Subject: soc.history.war.vietnam FAQ: Australian Involvement (1/3)
Supersedes: <602154823@panix3.panix.com>
Date: 15 Mar 1996 04:55:44 -0500
References: <603155571@panix3.panix.com>
Summary: This FAQ is the first of three parts dealing with the Australian
     participation in the Vietnam War.  This section deals with the military
     involvement.

Archive-Name: vietnam/australia/part1
Posting-Frequency: monthly (15th)

Frequently Asked Questions: soc.history.war.vietnam

Copyright 1996 by Brian Ross.  Permission to use this document is expressly
     given for use in Usenet newsgroup discussions and any other educational
     purpose, as long as the source is clearly identified and there is no
     fee.  All other rights are reserved.

The FAQs on the Australian involvement in Vietnam were written by Brian Ross.
There are three sections, the first covering military involvement and the
last two dealing with political issues.

Australia's Military Involvement in the Vietnam War

     This posting is the first of two intended to provide an
overview of Australian military operations in Vietnam, commencing from the
deployment of the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam in 1962 until
1969, when Australian forces began withdrawing, consistent with the Nixon
Doctrine of phased withdrawal from the mainland of Asia and the policy of
Vietnamization. 

     While the second will deal primarily with the political decisions
to become involved in the Vietnam war, suffice to say for the moment, that
the Australian commitment to Vietnam was largely dictated by political
concerns and was therefore limited by the same concerns. The
predominant theory of defence during the sixties was the containment of
communism and "Forward Defence". Both of these policies relied heavily on
the presence of America in Southeast Asia combating the perceived Chinese
threat. In Vietnam, this translated into the policy of supporting
American military involvement and encouraging the continuation of this
involvement until such time as China was sufficiently dissuaded from any
further adventurism or Australia could more capably defend itself.


Australian Army Training Team Vietnam

     Australia's initial commitment to supporting the American stance
in Vietnam consisted of the deployment of a team of military advisers. On
26th July, 1962, the Minister for Defence announced Australia's intention
to send 30 instructors to the Republic of Vietnam, 4 going to the Military
Aid Council Vietnam (MACV) Headquarters in Saigon, 22 to regional
locations in the Hue area and 4 to Duc My.(1) This team would be headed
by Colonel F.P. Serong, previously the Commanding Officer at the Jungle
Training Centre, Canungra, Queensland and would fall under the command of
the Australian Army Forces, Far Eastern Landing Forces Headquarters in
Singapore.(2) The AATTV arrived in the Republic of Viet Nam in August,
1962. 

     AATTV advisers served with ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam)
units, including infantry, artillery and armoured divisions, independent
regiments in the I Corps area (the northern province of RVN),regional and
provincial headquarters, the Viet Nam Police Field Force, US Special
Forces, Montegnard Special Forces and CIA operations.(3) with the
escalation of Australian forces in Vietnam in 1966, Australian advisers
also served with 1 Australian Task Force (1ATF) at Nui Dat. 

     The primary role of the AATTV was to train ARVN and other forces
in the use of weapons, jungle warfare, tactics and strategy. In addition,
especially after the Australian government allowed them to serve in
battalion and smaller size formations, they took liaison roles, calling
for airstrikes and arranging logistical support and medevac facilities.(4)
They usually operated as individuals or in small groups of two or three.
After 1963, the AATTV came wider the operational control of MACV HQ in
Saigon. 

     It was intended that the AATTV would represent Australia's
commitment to the American operations in Vietnam, and as such, would not
have a significant military impact, however, the success of Australian
advisers, not the least Captain Peterson's training of the Montegnard
Special Forces in Dar Lac Province, became quickly known throughout
Vietnam. Peterson established Armed Propaganda and Intelligence Teams
(APIT)from amongst Montnegard tribesmen in Ban Me Thout, designed to
disseminate propaganda, collect information and establish a network of
informers, disrupt Viet Cong infiltration and supply routes, conduct small
scale raids, ambushes and similar minor operations and to conduct long
range patrols into Viet Cong 'safe areas', rescuing captured Monteg nards
and liberating equipment and ammunition.(5) Building on these gains,
Peterson established a 'People's Army' just prior to his departure, which
at that stage had effectively regained control over much of southern Dar
Lac. Despite the inadequacies of the ARVN forces in protecting pacified
areas, and the racial problems between Montegnards and ARVN personnel,
Peterson had succeeded in regaining the upper hand in the Ban Me Thout
region. 

