
       ******************************************************************
                  >C O M P U T E R   U N D E R G R O U N D<
                                >D I G E S T<
               ***  Volume 1, Issue #1.00 (March 28, 1990)  **
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     MODERATORS:   Jim Thomas / Gordon Meyer
     REPLY TO:     TK0JUT2@NIU.bitnet

     COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing 
     information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of 
     diverse views. 
     --------------------------------------------------------------------
     DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent 
                 the views of the moderators. Contributors assume all 
                 responsibility for assuring that articles submitted do not 
                 violate copyright protections. 
     --------------------------------------------------------------------


     COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST was begun with the encouragement of Pat 
     Townson, moderator of TELECOM DIGEST. Pat received far to many 
     responses to the recent Legion of Doom indictments to print, and many 
     of the issues raised were, for reasons beyond Pat's control, unable to 
     be printed. This, the initial issue of CuD (as in "stuff to ruminate 
     over") will reprint some of the initial responses to provide the 
     background for those who missed the earlier discussions. 

     Preliminary interest in this forum has been relatively good. We 
     received about 50 inquiries in the first 12 hours. We anticipate 
     initial problems in linking bitnet with usenet and other outlets.  
     Doug Davis (in Texas) has thoughtfully volunteered to serve as a go 
     between Usenet and other links, so, by trial and error, we'll try to 
     contact everybody who has expressed interest. 

     We will set line length at 78 characters. If there are problems in 
     reading this, let us know and we will shorten it. 

     STATEMENT OF INTENT

     CuD encourages opinions on all topics from all perspective.  Other 
     than providing a context for an article if necessary, the moderators 
     *will not* add commentary of agreement or disagreement.  We see our 
     role as one of facilitating debate, although we will undoubtedly take 
     part in discussions in separate articles. 

     From the inquiries, interest seems to gravitate around a number of 
     issues related to the "computer underground," by which we mean the 
     social world of phreaks, hackers, and pirates. Judging from the 
     comments, we encourage contributions of the following nature: 

     1. Reasoned and thoughtful debates about economic, ethical, legal, and 
     other issues related to the computer underground. 

     2. Verbatim printed newspaper or magazine articles containing relevant 
     stories. If you send a transcription of an article, be sure it 
     contains the source *and* the page numbers so references can be 
     checked. Also be sure that no copyright violations are infringed. 

2
     3. Public domain legal documents (affidavits, indictments, court 
     records) that pertain to relevant topics. In the next issue we will 
     present documents from the Alcor (California) E-mail law suit. 

     4. General discussion of news, problems, or other issues that 
     contributors feel should be aired. 

     5. Unpublished academic papers, "think pieces," or research results 
     are strongly encouraged. These would presumably be long, and we would 
     limit the size to about 1,500 lines. Those appropriate for 
     distribution would be sent as a single file and so-marked in the 
     header. 

     Although we encourage debate, we stress that ad hominem attacks or 
     personal vituperations will not be printed. Although we encourage 
     opinion, we suggest that these be well-reasoned and substantiated with 
     facts, citations, or other "evidence" that would bolster claims. 

     CuD *is not* a preak/hacker forum, and it is not a replacement for 
     PHRACK magazine.  However, our initial model for this forum is a 
     combination of PHRACK WORLD NEWS and CNN's Cross-Fire if moderated by 
     Emo Phillips. 

     The first few issues are exploratory. If there is continued interest, 
     we will continue. If not, so it goes. We *strongly* encourage 
     suggestions and criticisms. 

     --------------
     In this issue:
     --------------
     1. Moderator's Introduction
     2. Background of the LoD debates
     3. Use of Aliases in the BBS world
     4. LoD Indictment
     5. Press Release Accompanying LoD indictment

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     ===================================================
     ===  Computer Underground Digest - File 1 of 5  ===
     ===================================================


     Welcome to the first "issue" of Computer Underground Digest.  Jim and 
     I thought it would appropriate if we both wrote a few words as a sort 
     of "hello" and introduction. I'll keep this brief for now as I believe 
     the "good stuff" will be found in the other inclusions.  However since 
     this is the first of what could be several (or perhaps few) issues it 
     is appropriate at this time to offer some thoughts, more or less off 
     the cuff, on the so-called "computer underground" (CU). 

     Over the past few years I've often been asked to justify the use of 
     "computer underground" when referring to the realm of hackers, 
     phreakers, and pirates. Certainly the "computer" part is easy to 
     justify, or at least accept as valid. No, it's the "underground" that 
     has been criticized.  Now I certainly don't claim to have invented the 
     term, in fact it is taken from the vocabulary of the p/hackers 
     themselves.  However "underground" does imply, at least in common 
3
     usage, some characteristics that are not necessarily accurate.  Some 
     of these are organization, criminality (or at lest marginality), 
     unity, and purposiveness. 

     Does the CU display these characteristics?  Discussing each would take 
     much more room than I intend to use today.  My M.A. thesis of August 
     1989 addressed the issues of organization and unity, from a 
     sociological viewpoint.  The articles included in this issue of the 
     Digest address all of the a fore mentioned issues from another 
     viewpoint, one formed largely by cultural outsiders.  The issue that 
     faces us now is who gets to define what the CU is all about? Do we 
     rely on the Federal Justice department to identify and label the 
     intent, organization, and purpose of the CU as conspirical?  Do we 
     rely on the media to define the CU as reckless and unlawful?  Do we, 
     as citizens, trust those in power to make decisions that will forever 
     impact the way our societal institutions of control approach those 
     whose application of technology has out paced our conceptions of 
     private property and crime? 

     Am I an advocate _for_ the computer underground?  No, I'm not "one of 
     them" and I don't speak for "them".  However I do think it is in the 
     best interest of all if the "problem" of the CU is approached from the 
     new perspective it deserves.  If our society is to ultimately decide 
     that CU activity is every bit as terrible as puppy-whipping then that 
     decision should be made, not forced upon us by lawmakers (and others) 
     who are assuming, from the very beginning, that CU activity is 
     threatening and criminal. 

