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Essay Name       : 1085.txt 
Uploader         : Calvin Cheng
Email Address    : 
Language         : English
Subject          : Philosophy
Title            : Mill's Theory of Liberty
Grade            : 90%
School System    : University
Country          : England
Author Comments  : Essay on Mill's theory of Liberty
Teacher Comments : Brilliant exposition of the main themes. Well done!
Date             : 16/11/96
Site found at    : Net Search
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	In outlining his theory on liberty, Mill separates his discussion into two
clearly defined areas. The first, of the liberty of thought and discussion,
deals with the freedom to articulate one's opinions, the freedom to
participate in intellectual, political, religious and general debates and
arguments, and the cognate freedom of the press. The second, of the
liberty of action, attempts to demarcate the area in which an individual is
free to act upon his will, opinions and thoughts. In both, there is a
consistent attempt by Mill to impress upon his readers the manifest
benefits that would attend an atmosphere of liberty.

	To Mill, one can never be certain about the veracity or mendacity of a
certain opinion or viewpoint. Any assumption of complete certainty of the
truth or falsity of an opinion is an allusion to the infallibility of man. In
addition, those who assume this, and consequently stifle an opinion,
exclude all others from hearing that opinion, thereby imposing their own
version of certainty ( as opposed to absolute certainty ) on them.  Thus,
Mill writes " We can never be sure that the opinion we are endeavouring
to stifle is a false opinion; and if we were sure, stifling it would be an evil
still."

	One obvious benefit from allowing an opinion to be expressed would be
when that opinion turns out to be true. Then, the intrinsic value of that
truth is the reward of the person who allowed his own opinion to be
challenged. But, more importantly, the gain is not confined to the
individuals involved in the debate ; society as a whole benefits from the
exposure of a fallacy, and the elucidation of a truth.

	Less palpable are the benefits that can be obtained even if the opinion is
false. Firstly, Mill believed, even erroneous opinions contain a portion of
truth in them. Since the dominant opinion rarely contains the whole truth,
Mill believed that such a collision of hostile opinions would bring forth
the rest, or at least more of the truth. 

	However, in rare cases, the prevailing opinion might be wholly true.
But, even in such cases, Mill believed, any challenges are not rendered
totally useless. As such, even in the locus of completely true viewpoints
( with the exception of mathematical truths where all argument is on one
side ), any attempt to differ should not be crushed and should be
entertained.

	Although such an argument would naturally follow Mill's insistence on
Man's ultimate fallibility, he bases his conviction on other benefits he
believed could be derived from a contest between a whole truth and a
differing opinion. Firstly, he believed that all truths, even the most certain
ones, would degenerate from being "living truths" to "dead dogmas" after
a period in which the opinion is not challenged. He believed it the fatal
tendency of mankind to stop any intelligent thought about a thing as soon
as it is no longer doubtful. This is especially evident in the average human,
as opposed to the intellectual, who relies on authorities to provide them
with truths. The owners of these received opinions tend to sink into " the
deep slumber of a decided opinion ". It is only when such dead dogmas
are challenged, are these people awakened from their slumber to defend
their 'truths' ; if these are not based on true conviction, even the most
blatantly obvious truth will give way. A challenge to a whole truth,
however foolish it might seem, would thus serve to strengthen the
foundation upon which it is built upon ; being cognizant of false opinions
pertaining to one's truths also aids in fortifying one's justification on
relying on one's judgement and tried opinions.

	An atmosphere of intellectual freedom, according to Mill, would also
benefit the general mental well-being of Mankind. It would serve to
nurture probing intellectuals to venture unimpeded into bold, ingenious
lines of thought, enable normal humans to develop to full potential their
mental capabilities including judgement. By reducing the deadening
effects of received opinions, a society where intellectual debate prevails
would also serve to strengthen its members' reasoning faculties. Even on
the disinterested bystander, a collision of opinion would reveal to him
truths and falsehoods he had never considered.