     AATTV techniques and method of operations were significantly
different to many of those employed by their American allies. Experience
in the jungles of Malaya and Borneo and limitations on the number of and
facilities available to personnel had combined to produce very different
tactics. Whilst American instructors expounded the virtues of the rapid
deployment of large numbers of troops, massive fire power and decisive
battles, Australians concentrated on individual marksmanship, the
independence of platoons from battalion HQs, small scale patrols and
ambushes. These differences frequently bought Australian advisers into
conflict with their American superiors. The Australian policy of 'economy
of effort' was directly opposed to the American idea of 'concentration of
force'.(6)

     The AATTV served with distinction in Vietnam. During AATTV's tour
of duty, members were awarded two Victoria Crosses, several Military
Crosses and several Military Medals.(7) It was the first Australian force
to arrive and the last to leave. After the initial deployment of 30
instructors, it was increased in size by 30 in May 64, by 23 in June 64
and then by 17 in January 65, bringing it to a total strength of 100. It
was restricted from further increases by the introduction of a National
Service Act ( 1965) in Australia which required large numbers of
instructors. The last instructors were withdrawn from Phuoc Tuy Province
in December 1972. 


The First Deployment of Australian Ground Forces

     In April 1965, consistent with President Johnson's deployment of
US Marines to protect airforce bases in Vietnam, Prime Minister Robert
Menzies announced his intention to send 1 Battalion, Royal Australian 
Regiment (1 RAR) to assist in the defence of American bases. 1 RAR was 
restructured into a tropic warfare organisation, similar to that employed 
by the American army and was to serve under the US 173rd Airborne Brigade
(Separate) (US 173 Abn Bde)defending Bien Hoa airforce base.(8) Initially
it was intended that 1 RAR would only be used in defence of the base but
by December offensive operations had begun in conjunction with 173 Abn
Bde.(9) During 1 RAR's tour of duty, 22 major operations were conducted,
usually within 10-20 miles from Bien Hoa. 

     Like the AATTV, significant problems were encountered in operating
with US forces. These were compounded by poor equipment, including WWll
Owen machine guns and boots, and no decent preparation before
embarkation.(10) The operational problems they encountered will be
discussed below, suffice to say here that they were not sufficiently
resolved until 1 ATF was established with its relative independence.
Despite these limitations, however, the Australian regiment was
successfully integrated into the 173rd Abn Bde until it's tour of duty was
completed in June 1966. 


1 Australian Task Force, Phuoc Tuy Province

     In March 1966, the Australian government announced its intention
to create a single and relatively independent Australian Task Force. This
came largely as a result of political pressure on the Australian
government by Washington but was also consistent with the dominant
foreign and defence policy trends within Canberra at the time. However,
there was good reason to create the Task Force from a military point of
view also. Not only would Australians regain some control over their
troops, they would also b e permitted to conduct operations in a manner
consistent with their experiences and techniques. Consideration was also
given to the limited resources available to the Australian command in
Vietnam and the need to pool these in order to have a more visible
effect.

     Phuoc Tuy Province was situated in III Corps Tactical Zone and had
a population of 160,000. At the time the Australian Task Force arrived, it
was a relatively wealthy province, agriculturally rich and had a
comparatively prosperous costal economy.(11) It had been a base for
anti-French activities after WWII and was familiar with the Viet Minh
presence that accompanied these activities. Despite having two large
Catholic migrant towns, it was also a popular base for Viet Cong
activities throughout the peri od of Diem's authority.(12) Operational in
Phuoc Tuy were the 274th and 275th NLF Regiments and D445 Provincial
Mobile Battalion, a local force with strong links to the population, an
intimate knowledge of the area and assured supplies.(13) Phuoc Tuy was
chosen because there was a reasonable amount of enemy activity, no risk of
border violations in the pursuit of the enemy and it had excellent air and
sea access ensuring adequate supplies and an assured evacuation route. The
terrain was not dissimilar from that often encountered by Australians in
Malaya and Borneo.(14) In addition to this, the pacification of Phuoc Tuy
was essential to the Republic of Viet Nam because of it's wealth and to
the MACV because of the significance of Vung Tau port and the supply line
(Route 15) to Saigon and Bien Hoa. 