     To this end I hope that the CU Digest can provide information and 
     discussion from a variety of perspectives.  The assumptions and 
     changes in definitions are subtle but hopefully we can begin to get a 
     handle on many aspects of the CU. 

     Gordon Meyer
     Internet: 72307.1502@compuserve.com
     3/27/90

     =====================================================================

     Recent media depictions of phreaks, hackers, and pirates have created 
     an image of evil lads (is it *really* a male bastion?) out to wreak 
     havoc on society (the studies of Erdwin Pfuhl and Ray Michalowski, 
     Dick Hollinger and Lonn Lanza-Kaduce, and Meyer and Thomas). Hollinger 
     and Lanza-Kaduce have argued that one reason that Draconian anti-
     computer abuse laws were passed in the past few years is because of 
     distorted images, lack of understanding of the computer world, and a 
     lack of a strong constituency  to point out the potential abuses of 
     restrictive legislation. 

     We see CuD as an antidote to the current--yes, I will call them WITCH-
     HUNTS--of law enforcement agents and media hysteria. There is also a 
     perceived need of commentators with some sympathy toward the computer 
     underground to preface their comments with "I don't agree with their 
     behaviors, but. . ."!  I see no need to adopt a defensive posture. All 
     predatory behavior is wrong, and that type of disclaimer should be 
     sufficient. However, it remains to be seen whether *all* computer 
     underground activity is as predatory as the media and law enforcement 
     agents would have us believe. 

     Yes, crimes are committed with computers. But, crimes are also 
4
     committed with typewriters, cars, fountain pens and--badges. Computer 
     Underground digest will attempt to provide an antidote to current 
     beliefs by creating an open forum where they can be debated by all 
     sides. 

     Our intent, as Gordon indicates, is not to serve as apologists, but 
     rather as gadflies. Technology is changing society faster than 
     existing norms, values, beliefs, or laws, can match, and by airing 
     issues we hope to at least provide insights into the new definitions 
     of control, authority, privacy, and even resistance.  Data from our 
     own studies indicate that sysops of some BBSs have been exceedingly 
     cautious in putting up documents that are quite legal. The sysop of 
     one of the world's largest legitimate BBSs has told us of the chilling 
     effect on freedom of speech that even a casual visit from the FBI can 
     produce. Our hope is to present facts, stimulate debate, and above 
     all, to create an awareness of the relationship between the computer 
     underground, which is currently a stigmatized pastime, and the rest of 
     society.  We are not concerned with changing opinions, but we do hope 
     to sharpen and clarify what, to us, are highly complex issues for 
     which there is no simple solution. 

     Jim Thomas
     Sociology/Criminal Justice
     Northern Illinois University
     DeKalb, IL  60115   (TK0JUT1@NIU.bitnet)

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     ===================================================
     ===  Computer Underground Digest - File 2 of 5  ===
     ===================================================

     -----------------------------
     The following articles are reprinted from an issue of TELECOM DIGEST 
     that appeared a few days ago. Because further responses could not be 
     reprinted, we present them again to provide the background that 
     spawned CuD. We have not added Professor Spafford's original comment 
     because Mike Godwin cites the bulk of it. If we err in not doing so, 
     we apologize in advance, but are guided here by space constraints and 
     not malice.
     -----------------------------


     Inside This Issue:                         Moderator: Patrick A. Townson

         Preface to Special Issue [TELECOM Moderator]
         Re: Legion of Doom Rebuttal to Moderator [Mike Godwin]
         Re: Legion of Doom Rebuttal to Moderator [Douglas Mason]
         Re: Legion of Doom Rebuttal to Moderator [Scott Edward Conrad]
         Re: Legion of Doom Rebuttal to Moderator [Gordon Burditt]
     ----------------------------------------------------------------------

     Date: Sun, 25 Mar 90 11:45:32 CST
     >From: TELECOM Moderator <telecom@eecs.nwu.edu>
     Subject: Preface to Special Issue


     This issue is devoted to replies to Gene Spafford about the activities 
5
     of the Legion of Doom. Like many controversial topics (Caller*ID for 
     one), the LoD has the potential to use great amounts of network 
     resources as the arguments go on. Because Mr. Spafford is a highly 
     respected member of the net community, the people who responded to his 
     article here certainly deserve the courtesy of being heard, but with 
     this selection of responses, we will discontinue further pros-and-cons 
     messages on LoD, at least until the criminal proceedings are finished. 
     Obviously, *new* information about LoD, government investigative 
     activities, etc is welcome, but let's not rehash old stuff again and 
     again. 

     Patrick Townson

     ------------------------------

     >From: Mike Godwin <walt.cc.utexas.edu!mnemonic@cs.utexas.edu> 
     Subject: Re: Legion of Doom Rebuttal to Moderator Date: 22 Mar 90 
     20:16:43 GMT Reply-To: Mike Godwin 
     <walt.cc.utexas.edu!mnemonic@cs.utexas.edu> Organization: The 
     University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas 


     In article <5462@accuvax.nwu.edu> Gene Spafford <spaf@cs.purdue.edu> 
     writes: 

     >The information I have available from various sources indicates that 
     the investigation is continuing, others are likely to be charged, and 
     there MAY be some national security aspects to parts of the 
     investigation that have yet to be disclosed. 

     The information that I have is that many innocent third parties are 
     being trampled by the federal agents in their investigatory zeal. The 
     unnecessary seizure of equipment at Steve Jackson Games in Austin, 
     Texas, is a notable example. In that case, the Secret Service assumed 
     that, since SJ Games employed a reformed computer hacker, it was 
     likely that their company BBS (used for feedback from role-playing 
     game testers nationwide) contained relevant evidence. So, the SS 
     seized all the company's computer equipment, including its laser 
     printer, all available copies of the company's new Cyberpunk game (set 
     in a William Gibson future involving penetration of repressive 
     corporate computer systems), and copies of Gordon Meyer's dangerous 
     academic thesis, in which the author proposed that the hacker 
     underground had been "criminalized" in the public mind due to images 
     created by a few destructive individuals and by the fairly ignorant 
     media. 

