 The shocking fall of communism in Eastern and Central Europe in the late eighties was
 remarkable for both its rapidity and its scope.  The specifics of communism's demise varied
 among nations, but similarities in both the causes and the effects of these revolutions
 were quite similar.  As well, all of the nations involved shared the common goals of
 implementing democratic systems of government and moving to market economies.  
In each of these nations, the communist regimes in power were forced to transfer that power
to radically different institutions than they were accustomed to.  Democracy had been
spreading throughout the world for the preceding two decades, but with a very important
difference.  While previous political transitions had seen similar circumstances, the actual
events in question had generally occurred individually.  In Europe, on the other hand, the
shift from communism was taking place in a different context altogether.  The peoples
involved were not looking to affect a narrow set of policy reforms; indeed, what was at
stake was a hyper-radical shift from the long-held communist ideology to a western blueprint
for governmental and economic policy development.  The problem inherent in this type of
monumental change is that, according to Ulrich K. Preuss, "In almost all the East and
Central European countries, the collapse of authoritarian communist rule has released
national, ethnic, religious and cultural conflicts which cannot be solved by purely economic
policies" (47).  While tremendous changes are evident in both the governmental and economic
arenas in Europe, these changes cannot be assumed to always be "mutually reinforcing"
(Preuss 47).  Generally it has been theorized that the most successful manner of addressing
these many difficulties is the drafting of a constitution.  But what is clear is the
unsatisfactory ability of a constitution to remedy the problems of nationalism and ethnic
differences.  Preuss notes that when the constitutional state gained favor in North America,
it was founded on the principle of the unitary state; it was not designed to address the
lack of national identity which is found throughout Europe - and which is counter to the
concept of the constitutional state (48). 
 "Measured in terms of socioeconomic modernization," writes Helga A. Welsh, "Central and
 Eastern European countries had reached a level that was considered conducive to the
 emergence of pluralistic policies" (19).  It seemed that the sole reason the downfall of
 communism, as it were, took so long was the veto power of the Soviet Union.  According to
 theories of modernization, the higher the levels of socioeconomic achievement, the greater
 the pressure for open competition and, ultimately, democracy.  As such, the nations in
 Eastern and Central Europe were seen as "anomalies in socioeconomically highly-developed
 countries where particularly intellectual power resources have become widespread" (Welsh
 19).  Due to their longtime adherence to communist policies, these nations faced great
 difficulty in making the transition to a pluralist system as well as a market economy. 
 According to Preuss, these problems were threefold: 
The genuine economic devastations wrought by the communist regimes, the transformation of
the social and economic classes of the command economy into the social and economic classes
of a capitalist economy and, finally, the creation of a constitutional structure for
political entities that lack the undisputed integrity of a nation state (48).

With such problems as these to contend with in re-engineering their entire economic and
political systems, the people of East Germany seemed to be in a particularly enviable
position.  Economically, they were poised to unite with one of the richest countries, having
one of the strongest economies, in the entire world.  In the competition for foreign
investment, such an alliance gave the late German Democratic Republic a seemingly
insurmountable lead over other nations.  In regards to the political aspects of unification,
it effectively left a Germany with no national or ethnic minorities, as well as having
undisputed boundaries.  As well, there was no need to create a constitution (although many
of the pitfalls of constitution-building would have been easily-avoided due to the
advantages Germany had), because the leaders of the GDR had joined the Federal Republic by
accession and, accordingly, allowed its Basic Law to be extended over their territory.
 For all the good that seemed to be imminent as a result of unification, many problems also
 arose regarding the political transformation that Germany was undergoing.  Among these
 problems were the following: the tensions between the Basic Law's simultaneous commitments
 to supranational integration and to the German nation state, the relationship between the
 nation and the constitution as two different modes of political integration and the issue
 of so-called "backward justice" (Preuss 48). The Federal Republic of Germany's Basic Law
 has been the longest-lived constitution in Germany's history.  Intended to be a
 short-lived, temporary document, the Basic Law gained legitimacy as West Germany continued
 to march towards becoming a major economic power and effective democratic society.  There
 seemed to be, at first, a tension between the Basic Law's explicit support of
 re-unification and its promise to transfer sovereignty to a supranational institution that
 would be created.  The conflict between West Germany's goals of national unity and
 international integration remained the main issue in the country's politics for many years.