     The exact placement of the Task Force was to be Nui Dat, a hill on
Route 2, heading north through the centre of the province, and was an
obvious challenge to the NLF and NVA forces in the area. The Logistics and
Supply Group (1 ALSG) was to be situated in Vung Tau where it had good
access to American supply groups and where it was hoped that it would be
somewhat safer from large scale attack.(15)

     The Task Force was to be comprised of 2 infantry battalions (5/6
RAR were the first to serve in 1ATF), artillery (including some New
Zealand elements), engineers, signals and administrative support, under
the command of Brigadier O.D.Jackson. 1 ALSG, situated in Vung Tau,
consisted of 176 Air Dispatch Company, 2 Field Ambulance, 33 Dental Unit,
2 Composite Ordnance Depot and the 101 Field Workshop of Royal Australian
Electrical and Mechanical Engineers.(16) Since August 1964, No.35
Transport Squadron R AAF had been situated at Vung Tau and one year after
the arrival of 1 ALSG, (June 1966) No.9 Helicopter Squadron was also
situated in Phuoc Tuy.(17)

     1 ATF's objectives in Phuoc Tuy were never very clear. Because it
came under the operational command of US II Field Forces Vietnam (II FFV)
but under the National command of Headquarters Australian Forces Vietnam,
the Commander 1 ATF had to reconcile sometimes inconsistent objectives.
Westmoreland told Jackson to "take over Phuoc Tuy" (18) this representing
the sum of operational commands to 1 ATF whilst from COMAFV, directions
were only a little more specific. The aims of 1 ATF were defined as the
security and domination of 1 ATF's assigned area, the security of Route
15, the conduct of other operations as required, conduct operations
anywhere in II Corps Tactical Zone and in Bin Thuan Province, II Corps
Tactical Zone, as required and agreed up on by COMAFV.(19) The actual
practicality of these aims was hard to assess but it seems that this meant
1 ATF was to act in both a pacification role as well as a large unit to
counter main force activity. COIN operations would require frequent
contact and close coordination with ARVN forces and the civilian
administration, yet the advisory positions in ARVN and the administration
were dominated by Americans. Alternatively, large scale operations against
main force units required more manpower, mobility and fire support and
could not adequately be completed by two battalions, one of which would be
required for base security at all times.(20)

     This obscurity when it came to the nature of operations 1 ATF was
to engage in did provide the Commander with some degree of operational
freedom. It was not long before the Australian forces had applied their
own style of operation. The base at Nui Dat, whilst its presence was
readily felt in the area, was not cleared as were American bases and few
ARVN personnel and no indigenous Vietnamese were allowed in to the base.
This meant that troop strength at any one time was hard to gauge and
security was excellent.(21)

     It was D Company of 6 RAR that first encountered the enemy in
strength at Long Tan on the 18th August, 1966. In engaging and severely
damaging D445 Regiment, 1 ATF had established a moral and later physical
victory over the NLF in Phuoc Tuy. The TET offe nsive of February 1968
also contributed to the relative demise of the VC 5th Division (274 and
275 Regiments) in the region, due to the heavy casualties they took. In
order to combat the decreasing strengths of the pre-existing NLF forces in
the province D440 was created in 1967, however, this too proved relatively
ineffective, not being a local force so much as comprising large numbers
of NVA personnel.(22)

     In November 1967, 1 ATF was increased in size by an extra
battalion (including of NZ artillery) and was reinforced by a squadron of
Centurion tanks. This was largely in response to the deteriorating
military situation in Vietnam and the possibility of a TET offensive.
General Vincent(COMAFV, Jan. 67 to Jan. 68.) was enthusiastic to increase
Australian forces either to enable them to take responsibility for all of
Phuoc Tuy or alternatively to allow 1 ATF to operate more tangibly outside
Phuoc Tuy Provinc e.(23) As a result, in January 1968, 1 ATF was ordered
to occupy an area 12 km north of Bien Hoa airforce base with a view to
preventing any expected TET assault. 1 ATF successfully engaged and
defeated the enemy in February (as it did an offensive in Baria at the
same time) and returned to Nui Dat. It was again called on to help defend
Bien Hoa in May.(24)