     In spite of this, they assured Jackson and his lawyer that neither 
     Jackson nor his company was the target of the investigation. (Jackson, 
     who owes his livelihood to the copyright laws, is an adamant opponent 
     of piracy.) 

     Apparently, the federal agents were angered by the Cyberpunk gaming 
     manual, which romanticized 21st-century computer "cowboys" like Case 
     in Gibson's novel NEUROMANCER. They further conjectured that the game 
     is a cookbook for hackers. 

     Jackson's business is losing, at his estimate, thousands of dollars a 
     month thanks to this seizure, which was far more intrusive than 
     necessary (why take the hardware at all?), and which seemed to 
     demonstrate the agents' willingness to find evildoings everywhere. The 
6
     Federal Tort Claims Act bars tort recovery based on law-enforcement-
     related seizures of property, I note in passing. 

     >Now maybe there are one or two people on the law enforcement side who 
     >are a little over-zealous (but not the few I talk with on a regular 
     >basis). 

     Yeah, maybe one or two.

     >For someone to be indicted requires that sufficient evidence be 
     >collected to convince a grand jury -- a group of 23 (24?  I forget 
     >exactly) average people -- that the evidence shows a high probability 
     >that the crimes were committed. 

     The notion that grand juries are any kind of screening mechanism for 
     prosecutions, while correct in theory, has long been discredited. In 
     general, not even prosecutors pretend that the theory is accurate 
     anymore.  In law school, one of the first things you're taught in 
     criminal-procedure courses is that grand juries are not screening 
     mechanisms at all. (It is so rare for a grand jury to fail to follow a 
     prosecutor's recommendation to indict that when it does happen the 
     grand jury is known as a "rogue grand jury.") The basic function of 
     grand juries at the federal level is INVESTIGATORY -- the grand-jury 
     subpoena power is used to compel suspects' and witnesses' presence and 
     testimony prior to actual prosecution. 

     >Search warrants require probable cause and the action of judges who 
     >will not sign imprecise and poorly targeted warrants. 

     Ha! Dream on.

     >Material seized under warrant can be forced to be returned by legal 
     >action if the grounds for the warrant are shown to be false, so the 
     >people who lost things have legal remedy if they are innocent. 

     Guess who pays for pursuing the legal remedy in most cases.
     (Hint: it's not the government.)

     Now guess how long such proceedings can take.

     >The system has a lot of checks on it, and it requires convincing a 
     >lot of people along the way that there is significant evidence to take 
     >the next step. 

     The system does have checks in it, but they are neither as 
     comprehensive nor as reliable as you seem to think. 

     >If these guys were alleged mafioso instead of electronic terrorists, 
     >would you still be claiming it was a witch hunt? 

     Possibly. There have been periods in this country in which it was not 
     very pleasant to be involved in a criminal investigation if your name 
     ended in a vowel. 

     >Conspiracy, fraud, theft, violations of the computer fraud and abuse 
     >act, maybe the ECPA, possession of unauthorized access codes, et. al. 
     >are not to be taken lightly, and not to be dismissed as some 
     >"vendetta" by law enforcement. 

     I don't think anyone is proposing that the investigation of genuine 
7
     statutory violations is necessarily a vendetta. In fact, I don't think 
     this is the case even in the Jolnet sting. But lack of understanding 
     on the part of the federal officials involved, plus the general 
     expansion of federal law-enforcement officials powers in the '70s and 
     '80s, mean that life can be pretty miserable for you if you even KNOW 
     someone who MIGHT be the target of an investigation. 

     There are civil-rights and civil-liberties issues here that have yet 
     to be addressed. And they probably won't even be raised so long as 
     everyone acts on the assumption that all hackers are criminals and 
     vandals and need to be squashed, at whatever cost. 

     Before you jump to conclusions about my motivations in posting this, 
     let me point out the following: 

     1) I'm against computer crime and believe it should be prosecuted.

     2) I'm nor now, nor have I ever been, a "hacker." (The only 
     substantive programming I've ever done was in dBase II, by the way.) 

     3) Even though (1) and (2) are true, I am disturbed, on principle, at 
     the conduct of at least some of the federal investigations now going 
     on. I know several people who've taken their systems out of public 
     access just because they can't risk the seizure of their equipment (as 
     evidence or for any other reason). If you're a Usenet site, you may 
     receive megabytes of new data every day, but you have no common-
     carrier protection in the event that someone puts illegal information 
     onto the Net and thence into your system. 

     And (3) is only one of the issues that has yet to be addressed by 
     policymakers. 

     >Realize that the Feds involved are prohibited from disclosing elements
     >of their evidence and investigation precisely to protect the rights of
     >the defendants.

     They're also secretive by nature. Much has been withheld that does not 
     implicate defendants' rights (e.g., the basis for Secret Service 
     jurisdiction in this case). 

     >If you base your perceptions of this whole mess on just what has been 
     >rumored and reported by those close to the defendants (or from 
     >potential defendants), then you are going to get a very biased, 
     >inaccurate picture of the situation. 

     Even if you screen out the self-serving stuff that defendants (and 
     non-defendants) have been saying, you still get a disturbing picture 
     of the unbridled scope of federal law-enforcement power. 

     In addition, we can't fall into the still-fashionable Ed Meese 
     mentality: "If they're innocent they don't have to worry about being 
     indicted." This is simply not true. 

     >Only after the whole mess comes to trial will we all be able to get a 
     >more complete picture, and then some people may be surprised at the 
     >scope and nature of what is involved. 

     Ah, just the way the Oliver North trial cleared things up?

     (I know that's a bit unfair, but it expresses my feeling that we're 
8
     better off relying on the press, flawed as it is, than waiting for the 
     feds to tell us what it's good for us to know at the time they think 
     it's good for us to know it.) 

     In sum, the *complaint* has been this:

     "Look at the way the feds are losing their cool over this! Lots of 
     folks are being harmed, and lots of rights are being violated!" 

     The *response* of those whose justifiable opposition to computer crime 
     has blinded them to the rights, due-process, and justice issues 
     involved has been something like this: 

     "They're the government. They wouldn't be doing this stuff if they 
     weren't a good reason for it." 