	The benefits that Mill attributes to a society that allows freedom of
action within a certain sphere ( which I will elaborate on later) are similar.
These are derived from Mill's assumption of the intrinsic good of
individuality, as opposed to the evils of conformity, such as Ralph Owens
socially manufactured men. 

	Mill believed that an individual ( and indeed all mankind ) will have his
human capabilities withered away if he blindly follows custom, and
conforms his nature to a mechanistic model, which it is not. This is
because no two persons are identical, and what is suited to one might be
anathema to another. Most importantly, if individuality is stifled by an
atmosphere of conformity, the exercise of choice by an individual is also
stifled. It is this exercise of choice, the liberty to choose, that Mill is
primarily concerned with in his essay. 

	According to Mill, it is only through a regular exercise of choice that a
man can benefit from developing his faculties of perception, reason,
discriminate feeling, and even moral preference. Without this, man is no
more than an automaton, devoid of his own desires, wishes, opinions and
even feelings. 

  Mill further extends the benefits of individuality to the entire society. He
believed that individuality brought about by liberty of action, and the
freedom to differ, would contribute to a more diverse, rich and livelier
world. This, he believed, makes the " (human) race infinitely better worth
belonging to ". By developing his own individual prowess, an individual
thus not only becomes more valuable  to himself, but also to others.

	Mill also thought that it is only in an atmosphere of individual freedom
can genius flourish ; and geniuses, that special breed of humans, are
integral to the development of society, as well as the leadership of it.
Ordinary humans, allowed to be original, also become independent centres
for creativity, innovation, and originality. Thus, society has as many
potential centres for improvement as there are individuals.  If everyone
was forced to be the same, made to learn the same things and think the
same way, mankind will degenerate into what Mill termed as "collective
mediocrity". This mediocrity not only affects individuals, but also stunts
societal growth and leads to mediocre government.  " It is only the
cultivation of individuality" , he wrote, " which produces, or can produce,
well developed human beings."  Imitation, Mill wrote, is but an "ape-like
faculty". Thus, Man benefits from a liberal society by the fortification and
development of his human nature.

Thus, to Mill, it is only in an atmosphere where people are free to carry
out " experiments of living", where men can be different and act
differently without fear, and where they can be free to choose unhindered,
can individuality flourish. And, for Mill, Individuality and Progress were
synonymous. He was of the opinion that it is only when people are
palpably different can it be seen which are superior modes of living,
values and behaviour. His belief that diversity aids progress reminds me of
Darwin's theory of evolution, where the strongest traits are carried on,
while weaker, vulnerable characteristics die off.  In a nutshell, Mill was
convinced that the singularly most important benefit of liberty is the
progress of humankind.

Nevertheless, it remains doubtful whether some of the benefits Mill
attributes to liberty would materialise, and whether a liberal society is a
necessary pre-condition for these benefits.

Firstly, Mill assumes that in the absence of impediments, people would
naturally aspire to individuality. He forgets that some people would rather
remain in the safety of conformism, try to be as ordinary as possible,
rather than risk being made to look foolish. However, Mill does believe
that people can be educated up to individuality by way of example and
exhortation by practising individualists.

Secondly, evidence of history has shown that love of truth and fiery
individualism grow at least as often in severely disciplined societies, like
in puritan Calvinist ones, or under military discipline ; if this is so, then
Mill's assertion that liberty is a necessary condition for the growth of
genius does not hold water.




	What then does Mill consider a legitimate constraint upon liberty? That
is,  under what circumstances can there be a warranted interference in a
man's freedom?

	At least to Mill, the answer can be easily found in his "one very simple
principle". That the only legitimate reason for constraint upon a man's
liberty is for "self - protection " and to "prevent harm to others". To clarify
things further, Mill distinguishes between two types of actions : One,
actions which concern only the agent (self-regarding actions) . Two,
actions that concern others besides the agent. As soon as any part of an
individual's conduct affects adversely the interests of others, society has a
legitimate right to intervene. Whether to intervene or not will depend on
whether general welfare will be promoted. In each person's own concern,
he is free to do as he pleases, as he alone will bear the consequences.