     If Vincent was enthusiastic about Australia's role in the war,
then McDonald, his successor, was passionate. McDonald was keen not to see
Australian operations limited to "[saving] the odd house from being burned
to the ground" in Phuoc Tuy. In gaining U S support for operations against
the VC in the Long Hai Hills in March 1968, McDonald believed the US was
attempting to hasten Australia's victory over the enemy in Phuoc Tuy so as
to get 1 ATF operational in areas of more strategic importance.(25)

     By 1969 and the beginning of the US withdrawal from South Vietnam,
II FFV had re-prioritized its aims and instructed the then COMAEV, General
Hay, that 1 ATF should do likewise. First priority was to be given to
pacification, second to upgrading ARVN for ces and thirdly to military
operations. Pacification operations began in May 1969 however, hampered by
unenthusiastic ARVN forces, they proceeded slowly. The success of the ATF
in forcing the withdrawal of NLF mainforce units and the provincial
battalions (the remnants of D445 and the newer but understrength D440) was
countered by the maintenance of the VC infrastructure in the villages.(26)
Thus, as the Task Force withdrew in December 1971, the remaining AATTV
members presided over the gradual return of NLF in Phuoc Tuy. 

The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) in
Vietnam

     As part of the policy of encouraging American involvement in
Vietnam, and as a result of his convincing victory at the polls in
November 1966, Menzies decided to increase Australia's military commitment
to Vietnam to include elements of all three service s. The commissioning
of two Charles F. Adams guided missile destroyers in 1965 and the
impending replacement of Canberra bombers by F-111s had made available to
COMAFV additional sources for Australian expansion in Vietnam.(27)


RAAF:

     Since August 1964, elements of No.35 Squadron (Transport) consisting
of fixed wing Caribous, had been stationed at Vung Tau in order to assist
in the movement and supply of 1 RAR. With the establishment of 1ATF and 1
ALSG in June 1966, No.9 Squadron (Helicopters) were deployed to provide
logistic support, troop movement and medevac facilities for the Task Force.
Both of these commitments were relatively insignificant except in so far as
they represent a desire to have Australians supporting Australians in Phuoc
Tuy. Both units served as essential support for 1 ATF but added little to
the ongoing American involvement. 

     Perhaps one of the most significant RAAF contributions to the
Vietnam war was the deployment of No.2 Squadron (Canberra Bombers) to Phan
Rang in April 1967. The Australian 5th Airfield Construction Squadron had
completed the provision of Australian facil ities by the time the first
eight of ten bombers arrived. The bombers were to under go usual
maintenance in Phan Rang but had additional facilities at Butterworth, in
Malaysia for major maintenance.(28) The entire contingent consisted of
approximately 300 men and came under the command of USAF 35th Tactical
Fighter Wing.(29)

     At the height of Australia's military involvement in Vietnam, RAAF
personnel numbered around 800 people from three squadrons. The Canberra
Bomber squadron was the first summoned home in March 1971 followed by the
remaining RAAF personnel in August. 


RAN:

     The Royal Australian Navy's contingent to the Vietnam war was
somewhat more substantial. The first RAN personnel to see action were the
six members of Clearance Diving Team 3 . CDT 3 was initially part of the
Inshore Undersea Warfare Group 1, based at Ca m Ranh Bay but itself was
assigned to Vung Tau from February 1967. It was largely responsible for
assisting in harbour defence, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), harbour
patrols and port command and communications during Operation Stabledoor
(1967-1970). (30) In addition to these responsibilities, CDT 3 was called
on to conduct marine salvage operations, especially where EOD might be
called for, river clearing in preparation for riverine military operations
and recovery of enemy ammunition. 

     The largest RAN contribution however was supplied by the
deployment of Australian destroyers to Vietnam. The destroyers came under
the command of COMNAVFORV, primarily operating with the US Seventh meet
and in March 1967, HMAS Hobart, was the first to see action.(31) HMA Ships
Hobart and Perth alternated sixth month deployments until March 1969 when
Australia's newest DDG, HMAS Brisbane arrived. Brisbane was replaced by
Vendetta, a Daring Class Destroyer which was in turn replaced by Perth and
Hobart respectively before completing RAN participation in the Vietnam
conflict.(32)

     Hobart, being the first RAN vessel to arrive in Vietnam under
combat conditions, participated in Operation Rolling Thunder's maritime
equivalent, Operation Sea Dragon. This was designed primarily to intercept
Water Borne Logistic Craft (WBLC) and bomb military and logistic targets
north of the DMZ. Sea Dragon was suspended in November 1968 during Perth's
second deployment. After this, RAN vessels' primary task was to provide
Naval Gunfire Support (NGFS) for ground operations near the coast. 