     I have no trouble with Gene Spafford's skepticism about the complaint; 
     please understand, however, why I insist on being skeptical about the 
     response. 


     Mike Godwin, UT Law School  
     mnemonic@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu 
     mnemonic@walt.cc.utexas.edu 
     (512) 346-4190              
                                 
       |"Neither am I anyone; I have dreamt the world as
       | you dreamt your work, my Shakespeare, and among
       | the forms in my dream are you, who like myself
       | are many and no one."  --Borges
                                 
     ------------------------------

     >From: Douglas Mason <douglas@ddsw1.mcs.com>
     Subject: Re: Legion of Doom Rebuttal to Moderator
     Reply-To: douglas@ddsw1.MCS.COM (Douglas Mason)
     Organization: ddsw1.MCS.COM Contributor, Mundelein, IL
     Date: Thu, 22 Mar 90 12:49:29 GMT


     I don't think that there is anyone out there saying that what those 
     guys did was right in any way, shape or form.  Granted, there are 
     people out there that are probably saying to themselves "These guys 
     were just trying to show what capitalistic pigs the government is and 
     now they are being stomped on for exposing ...  "  You get the idea. 

     I think (from the 60 or so messages that I received in the last few 
     days) that the general opinion seems to be "Yes, these guys are very 
     much in the wrong, BUT did their case deserve as much media hype as it 
     has received?" 

     Just the other day a group of people murdered a tax collector here. 
     The papers made it out to be a joke and a "get back at the government" 
     type of thing.  I personally couldn't see the funny side of a 27 year 
     old getting killed.  Anyway, the article was towards the back of the 
     paper (ie: not page one material) and was gone and forgotten 
     immediately after. 

     The infamous "LOD" busts, on the other hand, seem to be springing up 
     again and again. 

9
     Something else I noticed about the whole affair and LOD in general 
     (before the big ordeal): A large chunk of the respect and whatnot over 
     the group (in the hacker circles) seemed to be because LOD did very 
     little "broadcasting" of the information they came up with 
     collectively. 

     On the other hand, if I had been "wired for sound" by some agency in 
     the past, the LOD affair would have been over with much sooner, as all 
     members seemed to be more than willing to give out information on CBI, 
     Trans Union, SBDN, SCCS, ESACS, LMOS, Cosmos [insert favorite acrynom 
     here] when they were approached individually. 

     Last time I visited one of the infamous LOD people, he showed me how 
     he could monitor phone lines remotely.  Sounds like complete BS and it 
     is a worn out subject as to if it can really be done, but he ran some 
     Bell telco software and it allowed him to enter the number of any 
     phone number that was serviced by his local CO (I believe) and then 
     enter a callback number.  While I stood there not believing him, the 
     other phone rang, and sure enough, it was "testing for audio quality" 
     on another line.  He told me the acronym for the name of this 
     software, but it slips my mind, as I no longer have any interest in 
     that type of stuff.  Point is that these guys were pretty trusting. If 
     the feds wanted to get them, they could have done it long ago. 

     My guess is that by this point they have MORE than enough evidence to 
     prosecute these guys.  There is absolutely no doubt in my mind about 
     that. 


     Douglas T. Mason | douglas@ddsw1.UUCP or dtmason@m-net |

     ------------------------------

     Date: Thu, 22 Mar 90 13:20:10 CST
     >From: Scott Edward Conrad <sec0770@cec2.wustl.edu>
     Subject: Re: Legion of Doom Rebuttal to Moderator


             Because I happened to start researching a paper on law applied 
     to computer hacking, I have been following the LoD bust with great 
     interest.  Recently, someone mentioned that they didn't think these 
     alleged perpetrators (sp?) deserved 31 years. Where did this number 
     come from? 

             According to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, there 
     seem to be 3 areas covered: (see also Computer/Law Journal, Vol. 6, 
     1986) 

             1) It is a felony to access a computer without authorization 
     to obtain classified US military or foreign policy info with the 
     intent or reason to believe that such info will be used to harm the US 
     or to benefit a foreign nation. 

             2) It is a misdemeanor to access a computer without 
     authorization to obtain financial or credit info that is protected by 
     federal financial privacy laws. 

             3) It is a misdemeanor to access a federal government computer 
     without authorization and thereby use, modify, destroy, or disclose 
     any information therein. 

10
             (3) seems the most applicable. Where I am confused is whether 
     or not the 911 code is considered government property. If it is, does 
     this make Bell South, a federal government computer? 

             What exactly are the LoD being tried for? (or has there been 
     charges filed against them, or is the SS still gathering info?) 

     Please send any thoughts to me. 


     Scott Conrad
     sec0770@cec2.wustl.edu

     ------------------------------

     >From: Gordon Burditt <sneaky!gordon@uunet.uu.net>
     Subject: Re: Legion of Doom Rebuttal to Moderator
     Date: 24 Mar 90 10:21:24 GMT


     In article <5462@accuvax.nwu.edu> Gene Spafford <spaf@cs.purdue.edu> 
     writes: 

     >that the crimes were committed.  Search warrants require probable 
     >cause and the action of judges who will not sign imprecise and poorly 
     >targeted warrants.  Material seized under warrant can be forced to be 
     >returned by legal action if the grounds for the warrant are shown to 
     >be false, so the people who lost things have legal remedy if they are 
     >innocent. 

     I don't believe it.  It certainly doesn't work that way for non-
     computer crimes.  Let's suppose I am a homeowner, and a burglar rips 
     off my TV set.  I surprise him, and he shoots me with my own gun. 
     Later he is caught with the TV and the gun in his apartment.  Can I 
     get my TV set back before the trial?  No.  How about the gun (assuming 
     it's legal for me to have it)?  No.  Does anyone seriously think I'm 
     guilty of stealing my own TV or shooting myself with my own gun?  (I 
     got lucky and had a priest, two off-duty cops, and the mayor as 
     witnesses).  No.  Does anyone think the TV and gun aren't mine?  (They 
     have my name engraved, and I have receipts.)  No, but it doesn't 
     matter. 