	Taken on the surface, this attempt to clearly demarcate a sphere in
which an individual can safely operate without fear of societal interference
is very clear-cut and satisfactory. Outside this sphere, society can only
warn, advice and basically try to convince the individual when it sees its
lifestyle or actions as deviant and harmful to himself. But, it has no
legitimate right to actively constrain him, hinder him or impede his
freedom to do as he likes in that sphere. Neither does it have the right to
punish him, either by law or by moral disapprobation. This would then be
what Mill termed as "tyranny of the law " and "tyranny of opinion". 

	Where there are problems arising from ambiguity, Mill resolved them
himself. He acknowledged the fact that some self-regarding actions would
inevitably affect others, no man being an island. To resolve this
complexity, Mill brought in the concept of duty and obligation. As long as
his conduct does not violate a distinct obligation to another, such as a man
to his wife and children, he would not be morally castigated, or legally
punished by society. If he is so punished, it is for his breach of duty and
not for the original self-regarding action. An example given by Mill is the
difference between a soldier on duty getting drunk and ordinary man in
the same inebriated state ; the latter will be left alone as his action is self-
regarding but the former, would be punished not for the self-regarding
original action of drinking, but for neglecting his public duty. This
qualification, on the first reading, is again a satisfactory one.

Mill also quoted the extraordinary case of selling oneself to slavery. Based
on his principle, the man has the right to do so, as long as he does not
violate any defined duty, because this is a self-regarding action. However,
Mill sees ground for legitimate interference because he sees it illogical to
use one's liberty to sell away that liberty. "The principle of freedom cannot
require that he should be free not to be free". On the side of the buyer,
Mill sees it that no man has the right to act for another.

	Thus, in short, Mill's attempt to explain legitimate constraints on liberty
rests upon a clearly defined sphere where a man can freely do as he
pleases  - when what he does affects only himself and not others, and
when he does not violate any social or private obligation. 

	The problems arise when one realises that despite all his qualifications,
Mill's attempt to clearly distinguish between two different kinds of actions
is at most tenuous. Most of his critics agree that it is quite impossible for
any action to have no repercussions on the concern of others, despite his
qualification with the 'violation of duty' concept, which incidentally only
deals with indirect repercussions. This is especially so because the concept
does nothing to clarify his frequent mention of "harm to others" and
"injurious to others". It is also vague and open to interpretation, as 
whether there is a duty or obligation involved is quite subjective. To take a
modern day example, would a man have any duty or obligation towards a
test-tube baby borne not of his genes? Because of the frequency in which
the phrases "harm to others" and "injurious to others"  are used, I would
see them as central to his Principle of Liberty, and would be an extension
of what he meant by affecting the concerns of others. Thus I would see
this as superseding Mill's weak attempt to bring violation of duty into
play.

	That Mill never defined what he considered harm and what he deemed
injurious seriously undermines the coherence of his attempt to qualify
what he meant  by a legitimate constraint on liberty. How are we to know
how far a man is to be left free when we do not know what constitutes
harm? Is the hurt of feelings injurious; can we consider, for example, an
action to be injurious  only when physical pain is involved, or also when
more abstract, and less extreme harm like inconveniences are involved ?
 	The point is that because Mill never defines the scope in which an
action can be said to harm or affect others, a situation arises where there
are too few cases, if any at all, when an action is purely self-regarding,
and too many where one can argue that some person in some way is
affected. Thus, if we are unable to distinguish to clearly demarcated areas
in which some actions are purely self-regarding and some are not, Mill's
doctrine becomes entirely untenable.