     Whilst the threat of naval or air assault on Australian vessels
was not very large (33), as was the threat of sea borne mines. However,
during inshore operations against WBLCs and in support of amphibious
assaults, the ships were somewhat exposed to ground fire. In September
1967 Perth was hit by fire from a shore battery whilst in the pursuit of
WBLC. Australian vessels were also used in conjunction with 1 ATF in Phuoc
Tuy. In May 1970 Hobart relieved USS St Paul and provided NGFS for
Australian troops in the Long Hai Hills.(34)

     The Royal Australian Navy also played a considerable role in the
deployment of Australian troops and supply to 1 ATF and RAN vessels in the
Gulf of Tonkin. Primary amongst these was HMAS Sydney, an aircraft carrier
converted into a troop transport. 1 RAR was despatched aboard HMAS Sydney
from Sydney to Vung Tau in May 1965. HMA Ships Jeparit and Boonaroo acted
as supply ships for Australian forces in Vietnam and were particularly
important in supplying HMAS Vendetta with ammunition during its
deployment. (35)

     Other aspects of RAN involvement in Vietnam included the dispatch
of 8 pilots and support staff for retraining and posting with US 135th
Aviation Company at Vung Tau in October 1967. The RAN Helicopter Flight
Vietnam (RANHFV) was used for troop insertion and as gunships for support
fire. The RAN also provided pilots as part of a detachment to No.9
Squadron RAAF at Nui Dat, operating in cooperation with 1 ATF.(36)

     The Royal Australian Navy personnel in Vietnam totalled 2800. As
far as possible RAN forces were directed to operate in cooperation with 1
ATF in Phuoc Tuy Province, consistent with the concept of having an
Australian sphere of influence. Whilst operational command was reserved
for COMNAVFORV, the degree of integration with Australian forces was
maintained until the last RAN vessel, HMAS Sydney departed from Vung Tau
in February 1972. 


Assessment of Australian Military, Operations

     AATTV: Quite obviously if the general method of operations
practiced by Australian forces was significantly different to those
employed by US forces, then so to would the training techniques. The
AATTV, in instructing Vietnamese officers, often found themselves
contradicting or being contradicted by US advisers. In addition to this,
such was the social status acquired by being an officer in ARVN that
Junior officers were discouraged from humiliating their seniors by
learning more than they. Particularly if one trained junior officer was
expected to serve under an untrained (by AATTV or others) senior
officer.(37) AATTV advisers serving with Montegnard units found that
ethnic rivalry between Montegnards and the Vietnamese often resulted in
'no shoot' a greements being made with the NLF and VC forces entering
Vietnam via Laos or Cambodia. Peterson's Montegnard Special Forces at one
stage in 1964 even rebelled, marching on ARVN forces in Ban Me Thout.(38)

     AATTV operations under COMMACV were quite successful. There were
few problems in the actual command system, save that their were
disagreements over methodology when it came to instruction. AATTV's only
real problems came from working with the ARVN forces , whom they
frequently found to be unenthusiastic, lazy and often corrupt. 

     1 RAR and US 173rd Abn Bde: There were again general differences
of opinion between these two units as to the conduct of operations. The
Airborne Brigade was designed for large deployments and heavy firepower
whereas 1 RAR, even though restructured to suit the American style, with
its COIN experience in Malaya operating individually from larger units was
unfamiliar and uncomfortable with these type of tactics.(39) One such
example of this was 1 RAR's training with helicopters. In Malaya, up to
4 helicopters, primarily for medevac purposes, was all a company could
expect or need. There was no requirement for the calling of air strikes
and little for artillery strikes. Yet at Bien Hoa, the latter of these two
were frequently practiced, due to the number of enemy being engaged, and
up to 40 helicopters were effectively at the disposal of the battalion.(40)
Unlike subsequent Australian forces, there was little association with ARVN
forces and no reliance on them. 