     Do you really think that the operator of any BBS seized because it was 
     used by crooks to exchange long-distance access codes is going to get 
     his system back any time soon, even if the Feds are convinced of his 
     innocence and active cooperation?  Even if the active cooperation 
     started before there were any access codes on the system, and the 
     crooks were deliberately led to this system as part of a sting 
     operation?  No, it's evidence, and it will probably be released long 
     after anyone convicted has served his sentence, and only after the 
     owner has spent more in legal fees than the system is worth at the 
     time of its return. 

     I doubt also that the Feds are going to be helpful to a non-suspect 
     BBS operator, and give him a copy of his own data, (They took all the 
     backups) sanitized to remove anything illegal.  Nope, all those disks 
     with his tax records (which had nothing to do with the BBS) on them 
     will have to be manually reconstructed, even if he can borrow a system 
     somewhere. 

11
                                             Gordon L. Burditt
                                             sneaky.lonestar.org!gordon

     ------------------------------

     End of TELECOM Digest Special: LoD Rebuttals
     ******************************


     ===================================================
     ===  Computer Underground Digest - File 3 of 5  ===
     ===================================================

     There has been some debate about the use of "handles" (or "aliases") 
     in the BBS world. A few commentators have questioned their 
     appropriateness, and there seems to be a tendency for government law 
     enforcement agents to interpret the use of handles as a sign of 
     "conspiracy" or "hiding intents." 

     The use of handles to disguise identity has a long and honorable 
     tradition in the U.S. It was Publius, after all (the "handle" of those 
     notorious subversives and 18th century deviants John Jay, James 
     Madison, and Alexander Hamilton) who wrote THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, the 
     basis of our Constitution. 

     In the BBS world, handles provide not only a sense of anonymity, but 
     serve also as a symbolic identity. In a current research project, we 
     find that for serious BBS hobbyists, handles encapsulate an ethos 
     reflected by a fictional (usually science fiction) hero, a literary 
     genre, music or media characters, or public figures.  Handles connote 
     particular cultural meanings, and these meanings can be "read off" as 
     a short hand summary of the character, interests, or political 
     ideology of the user. 

     The anonymity provided by handles serves several purposes.  First, it 
     allows the user, for better or worse, a sense of freedom to express 
     ideas that might otherwise subject him/her to ridicule. Second, 
     analysis of BBS message logs suggests that women, especially, feel 
     freer to participate in discussions without fear of gender games that 
     might occur in face-to-face interaction. Third, concealing one's 
     identity provides limited freedom from kooks, merchandise hucksters, 
     and other snoopers. In a society in which making, maintaining, and 
     disseminating lists is common place, protecting one's identity hardly 
     seems unreasonable. 

     There is a fourth reason why handles are increasingly necessary.  As 
     Gordon Meyer cogently suggested in his recent comment, prosecutors are 
     not unwilling to confiscate e-mail, BBS message logs, or other 
     "evidence" of identity. These, in turn, are easily used to obtain 
     information on innocent parties. To those who have continually argued, 
     or who actually believe, the federal agents "know what they're doing," 
     or are too "professional" to abuse their powers, I remind you of the 
     witch hunts against "subversives" who opposed the Viet Nam war, the 
     FBI's COINTEL-PRO, and other gross abuses of power in recent years. 
     Attorney Gerry Spence is currently defending Friends of the Earth 
     against a "set-up" by federal agents that, unfortunately for the 
     agents, was captured on tape. It was, after all, the FBI who attempted 
     to coerce Martin Luther King to commit suicide! There is voluminous 
     literature, including the Church Committee's Report in the 1970s, and 
     other research (including my own) that documents these abuses. In 
12
     short, despite protections, our enforcement agents have a rather sorry 
     record of following the law to enforce the law (see the corpus of Gary 
     Marx's work for further documentation). 

     Especially at a time when laws related to computer technology are vague,
     inconsistent, occasionally Draconian, and not yet tested in court, and 
     when one's computer system can be confiscated on mere suspicion, and 
     when a BBS can be threatened by the FBI or Secret Service (as the 
     sysop of the world's largest BBS was) merely for posting LICIT hacker-
     type text files, a chilling affect occurs that stifles not only free 
     speech, but free revelation of identity.  I used my real name in 
     corresponding with the PHRACK folk at the University of Missouri, and 
     my name, documents, and other information--none illicit--is now in the 
     hands of federal prosecutors. Call it paranoia, but from past 
     experiences with federal agents, I have no confidence that they will 
     abide by rules of honor in using this information. 

     There are two ironies associated with the use of handles. First, those 
     who use them are generally sufficiently open to either self-identity 
     when sufficient trust has been built, or to provide enough identifying 
     information that identities can be determined.  Second, and more 
     important, in a "free" society built around open and unconstrained 
     information flow, forces operate to restrict openness. Therefore, to 
     be open requires concealment.  Rather than grip about the use of 
     handles, doesn't it make more sense to examine the factors that impel 
     their use? 


     Jim Thomas
     Sociology/Criminal Justice
     Northern Illinois University
     DeKalb, IL (60115)      (815) 753-6438

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     ===================================================
     ===  Computer Underground Digest / File 4 of 5  ===
     ===================================================

     -----------------
     We obtained the Chicago indictment of two Legion of Doom members from 
     a contributor. It originally was printed in PIRATE magazine. We have 
     checked this transcription against the original for accuracy. 

     ------------------


                   UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN
                           DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
                             EASTERN DIVISION

                                    )
     UNITED STATES OF AMERICA       )
                                    )
               v.                   )    No. ______________________
                                    )    Violations: Title 18, United
     ROBERT J. RIGGS, also known    )    States Code, Sections
     as Robert Johnson, also        )    1030(a)(6)(A) and 2314
13
     known as Prophet, and          )
     CRAIG NEIDORF, also known      )
     as Knight Lightning            )

                                 COUNT ONE

          The SPECIAL APRIL 1987 GRAND JURY charges:

                             PROPERTY INVOLVED

          1. At all times relevant herein, enhanced 911 (E911) was the 
     national computerized telephone service program for handling emergency 
     calls to the police, fire, ambulance and emergency services in most 
     municipalities in the United States. Dialing 911 provided the public 
     immediate access to a municipality's Public Safety Answering Point 
     (PSAP) through the use of computerized all routing. The E911 system 
     also automatically provided the recipient of an emergency call with 
     the telephone number and location identification of the emergency 
     caller. 