  As Preuss notes, "It will be extremely difficult to escape the economic and, in the long
 run also political, implications of this double-bind situation of Germany, one that remains
 a legacy of the postwar order" (51).  Since the unification of Germany was accomplished
 through accession, it meant, strangely enough, that neither West nor East Germany had a say
 in the other's decision on whether to form a unified state or what conditions such a
 unification would be contingent upon, respectively.  Put simply, the net effect of the
 extension of the Basic Law to all of Germany did not guarantee the implementation of a new
 joint governing policy or a new constitution for the country.   It seemed, as a result of
 some esoteric articles of the Basic Law, that the GDR would cease to exist legally and the
 FRG would survive.  It was impossible to draw the conclusion that both would die out and be
 replaced by a new political identity.  Many of the Federal Republic's laws immediately
 applied in the GDR (Gloebner 153).  Article 146 of the Basic Law, put simply, allowed for
 the annulment of the Basic Law, to be replaced with another governing system, without
 previously binding the people to any specific rules.  Seemingly, it sanctions revolution,
 and, "as proved to be the case in 1990, this is not a purely theoretical conclusion"
 (Preuss 52).  Some suggest that, by unifying through accession, Germany has made problems
 which could end up overshadowing the benefits of unification.  The suggestion is that the
 implementation of a constitution by a society without experience in utilizing it, without
 the necessary institutions and without the corresponding value system will bring about more
 harm than good (politically).  The imposition of the Basic Law was the root for much of the
 mistrust between East and West Germans following unification.  In regards to the East
 Germans, the Law was effectively self-imposed, and "neither submission nor voluntary
 self-submission is likely to engender the social and political coherence which is a
 necessary condition for a stable democracy" (Preuss 54). In regards to the economic aspects
 of unification, some major problems exist in the transition to democracy and market
 economics.  According to Preuss, the two main issues included in the realm of "backward
 justice" are the privatization of large pieces of state property, and the punishment of the
 elites of the previous regimes and their comrades under the headings of "self-purification"
 and "collective amnesia."  The privatization issue is among the thorniest involved in any
 country's transition from communism.  For one, a system of procedures must be developed
 simply to transfer such large amounts of property to private citizens.  Also, there must be
 mechanisms put in place to both protect new owners from claims of previous owners and to
 satisfy former owners without alienating possible future investors.  The problem boils down
 to the fact that private property laws do not always coincide with the "fair" concept of
 restitution.  As Petra Bauer-Kaase writes, "East Germans still have difficulties in
 adjusting to a political system where individuals have a great deal of responsibility for
 their own life" (307).  The former East Germans look upon this issue with contempt, because
 it is the Westerners who have control over the rules, as well as the enforcement of those
 rules.  This is merely one of a multitude of instances where this mistrust manifests
 itself.  
There are also the issues of self-purification and collective amnesia.  Due to the pervasive
nature of the communist regime's surveillance programs and so forth, there is very little
room for anyone to claim pure hands.  While West Germans can claim that they are innocent by
virtue of geography, East Germans are never able to escape the suspicions that they may have
been part of the machine.  Government jobs are denied to those who were affiliated with the
Stasi, and private businesses also may deny employment to these citizens.  While unification
has occurred theoretically, in reality the Germany today is one of de facto
separate-but-equal citizenship.
 There is no denying that there have been many problems associated with the unification of
 East and West Germany.  The transition from communist state to liberal democracy is a very
 difficult one, and there is no real way to predict how the German experience will turn out.
  As Preuss writes, "The transition from an authoritarian political regime and its
 concomitant command economy to a liberal democracy and a capitalist economy is as
 unprecedented as the short-term integration of two extremely different societies - one
 liberal-capitalist, one authoritarian-socialist - into one nation state" (57).  In other
 words, the unification of Germany is one of the most complicated and unprecedented
 historical events since the unification of Germany.

Jeremy Waldroop
Works Cited
Bauer-Kaase, Petra.  "Germany in Transition: The Challenge of Coping with Unification." 
German Unification: Processes and Outcomes.  M. Donald Hancock and Helga A. Welsh, eds. 
Boulder: Westview, 1994.  285-311. Gloebner, Gert-Joachim.  "Parties and Problems of
Governance During Unification."  German Unification: Processes and Outcomes.  M. Donald
Hancock and Helga A. Welsh, eds.  Boulder: Westview, 1994.  139-61. Preuss, Ulrich K. 
"German Unification: Political and Constitutional Aspects."  United Germany and the New
Europe.  Heinz D. Kurz, ed.  Brookfield: Elgar, 1993.  47-58. Welsh, Helga A.  "The Collapse
of Communism in Eastern Europe and the GDR: Evolution, Revolution, and Diffusion."  German
Unification: Processes and Outcomes.  M. Donald Hancock and Helga A. Welsh, eds.  Boulder:
Westview, 1994.  17-34.