     Australian Task Force: 1ATF met with mixed successes during its
five years in Phuoc Tuy. Initially, 5 & 6 RAR encountered large scale
opposition and attempted to combat NLF political structure. Given the
limitations under which 1 ATF worked (poor equipment, ambiguous
objectives and unfamiliar combat environment), it could be asserted that
it was quite successful in doing this.(41) Long Tan and the subsequent
follow up missions severely damaged NLF main force units in the region,
however, it is was apparent that the relative speed with which the NLF
reasserted itself in the years of ATF's withdrawal indicates the failure
to win the hearts and minds of the people, a tactic essential to the
defeat of communist terrorists in Malaya and Borneo. 

     The increase in size of 1 ATF in November 1967 introduced new
problems and new challenges to the Australians. From January, 1 ATF
operated in engagements outside of Phuoc Tuy. These were again large scale
operations and required some degree of integratio n with American forces.
Similar problems to those experienced by 1 RAR in 1965 were encountered,
somewhat lessened in effect by the larger size of 1 ATF (two battalions
were distributed through three bases; Balmoral, Coogee and Coral) and its
increased independence from ll FFV HQ. The defence of Bien Hoa during the
TET offensive in February 1968 was successful in so far as 1 ATF
maintained a relatively high enemy body count and weren't themselves
overrun. However, the nature of the war was such that victories in large
scale battle counted for little. It was hoped that 1 ATF could secure a
credible victory in Phuoc Tuy, one similar in nature to Australia's
military experience in Malaya, where the enemy was totally wiped out, the
people supportive of the Australian presence and the province safe from
subversion. an effect, a lasting and significant impact on the province,
culminating in the battle of Binh Ba in June 1969. 1 ATF returned to Phuoc
Tuy, after several redeployments to Bien Hoa, and engaged in the third
phase of their operations, the pacification of Phuoc Tuy.(42)

     This phase, from about mid-1969 to 1971, met with mixed success
also. Although carrying out operations which Australian troops were more
familiar with, the degree of success encountered was somewhat less than
expected. The reasons for this relative failure include not only the
ineptitude of ARVN forces, cooperation with whom was essential in
maintaining an allied presence in any given area, but also several rather
glaring deficiencies in Australian planning. An ambitious project by
Vincent in 1867 to cr eate a minefield barrier from Dat Do to Phuoc Hai,
described by Westmoreland as "imaginative", had resulted in a substantial
number of casualties (almost thirty) in operations in the Long Hai hills
in May 1969 and again by 8 RAR in January 1970.(43) Whil st it may have
been the responsibility of ARVN forces to patrol the minefield, it was
apparent that Vincent was remiss in expecting them to do so. In addition
to this, Larsen identifies one major deficiency in the Australian civil
aid program, claiming t hat lack of coordination with local administration
often resulted in poor planning and inadequate maintenance of completed
projects.(44)

     Quite clearly the major reason for the failure of 1 ATF to
complete a total victory in Phuoc Tuy was the lack of cooperation between
ARVN and 1 ATF and the failure of the civil aid program to win the support
of the populace away from the NLF. Australia's attempts to train and equip
RVN local units and their reluctance to allow these units any significant
participation in the pacification program, coupled with the failure of
these local units to perform adequately, destined Phuoc Tuy to be returned
to the influence of the NLF on the ATF's withdrawal. 


Conclusion

     The Nixon (Guam) Doctrine announced in July 1969 and the British
decision to quit East Of Suez by 1971 led to a radical rethinking of
Australian defence and foreign policy in Southeast Asia. Consistent with
the withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam, Australia also withdrew,
the last Australian troops to leave being the AATTV. The defeat of the
Liberal-Country Party coalition government coincided with this final
withdrawal. Australia had spent ten years actively involved in the
conflict in Vietnam, s ending almost 47 000 men, almost 500 of whom were
killed and about 2 400 wounded. Australia paid its own way through
Vietnam, employed its own tactical methods, adopted its own province and
pursued its own political ends. Australian's were noted to have h ated
everybody, the truth of which may lay under a mixture of racial prejudice
and discontent at the limitations they were placed under compared to the
excesses of their American allies. 

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--
Endnotes 
1) p.8, Australia's Military Committment to Vietnam, Paper tabled
in accordance with the Prime Minister's Statement in the House of
Representatives on 13 May 1975. 

2) p.1, Horner, D.M., Australian Higher Command in the Vietnam War,
Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No.40, Strategic and Defence
Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1986. 

3) p.38, McNeill, I., "Australian Army Advisers: Perceptions of Enemies
and Allies", in Maddox, K., &, Wright, B., (eds), War: Australia and
Vietnam, Harper & Row, Sydney, 1987. 