          2. At all times relevant herein, the Bell South Telephone Company 
     and its subsidiaries ("Bell South") provided telephone services in the 
     nine state area including Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, Tennessee, 
     Kentucky, Louisiana %sic%, North Carolina, South Carolina and Florida. 

          3. At all times relevant herein, the E911 system of Bell South 
     was described in the text of a computerized file program known as the 
     Bell South Standard Practice 660-225-104SV Control Office 

                                   - 1 -

     Administration of Enhanced 911 Services for Special and Major Account 
     Centers date March, 1988 ("E911 Practice"). The E911 Practice was a 
     highly proprietary and closely held computerized text file belonging 
     to the Bell South Telephone Company and stored on the company's AIMSX 
     computer in Atlanta, Georgia. The E911 Practice described the 
     computerized control and maintainence %sic% of the E911 system and 
     carried warning notices that it was not to be disclosed outside Bell 
     South or any of its subsidiaries except under written agreement. 

                              COMPUTER HACKERS

          4. At all times relevant herein, computer hackers were 
     individuals involved with the unauthorized access of computer systems 
     by various means. 

          5. At all times relevant herein, the Legion of Doom (LOD) was a 
     closely knit group of computer hackers involved in: 

               a.   Disrupting telecommunications by entering
                    computerized telephone switches and changing the
                    routing on the circuits of the computerized
                    switches.
               b.   Stealing proprietary computer source code and
                    information from companies and individuals that
                    owned the code and information.
               c.   Stealing and modifying credit information on
                    individuals maintained in credit bureau computers.

                                   - 2 -

14
               d.   Fraudulently obtaining money and property from
                    companies by altering the computerized information
                    used by the companies.
               e.   Disseminating information with respect to their
                    methods of attacking computers to other computer
                    hackers in an effort to avoid the focus of law
                    enforcement agencies and telecommunication security
                    experts.

          6. At all times relevant herein ROBERT J. RIGGS, defendant 
     herein, was a member of the LOD. 

          7. At all times relevant herein CRAIG NEIDORF, defendant herein, 
     was a publisher and editor of a computer hacker newsletter %sic% known 
     as "PHRACK." 

          8. At all times relevant herein, a public access computer 
     bulletin board system (BBS) was located in Lockport, Illinois which 
     provided computer storage space and electronic mail services to its 
     users. The Lockport BBS was also used by computer hackers as a 
     location for exchanging and developing software tools for computer 
     intrusion, and for receiving and distributing hacker tutorials and 
     other information. 

                                  E-MAIL

          9. At all times relevant herein electronic mail (e-mail) was a 
     computerized method for sending communications and files between 
     individual computers on various computer networks. Persons who sent or 
     received e-mail were identified by an e-mail address, similar to a 
     postal address. Although a person may have more than 

                                   - 3 -

     one e-mail address, each e-mail address identified a person uniquely. 
     The message header of an e-mail message identified both the sender and 
     recipient of the e-mail message and the date the was %sic% message 
     sent. 

          10. Beginning in or about September, 1988, the exact date begin 
     unknown to the Grand Jury, and continuing until the return date of 
     this indictment, at Lockport, in the Northern District of Illinois, 
     Eastern Division, and elsewhere, 

                       ROBERT J. RIGGS, also known
                       as Robert Johnson, also
                       known as Prophet, and
                       CRAIG NEIDORF, also known
                       as Knight Lightning,

     defendants herein, together with others known and unknown to the Grand 
     Jury, devised and intended to devise and participated in a scheme and 
     artifice to defraud and to obtain money and other things of value by 
     means of false and fraudulent pretenses and representations, well 
     knowing at the time that such pretenses, representations and promises 
     were false when made. 

                          OBJECT OF FRAUD SCHEME

          11. The object of the fraud scheme was to steal the E911 Practice 
15
     text file from the computers of Bell South Telephone Company though 
     %sic% the use of false and fraudulent pretenses and representations 
     and to conceal all indications that the text file had been stolen; and 
     to thereafter publish the information about the E911 Practice text 
     file in a hacker publication for dissemination. 

                                   - 4 -

                         OPERATION OF FRAUD SCHEME

          12. It was part of the fraud scheme that the defendant NEIDORF 
     would and did advise the defendant RIGGS that he had assembled a group 
     of computer hackers for the purpose of distributing computer 
     information. 

          13. It was further part of the scheme that the defendant RIGGS 
     would and did steal sensitive proprietary Bell South information files 
     including the E911 Practice text file by gaining remote unauthorized 
     access to computers of the Bell South Telephone Company. 

          14. It was further part of the scheme that the defendant RIGGS 
     would and did disguise and conceal the theft of the E911 Practice text 
     file from Bell South Telephone Company by removing all indications of 
     his unauthorized access into Bell South computers and by using account 
     codes of legitimate Bell South users to disguise his authorized use of 
     the Bell South computer. 

          15. It was further part of the scheme that RIGGS would and did 
     transfer in interstate commerce a stolen E911 Practice text file from 
     Atlanta, Georgia to Lockport, Illinois through the use of an 
     interstate computer data network. 

          16. It was further part of the scheme that defendant RIGGS would 
     and did store the stolen E911 Practice text file on a computer 
     bulletin board system in Lockport, Illinois. 

          17. It was further part of the scheme that defendant NEIDORF, 
     utilizing a computer at the University of Missouri in Columbia, 
     Missouri would and did receive a copy of the stolen E911 text file 

                                   - 5 -

     from defendant RIGGS through the Lockport computer bulletin board 
     system through the use of an interstate computer data network. 

          18. It was further part of the scheme that defendant NEIDORF 
     would and did edit and retype the E911 Practice text file at the 
     request of the defendant RIGGS in order to conceal the source of the 
     E911 Practice text file and to prepare it for publication in a 
     computer hacker newsletter. 

          19. It was further part of the scheme that defendant NEIDORF 
     would and did transfer the stolen E911 Practice text file through the 
     use of an interstate computer bulletin board system used by defendant 
     RIGGS in Lockport, Illinois. 