	However, it has been argued that this traditional interpretation of Mill's
'one very simple principal ' glosses over the fact that Mill uses two
different types of phrases to describe actions. On the one hand we have
the use of phrases like " conduct which affect only himself " , "conduct
affecting others"; on the other, we see phrases like "affects the interests of
no one but himself" and "affect the interests of others ". J.C Rees, unlike
traditional critics who see no difference between the two, believes that
they mean two entirely different things. He believes that an "interests" has
the specific meaning of something that is founded on social recognition as
an "interests", supported by reasons and thus, more tangible than the
generality of the unqualified word, "affects". For example, a personal
affront, which undoubtedly can be called an effect of an action, and thus 
rendering that action non-self-regarding in that sense, can hardly count as
an interest, because societal standards of evaluation will not count it as
such. Indeed, non-human entities such as plants and animals, whom Mill
definitely does not include under his Principle of Liberty, can also be thus
affected ; any attempt to talk of their interests would be ludicrous. Rees
further supports this distinction by pointing out the close relation Mill
creates between "rights" and "interests" when he speaks of "certain
interests, which, either by express legal provision or by tacit
understanding, ought to be considered rights ". By so narrowing the
definition down to rights, Mill can be seen to be clarifying that what he
meant was not a general effect on others, but a violation of interests and
rights.

	Thus, if we take this reading of Mill, and recognize that interests are not
synonymous to general effects, than it is still possible to demarcate an area
of non-interference where only an individual's interests and rights are
concerned.	

	However, I find this distinction hard to accept. Firstly, Mill uses these
phrases so interchangeably and freely that it is logical to think that he
meant them to be the same. Secondly, the ambiguity of the word
"concerns" cuts both ways : It might conceal a coherent theory based on
interests rather than effects but it might also allude to two completely
incompatible principles, one based on interests, and the other on effects. If
so, this contradiction renders Mill's attempt to explain legitimate
interference incoherent and impossible to apply. 

	Also, even if the theory of interests is accepted, it has its own built-in
complexities of interpretation. How widely are we to interpret interests ?
Do we include actions that affect public interests and not any individual's
interest in particular ? And even if we do only concern ourselves with
individual interests, under what standards of evaluation do we consider
something an interest ? True, any fanciful whim cannot be considered an
interest, but must all interests be tangible and material then ? Are
psychological interests any less important than monetary or legal ones ?
Rees attempted to define interests as "the condition in which a person's
claim to, or title to, or share in something is recognized as valid by others,
or at least is regarded as worthy if consideration. " Obviously, this aids
little in narrowing down the things that can be considered as interests, and
even Rees himself admitted that his attempt was not definitive.

	Even if we confine our discussion to rights, Mill's one very simple
principle is still obfuscated. Where constituted, legal rights are concerned, 
we only have to refer to the law ; but in the area of unconstituted rights,
where Mill advocated punishment by opinion if an infringement should
occur, there is again a wide scope for argument as to what counts as
unconstituted rights. 

	The bottom line is that a theory based on interests or rights might be
even harder to apply than one based on general effects ; at least effects can
be empirically observed. Perhaps if Mill, as C.L Ten suggests, had
confined his sphere of legitimate constraints to "essential rights resting on
the rules of justice which are common to different societies ", he might
have managed a more satisfactory attempt at defining legal constraints.

	The question of public interests that I mentioned above leads to another
major problem I encountered when trying to understand Mill's Principle of
Liberty. In some areas, Mill's attitude towards public interest and the
general concern of society is clear. For example, he supports police
restraint in public places because "offences against society are especially
apt to originate there". Also he believed that even when there are grounds
for legitimate interference, whether society should actually interfere or not
will depend on whether it will be beneficial to general welfare. Mill also
recognizes the concept of "general weal" when dealing with instigators
who derive personal benefit.

	However, Mill seems to drop his considerations of maintain public
interests. One blatant example is his opposition to the prohibition on
eating pork in a Muslim country. If he were to be consistent in bringing
into consideration "general weal", then he would have no grounds on
which to oppose the ban. 

