                       SECRECY & GOVERNMENT BULLETIN



                              Issue Number 54

                               November 1995



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Intelligence Facilities Uncovered on Internet



The existence and location of several unacknowledged U.S. intelligence

facilities were reported for the first time on Internet newsgroups in

October. The identification of a CIA facility at 1517 Westbranch Drive in

Tysons Corner, Virginia, precipitated additional disclosures of

intelligence facilities belonging to the CIA, the National Security Agency,

the National Reconnaissance Office and other agencies.



The disclosures (on newsgroups such as alt.politics.org.cia) represent a

qualitatively new development of the Internet as a vehicle of public

expression, and a new type of challenge to government security policies,

which have been slow to meet public expectations of reform.



It is generally agreed that there is an excessive level of secrecy

surrounding many intelligence facilities. The Joint Security Commission

reported in early 1994 that although "there are many valid reasons for the

special cover measures used by some military and intelligence

organizations, ... the use of cover to conceal the existence of a

government facility... is broader than necessary and significantly

increases costs.... Special protection generally should focus on the most

sensitive uses of a facility, rather than the fact of its existence." The

Commission recommended that cover should be rescinded except where there is

"a documented covert intelligence or operational mission." (Redefining

Security, pp. 19-20).



More than a year and a half later, no identifiable progress has been made

toward implementing this common-sense recommendation.



Significantly, the recent disclosures did not result from a leak of

classified information, but from a bottom-up effort by interested citizens

which provided general public access to information which had previously

been local folklore. The "group mind" on the Internet devised an effective

search strategy, which led to the identification of the Westbranch Drive

site (apparently a component of the CIA Directorate of Science and

Technology). This in turn led to the identification of several other

facilities, scouted out mainly by John Pike of FAS.



While many commenters on the Internet newsgroups applauded the disclosures

as an appropriate response to excessive secrecy and contributed their own

information and insights, others warned that identifying concealed

intelligence facilities was a reckless and presumptuous act that could lead

to no good. The ensuing debate about the proper role of secrecy and the

need to demystify the intelligence community was livelier and more

substantive than most recent Congressional hearings on intelligence.



In response to an S&GB query, the CIA declined to comment on the specific

disclosures but noted generally on October 27 that "The shooting murders of

two CIA employees in January 1993 reinforced CIA's long-standing practice

of acknowledging only our headquarters building in McLean, Virginia as a

CIA facility.... With the increase in domestic terrorist attacks, our

serious concern for the physical safety and well-being of our employees

motivates us to continue our practice of not acknowledging facilities other

than the headquarters compound. Of course, the Congressional intelligence

and appropriations committees are privy to comprehensive and detailed

information about the location, purpose, occupancy, and cost of CIA

facilities as part of their oversight functions."



Archived selections from the relevant Internet newsgroup traffic can be

viewed on the World Wide Web at http://www.fas.org/pub/gen/hypermail/cia/



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Automatic Declassification Under Attack



Declassification of the huge backlog of 25 year old secret documents could

be jeopardized by congressional criticism of the automatic declassification

requirements of executive order 12958, which took effect on October 16.



In report language on the 1996 energy and water appropriations bill (H.

Rep. 104-293), conferees claimed that automatic declassification of

national security information would inevitably lead to the uncontrolled

release of Restricted Data, i.e. nuclear weapons design information that is

protected under the Atomic Energy Act.



In reality, the executive order already provides a specific exemption for

Restricted Data in order to prevent any such inadvertent release, along

with a generous 5 year implementation period to seek out exempted

documents.



Nevertheless, prompted by the Department of Energy, the congressional

conferees said they "do not see how such an exemption can be effectively

implemented since the national security information records slated for

automatic release have a high probability of containing some Restricted

Data intermixed with the national security information."



This is nonsense, according to Steven Garfinkel of the Information Security

Oversight Office. "There is no justification for the idea that hidden

Restricted Data is spread throughout these files. Hundreds of millions of

pages of national security information have been declassified over the last

25 years, including bulk declassified, and there has been no indication of

any proliferation problem attributable to their release," Garfinkel said

October 30. Moreover, DOE never made any suggestion to the contrary during

the two year development of the new Order, he noted.



The conferees called on the President to revise the executive order so as

to exempt all files that "potentially" contain Restricted Data. This notion

of "potential" Restricted Data amounts to a new classification category

that has no clear boundaries. If accepted by the President, it could render

automatic declassification practically impossible, leading right back to

the Reagan era of open-ended secrecy.



The other outstanding threat to the new Order was the House Intelligence

Committee's attempt to restrict funding for declassification. But at the

end of October, the authorization bill containing this provision was

stalled, due to a bizarre move by Rep. Newt Gingrich to insert funding for

a "covert" program to overthrow the government of Iran. (Congressional

Quarterly, 10/28/95, p. 3320).



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Setting Global Standards for Openness



For better and for worse, the United States sets the world standard for

openness and accountability in national security affairs. Consequently,

efforts to eliminate unnecessary secrecy may have global impacts far beyond

their immediate domestic context.



"The United States currently has the most open intelligence services in

world history," the CIA advised S&GB on October 27. But it is

simultaneously true that the U.S. has the most secretive intelligence and

national security bureaucracy in the world. Because it spends vastly more

money on secret programs than any other nation, and has done so over a

fifty year period, the U.S. has accumulated an inventory of secrets whose

scope and volume can hardly be imagined.