          20. It was further part of the scheme that the defendants RIGGS 
     and NEIDORF would publish information to other computer hackers which 
     could be used to gain unauthorized access to emergency 911 computer 
     systems in the United States and thereby disrupt or halt 911 service 
16
     in portions of the United States. 

          22. It was further a part of the scheme that the defendants would 
     and did misrepresent, conceal, and hide, and cause to be 
     misrepresented, concealed and hidden the purposes of ane %sic% the 
     acts done in furtherance of the fraud scheme, and would and did use 
     coded language and other means to avoid detection and apprehension 

                                   - 6 -

     by law enforcement authorities and to otherwise provide security to 
     the members of the fraud scheme. 

          23. In or about December, 1988, at Lockport, in the Northern 
     District of Illinois, Eastern Division, and elsewhere, 

                    ROBERT J. RIGGS, also known
                    as Robert Johnson, also
                    known as Prophet,

     defendant herein, for the purpose of executing the aforesaid scheme, 
     did knowingly transmit and cause to be transmitted by means of a wire 
     communication in interstate commerce certain signs, signals and 
     sounds, namely: a data transfer of a E911 Practice text file from 
     Decatur, Georgia to Lockport, Illinois. 

          In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343.

                                   - 7 -

                                 COUNT TWO

          The SPECIAL APRIL 1987 GRAND JURY further charges:

          1. The Grand Jury realleges and incorporates by reference the 
     allegations of paragraphs 1 through 22 of Count One of this Indictment 
     as though fully set forth herein. 

          2. On or about January 23, 1989, at Lockport, in the Northern 
     District of Illinois, Eastern Division and elsewhere, 

                       ROBERT J. RIGGS, also known
                       as Robert Johnson, also
                       known as Prophet, and
                       CRAIG NEIDORF, also known
                       as Knight Lightning,

     the defendants herein, for the purposes of executing the aforesaid 
     scheme did knowingly transmit and cause to be transmitted by means of 
     a wire communication in interstate commerce certain signs, signals and 
     sounds, namely: a data transfer of a E911 Practice text file from 
     Decatur, Georgia to Lockport, Illinois, an edited and retyped E911 
     Practice text file from Columbia, Missouri, to Lockport, Illinois. 

          In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343.

                                   - 8 -

                                COUNT THREE

17
          The SPECIAL APRIL 1987 GRAND JURY further charges:

          1. The Grand Jury realleges and incorporates by reference the 
     allegations of paragraphs 1 through 22 of Count One of this indictment 
     as though fully set forth herein. 

          2. In or about December, 1988, at Lockport, in the Northern 
     District of Illinois, Easter Division, and elsewhere, 

                       ROBERT J. RIGGS, also known
                       as Robert Johnson, also
                       known as Prophet, and
                       CRAIG NEIDORF, also known
                       as Knight Lightning,

     defendants herein, did transport and cause to be transported in 
     interstate commerce from Decatur, Georgia, to Lockport, Illinois, a 
     computerized text file with a value of $5,000 or more, namely: 

          A Bell South Standard Practice (BSP) 660-225-104SV- Control
          Office Administration of Enhanced 911 Services for Special
          Services and Major Account Centers dated March, 1988; valued
          at approximately $79,449.00

     the defendants then and there knowing the same to have been stolen, 
     converted, and taken by fraud; 

          In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2314.

                                   - 9 -

                                COUNT FOUR

          The SPECIAL APRIL 1987 GRAND JURY further charges:

          1. The Grand Jury realleges and incorporates by reference the 
     allegations of paragraphs 1 through 22 of Count one of this Indictment 
     as though fully set forth herein. 

          2. On or about January 23, 1989, at Lockport, in the Northern 
     District of Illinois, Eastern Division, and elsewhere, 

                       ROBERT J. RIGGS, also known
                       as Robert Johnson, also
                       known as Prophet, and
                       CRAIG NEIDORF, also known
                       as Knight Lightning,

     defendants herein, did transport and cause to be transported in 
     interstate commerce from Columbia, Missouri, to Lockport, Illinois, a 
     computerized textfile with a value of $5,000 or more, namely: 

               An edited Bell South Standard Practice (BSP) 660-225-
               104SV- Control Office Administration of Enhanced 911
               Services for Special Services and Major Account Centers
               dated March, 1988; valued at approximately $79,449.00.

     the defendants, then and there knowing the same to have been stolen, 
     converted, and taken by fraud; 

18
          In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2314.

                                  - 10 -

                                COUNT FIVE

          The SPECIAL APRIL 1987 GRAND JURY further charges:

          1. The Grand Jury realleges and incorporates by reference the 
     allegations of paragraphs 1 through 22 of Count One of this Indictment 
     as though fully set forth herein. 

          2. On or about December, 1988, at Lockport, in the Northern 
     District of Illinois, Eastern Division and elsewhere, 

                       ROBERT J. RIGGS, also known
                       as Robert Johnson, also
                       known as Prophet, and
                       CRAIG NEIDORF, also known
                       as Knight Lightning,

     the defendants herein, knowingly and with intent to defraud, 
     trafficked in information through which a computer may be accessed 
     without authorization and by such conduct affected interstate 
     commerce; 

          In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section
     1030(a)(6)(A).

                                  - 11 -

                                 COUNT SIX

          The SPECIAL APRIL 1987 GRAND JURY further charges:

          1. The Grand Jury realleges and incorporates by reference the 
     allegations of paragraphs 1 through 22 of Count One of this Indictment 
     as though fully set forth herein. 

          2. In or about January, 1989, at Lockport, in the Northern 
     District of Illinois, Eastern Division and elsewhere, 

                       ROBERT J. RIGGS, also known
                       as Robert Johnson, also
                       known as Prophet, and
                       CRAIG NEIDORF, also known
                       as Knight Lightning,

     the defendants herein, knowingly and with intend to defraud, 
     trafficked in information through which a computer may be accessed 
     without authorization and by such conduct affected interstate 
     commerce; 

          In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 
     1030(a)(6)(A). 