4) p.39, Ibid. 

5) pp.35-36, McNeill, I., "Peterson and the Montegnards: An Episode in the
Vietnam War", Journal of the Australian War Memorial, Oct.1982, No.1. 

6) pp.56-58, McNeill, I., "Australian Army Advisers: Perceptions of
Enemies and Allies". 

7) p.311, McNamara, E.G., "Australian Military Operations in Vietnam",
Journal of the Royal Institute for Defence Studies, Nov.1968, Vol.113,
No.652,. 

8) p.30, Breen, R.J., "Problems of an Expeditionary Force - First
Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment, 1965", Defence Force Journal,
Sept/Oct.1986, No.25. 

9) p.44, McNeill, I., "An Outline of Australian Military Involvement in
Vietnam: July 1962-December 1972", Australian Defence Force Journal,
Sept/Oct. 1986, No.1. 

10) pp.30-32, Breen, R.J., op.cit.

11) p.312, McNamara, E.G., op.cit.

12) pp.60-61, Frost, F., "Australia's War in Vietnam: 1962-1972", in King,
P., (ed), Australia's Vietnam: Australia in the Second Indo-China War,
Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1983. 

13) p.62, Ibid.,

14) p.45, McNeill, I.., ., "An Outline of Australian Military Involvement
in Vietnam: July 1962-December 1972". 

15) p.313, McNamara, E.G., "Australian Military Operations in Vietnam".

16) p.61, Brodie, S., Tilting at Dominoes: Australia and the Vietnam War,
Child & Assoc., Brookvale, 1987. 

17) p.17, Fairfax, D., Navy in Vietnam: A Record of the Royal Australian
Navy in the Vietnam War 1965-1972, AGPS, Canberra, 1980. 

18) p.7, McAuley, L., The Battle of Long Tan, the legend of ANZAC upheld,
Hutchinson, Hawthorn, 1986. 

19) p.15, Horner, D.M., Australian Higher Command in the Vietnam War.

20) pp.64-65, Frost, F., "Australia's War in Vietnam: 1962-1972".

21) p.9, McAuley, L., The Battle of Long Tan, the legend of ANZAC upheld.

22) p.314, McNamara, E.G., op.cit.

23) pp.31-32, Horner, D.M., op.cit.

24) p.314, McNamara, E.G., op.cit.

25) pp.34-35, Horner, D.M., op.cit.

26) p.50, McNeill, I., "An Outline of Australian Military Involvement in
Vietnam: July 1962-December 1972". 

27) p.96, Larsen, R.L., &, Collins, J.L., Allied Participation in Vietnam,
Dept. of the Army, Washington D.C., 1975. 

28) p.97-98, ibid.

29) pp.17-18, Fairfax, D., Navy in Vietnam: A Record of the Royal
Australian Navy in the Vietnam War 1965-1972. 

30) pp103-105, ibid.,

31) pp.97-98, Larson, et.al, op.cit.

32) Fairfax, D., Navy in Vietnam: A Record of the Royal Australian Navy in
the Vietnam War 1965-1972. 

33) Perhaps with the exception of air assault from USAF jets, Hobart was
struck by three missiles in June 1968, killing two and wounding several. 
The fighters also attacked two patrol craft, sinking one. 

34) pp.59-61, 85, Ibid.

35) pp.170-173, Vendetta used British ammunition which had to be shipped
from Sydney. 

36) p.99, Larsen, et.al., op.cit.

37) pp.43-47, McNeill, I., "Australian Army Advisers: Perceptions of
Enemies and Allies". 

38) pp.37-40, McNeill, I., "Peterson and the Montegnards: An Episode in
the Vietnam War". 

39) pp.34-35, Breen, R.J., "Problems of an Expeditionary Force - First
Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment, 1965". 

40) p.312, McNamara, E.G., op.cit.

41) pp.65-66, Frost, F., "Australia's War in Vietnam: 1962-1972".

42) pp.66-67, ibid.

43) pp.41-42, Horner, D.M., op.cit.

44) p.113, Larsen, et.al, op.cit.,

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------
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- -Brian Ross------------------------------------------------------
              "For I will work the work in your days which ye will 
not believe, though it be told to you"
------------------------------------------Habakkuk, 7th Century BC- 