	Mill also neatly side-steps the issue of public interest in the area of
decency. He dismisses the offences of decency to be "only connected
indirectly with our subject. "  He also fails to come to a definite
conclusion with regard to the pimp and the keeper of a gambling house,
merely remarking that "there are arguments on  both sides". 
	
	I feel that by failing to clarify his stand on "the public weal" , Mill
makes it harder even for readers to construe a coherent theory on
legitimate restrains. It is often in the domain of public welfare that
individual desires and wants come into conflict with. By including public
interests in some considerations, leaving them out in others, and allowing
a few unresolved, Mill makes it difficult for his readers to understand
without doubt what activities he thinks can be legitimately prohibited, and
what should be left unrestrained.

	Perhaps Mill's Principal of Liberty would appear more satisfactory if we
accept G.W Smith's interpretation of it being a normative rule of liberty.
That is, it prescribes an area of non-interference, a domain of liberty of
action, rather than expounding the areas in which one can intervene. By
Isaiah Berlin's definition, Mill would then be a negative libertarian,
concerned with the question of what the area is in which a person can be
left to do what he desires unimpeded. If this is so, then what is important
is not how satisfactory Mill demarcates the area for interference, but the
area of non-interference. Mill does this quite well : Interfering in acts in
which only the agent is involved (few though they may be) and which
would only affect himself ,would not count as legitimate constraint on
liberty. However, this still does not resolve the complexities discussed
above on what counts as a legitimate restraint.

	Another way in which I would judge whether Mill's explanation is
satisfactory is whether it is consistent with his utilitarian theories. This is
because I feel that even if his explanation of  legitimate constraints is
cogent, I would feel it unsatisfactory if it did not also tie in with his
utilitarian theories.

	It is hard for me to see how Mill's theory of Liberty, and what he sees as
legitimate constraints to liberty, can be consistent with utilitarian
principles. It is clear that Mill totally discounts morality-dependent distress
as a legitimate constraint on liberty. This is clearly seen in his objection to
pork-eating prohibition in Muslim countries. Also, an appeal to the utility
of other people , whether they like an action or not, is invalid in Mill's
answer to the question of interference or non interference. 

  However, Mill does use a balancing of utilities, in cases where conduct
harms others, by taking into consideration whether general welfare will be
promoted by interference. However, because he deals so inconsistently
with general welfare, as I have shown, Mill also does not apply these
utility principles uniformly.

	I do agree with C.L Ten that in some ways, although Mill does not
explicitly employ an aggregative standard of value, we can infer it to
answer some questions in his theory of liberty. When an action conflicts
with similar or overlapping rights of others, it might be overridden in
order to minimize the disutility from the violation of these rights, and to
maximize the sum of intrinsic utility from having a want satisfied. Thus,
each interest, right and concern is weighted in order to resolve which right
is overridden. If explained as such, utilitarian principles, though not
underpinning Mill's theory of liberty, is also not incompatible, but instead
supplements it by resolving some difficulties arising from the collision of
two individual's spheres of liberty. 

	Another way in which I think helps in resolving the seeming
incompatibility in Mill's theories of Utilitarianism and Liberty is to
understand that underlying both is his theory of human nature. It is
because of man's hedonistic nature that causes him to strive to develop his
own individuality and satisfy his wants at the costs of others. By trying to
conform everybody according to his own idea of life, he secures his utility
and protects him from the disutility of conflict with a different lifestyle.
Mill's theory of liberty thus attempts to draw the boundaries in which a
man is free to pursue his own happiness, and the areas in which his
hedonistic impulses must be sacrificed in order that the sum of societal
utility is maximized.

	All in all, Mill's attempt to explain what counts as a legitimate constraint
upon utility has many questionable concepts and a plethora of ambiguities.
However, it would be wrong to dismiss his theory as untenable just
because we are unable to clearly define some terms. On the whole, it does
make a courageous attempt to answer the complex question of how much
authority should society have over an individual.	
	  

  
 
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