aggrandizement is in order here.  My review of
THE REMEMBERED PRESENT will be appearing shortly in ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE.  I
would like to think it will provide a good introduction to Edelman's view of
mind and body.  It also contains a back-pointer to my earlier review of NEURAL
DARWINISM.  Those who want something NOW might wish to check out the latest
issue of ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE for Bill Clancey's excellent review of THE
INVENTION OF MEMORY.

> Are you familiar with AR Luria,
> who gives good evidence that one does not become fully conscious before
> becoming literate? Luria was a medical doctor & neuroscientist (perhaps
> the best yet). His theory was fully grounded in 50 years of work with human
> beings, much of it spent in the hard laboratory of rehabilitating people
> having real brain damage.

One cannot cite Luria without also giving credit to his inspiring mentor, Lev
Vygotsky.  The recent second edition of THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE involved radical
alterations to the first edition and gives a much better sense of how brilliant
a pioneer Vygotsky was in these matters.  I recently learned from Oliver Sacks
(whom I credit for pointing me at Vygotsky) that the complete works of Vygotsky
are finally in the process of being translated from the Russian for
publication.  When they appear, they are sure to open up some new surprises.
>
>To the point ... Does dwelling in virtual bodies imply some hazard to one's
>personal biological body? By implication, Is "mind" dependent on body?

Now that Stephen has said his piece, I would like to respond, this time being a
bit more specific about virtual realities.  If I have not already made it 
clear, my basic position is that mind and body are co-dependent:  Neither can 
function effectively without the other.  Either may suffer radical depriva-
tions without damaging the other (witness the mind and body of Stephen 
Hawking);  but the two cannot be "surgically separated," so to speak (which 
means that "mind transplants" will probably never leave the realm of science 
fiction).  Having said my piece on Stephen's second question, let me now 
reflect it back on his first.

We tend to focus our attention of the technology of virtual realities,
sometimes passing over specific details concerned with the role of the
user inhabiting those realities.  I would argue that it is necessary to
account for user BEHAVIOR when designing such an alternative reality.
I would further argue that "dwelling in" a virtual body, to use Stephen's
phrase, MUST entail SOME involvement of the USER'S body.  From my point of
view, the reason why a device like a data glove is important is that it can
serve as an EXTENSION of motor behavior, rather than an ALTERNATIVE to it.
To get a bit less glamorous, if you want to "tour" that ship in dry-dock,
you still need a way to express your "virtual movement."  That expression
may be through one of many variations on a joy-stick or mouse;  it may even
be typing at a keyboard.  However, it is involving MOTOR BEHAVIOR on your
part, rather than that fantastic notion of tapping into your skull with
electrodes and letting you "think your way to another location."

My proposed answer, then, is that the extent to which virtual bodies imply a
hazard to personal bodies lies in how those virtual bodies are designed.  My
argument is that we cannot design virtual bodies without ignoring the
behavioral needs of the real ones.  Such ignorance could not only be
hazardous to our corporeal bodies but also to the tight coupling between
our bodies and our minds.

>As to mind vs. brain; I'm going to go metaphysical on this one, in two
>ways; (1st) we don't know what sort of system we're in anyway and (2nd)
>the clearest manifestation of disembodied mind each of us has is our
>dealings here on the net.

As far as the first argument goes, we know more than you think.  I cited
Edelman as a pointer to physiological evidence.  Like yourself, I do not
want this article to grow too long.

Regarding the second argument, if your body is involved AT ALL in your use of
the net, your argument has gone up in smoke.  What the net has taught us is
that we can extend ourselves through the physical use of eyes and fingers
alone.  This would not surprise anyone familiar with sign language.  (Sign
language DOES involve more than the fingers, but the reduction would not be
surprising.)  What would it be like for the net to be MORE physically
involving?  Let's leave that for another article.

-----------------------------------------------------

Stephen W. Smoliar; Institute of Systems Science
National University of Singapore; Heng Mui Keng Terrace
Kent Ridge, SINGAPORE 0511
smoliar%iss.nus.sg@nuscc.nus.sg