The demise of the Soviet Union, Edward Teller has observed, "puts the

United States in the uncomfortable position of holding the record in

secrecy. It is urgent that we do something about this situation." (Issues

in Science and Technology, Fall 1992, p. 6).



It is doubly urgent because foreign countries look to the United States to

define the limits of what is possible in achieving open, accountable

government. In some instances, American policies provide a source of moral

authority to dissidents who are seeking to open up their own governments.

In other cases, U.S. secrecy policies serve as a template for foreign

governments who are creating their own security structures. Last month, for

example, the head of a new South African Parliament committee on

intelligence oversight said that one of his committee's first tasks will be

to study the system of oversight that is applied in the U.S.

(FBIS-AFR-95-204, 10/23/95, pp. 8- 10).



The limits of U.S. leadership in secrecy reform can be sensed in foreign

news stories like "Government secrecy hampers a legal battle waged by

nuclear reactor staff against the employer they say gave them cancer" from

the Israeli biweekly The Jerusalem Report (11/2/95, pp. 20-21). It is hard

to read this story without recalling the lawsuit concerning the secret

facility at Groom Lake, Nevada, where the government insists that all

evidence of possible environmental crimes is a state secret. On September

29, President Clinton issued a Presidential Determination declaring that

"it is in the paramount interest of the United States" to exempt the site

from disclosure of any information the Air Force says is classified.

(Federal Register, 10/10/95, p. 52823). The Air Force in turn says that it

cannot acknowledge the presence of jet fuel, paint or car batteries at the

site without "risking American lives."



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Secret Human Experimentation at CIA



The recent Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation

Experiments provides informative new background material on the abuse of

classification for non-national security purposes, the practice of active

public deception, and the continuing conflict between secrecy and

environmental laws.



The impressive Report also makes a number of interesting observations about

the role of the CIA in human experimentation programs including the

following:



   * "The CIA indicated that it is currently performing classified human

     research projects. The agency informed the ... Committee that all

     human subjects are informed of the CIA's sponsorship and of the

     specific nature of the study in which they are participating, even if

     the general purposes of the research are classified." (p. 686).



   * "The CIA... reported that it was unable to retrieve any records of its

     participation in the midcentury DOD panels that met in secret to

     discuss, among other things, human experiments" (p. 646). "The

     Advisory Committee recommends... that the CIA's record-keeping system

     be reviewed to ensure that records maintained by that agency are

     accessible upon legitimate request from the public or governmental

     sources." (p. 837).



   * "The Advisory Committee recommends that all records of the CIA bearing

     on programs of secret human research, such as MKULTRA and the related

     CIA human behavior projects from the late 1940s through the early

     1970s, including Bluebird, Artichoke, MKSEARCH, MKDELTA, Naomi,

     Chance, Often, and Chickwit, become a top priority for

     declassification review with the expectation that most, if not all, of

     these documents can be declassified and made available to the public."

     (p. 838).



The 925 page Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation

Experiments (stock number 061-000-00-848-9) can be purchased for $44 from

the Government Printing Office at (202)512- 1800.



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Intelligence Muzak Reform at NSA



The quality of the background music that is piped into the National

Security Agency has improved lately, according to an NSA employee writing

in the internal NSA Newsletter (October 1995, page 11):



"I'd like to take time out to commend the organization that provides us

with the background music that we listen to each day as we go about our

tasks. The quality of the music has improved tremendously since I came on

board 7 years ago. I am a Beatles fan, but I remember hearing 'Penny Lane'

20 times a day-- every day (well maybe not 20, but it sure felt like it!)

and that was more than anyone should have to suffer. Now, we have a variety

of good music-- everything from Jonathan Butler to Bonnie Rait to The

Judds. In my opinion, it is a small thing that made a positive impact on

employee productivity. Once again, I'd like to say thank you to our 'NSA

DJ' for adding a bit of sweetness to our days."



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Bulletins



* "A Framework for Reform of the U.S. Intelligence Community," the

exceptionally informative paper by John A. Gentry, is now available on the

FAS intelligence reform homepage at http://www.fas.org/pub/gen/fas/irp/.



* The U.S. intelligence community maintains about 400 liaison relationships

with foreign intelligence and law enforcement organizations, said former

acting DCI Admiral William Studeman at an October 19 meeting of the

American Bar Association. "We are all each other's partners," he said, "and

we are all each other's targets." Intelligence operations with foreign

liaison services are typically not reported to Congress and "have been the

source of problems," according to Senator Robert Kerrey.



* On September 26, the DCI and the Secretary of Defense moved to eliminate

the classification marking NOFORN, i.e. Not Releasable to Foreign

Nationals. This follows the decision last April [see S&GB 48] to eliminate

WNINTEL (Warning Notice - Intelligence Sources or Methods Involved) and

NOCONTRACT (Not Releasable to Contractors/ Consultants). Elimination of

obsolete classification markings is intended to facilitate the often

arduous dissemination of intelligence information.



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Secrecy & Government Bulletin is written by Steven Aftergood and published

by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), a 50 year old public

interest organization of natural and social scientists concerned with

issues of science and society. The FAS Project on Government Secrecy is

supported by grants from the HKH Foundation and the CS Fund. Back issues

are available at the FAS secrecy homepage at http://www.fas.org/pub/

gen/fas/sgp/. This publication may be freely reproduced.



For further information, send email to Steven Aftergood at

saftergood@igc.apc.org or write to the Federation of American Scientists,

307 Massachusetts Avenue N.E., Washington, DC 20002.