                                  - 12 -

                                COUNT SEVEN

19
          The SPECIAL APRIL 1987 GRAND JURY further charges:

          1. The Grand Jury realleges and incorporates by reference the 
     allegations of paragraphs 1 through 22 of Count One of this Indictment 
     as though fully set forth herein. 

          2. In or about February, 1989, at Lockport, in the Northern 
     District of Illinois, Eastern Division and elsewhere, 

                       ROBERT J. RIGGS, also known
                       as Robert Johnson, also
                       known as Prophet, and
                       CRAIG NEIDORF, also known
                       as Knight Lightning,

     the defendants herein, knowingly and with intent to defraud, 
     trafficked in information through which a computer may be accessed 
     without authorization and by such conduct affected interstate 
     commerce; 

          In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 
     1030(a)(6)(A). 


                                     A TRUE BILL:



                                     ________________________________
                                     F O R E P E R S O N



     ________________________________
     UNITED STATES ATTORNEY


                                  - 13 -


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     ===================================================
     ===  Computer Underground Digest - File 5 of 5  ===
     ===================================================

     ------------
     This press release was attached  to the indictment. We reprint it here 
     to present the federal side of the case.  It originally appeared in 
     PIRATE Magazine. We have checked the text against the original for 
     accuracy. 

     -----------------

                                  INFORMATION RELEASE

     FROM: U.S. Department of Justice
     DATE: February 6, 1990


20
     IRA H. RAPHAELSON, United States Attorney for the Northern District of 
     Illinois, and PATRICK T. McDONNELL, Special Agent In Charge of the 
     United States Secret Service in Chicago, today announced the 
     indictment of Robert J. Riggs, 20, of %address deleted%, and Craig M. 
     Neidorf, 19 %address deleted%, on charges that between December, 1988 
     and February, 1989 they entered into a scheme to steal and publish to 
     other hackers highly proprietary and sensitive information about the 
     operation of Bell South's Enhanced 911 emergency communication system. 
     The seven count indictment charges Riggs and Neidorf with Interstate 
     Transportation of Stolen Property, Wire Fraud and Violations of the 
     Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986. 

     Specifically, the indictment charges that Riggs, also known as "Robert 
     Johnson" and "The Prophet", stole a copy of Bell South's highly 
     proprietary and closely held computer program that controlled and 
     maintained the E911 system. Bell South's E911 system controls 
     emergency calls to the police, fire, ambulance and emergency services 
     in municipalities of the nine state region served by Bell South; 
     Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, Tennessee, Kentucky, Louisiana, North 
     Carolina, South Carolina, and Florida.  The indictment alleges that in 
     December 1988 Riggs stole the E911 data valued at $79,449.00 by using 
     a computer outside the telephone company to call into the telephone 
     company computer in which the computer file was stored. The indictment 
     charges that Riggs then transferred the E911 data to a computer 
     bulletin board in Lockport, Illinois from which Neidorf, also known as 
     "Knight Lightning", down loaded it for publication in a computer 
     hacker publication known as "PHRACK." The indictment charges that 
     Riggs was a member of a closely knit group of computer hackers known 
     as the Legion of Doom whose members are involved in numerous illegal 
     activities including: 

        *Disrupting telephone service by entering the telephone
         companies switches (which are computers) and changing
         the routing of telephone calls.
        *Stealing computer data from individuals and companies.
        *Stealing and modifying individual credit histories.
        *Fraudulently obtaining money and property from companies
         by altering information in their computers.
        *Disseminating information about attacking computers to other
         computer hackers in an effort to shift the focus of law
         enforcement agencies to those other hackers and away from the
         Legion of Doom.

     The indictment charges that as part of their fraud scheme Riggs and 
     Neidorf disclosed the stolen information %reportedly PHRACK #24-eds.% 
     about the operation of the enhanced 911 system to other computer 
     hackers so that they could unlawfully access the E911 system and 
     potentially disrupt or halt other 911 service in the United States. 

     If convicted on all counts of the indictment Riggs faces a maximum 
     possible prison sentence of 32 years and a maximum possible fine of 
     $222,000.00; and Neidorf faces a maximum possible prison sentence of 
     31 years and a maximum possible fine $122,000.000. 

     In announcing the return of the indictment, Mr. Raphaelson noted that 
     the allegations of the indictment have far reaching implications for 
     the health and welfare of individuals in the United States who rely on 
     their telephones as a lifeline to the outside world.  Mr. Raphaelson 
     stated, "People who invade our telecommunications and related computer 
     systems for profit or personal amusement create immediate and serious 
21
     consequences for the public at large. No one should be made to suffer 
     loss of life or severe injury as a result of hackers who have 
     compromised emergency networks. The telecommunications industry and 
     law enforcement community have become attentive to these crimes and 
     those who choose to use their intelligence and talent to disrupt these 
     vital networks will find themselves vigorously prosecuted." 

     Raphaelson stated that the indictment in Chicago and a companion 
     indictment in Atlanta are the initial results of a year long 
     investigation by agents of the United States Secret Service in 
     Chicago, Atlanta, Indianapolis, New York, St. Louis and Kansas City. 
     Raphaelson further noted that pursuant to Court Orders, technical and 
     expert assistance was provided to the United States Secret Service by 
     telecommunication companies including Bell South and its subsidiaries, 
     Southwestern Bell, NYNEX (New York), and Bellcore. Raphaelson 
     particularly praised the actions of Bell South for its proactive 
     position in bringing their intrusion problems to the attention of law 
     enforcement officials and for its formation of an Intrusion Task Force 
     to analyze and respond to the intrusions noted in the Chicago and 
     Atlanta indictments. 

     Assistant United States Attorney William J. Cook, who heads the 
     Computer Fraud and Abuse Task Force, and Assistant United States 
     Attorney Colleen D. Coughlin presented the case to the federal grand 
     jury and will be trying the case in the United States District Court 
     in Chicago. 

     Members of the public are reminded that the indictment is only a 
     charge and is not evidence of guilt. The defendants are entitled to a 
     fair trial at which time it will be the government's burden to prove 
     their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 

                                    ***   END   ***


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